Immigration, as previously discussed, is a major force that drives populism, as scores of millions of people—especially in the EU but also in the US—view large-scale immigration as challenging their identity, national community, security, and jobs. In chapter 3, I suggested that dismissing these concerns as a sheer reflection of bigotry and simply calling for “open borders” is neither justified nor politically productive. In the following discussion, I seek to show that the greater the capacity of societies to acculturate new immigrants, the higher the levels of immigration they can accommodate without undue social disruption. In the process, nations need to change what they consider their core values rather than merely expecting immigrants to buy into the prevailing ethos. Building up the capacity of absorption should be a major element of the agenda of the patriotic movement.
A key question arises in this context as to what level and kind of acculturation a patriotic movement should call for. I will show that major forms of assimilation, often favored in Western states, tend to pose unnecessary burdens on acculturation processes, and I suggest a different model, which I refer to as “Diversity within Unity.” Given that this issue is much more acute in the EU than in the US, the discussion focuses on the EU.
Even before the recent massive immigration to Europe of people of different faiths and cultural backgrounds, many European societies and the EU faced multiple challenges. These included very low economic growth; high levels of unemployment; political fragmentation and polarization; increased interpersonal and intergroup violence; a rise in terrorism and right-wing parties and movements; the negative effects of globalization (and growing disaffection with the EU). Several European societies, most notably Germany, Sweden, Greece, and Italy, now face the challenge of absorbing a much larger number of immigrants than at any other time in recent history. The immediate concerns—such as limiting the flow of immigration, separating asylum seekers from economic migrants, and finding housing and work for the newcomers—have already received much attention and hence are not discussed in this chapter. Rather, I focus on strategies to absorb immigrants into their new home societies and cultures. In particular, I ask whether integration requires that these immigrants embrace the prevailing national values, or do these values need to change? This question confronts all nations that face large-scale immigration, but especially those whose immigrants are from very different cultures, for instance those who arrive in a major European metropolis after having fled a war zone in Libya or Afghanistan or, say, a rural village in Senegal.
Even prior to the recent influx of migrants, many European nations had seen a significant increase in immigration. Between 2001 and 2011, the foreign-born population in England and Wales grew by 62 percent.1 In Norway, the number of immigrants and their children nearly tripled between 1995 and 2011.2 In Spain, the increase was more dramatic still: in 2000, the country had fewer than 1.5 million immigrants, but by 2009, the number had risen to 6.5 million, more than a 300 percent spike.3 Even before these immigration surges, many countries had sizable minorities that were not well integrated. The result is what might be termed a normative distribution wherein European nations are struggling not only with integrating newcomers into the prevailing moral cultures but also with articulating what those moral cultures are and thus which values immigrants ought to embrace.
Some conceptualize nations as merely states and economies and focus on ensuring that new immigrants comply with prevailing laws and find adequate jobs. However, to reiterate, nations are communities invested in states. People are not merely citizens but also members of societies animated by a particular shared history, bonds, ideals, and hopes. To become full-fledged compatriots, immigrants need to wrestle with and embrace their new homelands’ moral and social values. Otherwise, much of Europe and quite a few other nations will experience increased levels of intergroup violence and terrorism. Moreover, failure to integrate the immigrants, old and new, is one key factor among several others that contributes to the rise of right-wing and xenophobic reactions in the host societies, the fracturing of national unity and stability, and the undermining of the EU. This failure is a key reason that the centers of political gravity in entire nations have shifted to the right, including in Germany, Hungary, Austria, and Poland, with others likely to follow. (An Autumn 2017 Eurobarometer poll found that across all EU member states, a clear majority of respondents had a negative view of immigration from non-EU countries.)4
Each nation must determine the most effective ways to absorb immigrants into their societies, their communities, and above all into their moral cultures. This is a major challenge because (a) many of these societies are unclear about what their distinct values are; (b) absorbing large numbers of new immigrants may well entail recasting these values to some extent; and (c) large-scale absorption is always a challenging process. Unless nations do much more to integrate immigrants on a normative level, including editing their own values, many cities are likely to come to look like the suburbs of Paris. This chapter seeks to outline how the patriotic movement should contend with this challenge.
Assimilation, Unbounded Pluralism, and Diversity within Unity
The various approaches tried by different European societies and favored by the European Commission fall on various points of a continuum. At one end of this continuum is total assimilation; at the other end, unbounded pluralism. These bookends are ideal types; no society fully adheres to either, but many are fairly close to one end or the other of the continuum. Diversity within Unity (DWU) falls in the middle of this continuum.
