

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND
THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE

Francis D. Cogliano and Patrick Griffin, Editors

The American Revolution and the Habsburg Monarchy



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To my parents, Julia and Kevin,
and
to historian William O'Reilly.

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Innsbruck, July 2021



The Austrian Netherlands ca. 1783



The United States of America ca. 1783

Introduction

BENJAMIN SILAS ARTHUR SCHUSTER.

It sounds a peculiar yet familiar name, right?

The same unplaceable strangeness struck the Viennese onlookers and well-wishers gathered at St. Stephan's Cathedral in 1778. They had assembled for the baptism of baby Benjamin, whose parents, Johann and Maria Schuster, had decided to name him in honour of the three American representatives in Paris: Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee. So great was their admiration for the revolutionary trio that the baptism entry recorded the American representatives as godfathers in absentia.¹ Buoyed by ineffable feelings of fatherhood, Johann Schuster wrote to his new-born son's first namesake within a week. He informed Franklin of his pride in their "little American" (*notre petit Américain*) who served as a daily reminder of the "illustrious and dear people" who strove for liberty half a world away.² Five years later, at the close of the War of American Independence, Schuster wrote again. He congratulated Franklin on the successful independence of the United States, a cause "engraved upon [his] heart" and for which he had earnestly prayed. In the meantime, however, his wife Maria had died. "She took with her to the grave, a consideration equal to mine for you and all your comrades," he found some comfort in confiding to Franklin.³ The Schusters' enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause lasted throughout the American Revolution and beyond. History does not record what happened further to the Schuster family or how Benjamin S. A. Schuster felt growing up as Vienna's embodiment of revolutionary heroes from across the Atlantic.⁴ They are a family with little trace except for their unbridled dedication to an America which they never visited apart from in their minds and hearts. They are a family whose reaction, enthusiasm, and voice in the story of the American Revolution has been almost forgotten.

The Schusters were by no means alone. Across the entirety of the Habsburg lands, which stretched from the Austrian Netherlands (present-day Belgium) in the West to the furthest reaches of the Transylvanian hills in the East, the American Revolution influenced the lives of Habsburg inhabitants. The Revolution was a diplomatic conundrum for Habsburg rulers, a commercial opportunity for some, and a cultural phenomenon for everyone. The Revolution altered the economic




FIGURE 1. Baptismal entry of Benjamin Silas Arthur Schuster in St. Stephen's Cathedral, Vienna

fortunes of Habsburg merchants. John Adams noted how the towns of Bruges and Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands had “grown out of the American Revolution,” at the same time as Hungarians rejoiced over the devastation of Virginian tobacco crops which “now [allowed] the Hungarians a share of their one-time profits.” A group of Bohemian glassmakers, meanwhile, assembled in the town of Nový Bor (Hajda/Haida) for a great feast to celebrate the end of the war which had sapped their trade and disrupted exports.⁵

Unravelling the meaning of the American Revolution in the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy forms the core of this book. It is admittedly an unfamiliar territory for viewing the effects of one of the most consequential political moments in history. Yet, when viewed from this vantage point, the familiar American Revolution looks rather different. Developing a political consciousness centred on individual rights and protection of liberty against tyranny was a key component in the American Revolution and, to be sure, there were some figures in the Habsburg lands—as there were elsewhere—who recognised the potency and danger of this emergent ideology. Fundamentally, the Revolution represented the struggle for the birth of a new nation. Yet this was not the only understanding of the American Revolution. We might assume the Habsburgs would be unwelcoming to such an event, but the chaos of war bred challenges as well as opportunities in equal measure. To the Habsburg monarchs and their subjects, the American Revolution contained great commercial opportunity and not just potential threats to their

security. In this first instance of democratic revolution, individuals in power in the Habsburg lands were not the reactionary and repressive bogeymen we tend to think about from the nineteenth century, but rather, they formulated a cautiously interested, and, in many cases, enthused response to the creation of the United States of America.

Mental landscapes and worldscapes changed fundamentally for many Habsburg inhabitants. For centuries, 'America' had been filtered through various lenses, from the religious frescoes adorning village churches to the doubtful propaganda peddled by recruiters who sought to lure prospective emigrants.⁶ But the Revolution made America an event for the first time, a point of fixation and fascination about which conversations formed and about whose future debates raged. Habsburg authors devoted books to the topic; some to ride the wave of fascination over America and others to praise its virtuous revolutionary leaders. In Viennese salons and palaces, the incessant chatter over the Americans enraged the British ambassador, who warned his superiors that "everyone here talks wildly about liberty."⁷ This obsession existed beyond the aristocracy. The "shot heard 'round the world" reached keen and supportive ears across the Habsburg Monarchy.⁸ The American Revolution advanced the concept of "revolution" in Habsburg minds to mean a more sudden political change rather than the literal revolving around a fixed point such as the Copernican orbit of planets.⁹ Reflecting on the transformation in public awareness of American revolutionary events, the Hungarian author Ferenc Kazinczy asked rhetorically, "What be our gatherings in villages until now than mere discussion of which hound is more worthy, the tan or the black, and what number among us knew whether the Atlantic Ocean lies East or West of us?"¹⁰ The American Revolution widened the intellectual horizons of many in the Habsburg Monarchy and, in doing so, left an indelible legacy which lasted into the next century.

This book is about the meaning of the American Revolution for the Habsburg Monarchy and, at the same time, the Habsburg moment in the American Revolution. It is a story about how one of Europe's most important dynasties managed the first opening salvo in what would become a succession of revolutionary crises stretching into the mid-nineteenth century. This was both a moment of challenge and opportunity for the people living in the Habsburg realms. Some like Schuster and his family welcomed the dawn of this new age; others, like the Habsburg monarch Maria Theresa and her State Chancellor Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz greeted these developments with more scepticism. Opportunity lay in the chance to engage with the wider world through commercial channels created in the wake of the American Revolution. It also represented a

potential realisation of long-held dynastic designs for imperial projects beyond the European mainland in emulation of rival powers.¹¹ Pursuing this potential extended the Habsburg influence in the western hemisphere. The first Habsburg representative beyond Europe arrived in Philadelphia as a result shortly after the conclusion of the war.

Difficulty accompanied opportunity. The upheavals of the War of American Independence presented individuals in the Habsburg Monarchy with new challenges. At several points, the American Revolution threatened the international position of the Habsburg Monarchy, and its rulers' struggle to remain a neutral power continued throughout the war. For all neutral powers, assuming impartiality was a difficult process often fraught and marred by international controversy. In the Habsburg case, neutrality pitted the Monarchy against belligerents who sought to either erode or entrench their neutral status. Crucially, the Habsburg position vis-à-vis the war was at one point or another a concern for all belligerents, including the American patriots. Later, as the war progressed and American independence from Britain became an increasingly likely reality, the struggle for neutrality gradually became the struggle for a relationship with the sovereign United States of America. Habsburg ministers believed in the potential advantages of American trade and took great steps to secure it. Through the American Revolution, the Habsburgs imagined a transatlantic expansion of imperial and commercial power. Yet pursuing such dreams came at a cost. The Habsburg Monarchy was not immune to the effects of revolutionary fervour. The American Revolution exemplified the best achievement of humanity to many in the Habsburg lands who later called for similar reforms, imparting a legacy which instigated conspiracy, reformism, and revolt.¹² The American Revolution had a deep-rooted impact in the Habsburg lands which ultimately lasted through to the nineteenth century.

The "Habsburg moment" in the American Revolution unites several instances when the Habsburg Monarchy became a focal point in the War of American Independence and exerted an influence on the war's outcome. Few historians today realise the role played by the Habsburg Monarchy in shaping the American Revolution economically and politically. Yet the Monarchy was a factor in the American Revolution despite how unlikely and unexpected this may seem to readers today. The Habsburg Monarchy was one of the great neutral powers in the War of American Independence as one of the largest states in eighteenth-century Europe with extensive territories, military capacity, and dynastic influence over the Holy Roman Empire—the source of tens of thousands of Hessian recruits for the British. The Habsburg territories encompassed a population of roughly

25 million and employed one of the largest European armies.¹³ In addition, from the early 1770s onwards, vital munitions manufactured in Liège passed through Habsburg lands in the Austrian Netherlands in order to supply the patriots in the American Revolution.¹⁴ Moreover, the Austrian Netherlands served over thirty prominent Americans throughout the war as a base of operations and from 1780, the port of Ostend became the emporium of all belligerents seeking to transport goods safely into the Atlantic under neutral colours.¹⁵

Most importantly, Vienna became a fulcrum around which the war would have turned if the Monarchy had joined one side or another. This was especially true following the Franco-American alliance of 1778 when efforts to cajole the Habsburgs into the War of American Independence reached an early crescendo. Winning over the Habsburgs became a frequent aim of the British who increasingly saw them as their last hope in Europe for deliverance from the war. Competition over the fate of the Habsburgs placed them unexpectedly at the forefront of the first serious attempts for peaceful mediation to the conflict which, if it had been successful, would have resulted in the Peace of Vienna in 1781 rather than the Peace of Paris in 1783. These moments in the American Revolution have been overlooked but recognising the importance of this wider international context to the American founding is necessary if we are to fully appreciate the complexity and globality of the American Revolution.

Including the Habsburg Monarchy in the history of the American Revolution, therefore, serves to broaden the international horizon and redefine the spatial context of American independence. The foundation of the United States was as deeply enmeshed within a European framework of shifting alliances and preconceptions as it was in North America.¹⁶ The War of American Independence all too often appears as a war which occurred within a North American context but from 1778 onwards, the war's ultimate determination, and with it American sovereignty, rested increasingly within Europe.¹⁷ Even American independence and the post-sovereign self-fashioning of the new republic transpired with a view towards finding a place in the pre-existing international order dictated by European states.¹⁸

Uncovering the continental European dimension within the American Revolution requires situating the Revolution within different European national contexts. Whilst promising advances are being made for western Europe—especially Ireland and Spain, to only name two cases—there are still multiple *terrae incognitae* ripe for the historians of eighteenth-century America. It seems the further east one moves, the less aware we are—despite the existence of many illuminating works.¹⁹ In the public and general academic imagination, regions such as central and eastern Europe or Scandinavia have boiled down to those made

famous by their participation in the American Revolution such as the Hessians or Tadeusz Kościuszko or perhaps Axel von Fersen, the possible Swedish lover of Marie Antoinette.²⁰ The reduction to these figures, important though they were, often obscures the deeper level of the Revolution's connection to and impact on these regions. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, the situation is worse still, with no comparable character firmly in the public mind as a tangible connection between these lands and the American Revolution. There is no reason for this obscurity; as the pages that follow will reveal, there was a host of influential individuals who considered themselves part of the American Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy.

In expanding the international dimensions of the American Revolution, this book speaks directly to the field of Atlantic history, which, until recently, has been the prevailing historiographical framework for histories of the American Revolution abroad. Proponents of Atlantic history posit the transit of peoples, ideas, and commodities around the Atlantic basin as responsible for creating a single connective space during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²¹ Atlantic history has brokered fruitful connections between historical foci, bringing historians of different periods and spaces into a common dialogue. Attempts to form a consensual definition have proven difficult with the boundaries of the Atlantic itself functioning as the most commonly accepted parameter.²²

Despite several decades of innovative histories, however, Atlantic history might be drying up. Atlantic fatigue has set in, especially among historians of the American Revolution, who have shifted towards newer geographic locales for fresh perspectives.²³ In the last decade, histories of the American Revolution have increasingly taken place within a continental or hemispheric space. Built upon a rising cognisance of Spanish-American and Native American presence in the Age of Revolutions, the continental and hemispheric viewpoints implicitly re-orientate attention away from the East of the thirteen colonies (the Atlantic) and present the Revolution as either inextricable from the West or as the first in a vertical wave of revolutionary movement from the North to the South.²⁴ This embrace of multidirectional approaches to the Revolution does not prejudice the Atlantic, but rather reframes the Atlantic world within a larger spatial dimension.²⁵ Some have taken to calling this new convergence "vast early America" as a signifier for viewing the wider entanglement of early American history from multiple geographies and imperial vantage points.²⁶ Such repositioning of our conceptions, both of Atlantic history and of early American history, can be instructive when also applied in the other direction; from further east as well as further west. In this reformulation the Habsburg Monarchy can be seen as a continuation of current trends to discern the various polarities of early America.

Atlantic history has long seemed distinct from, or even antithetical to, the Central European “hinterland” but the Habsburg experience in the American Revolution demonstrates this fallacy. Admittedly, the Habsburg lands did not stretch into the Atlantic. There were no new-world outposts under the rule of the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg—although ministers in Vienna and Brussels seriously considered acquiring such territory during the Revolution and one of their colonial missions ostensibly laid claim to the southern-Atlantic islands of Tristan da Cunha in 1777.²⁷ The commercial entrepôts of Ostend on the North Sea and Trieste in the Adriatic functioned instead as the connective nodes to the Atlantic nexus initially indirectly and, as a result of the Revolution, directly in the 1780s. Despite connection through the transfer of people and trade, it would seem inaccurate to demarcate these spaces as the Atlantic, however.²⁸ Yet for the Habsburgs faced with the upheavals of the American Revolution, what happened on one side of the Straits of Gibraltar mattered for the other. It was for this reason that Habsburg ministers tasked the secretary to the Habsburg legation in Madrid with planning contingencies for Habsburg commerce in the Atlantic and Mediterranean following the Spanish entry into the war.²⁹ The maritime consequences of the American Revolution reverberated in the Habsburg lands despite their distance from the Atlantic Ocean.

Recently, scholars have paid ever-greater attention to the role of the oceans in the shaping of terrestrial human history on a global scale. The ubiquity of waterways and waterbodies lends itself easily to this frame of reference where continents and coastlines became subsumed within a globally interconnected and interdependent “world ocean” system.³⁰ Island outposts and port cities, in particular, commanded a prominent role in facilitating connection across maritime spaces—as have ecological, geological, and meteorological attributes of the seas themselves.³¹ The Habsburg Monarchy presents an interesting lacuna within this emerging historical perspective, for two reasons. First, the Habsburg Monarchy is perceived conventionally as composed of “landlocked” entities with little or no maritime interests—this is in spite of an extensive existing literature proving otherwise.³² Yet this “inland” nature does not deny the Austrian Habsburgs an oceanic past. Indirect connections through rivers and overland routes connected much of Central Europe to the seas.³³ Secondly, the intrepid maritime imperialism of the Austrian Habsburgs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through exploration, commerce, and transoceanic colonisation represented a concerted effort to transcend the terrestrial and maritime understandings of empire.³⁴ The American Revolution was by no means the first or the only oceanic episode in Austrian Habsburg history but its effects, at sea and on

land, influenced the development of Habsburg overseas ventures and fortunes in ways that have not been previously acknowledged.

In many ways, this book serves as a maritime history of the Habsburg Monarchy. Current accounts of the overseas activities of the Austrian Habsburgs tend to centre on the attempts to colonise and trade in Asia during the early and late eighteenth century. The *Generale Keijzerlijke Indische Compagnie* (General Imperial India Company) of the 1720s in Ostend and William Bolts's expeditions to India and China in the 1770s and 1780s are well known.³⁵ Both of these initiatives ended in abject failure with short-lived commercial factories founded in Canton, China and along the Coromandel Coast at Covelong (Kovalam) and at Bankibazar (Ichapur) in India. The American Revolution, however, offers a counterpoint to this Habsburg maritime experience. It enabled new commercial opportunities for the Austrian Habsburgs after the established imperial Atlantic systems suffered disruption. Established trading routes relied upon Habsburg neutrality to maintain the flow of goods, communications, and people. As mentioned above, American revolutionaries and other belligerents sourced munitions from Liège which had to be procured through the canals, rivers, and roads of the Austrian Netherlands.³⁶ The Revolution similarly shaped economic fortunes in Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and the Hungarian lands both during and after the war. As Matyas Rát, editor of the Hungarian newspaper *Magyar Hirmondó*, asked his readers, "Who would think that the riots taking place there [the American colonies] could have been of benefit to our country?"³⁷ The American Revolution, in other words, furthered the oceanic entanglement of the Habsburg Monarchy in the late eighteenth century through the lure of profit and improvement.

In general, examining the effects of the American Revolution upon the Habsburg Monarchy further globalises its history. Few overviews of Habsburg history today recognise the global contexts of the eighteenth-century Monarchy.³⁸ The global backdrop appears either absent for a Monarchy usually perceived (and presented) as a landlocked Central European power or takes the form of studies of isolated facets of Habsburg global connections. We have a growing understanding of the Habsburg ambition to form global linkages through the development of extra-European commerce, the sponsorship of scientific missions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the creation of institutions designed to enable transcultural contact.³⁹ The ability of the Habsburgs to attract and cultivate individuals who broadly functioned as global facilitators is similarly growing in acknowledgement across different disciplines.⁴⁰ Yet we still lack a unified vision synthesising these threads into the reality which was the eighteenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Integrating

the transoceanic experience of the Habsburg Monarchy and its struggles to acquire trading privileges and geographical information about non-European territories—as was the case with the new United States—therefore puts the eighteenth-century Habsburg experience in a more appropriate framework.⁴¹

The American Revolution was the Habsburg Monarchy's first encounter with what is commonly termed the Age of Revolutions, a period characterised by the intense political struggles that took place in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.⁴² In geographic terms, historians traditionally designated the Atlantic as a central emanating point for the Age of Revolutions with America and France as sibling instigators.⁴³ Yet much like Atlantic history, the Age of Revolutions has undergone continual refinement and alteration. Modifiers such as *democratic*, *imperial*, and *global* prefixed to Revolution reflect the various reframings of a turbulent age generally stretching from the American Revolution up to the Revolutions of 1848.⁴⁴ The recent transnational and global turns have shifted attention to the mobility of revolutionary advocates and the smaller spaces experiencing revolutionary change—but most of these efforts remain concentrated within the Atlantic world.⁴⁵ In her transnational history of the revolutionary age from Haiti to the Low Countries, historian Janet Polasky articulated the permeability of the European mainland in the transmission of revolutionary ideas.⁴⁶ Polasky's vision makes good on the original expansive Age of Revolutions present in Robert R. Palmer's works. Palmer was one of the few historians who connected the totality of the European space within the period of the American Revolution.⁴⁷ Yet even Palmer did not fully realise the impact of the American Revolution upon the Habsburg Monarchy. In Palmer's works, the 1787 revolt in the Austrian Netherlands and the 1794 conspiracies in Vienna and Hungary were the only substantive responses to the Revolution.⁴⁸ But the taking up of arms is not the only legitimate response to revolutionary movements; some, like the Schusters, were inspired in other ways and made their response known peacefully.

Palmer only became convinced “that an ‘American dream’ existed in Germany as much as in France” some years later following the work of Horst Dippel who meticulously traced the reaction of German-speaking people to the Revolution.⁴⁹ Dippel's richly researched account deftly articulated the meaning of the Revolution for the German-speaking Habsburg populace but in severing them from the rest of the Monarchy, we are left with an incomplete understanding of the Revolution's impact in the Habsburg lands. Moreover, Dippel's in-depth analysis along with his bibliographic compilation of contemporary German-language works on the Revolution have been rather underutilised by historians of the American Revolution.⁵⁰ As a result, the Habsburg Monarchy

appears as a latecomer to the party—a guest who did not quite receive the invitation first time around and first showed up either in the 1790s brimming with Jacobins or the late 1840s accompanied by nationalists and secessionists.⁵¹ The Habsburgs only became symptomatic with revolutionary fervour, so the current narrative goes, when inhabitants became piqued by the Josephine reforms of the 1780s and had witnessed the example of the French Revolution.⁵² By tracing the antecedents in the Habsburg response to the American Revolution, this book effectively contextualises the Habsburg responses to later revolutionary currents.

Contrary to conventional expectations, the Habsburg Monarchy was not a reactionary power at the beginning of the Age of Revolution, as this book will show. To be sure, there were individuals in the Habsburg Monarchy who were more guarded towards or even criticised the American Revolution, but many looked positively on the American cause. Ministers and merchants across the Habsburgs lands were attentive to the changing fortunes of their neighbours and sought to harness the disruption caused by the revolutionary turmoil in North America. After 1783, moreover, preserving the economic benefit created through American independence outweighed the ideological gulf between monarchy and republic. The danger lay, however, in the cultural effects of the American Revolution, in its example of righteous self-preservation against tyranny. What America came to represent posed the real challenge. As time went on and the flame of revolutionary spirit spread to Europe, stakeholders in the Habsburg regime sought to dampen the embers of dissent in their own lands. Yet it was only in the wake of another revolution, which begun in France in 1789, that American influence, ideals, and discussion became intolerable as the instigator of a turbulent, destructive era.

Divergence between the United States of America and the Habsburg Monarchy became a distinctive hallmark from the 1790s onwards. The figure of Emperor Joseph II, who reigned jointly with his mother Maria Theresa during the outbreak of the American Revolution, best demonstrates the generational schism that emerged over the Habsburg Monarchy. John Adams once referred to him in 1783 as “one of the greatest men of the present age,” whereas the American poet Joel Barlow denounced the Habsburg monarch ten years later as “The ape of wisdom and the slave of gold, Theresa’s son, who, with a feeble grace, just mimics all the vices of his race.”⁵³ In time, the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy became the archetype for progressive and conservative standard-bearers and became increasingly uncomfortable in their connections to one another. The revolutionary year of 1848 proved a litmus test for such disparity, with American support of Hungarians against the “un-democratic” Habsburg regime almost bringing

the two states to declaring war in the decade afterwards.⁵⁴ Prince Klemens von Metternich's sense that America represented a sleeping giant which "in five years gets to where it otherwise would have taken two centuries" still dominates our perception of the two countries; one as sclerotic and a declining power in the late-nineteenth century versus the rise of a dynamic society and international heavyweight.⁵⁵ It has led to our perception of the two powers as having little or no connection. In the early twentieth century, Harvard historian and direct descendant of Thomas Jefferson, Archibald Cary Coolidge wrote "with Austria-Hungary the United States has never had much to do" and almost a century later, historian Thomas A. Schwartz declared that, "If you teach a survey course on the history of American foreign relations, chances are that you don't spend very much time on the Austrian-Hungarian Empire."⁵⁶ This malaise originating from the reactionary 1790s should not obscure the actual time of connection between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States, when, for almost two decades, these two powers were not adversaries, not antagonistic, nor dichotomies but rather mutually interested, inquisitive, and enterprising with one another.

The American Revolution is, therefore, the proper starting point for historicising bilateral relations between the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy and its successor states. Although diplomatic recognition proved elusive until the first bilateral treaties of the 1820s and the first mutual exchange of representatives in 1838, the 1770s and 1780s witnessed the first concerted efforts to forge US-Habsburg relations.⁵⁷ Political histories of this relationship have often sidelined this crucial period, if acknowledged at all, as an era of "benign neglect" with little perceived interaction.⁵⁸ This misconception explains why transatlantic histories of Austria-Hungary and its successor states predominantly tend to focus on the extensive migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁹ American financial support provided to Austria in the post-World War II period sparked a rise in the field of American Studies (*Amerikanistik*) which centred on the more immediate relationship between the United States and the Austrian Republic.⁶⁰ A similar situation developed in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia following the collapse of the Communist system in the 1990s.⁶¹ These circumstances have undoubtedly fostered a nuanced awareness of Central European ties with North America. Yet these separate historiographies have also inadvertently demoted eighteenth-century connections between these lands. The period of the American Revolution and the republic's founding remains a bountiful era of informal relations as a result.

Of course, this is not to say that no histories of the American Revolution and the Habsburg Monarchy exist. It is to say only that those available have been

written from a disaggregated viewpoint. Rather than treating the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, as this book does, these histories present the Habsburg reception and reaction to the American Revolution through anachronistic regional or nation-state perspectives. Austrian, Belgian, and Hungarian historians—to name but a few—have written individual histories of “Austria and the American Revolution,” “Belgium and the American Revolution,” and “Hungary and the American Revolution.”⁶² Nation-state perspectives arguably have merit as they allow for a focus on the specific modalities of each constituent region of the composite Habsburg Monarchy. The same can be said of the anachronistic regional perspectives where portions of the Habsburg Monarchy have been repurposed as part of a wider “German” or “East-Central European” response to the Revolution.⁶³ These reorientations can create meaningful comparisons with other eighteenth-century polities such as Prussia or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Yet these nation-state perspectives run the risk of promoting perceived exceptionalism within the Habsburg Monarchy. When we only have articles written on the Hungarian military officers who went to fight for the American cause, it overshadows the reality that men from across the Habsburg lands went to fight for the Revolution in relatively equal numbers.⁶⁴ Moreover, this perspective downplays the significant interplay of regional interests within composite states. The Habsburg Monarchy of the eighteenth century was a composite state consisting of several distinct territories under the rule of a sovereign dynasty.⁶⁵ Responses to the American Revolution in the Austrian Netherlands ultimately affected the decision-making process in Vienna and vice versa. Moreover, one region’s actions could set the tone for the external perception of the entire Monarchy as a neutral power during the War of American Independence. Thus the decisions of local magistrates, committees, and governors, such as those in the Austrian Netherlands, for example, coloured the British impression of the Habsburgs. The same was especially true for Habsburg diplomats at foreign courts as well as those in service to other members of the House of Habsburg, but who were not representatives of the Habsburg Monarchy. It is for this reason that the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, ruled under *secundogeniture* terms by the Habsburg dynasty, is paramount to understanding the complex interrelationship between the Habsburg Monarchy and the American Revolution. American patriots and British envoys, for instance, both interpreted the independent policies of the emperor’s younger brother in Tuscany as commensurate with the wider policy of the Habsburg Monarchy. Tuscany’s inclusion in this narrative is therefore crucial. Analysing various regional influences, as this book does, is a fundamental step in chronicling and understanding the Habsburg response to the American Revolution as a whole.

The importance of multi-archival and multilingual research in crafting new histories of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the American Revolution should become self-evident throughout this book. Austrian archivist-historian Hans Schlitter exercised this mantra in the 1880s when he completed the only other monograph on this topic. His *Die Beziehungen Österreichs zu den Vereinigten Staaten 1778-1787* (Austria's relations with the United States, 1778–1787) utilised sources at the Austrian State Archives (where he served later as one of the archival directors) and from a field trip to Washington, DC, sponsored both by his father and the education ministry.⁶⁶ Schlitter's combination of sources made him realise the interconnected goals shared by American citizens and Habsburg subjects and allowed him to write one of the best international histories of the Habsburg Monarchy of his time. Although Schlitter's work was pioneering for its time, it is still a work very much *of* its time as a study of the few great individuals of the Revolution and analysis limited largely to state-level diplomacy between the two states. In Schlitter's rendering, the ideas of the Revolution were largely absent. The economic lure of a sovereign United States, which tempted the Monarchy's mercantile classes and attracted foreign merchants to its ports, counted for little.⁶⁷ Now, this present book considers all three elements together. The American Revolution was not solely a diplomatic problem for the Habsburg Monarchy but also a commercial opportunity and a cultural obsession. One factor did not operate without affecting the other. Analysing these elements in tandem reveals the whole and showcases the breadth of the Habsburg engagement with the Revolution and the independent American republic.

What follows is a chronological analysis of the effects of the American Revolution in the Habsburg lands and the Habsburg response to American independence before the time of the French Revolution. The United States did not appear out of a vacuum in the 1770s, but rather its colonial ancestry formed an important part in the European reception and recognition of the new American republic announced in 1776. In charting this dynamic episode in American and Central European history, it is crucial, therefore, to be aware of how the United States fitted into a continuum of Habsburg perceptions of the Americas since the discovery of the New World. Once disquietude among the thirteen colonies erupted into open conflict, the American Revolution was an unavoidable political event to inhabitants across the Habsburg lands. The outbreak of war posed many initial challenges for the Habsburg Monarchy, which culminated in the dramatic first diplomatic mission of an American representative to the Habsburg court in 1778. Yet by the final years of the war, Habsburg officials had recognised the potential gains in the revolutionary turmoil and sought to profit, both economically and politically, from the conflagration engulfing the Atlantic

world. In surmounting these diplomatic challenges, the economic significance of the American Revolution for the Habsburgs became clear and the efforts to secure this commercial opportunity formed an ill-fated priority of the postwar agenda. Though the attraction of American commerce proved great and brought the Habsburgs into greater contact with the peoples of North America, the fatal influence of one prominent American revolutionary protected these designs for decades to come. This book concludes by chronicling the lingering American dream in the Habsburg lands which lasted for generations beyond the Revolution itself. Throughout this book, a whole host of figures emerge. Some will be familiar to many; some will be unknown to most; and some may be surprising inclusions, but all were in their own ways central in constructing the meaning of the American Revolution in the Habsburg lands. If it were not for people like Johann and Maria Schuster after all, we would be unaware of the immense impact of the American Revolution on the Habsburg Monarchy.

“England Is the Motherland and America the Daughter?”

Colonial and Revolutionary America in the Habsburg Mind

PEOPLE IN THE HABSBURG lands had formed a deep connection with America long before the American Revolution. For centuries prior to the outbreak of war in the 1770s, knowledge of an “America” and then many “Americas” had come through several mediums. Dynastic servants, Jesuits missionaries, merchant traders, newspaper editors, and artists came together to weave different strands into the tapestry of the Habsburg outlook on the New World; they influenced the wider perception of America and helped to shape the mental worlds of their contemporaries. This process began with the voyage of Christopher Columbus and was still underway by the time of the Declaration of American Independence and the Siege of Yorktown. It was a muddy process, one shaped as much by events in the Americas as it was by events in Europe. In the Habsburg case, it was also a process shaped by geographical proximities and cultural legacies: the abjuration from Habsburg Spain and the abrasion against the Ottomans. Negatives—depopulation, censorship, sickness and disease—also played a role. By the eighteenth century, however, a singular Habsburg preconception of America came to exist, one based on a blend of pseudo-scientific observations largely from Catholic missionaries and coloured by late-Baroque rationalism. As revolution approached in the 1760s, attention shifted northwards towards the British North American colonies. New commentators focused on the potentiality of America, its bountiful landscape, and the harmonising nature of its commerce in more universal tones rather than a foreign land of oddities.

In charting this rise of colonial and revolutionary America in the Habsburg mind, one fact becomes clear: the Habsburg Monarchy was not a detached entity from the Atlantic maritime world. On the contrary, Habsburg inhabitants learned about America with relatively equal pace as much of western Europe.