Assimilation is a term used in different ways by different social scientists and policy makers, and it translates into different policies.5 In its strongest form, assimilation requires that immigrants abandon all of their distinct cultures, values, habits, and connections to countries of origin in order to fully integrate into their new home.
France stands out as close to an archetype of this approach. For many years it was regarded as discriminatory—in the Republican tradition—to officially recognize French citizens’ country of origin or religion.6 France made it much easier than did other European countries for new immigrants to obtain citizenship, but it also made stricter demands of newcomers to “become French.” In 2004, France passed a law banning all ostentatious religious symbols from public schools, although students are allowed to carry “discreet” religious symbols. Although concerns over the hijab were the initial impetus for the law, it does not single out any particular religion, meaning that crucifixes and yarmulkes are also forbidden in schools. The law is so far-reaching and has been interpreted so broadly that several schools have forbidden female Muslim students to wear long dresses.7 More recently, schools in several French towns have decided to stop serving pork-free meals.
This approach is prone to failure because it requires immigrants to give up values and behaviors that are central to their identity. Such excessive homogenization undermines rather than facilitates integration, as we shall show below in some detail. Moreover, placing such severe, inflexible assimilation requirements on immigrants creates unrealistic expectations of homogeneity among the native population. The fact that there is a high level of alienation among immigrant and minority communities in France—and also among the native majority—reveals that this approach is not satisfactory.8
Unbounded pluralism holds that there is no need for immigrants to modify their behaviors, habits, and customs (as long as they do not violate existing laws) and that, instead, the host societies are to abandon their core of shared values, demands for loyalty, and national identity in order to accommodate various differences—above all normative ones—between the host society and various immigrant groups and minorities.
No society in Europe follows such a policy (Canada claims it does). Such an approach was advocated by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, whose widely discussed Parekh Report concluded that the United Kingdom had become a territory that English, Scottish, Welsh, West Indian, Pakistani and other groups inhabit like tribes resting next to each other. They had and needed few shared values or other commonalities; the government should avoid promoting any set notion of national identity and culture in order to avoid offending or injuring any of the various groups.9 Along similar lines, the political scientist Jamie Mayerfeld has argued that national identity is a form of group identity that—like identities based on race, religion, and ethnicity—arouses sentiments that exaggerate feelings of injury and exerts pressure on people to undertake acts of aggression and violence.10 In short, strong national identities are best avoided.
Although no European nation is currently following a full-blown unbounded pluralism policy, one can find it reflected in particular domains. For example, several countries have taken an approach to religious symbols that reflects unbounded multiculturalism. Sweden allows on-duty police officers to wear turbans, headscarves, or yarmulkes instead of the police hat that had previously been worn by all officers. Similarly, the UK permits police officers to wear various religious head-coverings.
Unbounded pluralism cannot be made to work as a general policy for a number of reasons. First, despite growing diversity, a strong sense of national identity is far from dead or dying in most European societies. Indeed, it seems to have been reinforced in response to the mass immigration and the weakening of the EU. Second, in those countries in which national bonds are weak, we see rising tensions and conflicts. David Goodhart notes that as societies become more diverse, there are fewer shared values and thus less solidarity or willingness to redistribute resources.11 The institutional paralysis one witnesses in Belgium, which some have termed a failed state,12 reflects such a division between the Flemish and Walloons—a division that is exacerbated by the absence of a sufficient normative shared core. This lack of a shared core, in turn, makes it difficult to integrate immigrants, as there is not one normative framework into which they can be integrated.