Many Habsburg subjects, moreover, contributed to the discourse around the Americas from the Hungarian István Budai Permanius, whose poems waxed lyrical about Newfoundland, to the Brno-based tax collector and publicist Heinrich Georg Hoff, who counted George Washington as among one of the most remarkable and famous people in the world.¹ Entwined within the richly interwoven European narratives on America was a continuous Habsburg thread. Unpicking this thread not only contextualises the meaning of the American Revolution in the Habsburg world but also better contextualises that same Habsburg world, one which encompassed a broad, global outlook as well as a European one.²

Post-Columbian America and the Habsburg Monarchy

The voyages of discovery from Christopher Columbus's arrival in 1492 to the confirmation of a separate hemisphere in the voyage of Amerigo Vespucci implanted a new spatial order in European minds. The Habsburg Monarchy of the eighteenth century did not yet exist at that time. Bohemia and Hungary were independent kingdoms. The Austrian dominions were fragmented as several duchies and, up until a few years before Columbus's landing in the Bahamas, had been partly conquered by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus. Emperor Maximilian I's reconquest of the Austrian territories throughout the 1480s consolidated his reputation. Maximilian sought to commemorate his achievements in imperial propaganda. He ordered the completion of the *Triumphal Procession*, a series of woodblock prints, spanning 54 metres in length. Conceived by Maximilian and an Austrian cartographer before being worked on by several artists including Albrecht Dürer and Hans Burgkmair, the series depicted a fantastical allegorical train of carriages containing the emperor's subjects to proclaim his glory. One such group was the warriors of Calicut, a malleable sixteenth-century term denoting people beyond the seas, including Americans.³ Half-dressed in feather skirts and headdresses, erroneously clutching European bladed spears, the ensemble reflected the new cognizance of America in the Habsburg mind. On another plate, the people of Calicut appear as bare-breasted women carrying bountiful produce, tending to oxen and rams while one features a monkey combing her hair and headdress. In this case, the plates served Maximilian's desire to display his worldly omnipotence.⁴ To erase any shadow of a doubt, Maximilian sanctioned an accompanying verse to reinforce his ties to the Calicut and connection to the New World: "The Emperor in his warlike pride, conquering nations far and wide, has brought beneath our Empire's yoke the far-off Calicuttish folk."⁵

It was a Habsburg device deployed again in the real-life procession held in Brussels in 1517 to mark the accession of Maximilian's grandson (and future heir) Charles of Ghent to the Spanish throne as Carlos I (known more famously as Charles V). A group of Amerindians preceded a final float which carried a giant golden globe as if to fulfil Maximilian's earlier vision.⁶ For the Habsburg rulers contemporary to the discovery of the New World, inclusion of the Amerindian float in their displays of power meant projecting their interests upon it. As rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, an edifice commonly understood to be universalist in scope, Maximilian saw new extra-European territory as falling under his patrimony as a universal emperor.⁷ But staking a theoretical claim was not the only result. By incorporating America, the Habsburgs also served to revitalise their image as modern rulers, bringing the new, wondrous, and exotic to the people in such public processions and prints. Maximilian planned for the *Triumph* series to be hung in all major halls throughout the Holy Roman Empire and had various copies made of the panels. In a later version by a Tyrolean artist, the Calcuttish warriors appear even further defined by the Habsburg psyche; possessing beards, wearing sandals, carrying rounded shields, and brandishing bows more akin to an Arabian style than anything related to the New World.⁸ Maximilian alluded to further claims in his written plans for the *Triumphal Arch*, which included the "1,500 islands"—a reference to Columbus's letter about 1,400 sighted islands—as one of his patrimonial crests adorning the monument.⁹ It was only fitting that the first Latin publications of Amerigo Vespucci's voyages, which capitulated his prominence and helped enshrine the name America for the new continent, bore dedications to Maximilian.¹⁰

Amassing new-world objects for semi-private display was another route to utilise America for personal enhancement. Habsburg elites were no different from their European contemporaries who sought to acquire American objects for their collections. Emperors Maximilian I through to Rudolf II all collected new-world curiosities for their wonder cabinets (*Wunderkammern*).¹¹ Maximilian's daughter, Margaret of Austria, was one of the earliest collectors owing to her brief second marriage to Don Juan, son of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain in the 1490s. She saw herself as a future ruler of the newfound dominions over which the Spanish monarchs had claimed sovereignty for themselves. By 1524, she had acquired nearly two hundred American artefacts.¹² In general, the Habsburg obsession with the Spanish throne and its territories in the New World fostered an American prominence in the dynastic lands of Central Europe. Emperor Ferdinand I, who was born and raised in Spain, prized his collection of Americana.¹³ He retained personal connections with numerous

Spanish courtiers who informed him of the latest American discoveries.¹⁴ His son and heir, Maximilian II, followed much the same interest, instructing his ambassador in Madrid to collect the rarest and most spectacular new-world objects.¹⁵ Ferdinand I's other son, Ferdinand, who ruled as a sovereign in the secundogeniture of the Tyrol and Further Austria, also placed great value on obtaining and exhibiting Americana. His most notable possessions included Aztec feather garments, headdresses, and shields such as those worn by the Aztec figures featured in *Esther und Avasver*, a painting which he displayed prominently at Schloss Ambras near Innsbruck.¹⁶

Dreams of owning the New World and of reconnecting with Spain persisted throughout the dynastic line of the Austrian Habsburgs. The father of Maria Theresa, Emperor Charles VI, yearned to recreate a Spanish-Austrian world empire centred on the colonial conquests in the New World.¹⁷ After his forced relocation from Barcelona to Vienna upon the death of his brother, Charles contorted the Central European space he found around him towards such a vision. He filled the court with Spanish personnel and reformed institutions to be more like Spanish colonial enterprises. The Karlskirche in Vienna became perhaps the most tangible manifestation of his imperialist aims with its dual columns representing the Pillars of Hercules at the Straits of Gibraltar opening out to the Atlantic.¹⁸ This Spanish-New World influence was still alive and well in the generation of the American Revolution. Maria Theresa's court processions as well as portraits of her and her husband Francis Stephan boldly showed off Spanish-styled clothes and fashions.¹⁹

Illusions of the rulers often affected the allusions of the ruled. Habsburg elites emulated the incorporation of America through collecting and self-fashioning. Prince Pál Esterházy, for example, acquired engravings of Amerindians after observing the collections of Rudolf II in Vienna.²⁰ In mimicking the tastes of the Habsburg monarchs, courtiers and nobles precipitated a wider craze for Americana. Fetishising parrots became one symptom of this trickle-down mania. The quest for these new-world birds, mainly from the "land of parrots" (Brazil), was a longstanding obsession of the Habsburg rulers from Rudolf II to Francis Stephan.²¹ Such imperial projects provoked a cultural fascination around the colourful avians. The Archduke Sigismund Francis of Tyrol and Further Austria purchased an ornate parrot clock, and in Bohemia, a surviving inventory of ball costumes features a courtly couple bedecked in parrot feathers.²² Donning new-world dress became a fashionable exercise among Habsburg nobles as proud portraits of the Netolický and Schwarzenberg families can attest.²³ In Prague, the imperial feather-worker Jan Fuchs established a shop to cater for city elites

and their fascination for colourful plumes.²⁴ Aristocrats consciously sought out and absorbed Americana through friendships, family networks, grand tours, and diplomatic offices.²⁵ As time wore on, these elites developed more consumer-orientated tastes for Americana. The exotic gave way to the luxurious. Consumables and commodities such as sugar, coffee, and beaver hats became *en vogue* and with them the first indirect commercial pathways to the Americas emerged.²⁶ In turn, America became less a curious land and more a source of produce, industry, and exploitation for Habsburg inhabitants.²⁷

Allegorical art was one medium in which the colonial image of America remained constant. From the late Renaissance to the early nineteenth century, artists developed a visual metaphor for America. Continental allegories depicting the four continents of the earth—Africa, America, Asia, and Europe—became an artistic shorthand throughout the southern lands of the Holy Roman Empire.²⁸ No less than ninety American allegories appeared on the ceilings and walls of parish churches, manorial houses, monastic libraries, and grand palaces across the Austrian lands between 1645 and 1832.²⁹ In these frescoes, the personification of America often took the form of a woman (or cherub) half-dressed and crowned with a feather headdress. Commonly associated animals, including the much-adored parrots, featured alongside alligators and armadillos. Inferences oscillated between representations of a noble savage and princely figure, but a sense of inferiority was always apparent, reinforced by the position of America as subordinate to Europe and Asia and a counterpart to Africa. The locations of these allegories reflected the further trickling-down of American interest within Habsburg society. Prior to 1710, the majority abounded in the palaces of Lower Austria and Styria such as Schloss Eggenberg near Graz and the Lower Belvedere near Vienna. Later, American allegories appeared predominantly in abbeys and monasteries before reaching parish churches in the mid-eighteenth century. These images introduced the concept of America to ordinary people who came to these everyday places of worship. Consciously and unconsciously, such iconography shaped the mental worldview of Catholic churchgoers across the Austrian lands.³⁰ Despite this localised influence, parish reliefs did not hold a monopoly on the religious vision of the Americas in Central Europe.

The Society of Jesus was responsible for the most popular religious lens on the Americas in the Habsburg lands. Whereas fashion and art had solidified forms of the exotic, Jesuit missionaries from the Austrian Habsburg lands created a more nuanced picture of the Americas. Officially formed in 1540, the Society of Jesus grew steadily in the Habsburg lands. Of the 5,340 Jesuits of the German assistancy in 1750, over half originated from the Austrian and Bohemian

provinces.³¹ Jesuits from the Habsburg lands enthusiastically participated in the missionising efforts of the order in the Americas. At least 737 Jesuits travelled westward for this purpose from the German assistancy; around forty percent came from the Austrian, Bohemian and Tyrolean provinces.³² A similar enthusiasm existed in Hungary.³³ Completing this mission brought Jesuits into close contact with inhabitants from Brazil to the plains of North America.³⁴ From these intense and sustained encounters, often lasting years, Jesuits from the Habsburg lands formulated pejorative views of their hosts and neighbours. Indigenous societies seemed “primitive” even “uncivilised” rather than conforming to the idyllic representations of the “noble savage” or “children of nature” tropes.³⁵ Missionaries played an important role in brokering this new view to people in their native lands by writing reports to their peers in provincial seminaries and to their families.³⁶

Central European Jesuits also aimed to publish their letters in specialised journals in their native lands. In the Habsburg lands, two Jesuit journals stand out as influential in shaping the Central European perception of America. In the first instance, Jesuits at the University of Trnava (Nagyszombat) began publication of an annual almanac in 1676. Reports from missionaries in the New World featured throughout. Typical entries focused on the savagery and dissimilarity of the Native peoples.³⁷ The 1709 issue, for example, featured news of the “Indos” who had dog’s teeth and barked.³⁸ The Bohemian Jesuit Joseph Neumann, for instance, published in Prague a bloody memoir in Latin of his mission during the Tarahumara revolts against the Spanish and Jesuit presence in New Spain in the 1690s.³⁹ Another Bohemian Jesuit, Adam Gilg, formulated his American reality with harsher words in a letter home. America, in his opinion, was “a garden full of spines deprived of all human consolation.”⁴⁰ Such information appeared as evidence in treatises written by Jesuit fathers at Trnava who strove to comprehend mankind in all its unusual forms from the “harmonious” to the “imperfect.”⁴¹ Their treatises on geography, avians, botany, and dendrology all cited examples from New World observations. From the men who outran deer in Florida to fantastical golden trees in the Caribbean to the worshiped *Quetzalcoatl* birds of the Aztecs, such information supplemented the growing global outlook of Central European Jesuits who sought to conform new discoveries into a rationalised knowledge system.⁴² Information contained in the Trnava almanac reached large audiences. The main editor of the almanac, the polymath professor Márton Szentiványi, repurposed this information for further publications which were translated into German and French.⁴³ Szentiványi’s refashioning of new-world knowledge also reached

other Jesuit centres of the Hungarian lands long after his death in 1708. In Košice, for example, parts of his treatises were printed in the *Calendarium* of the Jesuit university in 1754.⁴⁴ The Jesuit father Pál Bertalanffi reworked much of the Hungarian Jesuit knowledge into his 1757 geography of the Americas.⁴⁵ The endless cycles of circulation and recirculation through multiple authors, from Jesuits present in the Americas to the editors of almanacs in Hungary to their translators and readers, ensured the constant diffusion of Jesuit knowledge about the New World in the Habsburg lands up to the time of the American Revolution.

If Hungarian Jesuits had Trnava as their epicentre of world-knowledge generation, then the Jesuits of the Austrian province had the city of Graz. For thirty-five years between 1726 and 1761, Jesuits in the city produced *Der Neue Welt-Bott* (The New World Messenger), founded by Joseph Stöcklein.⁴⁶ Stöcklein's initiative was a similar undertaking to Szentiványi's almanac in Trnava and followed examples of French Jesuit journals about the New World, which reproduced translated accounts and transcribed oral testimonies of missionaries.⁴⁷ By presenting actual assertions of missionaries, albeit somewhat edited, Stöcklein directly transported his readers to an eyewitness position. Furthermore, accounts published in *Der Neue Welt-Bott* appeared in the vernacular German rather than Latin, reflecting Stöcklein's broader aims for dissemination beyond the clergy.⁴⁸ In producing such rich content, around 812 reports in total, Stöcklein's endeavour paid off as *Der Neue Welt-Bott* became one of the most influential sources of new-world information in the German-speaking lands.⁴⁹ Although the journal featured reports from Jesuits across the world, fully one quarter (203 reports) featured the Americas.⁵⁰ *Der Neue Welt-Bott* presented a wondrous vision across the Atlantic. It was a land filled with mysterious animals and peoples in need of converting by a "civilised," learned preacher.⁵¹ Aiming to serve German-speaking readers, Stöcklein selected letters showing non-German missionaries (except for the Bohemians and Hungarians) as "vainglorious and boastful" or "cruel and greedy."⁵² Combined with extensive imagery, *Der Neue Welt-Bott* served to create vindication and enthusiasm for the Germanic—and in this case, Habsburg—presence in the Americas.⁵³ Stöcklein's mission to not only to feed the "German" "appetite for knowledge" but also to elevate the endeavours of his fellow countrymen that increased the Habsburg sense of purpose in the New World and, at the same time, made it less alien.⁵⁴ It was no surprise that young Jesuits from the Habsburg Monarchy who ventured to the New World after reading Stöcklein's journal specifically wrote accounts intended for publication in subsequent editions.⁵⁵

First-hand accounts of America in the Habsburg lands rose after the sudden prosecution of the Jesuit order in the Spanish empire in 1767. Following the decree banning all Jesuit activity in Asia and America, around three hundred Central European Jesuits attempted to return home.⁵⁶ A return to normalcy became increasingly difficult following the general suppression of the Jesuit order in 1773.⁵⁷ Many ex-missionaries turned to printing their memoirs in order to supplement their position, resulting in a literature boom which often portrayed the colonial Americas in a nostalgic fashion.⁵⁸ The fantastical series of forty-seven watercolours depicting mission life in Baja California with German and Spanish subtitles by the exiled Ignaz Tirsch in Znojmo best represent a Habsburg Jesuit's case of longing for former life in the New World.⁵⁹ Jesuits in the Habsburg lands enjoyed relative freedom under the more pious and tolerant reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.⁶⁰ Martin Dobrizhoffer, a Jesuit who missionised among the Guraní and Abipone peoples of Paraguay from 1749, settled in Vienna after the suppression, where, through the patronage of Maria Theresa, he worked as one of her more favoured court preachers.⁶¹ In fact, she often sent for Dobrizhoffer to preach to her personally so that she "might hear his adventures from his own lips."⁶² The publication of his monumental three-volume *Historia de Abiponibus; equestri, bellicosaque Paraquarieae natione* (A History of the Abipones, an Equestrian Warrior Nation of Paraguay) in Vienna in 1784 was due to his royal patronage and an immediate German translation followed.⁶³ In the preface to his work, Dobrizhoffer explained his rationale for writing his account, which does much to illuminate the widespread interest in Americana in the Habsburg Monarchy by the late eighteenth century. Whereas in America Dobrizhoffer had been continually interrogated about Europe, in Austria he was "frequently questioned concerning America" and sought to alleviate himself of this trouble but writing "this little history" on the advice of "some person of distinction," referring to Maria Theresa.⁶⁴ The thirst for first-hand accounts of the Americas from returning Jesuits peaked in the years of the American Revolution. It was not only Dobrizhoffer and Tirsch who contributed to the blossoming field of ex-Jesuit studies on America. American works continued to appear by Jesuits who had sought refuge in the Habsburg lands such as Bernhard Havestadt-, Franz Xaver Veigl, and Florian Paucke who settled in Vienna, Klagenfurt, and the Cistercian abbey of Zwettl, respectively.⁶⁵ Such works by returning Jesuits and their predecessors embedded a deeper understanding of the Americas in the Habsburg web of knowledge.⁶⁶ Yet given the geography of the Spanish empire and the preponderance of Jesuit missions in central and southern America, these

Jesuit accounts transfixed the Habsburg gaze towards these regions rather than North America. It was only as news of the domestic grievances in the British colonies filtered through in the 1760s that the orientation shifted northwards and a new American arena became the focus of attention.