Several countries that had previously embraced multiculturalism (some forms of which are a mild form of unbounded pluralism) are retreating from this position. For example, in the 1980s, the Netherlands adopted a policy of multiculturalism that promoted respect and support for cultural diversity and allowed minorities to maintain their cultural and religious differences but paid much less attention to the unity realm. The Dutch attitude of accommodation was built upon the “pillarization” that developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that allowed various groups (originally Catholics and Protestants, and later others) to have their own semi-autonomous institutions for education and social services.13 However, in 2004, following the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, the Dutch government officially rejected multiculturalism and “accommodation” by adopting a new strategy that requires new immigrants to “become Dutch” not only through language acquisition but also in a cultural and moral sense.14
There are also some indications that Germany is moving away from pluralism in the wake of an unprecedented intake of refugees and asylum seekers in 2015. In Cologne, a series of sexual assaults and harassment by gangs of men described by the authorities as having “a North African or Arabic” appearance during New Year’s Eve celebrations resulted in a backlash against the German government’s previous attitude.15 Labor Minister Andrea Nahles wrote in February 2016: “If you come to us seeking protection and wanting to start a new life, you have to stick to our rules and values. If you signal that you can’t integrate, your benefits will be cut.”16 Germany requires an “integration course” that consists of language and culture classes. An official German government description of the “integration course” says that attendees will discuss “important values in German society, e.g., freedom of worship, tolerance and equal rights.”17 Whether the curriculum of these classes is well formed, the teachers are properly prepared, and these classes are effective is far from clear; however, the direction in which the policy is shifting is quite evident.
A third approach is that of Diversity within Unity (DWU).18 It presumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to select core values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared framework of the society (the unity component). At the same time, every group in society is free to maintain its distinct subculture—those policies, habits, and institutions that do not conflict with the shared core (the diversity component). Respect for the whole and for all is the essence of this position, with respect for the community (which itself may be recast over time) taking precedence over diversity if and when these two come into conflict (unless the claims of community infringe on basic liberties and minority rights). No European nation fully adheres to this model; the US comes closer and has been more successful in absorbing immigrants than have many EU members.
Each of the three positions discussed here (assimilationist, unbounded pluralism, DWU) can be represented through visual metaphors. The melting pot is often used to depict society under an assimilationist model, in which all differences are melted down, resulting in a high degree of homogeneity. A salad bowl is used to represent a multicultural society in which various groups are tossed together but each maintains its original flavor and form, remaining largely unchanged by contact with other elements. DWU is akin to a mosaic that is richer for the difference in size and color of its pieces but that also has a shared frame and glue that holds the various pieces together, a frame that can be recast but not abandoned. Because I hold that DWU is the most promising approach and the one that the patriotic movement ought to champion, it is next spelled out.
The DWU approach is based on the observation that immigrants are not only joining a state with a particular polity, laws, and institutions but also a community with a distinctive history, values, and affiliations. States have citizens; communities have members. The requirements of citizenship are relatively limited: obey the law, pay taxes, follow public affairs, and vote. Some countries require various forms of public service of their citizens, including military service. The patriotic movement should embrace the idea that all young people provide some form of national service. Membership in a community requires learning and embracing its core values and forming bonds of affinity with other members in accordance with these values. It combines respect for individual rights with social responsibilities to the common good.
If one examines, from this viewpoint, the classes and tests required by various European societies of new immigrants, one finds that many are focused on verifying that immigrants are ready to become good citizens. Occasionally, they also include some, albeit rather limited, preparation for membership in a community. For instance, tests introduced in 2006 by the German state of Baden-Württemberg ask questions such as, “Is it right for women to obey their husbands, and for men to beat their wives when they are disobedient?” and, “If your adult daughter dressed like a German woman, would you try to prevent her from doing so?” In the German state of Hesse, the citizenship test asks, “If someone described the Holocaust as a myth or folktale, how would you respond?”19 In the Netherlands, would-be immigrants, prior to immigration, must take a “civic integration test” that quizzes them about their command of the Dutch language, history, and culture. In addition, the Dutch pre-immigration test requires viewing a video entitled Coming to the Netherlands that includes images of female nudity and homosexual men kissing. In addition, imams of Dutch mosques must also attend a mandatory course on “Dutch law, including the rights of women and freedom of speech.”20 A British citizenship test introduced in 2003 seeks to tease out whether a person is ready to engage others in a proactive rather than antisocial or violent manner: “What should you do if you spill someone’s pint in a pub?” The correct answer in this case is, “Offer to buy them another.”21 One can argue about whether one question or another is appropriate or well-worded. However, from a DWU perspective, which seeks to make immigrants not only citizens but also members of the national community, incorporating society’s values and norms in civics education is essential and deserves more attention.
The discussion next turns to examine which required behaviors and elements belong to the unity realm—to which all members of the society are expected to adhere—and which belong to the diversity realm. To reiterate, although a realm of normative unity, of a core of shared values, must be maintained if the society is to hold together and the polity is to function, these values may be reexamined and adjusted over time. There is room for differences of opinion over which elements belong to which realm, and these distributions tend to shift over time and from one society to another. Nevertheless, to endure and flourish, nations—at any given point in time—need to clarify which behaviors must be “unified” (so to speak) and which can be left “unbound.”