The Dawn of North America

The mid-eighteenth century witnessed a marked decline of hispano-centric Americanism within Habsburg audiences whilst British North America captured an increasing share of the attention. Discussions over southern and central America continued but observers in the mid-eighteenth-century Habsburg lands began to recognise a prosperous, yet precarious situation developing in the British colonies. Prognostications swirled over the future of the colonies and the nature of the colonists living there as new information came to light. Economists, scientists, librettists, and newspaper editors contributed to these emerging debates. The ideas put forward by these individuals owed a debt to the previous centuries of knowledge about the Americas but advanced conversations around the thirteen colonies that would later become the United States of America. Engagement with the complexity of America was not uniform across the Habsburg lands on the eve of the Revolution. Each region—Habsburg Milan, Tuscany, the Austrian Netherlands, Austria-Bohemia, and the Hungarian lands—ascribed their own importance to events and ideas circulating about North America. As the American Revolution dawned, however, the tumult occurring across the Atlantic interested peoples of all areas of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The genre of emigration literature first saw a shift towards North America. Over the course of the eighteenth century, one in three inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire relocated to territories outside its imperial borders.⁶⁷ Around 100,000 German-speaking migrants sailed to British North America prior to 1776.⁶⁸ Transatlantic migration from provinces bordering the Habsburg lands formed part of this movement, with the most notable cases involving victims of religious persecution such as the Salzburgers, who arrived in Georgia in 1734, and the Moravian Herrnhuters, who followed Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf and David Nitschmann to Pennsylvania in 1741.⁶⁹ Total emigration from the Habsburg lands proper to North America only reached several thousands at most, however.⁷⁰ Another substantial block of German speakers, totalling around 500,000 people, travelled eastwards following resettlement schemes to populate the Hungarian lands and the newly reconquered Banat of Temesvar

from the Ottomans in 1717.⁷¹ The resulting demand for colonists pitted migrant recruiters against one another over the supply of human capital.⁷² Popular conceptions of emigration destinations in North America and the eastern lands became increasingly distorted by the advertising of these recruitment drives. Recruiters frequently depicted North America as a land of proverbial milk and honey.⁷³ Land was cheap there; work was plentiful; religious persecution did not exist, and so on. Even hunting was easier, as the bison, to take one recruiter's word, wandered into your house almost begging to be shot and slaughtered.⁷⁴ The ideal of American life appeared so strongly to prospective German migrants that recruiters for the eastern part of the Habsburg lands chose to imitate the claims. The Banat of Temesvar became known as "Europe's America" in an effort to ascribe positive connotations with North America to the Hungarian interior.⁷⁵ Letters sent back from emigrants to their home communities established a better sense of the harsher realities, but these did little to deter future migrants who relied upon manuals when crossing the Atlantic.⁷⁶ It was possible to walk through the eighteenth-century Habsburg lands and hear the buzz of excitement about America. Towards the close of the century, one writer arrived at a tavern in lower Styria and heard tales of the innkeeper's grandfather and his adventures in America. The writer subsequently published his diary, calling him the "Styrian Robinson Crusoe."⁷⁷

Positive depictions of life in North America created defenders and detractors in Europe. A naturalist, Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon—led the charge in admonishing American qualities. Buffon contended that the presence of smaller creatures in the New World along with the less populous Native peoples pointed to a general American inferiority compared to the inhabitants and nature in Eurasia. Buffon's theory of "American degeneracy," as it came to be known, ignited and fascinated readers in the Habsburg lands as it did elsewhere in Europe. Yet to some, these theories seemed incompatible with the economic vitality of British American colonists. Intellectuals challenged Buffon's ideas, especially in the Habsburg provinces in the Italian peninsula. The Milanese mathematics professor Paolo Frisi attacked the leading works of Buffon and his supporter Cornelius de Pauw.⁷⁸ Frisi argued America was a fertile land populated by intelligent people.⁷⁹ The ultimate proof, Frisi concluded, lay in the example of North America, especially "in Philadelphia where all the other glories of Europe have already been emulated." British colonists, Frisi noted, had engaged in a series of pioneering scientific studies, leading them to "controlling the fire of heaven and calculating the quantity of matter in comets."⁸⁰ His examples alluded

to Benjamin Franklin's electrical experiments and John Winthrop's studies on comets. In exemplifying North America, Frisi shifted focus away from South America. For Frisi, the British colonies in North America served as a repudiation of degeneracy and offered a convincing model for American prosperity and contribution to European life.

Frisi was not alone in his rebuttal of degeneracy and promotion of British North America as the paragon of colonial virtue and enterprise. The Milanese nobleman Gian Rinaldo Carli published his own polemic refuting degeneracy ideas. Written during the course of the American Revolution, Carli's *Lettere Americane* drew more heavily on the North American example and contained far more vitriol for De Pauw personally. "He thinks everything outside of Breslau and Berlin as barbaric and savage," Carli decried before he claimed De Pauw was an alcoholic who "is drinking beer at this very moment as I write."⁸¹ Carli likewise extolled British colonial examples and won the greater share of acclaim for his *ad hominem* treatise with subsequent translations in French and German.⁸² Franklin, to whom the *Lettere Americane* was dedicated, wrote personally to Carli's publisher to extend his thanks for Carli's "witty defenses [*sic*] against the attacks of that misinformed and malignant Writer."⁸³ Indeed, Carli had done much to propagate Franklin's reputation among the Milanese. An anonymous reviewer of the *Lettere Americane* praised Carli in 1782 for confirming that "the immortal American Mr. Franklin demonstrates the health and greatness of that new American nation."⁸⁴

Friedrich Wilhelm Taube became one of the most knowledgeable commentators of his day on North American matters. Born in London as the son of Queen Charlotte's personal physician, Taube spent his youth in the British capital before the queen's death in 1737 provoked his family's relocation to Hannover where the young Taube studied law at the University of Göttingen. Taube later worked as a lawyer but spent many years travelling, which reportedly included a trip to North America.⁸⁵ Upon his return to Europe, Taube eventually became the legation secretary in the Habsburg embassy in London, utilising his German and English fluency and quickly establishing himself as an expert on the British economy, with a particular interest in Britain's emerging struggles to tax North Americans. In 1766, he published his first work on the issue titled *Thoughts on the Present State of our Colonies in North America*, but no known copy survives today.⁸⁶ One description of this work, however, attests that Taube collected the evidence for it from "his friends in North America."⁸⁷ The work was well received and Maria Theresa honoured him with a golden medallion. Later that

year, Taube unfortunately penned a critical report on the British government's handling of the situation, which prompted his recall back to Vienna. Still of use and recognised for his talents, he joined the Council of Commerce (*Commerz-rat*) as a counsellor (*Hofskretär*) in compensation.⁸⁸

Subsequently, Taube published his magnum opus in Vienna in 1774, his *Historische und politische Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen* (Historical and political depictions of English manufacturers).⁸⁹ In this work, he detailed the nature of the British economy, ranging from the goods produced to the scale and health of Britain's international trade across the world. The book's comprehensiveness made it a popular success, and this work included plenty of reference to the situation of the British colonies in North America. He highlighted for his readers the future prosperity of North America based on its economic vibrancy, growing population, and abundance of land. "That the land in America is so plentiful and inexpensive," he explained, "even the workers, servants, and day-labourers who know something of farming, can in a short time save so much money."⁹⁰ Such attractive economic vitality clarified, in Taube's view, why the population grew so rapidly since young men could easily provide for their families, therefore allowing American couples to marry earlier and have an average of eight children.⁹¹ Although much less explicitly than Frisi and Carli, Taube's convictions also flatly contradicted the ideas of American degeneracy. He argued, moreover, that the colonists were united by shared values of freedom of commerce and equal rights before the law.⁹² This common principle stood in contrast to the evermore restrictive policies imposed on them by their government in London. Taube made a forthright prediction that open conflict would come between the Americans and the British. Already in 1774, he wrote of the inevitability of American independence, which he believed would arise when Americans became "weary enough of English supremacy" and he was made all the more certain by the recent protests for which the colonists went without any chastisement for their disobedience.⁹³ "So it seems doubtful," Taube concluded, "to say whether England has more cause to fear or to hope from its colonies."⁹⁴

As the tensions led to bloodshed in the colonies, Taube wrote more works outlining his views. In 1776, he published his *Geschichte der Engländischen Handelschaft, Manufacturen, Colonien und Schiffahrt* (A history of English commerce, manufacturing, colonies and shipping). In an appended essay on the "true causes of the current war in North America," Taube squarely blamed the excessive taxation of the American colonists by the British, which itself lay in the historical development of the British economy.⁹⁵ From Taube's *longue durée* perspective, quite uncommon among German commentators at the time, the

American Revolution was an entirely foreseeable event. “Soon after the Treaty of Paris in 1763,” he explained in the introduction, “there began a longing for free trade in the hearts of the Americans.”⁹⁶ The Tea and Stamp Acts had denied them this natural desire and so the British were at fault for not listening to their unrepresented colonists. A strikingly sympathetic argument, Taube touched upon this theme again in his revised second edition of the *Historische und politische Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen*, which he expanded into two volumes in 1777 and 1778.⁹⁷ In the second volume, Taube took great pains to reiterate the “tremendous changes” and damage done to the British economy by their disastrous war in North America.⁹⁸ Yet Taube planned to publish his best material on that topic in a new third volume focused solely on the American Revolution.⁹⁹ What laudatory views of America and further criticisms of the British position this work would have contained we cannot know since Taube died suddenly in June 1778. In spite of his premature death, Taube’s works helped to pivot attention towards the peril and potential of the American colonists in North America. His works reached a large audience even in England, where the 1774 German edition appeared on the shelves of the Foreign Circulating Library in Leeds.¹⁰⁰ Not all reception was positive, however. The free-market advocate and court economist Count Karl von Zinzendorf read Taube’s volumes in December 1778 with great disgust. As a man who had studied the British economy and American colonial situation, Zinzendorf disagreed with Taube’s praise for the American boycott of British goods.¹⁰¹ “It is a compilation containing some curious facts interspersed with false or superficial reasoning,” he noted in his diary.¹⁰² Superficial or not, Taube had sown the seeds of discussion among the inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy. Years later, even Zinzendorf was still reading Taube’s texts.¹⁰³

One man in Vienna undoubtedly aware of Taube’s texts was Jacques Accarias de Sérionne. Like Taube, Sérionne was not a native of the Habsburg Monarchy. Born in Châtillon-en-Diois in southeastern France, Sérionne rose through the French administrative ranks before several risky investments forced him to flee Paris in the late 1750s. He settled in Brussels where he advised regional authorities on economic matters for almost a decade. In 1768, he relocated to Vienna as an advisor in the State Chancellery (*Staatskanzlei*) before moving to Hungary as an agent for the Batthyány family.¹⁰⁴ It was during these wandering years that Sérionne became one of Europe’s most popular economic essayists, publishing a variety of influential texts.¹⁰⁵ In Brussels, he founded the *Journal de Commerce* which ran for forty-eight issues with state support.¹⁰⁶ From his experience in France and as editor of the *Journal*, Sérionne became acutely aware of colonial

economic policies. In nine issues of the *Journal*, Sérionne penned essays on the colonial economies of Portugal and Spain.¹⁰⁷ Sérionne took a harsh line towards the effects of colonial enterprise. He looked backwards rather than forwards and saw in the previous decadence of the Spanish empire how corrosively the colonial market could undermine the metropole. In 1761 he published his *Les intérêts des nations* (The interests of nations) followed by his *La richesse de l'Angleterre* (The riches of England) in Vienna in 1771.¹⁰⁸

In *La richesse*, Sérionne took aim squarely at the American colonies, which he felt had sapped the English commercial system. From Sérionne's perspective a country could only count on its material wealth for economic strength. England, with its vast resources in timber and minerals, enjoyed a stable footing but the establishment of colonial projects had turned this economic system towards venture capitalism. Public credit served no one and private enterprise sequestered away the resources of the state. He noted how the American colonies had all been founded by private companies and had become their "richest branches of trade."¹⁰⁹ In agreement with authors like Taube, Sérionne echoed the vitality of these American colonies but rather than praise their might, he predicted inevitable conflict. "It is astonishing," he wrote in *La richesse*, "that a nation as enlightened as the English, has not foreseen in the projects of its plantations of North America, that those colonies which gather the same fruits and which have exactly the same industry as their metropolis, must necessarily become its rivals and therefore infinitely harmful."¹¹⁰ Sérionne went further with added prescience. He awaited the eventual independence of the American colonies. Written during his Hungarian employment in 1771, Sérionne lamented how it was too late for the British. The Americans had already been allowed to become too powerful for them to be subjugated indefinitely.¹¹¹ "The Englishmen of America are as good as the Englishmen of Europe," he warned, "and three or four thousand troops, which are about all that a European nation can transport to America, would not be enough of an army for them."¹¹² True, he acknowledged, the path to American independence had begun with the Stamp Act crisis, but it was fuelled by the "unceasing" rivalry of trade between the two sides. It would be completed only when the "embarrassment of such division" would interest all the "other industrious nations of Europe."¹¹³ In other words, not one but two commentators under the Habsburg Monarchy expounded the strengths of the American colonies and predicted the course of the War of American Independence several years before its outbreak.

The economic aspects of the American Revolution became one of the most intriguing details for Habsburg observers as attention shifted towards North



FIGURE 2. Portrait of Father Maurus Lindemayr of the Benedictine Abbey in Lambach, Upper Austria

America. In Lambach Abbey in Upper Austria, one Benedictine monk wrote a play about the Revolution's commercial fallout. Written in heavy Austrian dialect in 1780, Father Maurus Lindemayr's three-act drama *Der engländische Patriotismus* (English patriotism) featured two English merchants coping with wartime turmoil.¹¹⁴ The first, Hickshot, denounces the American "rebels" he reads so much about in the newspapers and yearns for peace.¹¹⁵ "I toss and turn at night; you'd have to scorch Philadelphia for me and blow Boston to smithereens," he recalls in one aria.¹¹⁶ A proud Londoner and Tory, Hickshot defines his Englishness upon anti-American lines. "Good" Englishmen should, in Hickshot's view, "curse the colonists [and], like the Antichrist, strike thunder into the rebel! To pray for that is to be a Brit."¹¹⁷ Hickshot's staunch sentiment is counterbalanced by a Bristol merchant named Smedley who trades freely with the Americans. Lindemayr's play was not anti-American, however. Debate over the colonies is complicated by additional characters, such as Hickshot's lackey John who acts confused by events. He asks at one point whether England is the motherland and America the daughter ("*England ist ja das Mutterreich, und Amerika ist die Tochter?*").¹¹⁸ In a one-sided conversation between John and another, more cognisant Hickshot lackey, the clearest distillation of the new

definition of America appears. Hagel, in response to John's incessant misunderstanding of the impact of the Revolution, proclaims "for me America may be a part of the world but it is no longer a continent (*Weltteil*)."¹¹⁹ Before this, Hagel spells out for John how North America is in fact many component pieces including New France, "*Neubritannien*," Acadia, New England, New Holland, New Denmark, New Spain, Virginia, Florida, and the lands of the Huron and Iroquois.¹²⁰ In Lindemayr's theatrical depiction, America was no longer a single entity but rather a fractured land reflecting the disaggregation unfolding across the Atlantic. Lindemayr's vision of America reached audiences beyond his monastery at Lambach. Augustinians frequently performed his plays in nearby Sankt Florian and Linz and in the neighbouring Archbishopric of Salzburg, Michael Haydn—Joseph Haydn's less famous younger brother—set the play to music.¹²¹ Through song and drama, they articulated the new political constellation unfolding across the Atlantic.

Taube, Sérionne, and Lindemayr were not alone in their reorientation towards North America. On the stages and in the palatial concert halls of the Habsburg lands, theatrical and instrumental works also guided outlooks northwards. Joseph Marius Babo's 1778 play *Das Winterquartier in Amerika* (The winter quarter in America) centred on Hessian mercenaries and the quartering of soldiers among the colonists, for instance.¹²² This trend had begun already in the 1750s. One of the most popular and controversial dramatists in Vienna at that time, Joseph Felix von Kurz staged a pantomime called *Arlequin, der neue Abgott Ram in Amerika* (Harlequin, the new idol Ram in America).¹²³ The titular character Arlequin finds himself shipwrecked on the fictive American island of Tschaladey where, through comical altercations with a magician, he becomes mistakenly transformed into the deity Ram for the native "Indian" islanders. Kurz invoked standard stereotypes of American savagery typical of the prejudicial colonial lens, but the pantomime's end implied the existence of a more sophisticated North America as Arlequin is rescued by Dutch traders heading to the West Indies or New Netherlands.¹²⁴ Kurz's drama was also popular in Prague and Bratislava.¹²⁵ The piece was revived in Vienna in 1766 and appeared again in the 1770s under the name *Die Insel der Wilden* (The island of the savages).¹²⁶ This time the elder Haydn, Joseph, wrote music for the pantomime's arias.¹²⁷ And it was not the only piece by him to deal with an American theme.

Joseph Haydn's cosmos was filled with American imagery. His patron, Prince Nikolaus Esterházy, employed a servant from the West Indies whom Haydn knew well and whose mixed-race son he tutored.¹²⁸ At the Esterháza court in Hungary, where Haydn lived and worked for most of his life, depictions of South

American characters became commonplace through adaptations of works such as Voltaire's *Alzire, ou les Américains* (Alzire, or the Americans) (1736) and Graun's *Montezuma* (1755).¹²⁹ Haydn followed this trend by composing his own works to American themes, but he primarily composed around North American tropes. His symphonies, no. 34 in D minor (1765) and no. 49 in F minor (1768), made allusions to the Quakers in the popular comedy *La jeune Indienne* (The young Indian girl) (1764) by Nicholas Chamfort, a popular fixture throughout the 1760s and 1770s in Vienna as *Die junge Indianerin* (The young Indian girl). In 1779, Haydn set a libretto of *L'isola disabitata* (The deserted island) to music by the Viennese court poet Pietro Metastasio. The performance referred to a Caribbean moral tale of an English slave-owner whose life is saved by a West Indian girl, who he eventually sells into slavery for social advancement.¹³⁰ Within the walls of Esterháza, Haydn learned about America from his careful reading of William Robertson's *A History of America* before his journey to London in the 1790s brought him into personal contact with West Indian merchants and exiled American loyalists.¹³¹

Beyond Esterháza, Habsburg audiences (mainly the nobility) digested an influx of new American imagery through operas.¹³² Popular works in Vienna often revolved around new-world themes but in the 1760s and 1770s, the figure of the Quaker loomed large over this cultural space. Viennese conceptions of the Quakers were imported from abroad, in works such as Chamfort's *La Jeune Indienne* (The young Indian girl) and Guglielmi's *La Quakera Spiritosa* (The spiritual quakeress).¹³³ The Tuscan-born librettist Ranieri de Calzabigi was one of the most influential dramatists living in Vienna; he popularised Quaker characters and a more favourable vision of North America.¹³⁴ His operatic libretto *Amiti e Ontario* (1772/1774) takes place in Pennsylvania where two Native Americans, a female Amiti and a male Ontario, are owned by a Quaker, Mr. Dull, who falls in love with Amiti, whilst his relative Mrs. Bubble falls for Ontario. Dull plans to free both of the enslaved in order to go ahead with the marriages but Amiti and Ontario have concealed their own love for each other from him. When this is revealed, Dull, inspired by their true love, responds leniently and honours their freedom despite his own feelings of affection and his power over them.¹³⁵ Although the main Quaker character, Dull, is represented as a slave owner, his benevolence and self-sacrifice shines through, even towards Native Americans. Calzabigi's choice of Mr. Dull as a name seemed loaded with intent as it conjured up connotations with the German *duldsam* (meaning tolerant or indulgent) to further reinforce the positive attributes of the character and his actions at the end of the opera.¹³⁶

As fictive as the characters' names sounded, Calzabigi played on the realistic antagonism between Great Britain and the North American colonies. Mr. Dull's relative, Mrs. Bubble, is made out to be an Anglican who decries Dull's plans for freedom for Amity and Ontario and offers to buy one of them herself—her preference is, of course, for her beloved Ontario. Her interjection provokes an abolitionist declaration from Dull, which not only underscores the moral superiority of the Pennsylvanian but, in the context of the emerging transatlantic split, serves to undermine the British stance vis-à-vis slavery.¹³⁷ In creating a character like Mr. Dull, Calzabigi was not only demonstrating how North America offered a more enlightened example to the world but he was also echoing the thoughts of other intellectuals in the Habsburg lands. It was as if Calzabigi had read and dramatised the reports of the *Gazzetta di Milano* which announced how Quakers in Pennsylvania “gave an unusual proof of love for humanity [as] the majority of the residents of that colony agreed to free all their black Slaves.”¹³⁸ Despite the reflections in Calzabigi's opera, discussions on slavery and the abolition of the slave trade in Central Europe remained muted until the early nineteenth century.¹³⁹ Yet Calzabigi's rendering of Pennsylvanian Quakers in *Amity e Ontario* endured throughout the age of the American Revolution and throughout the Habsburg lands. Giuseppe Scarlatti composed music for its premiere at the Burgtheater in Vienna and for a private performance at the Auersperg family residence.¹⁴⁰ The work was subsequently adapted by Neapolitan librettists and composers into *Le gare generose* (The contests in generosity) in 1786, which saw Mr. Dull relocated to Boston and devoid of any Quakerism.¹⁴¹ The new version arrived back in Vienna the following year with additional revisions by Lorenzo da Ponte and Carl Ditters von Dittersdorf whose changes retained the core of Calzabigi's vision of virtuous North American inhabitants.¹⁴² As the musicologist Pierpaolo Polzonetti points out, America in these operatic performances “was not represented as an exotic, primitivistic land” but rather as “modern, business-orientated, and politically and socially more advanced.”¹⁴³ By the 1780s, North America had firmly entered the cultural zeitgeist of the Habsburg lands through drama and print to create a rising awareness of the different character of the British colonies and their increasingly uncertain future.

Conclusion

The notion of America fascinated the inhabitants of the Habsburg lands long before the American Revolution, and various views of the New World circulated via several mediums in Central Europe. America functioned as a symbol

for Habsburg rulers and elites seeking to display their worldly wealth, and it appealed to aristocratic sensibilities for the latest fashions and curiosity for new-world artefacts. Religious lenses often depicted the New World as primitive and inferior, but information from first-hand reports became the bedrock for new global epistemologies. Jesuit authors in Trnava and Graz contributed to the proliferation of American knowledge. Returning Jesuits kept alive the curiosity and captivation with the Americas; even Maria Theresa was susceptible to the opportunities to learn indirectly about American encounters. As the first murmurings of the American Revolution began in the mid-eighteenth century, Habsburg inhabitants became increasingly aware of the situation in British North America, and Habsburg intellectuals developed distinct responses to these disturbances. Taube and Sérionne correctly articulated the colonial challenge to Great Britain and believed in the inevitability of American independence. In Habsburg Lombardy, Frisi and Carli refuted ideas of American degeneracy using examples of progress from the British colonies. The shift towards a progressive, industrious view of North America occurred simultaneously in drama and music. Colonists in the thirteen British colonies represented a tolerant and prosperous people on stage and in sound, and theatrical performances, especially, reinforced understandings of the colonial contest erupting in North America. England was the motherland and America was the daughter, but the question in Habsburg minds became: for how long?

“Some Here Are Warm for the Part of America”

The American Revolution and the Imperial Court at Vienna, 1776–1783

“**E**VERY IDLE FELLOW TALKS of America,” complained the British ambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith about his Viennese neighbours to his friends in London.¹ He first sounded that alarm in 1774. As time rumbled on, the rumours of discontent between Great Britain and her thirteen colonies became an unavoidable fact, much to the fascination of the “idle” onlookers in Vienna. When war broke out a year later and the unilateral announcement of independence followed another year after, Viennese courtiers became fully aware and engrossed by events transpiring across the Atlantic. They were not merely passive observers, however. American news fuelled sympathies as well as speculation. There were those who felt content to follow events closely and those who could not do so without expressing their support. There were, of course, those who disagreed with the American crusade, but they were in a minority. The imperial court at Vienna was a largely pro-American scene. When the first official American representative, William Lee, arrived in Vienna in 1778, he could write home with pride about how “Some here are Warm for the part of America.”²

Identifying who these “warm” supporters of the American Revolution were within the Viennese court reveals the widespread interest in American affairs within Habsburg government circles. This includes individuals who worked and attended court in Vienna, from the clerks to the socialites to the highest echelons of political circles, including the imperial family themselves. The rather pro-American stance to be found across this hierarchy might seem surprising at first but it speaks to the cultural and intellectual power of the American Revolution. Discussing the attitudes of imperial courtiers in Vienna is a necessary step in understanding the American Revolution’s impact upon the Habsburg Monarchy, especially since courtiers’ knowledge and opinions shaped the policies of the Habsburg dynasty and the policy of the Holy Roman Empire.³

The nobility, moreover, were social shapers, signifying contemporary intellectual and cultural currents.⁴ Whilst French and British influences were undeniable in their socio-cultural cosmos, a distinct American line entered the highest Habsburg circles as a result of the fascination surrounding the Revolution as a political event. Absorption of the American Revolution at the Viennese court produced discernible effects; it shaped the monarchs’ responses to the Revolution as well as the first American envoy’s chances of success. As a continual site of cultural exchange, political patronage, and social visibility, the imperial court at Vienna also determined, in part, the cultural tone for the rest of the Habsburg lands. Fascination with the American Revolution, once signalled there, became an obsession across the whole of the Monarchy. In doing so, courtiers not only defined their own cultural cosmos but also the wider reception of America throughout the Habsburg Monarchy.

Imperial Courtiers and the American Revolution

Individuals rarely commit to paper with their own name something which they do not believe to be true. In this sense, letters written to Benjamin Franklin, arguably the most famous celebrity of the revolutionary cause in Europe, provide one of the most insightful windows into the effects of the American Revolution and its widespread popularity within the Habsburg Monarchy. It is, admittedly, an imperfect window; one which marginalises those who felt disgruntled by the American revolutionary influence, or those whose letters have failed to be preserved. But the outpouring of sentiment manifested in the surviving letters from the Viennese elites does offer an illuminating perspective as to how the American cause was received among imperial courtiers. Three officials contacted Franklin from inside the walls of the Hofburg, the main residence of the Habsburgs in Vienna. The earliest message came from Joseph Bek, a comptroller (*Raitrat*) in the accounting department of the war ministry (the *Hofkriegsbuchhalterei*). Bek’s letter gushed with his enthusiasm for the United States. He hoped to emigrate and serve through Franklin’s sponsorship. His desire to “sacrifice” himself for the American cause came from his reading of “The History of America,” which likely referred to William Robertson’s volumes of the same name.⁵ Bek possibly received these tomes through his friendship with the Zinzendorfs; Count Karl von Zinzendorf, the governor of Trieste, who knew Robertson personally from his visit to Scotland and read his works, and his half-brother Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf who, as president of the former Court Accounting Chamber (*Hofrechnungskammer*), wrote a recommendation for Bek to Franklin.⁶

Whereas Bek requested Franklin's assistance—an example that many others in the Habsburg Monarchy would emulate—two other courtiers sought to offer gifts to Franklin. Paul Strattmann worked in the Court Library (*Hofbibliothek*) as a court censor when he wrote to Franklin offering a catalogue of French books.⁷ His gift to Franklin was a token of esteem but also as an offer of service should Franklin need a librarian.⁸ In 1786, Johann Melchior von Birkenstock, another member of the censorship committee and court councillor (*Hofrat*), gifted Franklin a copy of his work commemorating Frederick II of Prussia, which Franklin deemed worthy enough to acknowledge.⁹ Importantly, Birkenstock shared with Franklin a deeply held sentiment for the United States. "I pray to God," Birkenstock informed Franklin, "that he will preserve for you for the glory of your country, for the consolation of all good people, a long succession of years, and that he will fill you with blessings reserved for the most worthy mortals." These were hardly empty words since Birkenstock asked Franklin to "accept these vows, Sir, as true and sincere."¹⁰ Vowing to pray for the prosperity of the United States was a remarkable promise for a Viennese courtier to make, especially one who sat on the censorship committee within a monarchical state.

Such sentiments espoused by Birkenstock and Strattmann help explain the relatively lax censorship of Americana in the Habsburg lands during this period.¹¹ From mid-century onwards, censorship in the Habsburg Monarchy fell under the purview of a central committee consisting of religious officials, university elders, and several courtiers.¹² After Maria Theresa's death in 1780, her son Joseph II relaxed many of these efforts and allowed a flood of new domestic works to enter market.¹³ From 1754 until the thaw of the 1780s, the committee maintained a running list of banned works in the *Catalogus librorum prohibitorum* (The catalogue of prohibited books), which mainly consisted of works critiquing the clergy, philosophical and literary works deemed too "radical," and, of course, pornography. In all, the committee banned 5,000 works in the period before Joseph II's sole accession and only a few hundred thereafter.¹⁴ The vast majority were French and German works; English texts numbered just over a hundred by 1791.¹⁵ During the Revolution, only seven works relating to America appeared on the censors' lists.¹⁶ In 1776, three books received the "*damnatur*" (rejected) grade as retroactive bans on works of fiction which portrayed America in an adventurous light. Apart from a German translation of William Russel's *History of America*, the remaining texts pertained directly to the Revolution and included a German rendition of one of Samuel Adams's speeches.¹⁷ No other revolutionary tract or American figure's works were banned in the Habsburg Monarchy until the 1790s. The reaction was the same in other regions such as

the Austrian Netherlands and Habsburg Lombardy where censorship rates were lower and the Catholic Church determined efforts towards more religious and moral matters rather than political tracts.¹⁸ The relatively lenient attitude of censorship officials towards Americana, combined with the fact most nobles could obtain outlawed works through various means, effectively rendered the imperial court and the Habsburg Monarchy completely permeable to the expansive literature surrounding the Revolution.¹⁹

Newspapers in the Habsburg Monarchy reported on American matters rather freely but when editors did fall foul to censorship due to the Revolution, they received support from the court nobility. The state-sponsored *Wienerisches Diarium* produced the highest amount of Americana in the Habsburg Monarchy out of twenty-four other newspapers and periodicals which discussed the Revolution.²⁰ From tumultuous Boston in 1774 to surrender at Yorktown in 1781, around 3,500 pages described revolutionary events in the *Diarium*.²¹ In April 1779, its editors created a separate “American News” section.²² Texts by American revolutionaries frequently appeared in German translation without any difficulty from censors. In fact, Thomas Jefferson’s *Summary View of the Rights of British America* became the first such published text in late 1774.²³ There were some signs of self-censorship, however. Prior to 1776, for example, emigration to North America was a reoccurring theme in the *Diarium* but this topic halted abruptly from then until the end of the war.²⁴ When the Declaration of American Independence became known in Europe, most Habsburg newspapers exercised caution—with the exception of those in Lombardy and Tuscany—by omitting the charges against King George III and printing only the preamble and conclusion.²⁵ Other newspapers in the Habsburg lands showed clear signs of tampering. In one Hungarian newspaper, the editor apologised to his readers for the blank spaces about the Revolution in previous issues due to what he called the “High Authority.”²⁶

In December 1777, the *Wienerisches Diarium* incurred the same scrutiny after publishing an article that would become known in Vienna as the “American Catechism.” The article outlined the radical devotion of the Revolution’s adherents through a fictional interview with a mob of rebellious patriots in the form of a series of fictive questions and answers. The final exchange provided the most alarming refrain: “What shall pass if you should be defeated? Answer: We would set everything ablaze and kill ourselves, our women and children.”²⁷ When Maria Theresa learned of this publication, she was incensed that such an article had been published and sought retribution against the editors.²⁸ However, one nobleman intervened to protect them from punishment. Count August von Seilern

had been the Habsburg ambassador in London during the 1760s where he reported sympathetically about the colonists during the early disturbances with the British in North America.²⁹ By 1777 he had returned from London and was the Governor of Lower Austria (*Statthalter des Erzherzogtums Österreich unter der Enns*). He interceded in the case over the “American Cathecism” by insisting that the newspapers had not impinged upon monarchical supremacy by printing the text, but rather had merely sought to show the “fanaticism” in North America.³⁰ Seilern’s reluctance to prosecute the editors reflected the general tolerance shown by courtiers towards the flood of Americana during the Revolution.

Across the Habsburg Monarchy, administrators shared similar sentiments. The head of the regional government in Lombardy, Count Johann Josef von Wilczek, convinced Franklin’s Milanese friends to confer his “highest esteem” and sought to obtain an original English copy of the constitutions of the United States—this was after one of them had lent him a copy in French.³¹ In the Austrian Netherlands, Count Joseph Nicolas Windischgrätz declared Franklin to be a worldwide inspiration.³² He extolled Franklin’s wartime actions, claiming he had done “so much good for [his] country [. . .] and for humanity.”³³ In a giddier second letter, written in response to Franklin’s simple receipt of the fifty copies of Windischgrätz’s latest essay, he confessed his wish to meet Franklin, willing as he was to travel from Brussels to Paris in order to become the “happiest man” in the world if Franklin accepted.³⁴ Buoyed after their meeting in late April 1785, Windischgrätz wrote once more to reiterate his “eagerness” to fulfil any of Franklin’s future “orders” either in the Austrian Netherlands or the Holy Roman Empire.³⁵

Windischgrätz was the sort of aristocratic who enjoyed contact with famous minds like Franklin.³⁶ However, his interactions with Franklin were also somewhat more sincere than his interactions with other famous scholars. In addition to flattering words, Windischgrätz actively supported American activities by acting as a courier for American newspapers, which Franklin sent to Vienna.³⁷ But Windischgrätz was an erratic intellectual whose progressive views jarred with his contemporaries who thought him to be wild, vain, and an overly utopian thinker.³⁸ In a series of pamphlets published in the mid-to late 1780s, Windischgrätz dabbled in philosophical and political matters in sometimes meandering tracts. In one treatise, his *De l’âme, de l’intelligence et de la liberté de la volonté* (Of the soul, of intelligence, and of freedom of will), he merged his philosophical studies with Franklin’s electrical theories, asserting that human intelligence was defined by an internal electricity.³⁹ By 1787, his mind had hardened towards the belief that government should not transgress natural rights of

subjects.⁴⁰ Amid the revolutionary unrest in the Austrian Netherlands in the late 1780s, Windischgrätz advocated constitutional rights and defended these in radical pamphlets that "turned heads" and drew the ire of his friend, Emperor Joseph II.⁴¹ The American Revolution was therefore a natural attraction for Windischgrätz given his intellectual leaning and his admiration of Franklin.