Shared Values—Core but Not All
The term “national ethos” refers to the values, traditions, identity, and vision of the future (or “destiny”) of a given nation.22 The DWU model holds that integration of immigrants does not require that the immigrants adopt all the elements of the national ethos but only the core values—in sharp contrast to an assimilationist approach. To proceed, nations in the process of planning for massive absorption of immigrants need to sort out which values are part of the core and which are not. This requirement is challenging for members of many European societies that have only a vague sense of what would constitute such a core.
Assimilationists avoid this issue because, as a matter of principle, they view all shared values as obligatory for immigrants’ adoption. Unbounded pluralists avoid the question by assuming that immigrants need no new values. However, if one grants, even for the sake of argument, that DWU might work better, one must inevitably ask, What is the core of shared values?
Granted, many difficulties arise once one seeks to determine which values are “core” and which are not. Many of the values various European societies may regard as defining their nation are universal, for example, respect for human rights. Other values are European—for example, strong support for a social welfare state as opposed to American capitalism—but do not necessarily define what it means to be French or a Swede or an Italian. (A wit captured this dilemma by asking if warm beer and fish and chips are what makes one a Brit.) Former Norwegian prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik stated at the 2004 Conference on European Values: “In Europe . . . to some extent we all have a spiritual and intellectual heritage from Athens—democracy, Rome—the rule of law, and Jerusalem—the Judeo-Christian values.”23 Well put, but it does not define national differences in core values.
One set of values cited by some European leaders as part of the core is a Christian heritage or worldview. Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy said: “The roots of France are essentially Christian. . . . To take away those roots means to lose meaning, to weaken the cement of national identity.”24 Former British prime minister David Cameron argued that Christianity had played an important part in shaping the country’s identity, stating: “These are values we treasure. They are Christian values and they should give us the confidence to say yes, we are a Christian country and we are proud of it.”25 Public schools in many European countries in effect incorporate Christian values as part of their curriculum.
This position has to be reexamined given the need to absorb millions of Muslims. European societies have two basic choices: separate state and religion and relegate religion to the private realm of diversity or provide equal expression to several religions. For example, starting public events with a blessing from a priest, an imam, and a rabbi and perhaps a reading of a humanist text by an atheist. (While this may sound far-fetched, quite a few public events actually are implementing this policy, though atheists are typically excluded.)
There are some signs that Europe is moving in the direction of scaling back the role of Christianity in public life. Thus, Scandinavian countries that had long-standing official state churches have disestablished their national churches in recent years. Norway’s parliament voted in 2012 to separate the Norwegian Church from the state but to continue to finance the church “on par with other religious and belief-based societies.”26 Similarly, Sweden disestablished its official Lutheran church in 2000, and the government now allocates money to other faiths as well, with individual taxpayers deciding what their taxes will fund.27 These changes illustrate what I meant by saying that integrating immigrants needs in part to be achieved by changing the core values rather than those of the immigrants.
Another challenge to defining the national ethos for the patriotic movement is fear of endorsing insular nationalism that can spill over into nativism and xenophobia. In the 1990s, a group of political theorists began to argue for “liberal nationalism,” which sought to preserve the sense of belonging, loyalty, and solidarity embodied in nationalism while removing chauvinist and racist elements and incorporating the personal autonomy embedded in classical liberalism.
Despite all these difficulties, one cannot disregard that each European nation has some shared values so central to communal bonds and practices that ignoring them offends or violates communal identity. One possible approach to articulating these values is for various societies to combine universal and “European” values, each in their own way. Thus, the Nordic countries may put more focus on social egalitarianism than does the United Kingdom, while the Netherlands may place more emphasis on personal liberties than does France. The UK may place less emphasis on the social welfare state than most other European societies, whereas France may stress the separation of state and church more than the rest of Europe, and so on. Further, each society has its own historical narratives, national heroes, and celebrations, which are all elements to consider in determining which particular values are to be included in the core and which are not.