When in Vienna, Windischgrätz was part of a close coterie of influential courtiers thanks to his first wife, the Countess Maria Josepha Windischgrätz (née Erdödy) and her friends. The "society of the five dames" brought together prominent members of the court's aristocracy for almost daily informal gatherings starting in 1767.⁴² As a close friend of the Windischgrätzes and fixed member of the group, Count Philip Cobenzl noted how the meetings in the Viennese townhouses and country palaces revolved around sipping tea and chatting as "one of us read from an interesting work of some sort."⁴³ Discussions of the American Revolution featured in these chatty moments. Karl von Zinzendorf noted the oration of an American revolutionary text during one dinner party in 1785 with several of the dames in attendance.⁴⁴

Yet despite the collective being composed of "political and religious radicals," it is doubtful that this coterie harboured much American support beyond perhaps those of the Windischgrätzes.⁴⁵ Although Princess Eleonore von Liechtenstein (née Oettingen-Spielberg) delighted in reading Voltaire and became an epitome of an enlightened woman at court, she mistrusted revolutionary movements.⁴⁶ For her, the American Revolution was simply a step too far as reflected in her distaste for the upheaval caused by the Revolution. During one meeting, Liechtenstein derided the official "sixth member" of the group whose idleness in trying to end the American Revolution caused her great frustration.⁴⁷ The "sixth member" was the emperor, who joined the group from 1769 onwards. At another point, Joseph's visit to the Dutch Republic in 1781 annoyed her further since she felt the visit was mistimed and could damage relations with the British who had just gone to war with the Dutch.⁴⁸

Her preference for ending the American war came from her sister-in-law, another one of the dames, Princess Leopoldine von Liechtenstein (née von Sternberg), who was friends with Lady Juliana Penn, the daughter-in-law of Pennsylvania's founder William Penn. In a letter to Leopoldine, Lady Penn had explained the dire situation of the loyalist dynasty whose family estates had been confiscated by the patriots without compensation. Almost destitute, she appealed to the Liechtensteins for Joseph's intervention, and the duo tried to help. Given the criticism of the emperor's actions, Eleonore and Leopoldine likely knew that Joseph would be unable or unwilling to offer any assistance and so they hesitated

until the end of the conflict when they asked an intermediary “in the most pressing way” for Franklin’s intercession on behalf of the Penns.⁴⁹ Franklin of course ignored the request as he had Lady Penn’s earlier direct appeal to him.⁵⁰ Though Lady Penn was not successful, her appeal increased the negative views of the American Revolution held by both Eleonore and Leopoldine Liechtenstein. Others within the group also disliked the American cause. At the prominent Burghausen salon, Countess Leopoldine von Kaunitz (née Oettingen-Spielberg) erupted into “a grand tirade against the Americans” when the emperor raised the subject.⁵¹ Such an outburst greased the millwheels of gossip at court.

Apart from the dames, there were several prominent Anglophile salons in Vienna which harboured those more unsympathetic to the American cause. The houses of the Pergen and Thun families constituted this bulwark. Both households shared close ties to the British ambassadors serving in Vienna. Countess Philippine Gabriele von Pergen (née Groschlag) and Count Johann Anton von Pergen considered themselves intimate friends of Sir Robert Murray Keith. Count Pergen command excellent English and wrote extensively to Keith on personal matters when out of town.⁵² The previous ambassador David Murry, then Viscount Stormont, occupied the same house as the Thun family on Minoritenplatz and fraternisations were so close that guests suspected an affair between Stormont and Countess Wilhelmine von Thun (née Uhlfeld). Years later, Keith relocated to the same residence.⁵³ Both households became renowned among British travellers for their hospitality and friendly dispositions towards Britain. The famed travel writer of his age Nathaniel Wraxall waxed lyrical on their importance for such visitors to Vienna. “The houses of both [...] form the best resource for the English during their stay in this capital,” he wrote.⁵⁴

Count Karl von Zinzendorf, a frequent guest at the Pergen’s whenever he was in town, noted the continual presence of English guests.⁵⁵ On one occasion, he happened to overhear Countess Pergen reassuring her visitors that there were “ten royalists for every one American” in Vienna.⁵⁶ At first, Countess Thun was broadly sympathetic to the Americans. “I am a Bostonian at heart,” she wrote to one of her British friends in 1775, but bloodshed dampened her enthusiasm.⁵⁷ Both countesses played host to the centre of British life among Viennese courtiers.

There is no evidence of any anti-American sentiments among the wider court nobility apart from pro-British salons and the dames. The first explicitly anti-American propaganda in the Habsburg Monarchy circulated privately after the Napoleonic Wars when most aristocrats viewed all revolution negatively.⁵⁸ In fact, courtiers contested the condemnation of the American Revolution by the dames. In 1781, Zinzendorf noted a “dispute about the Americans” over a

dinner hosted by the Liechtensteins.⁵⁹ He did not describe the argument in any great detail nor the positions of the attendees, leaving us to surmise that the likely pro-American guests were Gottfried van Swieten—Strattmann's boss at the Court Library—and Count Joseph Johann von Seilern, the son of Count Seilern who had defended the publication of the Declaration of American Independence.⁶⁰ Likely opposing them were the conservative-minded Bishop of Wiener Neustadt, Johann Heinrich von Kerens and the elderly Prince Heinrich von Auersperg, then aged eighty-four, who were close friends of the Liechtensteins and the British ambassador. In any case, the divides over America between the dames and their guests was enough to merit Zinzendorf's record.

Zinzendorf himself was certainly one of the most learned men in the Habsburg Monarchy about the American Revolution. A Saxon by birth but scion of an ancient Austrian family, Zinzendorf was the nephew of the Protestant evangelist, Count Nikolaus von Zinzendorf who had led the Moravian Herrnhuter to North America in the 1740s.⁶¹ After studying in Jena and moving to Vienna, Karl von Zinzendorf embarked upon a series of state-sponsored commercial tours as a means to gather intelligence on the latest economic and administrative ideas.⁶² Great Britain, as part of his tour, was where he gained his intimate knowledge of America. He met Benjamin Franklin in London, walked with William Robertson in Edinburgh, travelled the Highlands with Johan Murray, the fourth earl of Dunmore—before he became the royal governor of Virginia—and dined with Glasgow's infamous tobacco barons.⁶³ In a report prepared for the Viennese court, simply entitled his *Observations*, Zinzendorf devoted an entire section to the economic and legal arrangements of British North America.⁶⁴ Spanning nearly one hundred pages, Zinzendorf described how the colonial government operated in all twenty-six British-American colonies. He listed their major manufactured goods, detailed various colonial currencies, explained property rights, calculated the populations of each colony and their tax incomes, and provided a history of major cities from Boston to Charleston. As a result of his British sojourn, Zinzendorf became an unquestionable authority on the American colonies in the Habsburg Monarchy at the beginning of the Revolution.

Zinzendorf spent most of the American revolutionary years in Trieste where he served as governor between 1776 and 1782. He used his position to procure Americana in Trieste, where traders smuggled anything for a price. He developed a huge appetite for such literature, reading all he could about the Revolution. In 1778, for instance, he read Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, John Dickinson's *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania*, and the British radical Richard Price's *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty*.⁶⁵ Zinzendorf's interest persisted long after

the war. In the 1790s, he read histories of the Revolution by Americans David Ramsay and Charles Stedman.⁶⁶ His personal contacts fleshed out the rest. In 1780, Zinzendorf heard first-hand accounts of the Ticonderoga campaign from English guests over a game of whist.⁶⁷ On another occasion, he met with a British veteran of the war.⁶⁸ Consuls and merchants became Zinzendorf's avid informers of revolutionary news throughout the period.⁶⁹ During his frequent visits to the Vienna, Zinzendorf went out of his way to learn from others about the Revolution.⁷⁰ He sought out those more knowledgeable and exchanged texts on American topics.⁷¹ As an inquisitive person, the American Revolution fascinated Zinzendorf throughout this period.

Imperial courtiers were well-informed about the Revolution and animated by its cause. In an age when courtly life and the governance of a nation were so closely linked, the personal opinions of administrators mattered a great deal. Positive reception of the American struggle enabled transparent encouragement among officials for Franklin and his Revolution. In terms of the censorship, the deeply held views of two committee members accounts to some degree for the negligible efforts to curb the flow of Americana during the Revolution. Count Seilern's defence of the *Wienerisches Diarium* reflected his more favourable disposition towards the American colonies resulting from his earlier time as ambassador in London and his advocacy was strong enough to question his monarch's intentions. Zinzendorf's erudition about British North America influenced his later outlook on trade between Trieste and the United States. In short, absorption of the American cause among courtiers influenced tangible aspects of the Habsburg reaction to the Revolution.

Impugning the American Influence at Court

For certain, a curiosity about the American Revolution pervaded the atmosphere at court in Vienna. The nobility was united by an interest in the progress of American affairs. During the revolutionary years, speculations abounded, and news of the latest victories were shared among all ranks of the nobility.⁷² This incessant obsession of courtiers drove the British ambassador, intent on suppressing the issue, to utter despair. The desperation is almost tangible in Sir Robert Murray Keith's personal correspondence with a group of friendly civil servants in London known as "the Gang."⁷³ "I would give my best suit of gala clothes for the gift of a six months' fore-knowledge of your American affairs," he offered to one friend in the British admiralty.⁷⁴ To another he proposed fifty pistols in exchange for any news about the "refractory offspring in America."⁷⁵ Keith

constantly bemoaned how he was "famished," "parched," "too little informed" about American events and implored his friends to become his "Cicerone in America," or his guide with "their echo to my attentive ear," or his "pilot to guide me into port."⁷⁶

When his friends in London failed him, he often turned to others in the British diplomatic corps but without much success either.⁷⁷ The sudden death of his younger brother, Sir Basil Keith, Governor of Jamaica from 1773, left Keith bereft and without another avenue for information.⁷⁸ As a member of the Scottish aristocracy, however, Keith often played host to a number of young Scots on their Grand Tours of Europe and came to rely on these informal channels for American news. When the young Scottish aristocrat Henry Hay-Macdougall visited Vienna during the winter of 1776, for example, Keith received letters containing forwarded reports from relatives fighting in North America.⁷⁹ Resonant of Keith's desperate situation, Hay-Macdougall informed his father on multiple occasions how "We long much for good American News."⁸⁰

Keith laid bare the reasoning behind his desperation in his personal letters. He sought to combat the "public clamour" for Americana at the Viennese court where, in his opinion, only the voices of "the noisy brawlers for licentious democracy" could be heard.⁸¹ As early as March 1774, Keith bluntly pointed out the precariousness of the situation:

Everybody here talks wildly about liberty, and electricity, *because they understand neither*; and I am shrewdly suspected to be a friend to monarchy and King George, and therefore to have seen everything that regards America and the Doctor [Franklin] with an eye of partiality. I shall fight, however, a rare battle, under your banner; only give me now and then a few material[s] to dumbfounder my noisy opponents.⁸²

Keith clearly felt that an information war was being waged in Vienna between him and those advocating for the Americans. He also wanted to rehabilitate the British standing against "the absurdities with which every paper has been filled" and to "stem with honour the torrent of falsehood and presumption."⁸³ Following talk of desertions in the British army in North America, Keith was relieved to learn from friends that this was just hearsay and he used this news "to knock half a dozen lies on the head."⁸⁴

Keith sensed, however, that he was fighting a losing battle such was the interest and pro-American feeling among courtiers.⁸⁵ Compounding his situation was the increasingly bad turn of events as Britain slowly but surely lost control of the American colonies. Keith could not conceal British defeats from Viennese

courtiers. One of Keith's young Scottish visitors commented in a letter to his mother upon learning of the recent naval defeats and of the British surrender after the Siege of Yorktown,

You can't conceive how our poor country is now despised, even by those who acknowledge the Great Power, Patriotism, and Courage of Great Britain. They ask, have you lost your Senses that you don't procure better commanders, and punish those who behave ill. A Foreigner asks an Englishman [here]: where are all your sailors who distinguished themselves in the last war? Your Hawke, your Boscawen, your Howe, your Keppel, your Gilchrist, your Elliot etc. etc. Those that never sought conquering and who never turned their back to their enemies. The Englishman with silent sorrow shakes his head.⁸⁶

"Silent sorrow" summed up the feeling of shame that clouded Keith's status in Vienna as a result of the war. Such was the bitterness of loss that another of Keith's Scottish guests wrote home to the Highlands towards the end of the war, "I am almost ashamed to wear the English uniform; the taking of Minorca surprises everybody here and I suppose the whole world too."⁸⁷ By 1780, the British chances at victory seemed so remote that Keith led his delegation and friends to a chapel in St. Stephen's Cathedral to pray for England.⁸⁸

Among the foreign diplomatic corps at the Viennese court, Keith was most certainly outnumbered by pro-American supporters. He remarked how news of British defeats made it "hard to hold my head as high as I shall ever wish to hold it," especially among the "score of foreign ministers who [...] look upon the faithless Bourbons as the very lords of the ascendant."⁸⁹ Indeed, the French delegation acted as a bastion of support for the Americans in Vienna. Prior to 1778 when France openly took part in the conflict, they ensured Franklin had open channels of communication with Vienna.⁹⁰ In transporting back and forth letters from his friends, the chief secretary in one instance slipped in his own letter to Franklin, offering him another means of conveyance and supporting the application of the delegation's courier who wished to go fight for the United States.⁹¹ At the same time, another secretary offered to sell Franklin his recipe for improved gunpowder, something which he felt would secure patriot victory.⁹² Cardinal Louis de Rohan, the French ambassador from 1772 to 1774, offered one of Franklin's friends in Vienna the use of his palace in Paris should he not have means to visit Franklin.⁹³ These supportive acts preceded the later hosting and direction of the first American envoy to the court of Vienna by French representatives.

Keith's only hope was the attitude of the State Chancellor (*Staatskanzler*), Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg. As his biographer points out, "no subsequent foreign minister, including Metternich, wielded the kind of domestic influence that Kaunitz did."⁹⁴ Kaunitz was the gatekeeper for international affairs. He decided what issues to bring to the monarchs' attention and formulated his own articulations before doing so. It is for this reason that Kaunitz has been touted as a "de facto third head of state."⁹⁵ Although Kaunitz was a noted fan of enlightened thinkers and many historians have pointed to his interest in the French philosophes and patronage of the arts, there is no evidence that he held any interest in American ideals.⁹⁶ In all his memoranda and discussions on American-related events, Kaunitz adopted an opinion heavily defined by geopolitical considerations and a marked caution towards the upheavals caused by rebellion against British monarchical authority. Containment appears to be the byword for his initial reaction. At no other point was Kaunitz clearer about his fears of democratic revolution than in his remarks on first reading the Declaration of American Independence in the Viennese newspapers. He believed it to contain "extraordinary sections which may cause the spirit of rebellion to spread like a plague."⁹⁷ For Kaunitz, the anti-monarchical nature of the Revolution was the seemingly greater danger to ward against.