In sorting out the historical values, the patriotic movement needs to take special note of the norm that accession to membership in a national community, and enjoyment of the benefits that such membership bestows, must be accompanied by an assumption of the nation’s burdens. Just as one who joins a family via adoption or marriage cannot claim they are entitled to part of the new family’s assets but none of its liabilities, so upon becoming a member of a new society, one cannot merely benefit from its accumulated wealth while disowning its past misdeeds and obligatory reparations. Thus, a new British citizen cannot claim to be an heir to the tradition of civil liberties passed down from the Magna Carta onward, yet disavow any implication in the legacy of British imperialism. Similarly, a new German cannot pride himself on the achievements of Kant, Goethe, and Bach—or Dichter und Denker—without also sharing in the national shame of the Holocaust.
The fact that the line between the unity realm, which all members of a society must enter, and the diversity realm, in which they are welcome to differ, is not always observed is illustrated by the following case in point. A website launched by the Federal Center for Health Education in Germany in 2016 seeks to provide sex education mainly to Muslim immigrants. The online guide seeks to teach them about the impropriety of groping women, respect for gay people, and manners for conversation with German women. But the guide also uses exceedingly graphic images and language to introduce immigrants to the “joy of sex,” for example, by showing various sex positions and the details of oral sex.28 Education of the latter kind seems unnecessary to impart core values, and respect for diversity in attitudes about such matters should be part of the patriotic movement platform.
Education: 80 Percent Shared
The assimilationist model assumes that immigrants and minorities will attend public schools and learn basically the same material as other members of society. An unbounded diversity model calls for setting up separate schools and allowing distinct curricula for various ethnic and religious groups from kindergarten to grade 12, such as separating Muslim or Jewish schools, and not merely as “Sunday” schools but as full-time schools.
The DWU model calls for a significant core curriculum (comprising perhaps 80 percent of the total curriculum) for all students. This core curriculum is to include the normal elements of a modern education (math, sciences, language arts, etc.) as well as classes that teach core values and prepare students for citizenship and membership in the society. For the remaining 20 percent, students would be free to choose between classes that nurture their particular religious or cultural values; for example, students might be able to take a course on the history and traditions of their (or their parents’) country of origin or a theology course taught by a vetted religious leader.
Several European nations lean in this matter toward the unbounded pluralism model. For example, the British government provides financial support to a variety of religious schools; although the majority of these schools are Christian, there are also Muslim, Jewish, Sikh, and Hindu faith schools.29 The extent to which the government requires some measure of shared core values curriculum in these faith schools varies depending on their status.30 However, serious failings have been found at some of these schools; an official investigation determined that “seven hundred children attend schools where inspectors considered that pupils were not being adequately prepared for life in modern Britain.”31 Among the failings were students who thought that France was a part of Britain, a book in one school’s library that asserted that women were less reliable witnesses than men, and older pupils who did not know the term “government” or understand the democratic process. Such findings confirm the DWU view that if students are segregated into religious schools, a strong core of shared teaching needs to be assured.
Some countries have taken actions that move diverse schools somewhat closer to the DWU model. For example, Finland’s National Core Curriculum gives guidance on helping immigrant and other foreign-language students develop both cultural identities, instructing that schools should “support students’ growth into active and balanced members of both the Finnish linguistic and cultural community and their own linguistic and cultural community.”32 From a DWU viewpoint, ideally all children should attend the same public schools—to ensure the element of unity and reduce tribalism as all intermingle socially—and all schools should include in their curricula classes that teach history, literature, civics and social sciences, as well as core values. If students attend private or religious-based schools, they should still be required to include these elements in their curriculum. It would also be beneficial if these students were expected to participate in some interscholastic events and activities, not just in competition against each other but also in cooperative events, for example, participating in activities such as building homes with Habitat for Humanity, to protect and restore the environment, or joint field trips to local historical sites.
At the same time, there should be room for respect for diversity. For instance, in Germany, an eleven-year-old girl requested to be exempt from coed swimming lessons at school because she did not want to swim with boys, arguing that Islam forbade her to see male classmates shirtless. A federal court ruled, however, that the girl must continue, insisting that coeducation was an important component of learning to live in a pluralistic society.33 A DWU approach favors allowing diverse accommodations in such situations. If a significant number of students hold similar views, schools could offer gender-segregated swimming lessons. Otherwise, individual students could use the time to pursue other scholarly or extracurricular activities approved by the school. Diversity in student attire (wearing the hijab or Islamic headscarves, yarmulkes, etc.) should be accommodated, and used to teach tolerance, as long as students are able to socialize and learn together.
In Switzerland, when two Muslim students from Syria asked to be excused from shaking a female teacher’s hand at the beginning and end of the school day, the local school district accommodated the students’ request. The arrangement, however, became a national flashpoint. There was strong consensus that a refusal to shake the teacher’s hand shows disrespect for Swiss fundamental values. Hence the canton in which the school was located overruled the decision and instituted a five-thousand-dollar fine for students who refuse to shake hands with their teachers.34 Every act and custom can be turned into a polarizing symbol. In my judgment, this specific practice is innocuous and should serve as an occasion to promote vibrant diversity and find substitutes. Thus students may salute their teachers rather than shake their hands. Indeed, all students may be asked to change their behavior accordingly (an especially good idea in flu season).
Primary and Secondary Loyalties
Strict assimilation models hold that any vestiges of loyalty to one’s country of birth are problematic and jeopardize loyalty to the host country. According to this view, loyalty is a zero-sum game. The Netherlands’ policy on citizenships reflects this view, as immigrants wishing to obtain Dutch nationality through naturalization are usually required to forfeit their other nationality.35
DWU does not suggest, as do assimilationists, that adopting the identity of the host country implies discarding loyalty to immigrants’ countries of origin. Rather, DWU suggests layered identities where various immigrants maintain subidentities (Turkish Germans, for example, or Dutch Moroccans) that are situated within an overarching shared identity. Dual citizenship is acceptable under this framework. However, when the two loyalties clash, loyalties to the new home nation must take priority in liberal democracies. Thus, refugees from conflict zones might be expected to have special concerns about the fate of people in the countries they came from, to send remittances, and to urge their adoptive country to help restore order in places such as Syria and Libya. However, if the new home nation were to send troops to fight in the old home country, immigrants must side with their new home, or they would be considered ill-integrated.
While the DWU approach demands primary loyalty to the national community from all its members, immigrants’ affinity to their respective homelands need not be discouraged. In fact, such diversity can be enriching to the host society, contributing new holidays, cuisine, and other cultural attributes.
The assimilationist model emphasizes acquisition of the national language(s) and advocates for a ban on using other languages in official business, courts, ballots, and street signs. In the Netherlands, anyone receiving social assistance benefits must be able to communicate in Dutch; if a claimant has not attained a considerable level of language proficiency, they may have their benefit reduced and eventually discontinued.36 In some cases, assimilationists even seek to limit second languages in the private sphere. Austria, for example, passed a bill in 2015 that requires imams to speak German.37 Some think any use of immigrants’ native languages signals a refusal to integrate. They take offense at shops that display foreign signage and street signs with “foreign” languages.
Unbounded multiculturalism opposes the recognition of any one language as official and seeks to provide a coequal status to multiple languages (sometimes a rather large number) in courts, official documents, and so on. The nearest example of this sort of linguistic pluralism is Belgium, where French, Dutch, and German are all official languages, and there are further languages and dialects that are recognized by regional authorities. As already noted, Belgium is one of the least integrated European countries, barely able to support a state.38
A DWU approach recognizes the considerable advantages to social cohesion of having a shared language and teaching it to all immigrants, members of minority groups, and people whose education is lagging for other reasons. However, it does not oppose the state provision of translators and translated documents for those who have not yet acquired the shared language, even if this reduces the motivation for immigrants to learn the prevailing language. Thus, Sweden guarantees mödersmålundervisning, or the right to receive instruction in and develop one’s native language. State-funded schools offer classes in indigenous minority languages, as well as Arabic, Farsi, etc. while also teaching Swedish as a second language to students who require it. The DWU model would operate on the assumption that these measures are transitional, helping immigrants bridge the gap until they are fluent in the national language rather than facilitating the long-term conducting of official business in their native language.
The patriotic movement should mobilize members of its chapters to act as volunteers, teaching immigrants the national language or languages. In this way, not merely will acculturation be much accelerated but also the immigrants would get to know the old-timers on a prolonged personal basis (as distinct from going out to dinner together here and there).
Many nations face the challenge of integrating large numbers of immigrants, which entails providing institutions and processes that will lead new immigrants to embrace the moral culture of their new homeland, even if the culture is changed somewhat in the process. The patriotic movement would do best to recognize that assimilation is unnecessary and unduly taxing while unbounded pluralism is insufficiently integrative. Sorting out which elements of the new homeland’s values and norms the immigrants must absorb and in which areas they are free to affirm diversity is the basis of the model the movement ought to adopt—Diversity within Unity.