None of his official or personal writings with the Habsburg monarchs strays from this guarded approach.⁹⁸ Much has been made of the terms "insurgents" and "rebels" that Kaunitz used to describe Americans in his despatches to Habsburg diplomats, yet these descriptions do not reveal any great insights into his views on their Revolution since such terms were commonplace among European officials.⁹⁹ What is more revealing is that Kaunitz held on to this terminology longer than other officials within the Habsburg administration, perhaps demonstrating that his subtle bias against the Revolution persisted longer than those of his contemporaries.¹⁰⁰ When confronted with the news of Franklin's arrival in Paris amid rumours of an intended alliance, Kaunitz regarded Franklin's intentions as "foolish" if the rumours were true.¹⁰¹ Kaunitz certainly expressed his belief that any American victory would be "hard to expect" but the effects of one should be prepared for either way.¹⁰² This black-and-white logic surrounding American events is the major characteristic of Kaunitz's reaction to the Revolution.¹⁰³ In spite of his dominance over the State Chancellery, Kaunitz's logic was only advisory in nature, as the Habsburg monarchs remained the sole arbiters of executive authority and indeed had rather different ideas.

The Imperial Family and the American Revolution

In considering the position of the foreign monarchs, historians have tended to assume a natural alignment against the Americans since a revolution against the British crown transgressed the rights of rulers. This assumption is only half correct in the Habsburg case. Not all members of the Habsburg dynasty shared a negative outlook on American events. They were equally affected by the same curiosity which intrigued the Viennese court at large.

When the Continental Congress proclaimed independence in 1776, Maria Theresa had ruled the Habsburg Monarchy for just over thirty-five years. Her early reign endured a baptism of fire during the War of Austrian Succession and the failure to reverse territorial losses in the Seven Years' War. She lost all appetite for international conflict and dedicated the remaining years of her reign to securing peace and stability for her realm. It was within this context that the sixty-year-old monarch received the unwelcome news of revolution across the Atlantic. Her initial reaction chimed with Kaunitz: the American Revolution was something to be ended and shielded against in the meantime. When an article known as the "American Catechism"—advancing the American justifications for the war—appeared alongside a translation of the Declaration of American Independence in the *Wienerisches Diarium*, her response centred on stifling public awareness in case it should "breed incivility" within her realms.¹⁰⁴ Maria Theresa was equally fearful about the international fallout of the Revolution. She feared it would lead the whole of Europe to war. "The war in America," she fretted to her daughter Marie Antoinette, queen of France, "may very easily cause a conflagration where I could be driven against my will, especially with our despicable neighbour Prussia."¹⁰⁵ Her fears seemed borne less out of prediction than her memory of the Seven Years' War when conflict in North America had boiled over into a war in continental Europe.

Maria Theresa remained highly vigilant about American events due in part to her paranoia over its consequences. Among the people of the Habsburg court, she may have indeed been the most informed about the actual events of war thanks to her network of informants, which she cultivated up to her death in November 1780. Aside from the steady stream of information from Kaunitz's ministry, she also relied on other court officials for news from America, who supplied to her "reflexions upon the present affaires of the world which she could not so well be informed of by her own ministers."¹⁰⁶ Franklin, by way of his Habsburg correspondents, sensed a way to influence the imperial court. On December 29, 1777, the first of many long reports Franklin penned made its way into the hands of



FIGURE 3. Portrait of Maria Theresa as a widow (ca. 1767)

Maria Theresa's secretary, Baron Karl Joseph von Pichler, which summarised Franklin's views on the current state of the war.¹⁰⁷ Franklin showed a clear determination to influence Maria Theresa towards a more favourable outlook on the Americans. His reports emphasised atrocities committed by the British, the losses suffered by mistreated Hessian recruits, and the significance of American victory at Saratoga. One line spoke directly to her as a sovereign:

If America without England can become formidable, what would become of England combined again with America? Those who know the natural insolence of the British Nation will think that the common interest of Europe is to keep these two nations separate.¹⁰⁸

These lines were aimed at coaxing Maria Theresa's support for American independence by reminding her of Britain's propensity for expansion and the dangers of American defeat. Maria Theresa left no written reaction to these texts, but she expressed gratitude to the court officials for supplying her with these informal updates, which demonstrates her curiosity to learn about the Revolution.

When Maria Theresa passed away in late 1780, this dissemination campaign continued with her son Joseph II who from then on ruled as the sole sovereign of the Habsburg Monarchy. He received a French translation of Franklin's views in

1782, which was also read aloud to Joseph's private chamberlain, Count Karl von Hatzfeld—such was the interest at the court.¹⁰⁹ It was not the first time Joseph had received and read such material. In August 1782, a similar set of Franklin's reflections arrived, which the emperor kept personally.¹¹⁰ Franklin's direct link into the Habsburg court and by extension the royal family was unusual for European courts. In France, American envoys waited on invitations to speak with the king, whereas in Vienna, their desired words could be translated and delivered personally to the Habsburg monarch.

When Joseph II travelled to Paris to visit his sister Marie Antoinette in 1777, two myths regarding him and the American Revolution were born. Only one can be proven. In advance of his journey, Joseph made known the sort of people he wished to meet in the French capital, Franklin included.¹¹¹ There was one stumbling block, however. Joseph could not openly invite Franklin to an audience nor could he, as an imperial ruler, pay a visit to a rebellious commoner. Although the meeting between the American revolutionary and the "revolutionary emperor" was intended to be a meeting of enlightened minds, they could not escape the political ramifications if such a meeting were to take place.¹¹² Yet Joseph seemed determined to meet with Franklin. Intent on finding a solution, Habsburg ministers arranged for an intermediary to host the meeting in an unofficial capacity. They chose Raimondo Niccoli, the head of the Tuscan delegation in Paris and a supportive figure to the Americans, since his service to the emperor's brother and his affinity with Franklin would endear him to both sides.¹¹³

On Monday, May 26, 1777, Franklin received an invitation to drink hot chocolate at the Hotel de Mirabeau two days later with Niccoli, a Count Falkenstein—Joseph's customary travelling alias—and two Frenchmen.¹¹⁴ Franklin had all the reason to accept. It was a great opportunity to press the claims of the Americans directly to one of Europe's great powers and to the head of the Holy Roman Empire, the source of German mercenaries for the British. Moreover, the personal admiration between these two men went both ways. Franklin had noted the arrival of the "very industrious" emperor a few weeks earlier.¹¹⁵ He also later commented that "I respect very much the Character of that Monarch, and think that if I were one of his Subjects he would find me a good One."¹¹⁶ Franklin and Joseph were to be disappointed, however. Franklin recollected the event on the back of his invitation immediately after the arranged meeting: "The Emperor did not appear, and the Abbé [Niccoli] since tells me that the Number of other persons who occasionally visited him that morning [. . .] prevented his coming [. . . though] at twelve he came but I was gone."¹¹⁷ As a result Franklin and Joseph never actually met in person and one of the greatest encounters of

the enlightenment, perhaps on par with the meeting of Johann Sebastian Bach and Frederick II of Prussia, vanished.

Niccoli obscured the truth from Franklin by telling him a “number of other persons” had prevented Joseph’s attendance. The “other persons” were in fact the British delegation in Paris. The British ambassador knew about the meeting and worked to thwart it. He and his secretaries descended upon Joseph that morning and stalled him long enough to prevent him meeting with Franklin.¹¹⁸ In spite of their endeavours, the British did not prevent one of the emperor’s subordinates from attending the meeting. Count Johann Philipp Cobenzl—the same count who had attended meetings with the dames—recorded in his diary how he enjoyed his time at Count Niccoli’s and his “appointment with Doctor Franklin.”¹¹⁹ No further contact came between the two parties during the emperor’s stay, however. News of the British subterfuge eventually spread and even soon found its way back to Vienna. “I know he [Joseph] wished to have a discourse with you,” one courtier later mourned, “and he should be sorry some management for England had prevented him to instruct himself in the company of a philosopher.”¹²⁰ Joseph’s plan to meet Franklin may have been sabotaged, but his high regard for Franklin still became widely known.

Underhand British actions could not prevent the rumours among French courtiers that Franklin had in fact met Joseph. In 1787, the Scottish statistician and architect William Playfair published a pamphlet titled *Joseph and Benjamin – A Conversation*, which he claimed was based upon “a French manuscript.”¹²¹ Whether or not such a French manuscript existed is unknown.¹²² Playfair’s work was a rich fictional dialogue in which the two men discuss human nature, economic theory, and exchange good humour between them. His version of the encounter was an idealised form of enlightened interaction between men renowned for their progressive inclinations. Playfair’s publication cemented the ambiguity of the meeting in the public mindset despite the poor reviews it received in London.¹²³ In the fictional conversation, the character of Joseph is supportive of Franklin’s revolutionary efforts and so the first myth was born.

The second myth arose from one of the many dinners during Joseph’s stay in Paris. A guest at one reportedly asked him whether he supported the actions of the American patriots. Joseph cryptically replied something along the lines of “I am a royalist by trade.” This remark became arguably Joseph’s most well-known utterance on the American Revolution. It was included in numerous contemporary publications but without a credible source.¹²⁴ Since then this quotation has appeared frequently, most notably in American literature.¹²⁵ There is no

single verifiable trace of whether Joseph said this or not. It is likely this phrase was invented. As the Habsburg ambassador commented to Maria Theresa a few months after Joseph's departure, "The public continues to be preoccupied with the details of the emperor's journey; they amuse themselves by composing a thousand anecdotes that I do not believe are genuine."¹²⁶ Moreover, it was simply not in keeping with the rest of his visit where everything was carefully choreographed and even the meeting with Franklin was conducted under the strictest measures to avoid any signs of partiality. In all likelihood, Joseph kept his opinions on such matters close to his chest.

Joseph expressed his true feelings on the American Revolution with individuals closer to him. In his personal correspondence with his ambassador in London, Count Ludovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso, Joseph revealed an increasing disdain for British actions in the American Revolution. He disagreed with what he perceived to be Belgiojoso's "slight Anglomania" considering the disastrous campaigns in North America. "You cannot deny," he argued to Belgiojoso, "that it would be impossible to make worse all the affairs of England, that is politically and militarily, from the last years."¹²⁷ In subsequent letters, Joseph saw the consequences of the Revolution as overwhelmingly negative for Britain. "The fruits of this disorder," he warned, "where there is neither love of country, nor of the state, nor of the sovereign, will be felt for a long time."¹²⁸ This sorrow for the effects of the Revolution was the closest Joseph came to condemning it. However, he did not outright denounce the Americans for causing such chaos. They appeared in his letters as a rather more innocent by-product of British misrule than active instigators—his descriptions mimicking a line espoused by Franklin in the reports that made its way to Joseph at court. In a personal letter to his brother, Joseph voiced his belief in British comeuppance after receiving the "happy" news from Belgiojoso that the famous British Admiral Rodney had been roundly defeated by French forces. "I am not as English as they believe," he confided to him, "nor as they want me to be."¹²⁹

In his private correspondence with the Russian Empress Catherine II, Joseph went a step further. He expressed pity for the "poor Americans" who he felt had been beaten, bankrupted and sat "like frightened hens, waiting for someone to shoot them."¹³⁰ "Poor Americans" was a phrase he used often to Catherine even as he described their forces as "superior" and noted that British victory was impossible.¹³¹ In the early 1780s, "Americans" was not yet a fully established term within the Habsburg administrative vocabulary. Kaunitz and others still used the pejoratives "rebels" and "insurgents" but Joseph adopted the newer demonym, perhaps revealing a tacit—or willing—acceptance of their political independence.



FIGURE 4. The brothers Emperor Joseph II and Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo of Tuscany by Pompeo Batoni

Joseph's view on the Revolution evolved over the course of the war from an initial interest to be informed like his mother, to wishing to meet with Franklin despite the political consequences, to a natural aversion towards it brought on by the discord created in Britain and, finally, to the acceptance that the United States of America would be a sovereign nation. Throughout it all, Joseph, along with his ministers, struggled to maintain a neutral balance. This was the reason why he came under fire from the dames for not acting to end the war just as the British carefully monitored his actions for sympathising with the Americans. Caught in the middle of what he called a "big and furious game," Joseph's true feelings towards the Revolution centred on frustration with an event not of his design and outside of his control. It was the price to pay for being "a royalist by trade."¹³²

The same cannot be said for Joseph's younger brother. As the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Pietro Leopoldo occupied an easier position.¹³³ The Revolution still affected his grand duchy in a number of ways, however. Commercial ties between the Tuscan ports and the New England fisheries had existed for decades and such connections as well as the lure of further wealth forced the Grand Duke to act sooner on the issue than his brother. Hence Pietro Leopoldo developed

an intense interest in the American Revolution, its developments, and ideas. He corresponded with the Tuscan schemer Filippo Mazzei in order to find out more and, knowing the Tuscan delegation in Paris had substantial inroads with the American commissioners, sought to gather further information from them.¹³⁴ He received translations of American documents and subscribed to the partisan *Affaires d'Angleterre et d'Amérique* (English and American affairs), which Franklin published with French collaborators.¹³⁵ When Pietro Leopoldo temporarily relocated to Vienna in 1778 to deputise for his brother and mother during the War of the Bavarian Succession, he continued this subscription and had the American propaganda delivered directly to the imperial residence at the Hofburg.¹³⁶

In March 1779, Pietro Leopoldo left Vienna for Florence in a disgruntled mood. Over the course of his deputyship, he felt horrified at the running of the Monarchy: finances were poor; civil servants waged interdepartmental war, radicals agitated for religious reform, Hungarians decried new taxation, foreign alliances were either weakened or faltering, and, worst of all, the emperor only uttered "frightful, despotic statements."¹³⁷ Upon his return to Florence, he set about a new project to redefine the political order between subjects and sovereign in Tuscany. In his *Primo distesto ed idee sopra la formazione degli stati nuova costituzione pubblica* (First draft and ideas on the formation of states and the new public constitution), he planned to relinquish absolute power in favour of popular consent.¹³⁸ Such ideas, he argued, were more in line with the modern ideals of French philosophers, whom he deeply admired.¹³⁹ Leopold's new constitutional ambitions owed a share of influence to American thinkers, too. In one section, Leopold declared every Tuscan had "an equal right to happiness, well-being, security and property."¹⁴⁰ The familiar-sounding line is unequivocally American. Tuscan newspapers had published complete translations of the Declaration of American Independence years earlier with the immortal phrase, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."¹⁴¹ But another American declaration might have been his inspiration; in June 1776, the Virginia Convention adopted George Mason's Declaration of Rights which also proclaimed the rights to "life and liberty, [...] property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."¹⁴²

Pietro Leopoldo's new plans contained many echoes of the Virginian Declaration of Rights yet it was Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776 which provided him with concrete ideas about how best to enact more enlightened government.¹⁴³ He studied a French translation of the Pennsylvanian constitution intently, producing a handwritten copy and his own ten-page *Observations*.¹⁴⁴ Pietro Leopoldo's notes were his gut-reactions to the ideas he encountered in the American text, offering a fascinating insight into a Habsburg archduke's first-hand take on the radical democratic experiments unfolding across the Atlantic. His *Observations*

opened with a bold declaration of his own admiration for American political ideas: "What I ask is that, in order to make a good [legal] code in all states, even in monarchies, one begins with the principle posed by the Americans, the principle of equality."¹⁴⁵ Pietro Leopoldo saw this core American value as the basis for any good form of government; "political equality," he later noted, "is essential to the democratic order [...] there should be no exception for anyone."¹⁴⁶ In his view, the safeguarding of this equality clearly existed in Pennsylvania's constitution through innovations such as limited terms and the rotation of positions, which Pietro Leopoldo felt would eradicate any abuses of power.

For the next three years, the Grand Duke toiled away on his constitutional project, swapping ideas and drafts with his chief minister Francesco Maria Gianni.¹⁴⁷ Concerning the extension of what Pietro Leopoldo termed peoples' "sacrosanct natural rights"—another allusion to "unalienable rights" in the Declaration of American Independence—and Pietro Leopoldo's calls for wider democratic participation, Gianni frequently dissented. Gianni saw the Tuscan people as unfit for democratic duty. The notorious Medici family had ruled Tuscany for the better part of three centuries before the Habsburgs took control in 1737; such a legacy, Gianni claimed, had corrupted the Tuscan people beyond recognition. They could not be entrusted to act for the greater good.¹⁴⁸ Pietro Leopoldo might have agreed with him. In an earlier study of his Tuscan holdings, the Grand Duke acknowledged that his people possessed a "certain shrewdness" or "deception" and were "always divided amongst themselves."¹⁴⁹ In his *Observations*, Pietro Leopoldo had already conceded, "When one understands the human heart, one sees how difficult it is to sustain governments at a certain degree of perfection. It is men who govern and [for perfect government] it would be necessary that the leaders be above man, that they be angels."¹⁵⁰ As much as Pietro Leopoldo endeavoured to endow his subjects with greater rights, his constitutional project stagnated. The bout of intense collaboration with Gianni starting in 1779 gave way to long periods of apathy throughout the 1780s.¹⁵¹ Despite the immensity of his reform achievements in Tuscany, Pietro Leopoldo's constitutional ideas remained in draft form.¹⁵² Notwithstanding, for a brief time during the American Revolution, a Habsburg ruler seriously contemplated its ideas and sought to implement them in his own lands.

Conclusion

If we are to understand the magnitude of the American Revolution, we must be able to comprehend its totality. The imperial court at Vienna, far removed from the Atlantic coastline, was not impervious to American revolutionary

sentiments. Courtiers expressed a large degree of fascination for the goings-on in North America. The ideals they encountered, the gossip it produced, even the disagreements it provoked, set the imperial court abuzz. Much to the despair of the British ambassador in Vienna, there was a positive attitude towards American victories and little by way of counter-revolutionary rhetoric. There is little evidence to show that the Viennese court was a divided society over the Revolution and much to show that it was generally supportive. Noblemen such as Seilern, Wilczek, and Windischgrätz and administrators such as Bek and Birkenstock looked favourably upon the success of the patriots. Zinzendorf, one of the most knowledgeable bureaucrats, devoured whatever information he could come across regarding the Revolution.

Franklin gained unrivalled access to the monarchs unlike anywhere else in Europe. The imperial family were awash with information about the American Revolution: Maria Theresa read tailor-made reports by Franklin whereas Joseph sought to meet the latter for himself whilst his brother Pietro Leopoldo mused upon the Revolution's principles. It can be of no surprise to anyone that when the first American representative arrived in Vienna in May 1778, he exclaimed how "some here are warm for the part of America." The cultural phenomenon of the American Revolution, its spectacle and its influence, forces us to recognise the magnitude of its reach—even in a place we might assume to be too remote and within circles previously assumed to be too anti-revolutionary.

“Angels of the New Republic”

The American Revolutionary Influence in the Habsburg Lands,

1776–1789

IN THE ARKADENHOF, the central courtyard of the University of Vienna, a gallery of pillared busts entreats the visitor. Along the row of marbled figures and underneath the Tuscan-sloped arches of amaranth pink and almond yellow stands a scientist with a smirk. “*JOHINGEN - HOUSZ 1730 - 1799 ARCHI-ATER CAESAREVS 1768 - 1799 QVA RATIONE PLANTAE ALANTVR PRIMVS PERSPEXIT*”—“Jan Ingenhousz (1730–1799), Court Physician (1768–1799), Discoverer of Photosynthesis.” An ordinary scientist for those who happen to notice his visage as they stroll through the hallowed hallways. Ingenhousz was not a conventional character, however. Neither an alumnus nor ever a full member of the university, nor even an Austrian for that matter, Ingenhousz’s inclusion in the Viennese Valhalla came about due to the determination of his first biographer, the botany professor Julius Wiesner. Erected in 1905, the artistic rendering of Ingenhousz arrived in time for Wiesner’s organisation of the second International Botanic Conference which took place in Vienna that year.¹ As cognizant as Wiesner and other biographers have been of Ingenhousz’s discovery of photosynthesis and of his contemporary celebrity, his role in bringing the American Revolution to Vienna has gone unnoticed. He was Franklin’s contact at the imperial court. He was the disseminator of American propaganda to Maria Theresa and Joseph II. He explained the American Revolution to people like Zinzendorf. Ingenhousz was the great partisan of the revolutionary cause in the Habsburg Monarchy. His unfettered access to the court allowed him to be the spokesman for the patriots, the defender of Franklin, and the focal point for others interested in the revolutionary turmoil across the Atlantic. There is still space for such a recognition on the plinth.




FIGURE 5. The memorial bust of the great partisan of the American cause, Dr. Jan Ingenhousz in the central courtyard of the University of Vienna

The American Revolution became a diplomatic conundrum and a commercial opportunity for the Habsburg Monarchy, but it remained throughout its course a cultural phenomenon. Contemporary observers and historians alike have noted the Revolution's intellectual and cultural impact across Europe.² Yet their accounts neither acknowledge the immediate impact of the Revolution on the Habsburg lands nor the breadth of its effects. The effects of the Revolution simmered before they burned. The American precedent inspired the United States of Belgium in the Austrian Netherlands in the late 1780s as well as the Revolutions of 1848. Although prominent examples, these instances were not the first symptoms of American revolutionary influence in the Habsburg Monarchy. Instead, individuals in the Habsburg lands reacted positively and vehemently to the unfolding events transpiring across the Atlantic. Observers of the Revolution across the Habsburg lands felt compelled to act; some to promote the revolutionary goals, other sought to enlist for the cause, and many wished for the Revolution to succeed. Events begot emotions which in turn produced actions. We have already seen how one family, the Schusters of Vienna, named their child in honour of patriot revolutionaries. Across the Habsburg Monarchy, individuals responded positively to the struggle against British rule in the

thirteen colonies. This positivity signals a need for the wider acknowledgement of the influence and impact of the American Revolution in Europe.

The Franklin Factor

Benjamin Franklin was undoubtedly the popular face of the American Revolution in Europe. For people across the Habsburg this famous scientist-turned-revolutionary embodied the spirit of the American cause. The hundreds of surviving letters from Franklin's correspondents across the length and breadth of the Habsburg Monarchy are testament to the enduring appeal of Franklin and the Revolution he represented in the minds of many Habsburg inhabitants. His correspondence yet again provides a useful barometer for American interest in the Habsburg Monarchy. In the words of one historian, "the number of Franklin correspondents from that area is amazing." "They confirm," he added, "the impression that pro-American sympathies were widespread in this area," especially in Vienna, which he also surmised "was much better informed about American events than the court of the Prussian king."³ Indeed, the number of existent Franklin correspondents from the Habsburg Monarchy outnumbers Prussian correspondents by almost five to one.⁴

Franklin received at least 258 letters from 97 individuals who either resided in or were natural-born subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1775 and 1789.⁵ Notorious for never keeping up with his mail, Franklin sent a total of forty-nine letters back to sixteen individuals. Franklin's letter exchange with Habsburg residents and subjects amounted to almost two percent of his total (incoming and outgoing) correspondence.⁶ No other American corresponded with as many individuals from the Habsburg lands during this period, reflecting Franklin's overwhelming centrality in the Habsburg interest for the American Revolution. His correspondents came from all corners of the monarchy and beyond; from Lemberg (nowadays Lviv in the Ukraine) to Linz. At one point or another, Franklin received supportive messages from every province of the Habsburg lands.

Professional interests played a large role in determining who chose to write to Franklin. Intellectuals, scientists, and men of letters were pivotal in crafting the first positive views of Franklin and his later participation in the Revolution. Many had met Franklin personally. Professor František Antonín Steinský was a gifted polymath and professor of auxiliary historical sciences at the Charles University in Prague.⁷ He detoured to Paris during his European tour in 1780 to explicitly meet with Franklin, whom he admired and had sign his autograph book. A cordial friendship developed between them that continued after




FIGURE 6. Benjamin Franklin's arrival at Versailles by an unknown engraver (ca. 1778)

Steinský's return to Prague, where he functioned as Franklin's promoter among the Bohemian intelligentsia.⁸ The two kept each other informed of scientific developments in North America and Central Europe, exchanged books, and Steinský gifted Franklin's works to other Habsburg scientists.⁹ In 1789, Steinský became one of the first Habsburg subjects elected to the American Philosophical Society at Franklin's behest.¹⁰

In Milan, Marsilio Landriani helped to popularise Franklin's scientific reputation. Landriani endorsed the advantages of Franklin's famed electrical conductors. In his *Dell'utilità dei conduttori elettrici* (On the utility of electrical conductors) (1784), he praised the "immortal" Franklin's invention and referred to the lightning rod as the "Franklinian bar."¹¹ At the same time, the director of the Oriental Academy in Vienna, Johann von Gott Nekrep, returned from visiting Franklin in Paris and lauded him among colleagues. "Vienna," he informed Franklin, "is more than ever desirous to see so sage and so able a Statesman, and so a philosopher."¹²

Franklin's scientific fame had secured him an admiring audience long before 1776, but his perceived support of the Revolution followed by his arrival in Paris as American ambassador made him the Revolution's tangible contact for many Europeans. Military personnel consistently approached Franklin, both in person and in writing, in order to offer their services for the young republic. In total, twenty-one people from the Habsburg lands offered Franklin military




CHART 1. Letters received by Franklin from the Habsburg Monarchy, by background, 1775–1789.

service. Applications came from across Europe, however, not just the Habsburg Monarchy. Many did so out of desire for employment, especially during periods of peacetime in Europe. In the chart above, it is possible to see the correlation between Habsburg military approaches to Franklin and the times of war. When forces were mobilised for the War of the Bavarian Succession between Prussia and the Habsburgs in 1778, military solicitations to Franklin dropped but picked up again in the final two years of combat in North America. After hostilities ceased in 1783, nobody with a military connection wrote to him from the Habsburg lands. A majority of the offers came from officers, but more ordinary soldiers also wrote to Franklin.¹³

Several soldiers were sincerely inspired by the revolutionary cause. Mihály Kováts de Fabriczy was a Hungarian nobleman and highly decorated soldier who found his own way to North America in 1777. In a letter to Franklin, he shared his motivation for doing so:

I now am here of my own free will, having taken all the horrible and trouble of this journey, and I am willing to sacrifice myself wholly and faithfully as is to be expected of an honest soldier facing the hazards and great dangers of the war, to the detriment of Joseph [II] as well as for the freedom of your great Congress.¹⁴

Similar sentiments can be found in other letters to Franklin. Two cavalry officers stationed in Babarc near Mohács in southern Hungary offered to desert for

America. “Born in the Empire,” they wrote, “where we still breathe some Freedom, and [are] burning with the Desire to spend our Days in a Country where Freedom will make so many happy.” In other words, they applied for service out of ideological concerns.¹⁵ This zeal was widespread among Habsburg officers. Count Franz Leopold Barbo von Waxenstein in Vidéz, Slovenia, described himself as “burning with a noble desire to serve [Franklin’s] country and find glory or death” and Captain Hippolytus Verité, commander of the Hungarian engineers stationed at Olomouc, Moravia, so desired “to serve the illustrious Republic” that he planned to quit his Habsburg service after twenty-six years and relocate his family in order to demonstrate his commitment.¹⁶ Verité sensed the wider trend of Habsburg soldiers offering themselves to the Americans and felt the need to distinguish himself among the applicants. “I would ask you not to confuse me with the many Austrian officers,” he begged of Franklin, “since it is not the necessity that forces me to seek the services of the United American Colonies [...] but only my inclination which makes me seek this change.”¹⁷ Throughout the War of American Independence, the desire to fight on behalf of the revolutionary cause was a common sentiment among officers in the Habsburg lands.

Others sought to aid the American cause in different ways. Many felt the need to share their linguistic capabilities. The Viennese physician Dr. Jakob Oberleithner offered his medical talents to Franklin in (somewhat patchy) Latin and asserted his useful proficiency in French and “Slavic Bohemian.”¹⁸ The radical author and former court secretary (*Hofsekretär*) to Maria Theresa, Franz Rudolf von Großing, professed his love for America which drove him to seek a secretarial role in America given his “thorough knowledge” of Latin, Italian, French, German, Hungarian, English, Spanish, and “Prussian.”¹⁹ Count Friedrich August von Grävenitz was an Aulic Councillor (*Reichshofrat*) in Vienna, who, apparently as one of eighteen children in a large aristocratic family, informed Franklin of his desire to retire to the United States “to acquire a small estate in either Georgia, the Carolinas, or Virginia.” With no shred of humility, Grävenitz insisted the United States, as a new country, would need such “accomplished” men.²⁰

There were also those who sought to gain from the American Revolution. Merchants were the most obvious collective seeking to exploit revolutionary upheaval to their benefit. Some of them wrote on behalf of their own mercantile houses—like those of *Veuve d’Aubremé & Fils*, *de Vinck & Co.*, and *Salucci & Fils*—whilst some represented consortiums of merchants such as Jean-Guild Wets in Bruges who represented a group of forty Flemish merchants.²¹ These mercantile letters to Franklin were often tinged with the sense of uncertainty

and their desperate need to obtain more information in order to begin transatlantic trade. Such was the case when Aegidius Dujardin wrote from Ghent in 1778 as one of the first merchants seeking Franklin's help with forging these new transatlantic ties.²² The majority of Franklin's mercantile correspondents in the Habsburg lands contacted him in 1783 when merchants desired to open and retain trading links to the United States now that peace had been declared. Even though merchants pursued profit more than passion, their interest in the United States as a trading destination greatly affected the overall response of the Habsburgs towards the American Revolution. It will become clear in later chapters just how deep this mercantile vein ran in the formation of Habsburg policy towards the United States.

For now, Franklin's epistolary connections represents the wealth of reactions among various inhabitants across the Habsburg Monarchy. These individuals overwhelmingly looked favourably upon his character and the Revolution he epitomised. For many, the Revolution signified opportunity, progress, or a cause to honour and defend. From Vienna to Vidéz, Brussels to Babarc the American Revolution was not held in contempt but rather praised and supported in the hands and minds of various individuals from a variety of different backgrounds. Their surviving testimony in their letters to Franklin reflects a sympathetic groundswell for the principles of the American Revolution long before the revolutionary turbulence of the 1790s. In the Age of Revolutions, the Habsburg Monarchy was not a land of latecomers but a land of engaged, observant, and even sympathetic inhabitants.

The Making of a Partisan: Jan Ingenhousz

Jan Ingenhousz was Franklin's chief correspondent in the Habsburg Monarchy. He received over half of Franklin's total replies and was Franklin's most prolific correspondent, representing nearly one-quarter of Franklin's Habsburg mail. The two men shared a close friendship which began in London during the 1760s when they met through common scientific interests and their acquaintance Sir John Pringle. In 1768, Ingenhousz left London for Vienna, where he successfully inoculated the imperial family and became the court physician to Maria Theresa. Despite separation, Franklin and Ingenhousz maintained a correspondence lasting from at least 1773 until 1788. Ingenhousz was cognizant of the great value of his connection with Franklin. Throughout the War of American Independence, Ingenhousz took great pains to ensure that this correspondence continued. He sent two copies of his earliest letters to Franklin—one via New York and one via

St. Eustatius—in the hope of reaching him in Philadelphia.²³ He relied upon the Parisian bankers *Tourton & Baur* to safely transmit letters to Franklin following his return to Europe in 1777. Often Ingenhouz concealed his letters in sealed, unaddressed envelopes which the bankers recognised. He reminded Franklin numerous times of the necessity of such clandestine actions and warned him not to trust servants with their mail as they “are too often unfaithful and paid by the police.”²⁴ By 1782, Ingenhouz had secured a more confident route through the Habsburg ambassador in Paris.²⁵

The spectre of their correspondence being discovered haunted Ingenhouz throughout the wartime years. For him, the act of communicating to Franklin linked him inextricably to the patriot movement. During his travels across Europe, especially to London in 1777–1778, he acknowledged the risks attached to such a dangerous liaison. Verbal communication through mutual friends was a safer way to correspond, Ingenhouz suggested to Franklin, especially as border guards “could search my pockets and find letters which they could suspect.”²⁶ A few months later, he thought it would be safer to use fictitious names for the letters.²⁷ Ingenhouz certainly was being overly paranoid. Though he imagined the very real threat of criminality arising from his association with an American revolutionary, there was little actual danger since most elites, even the monarchs themselves, were completely aware of his connection and permitted it. “They know I am known and correspond with a man of such public concern as you are,” Ingenhouz demurred. Indeed, for many people in the Habsburg capital, Franklin was the face of the Revolution, but this increased their desire to know more about him and, as we have seen, prompted many to write to him. Nothing ultimately came of Ingenhouz’s fears bar a few packages containing American newspapers held hostage in the Viennese post office until after the war had ended.²⁸ Yet the anxiety Ingenhouz endured from maintaining this correspondence forced an emotional reaction within him: he felt part of the Revolution.

Ingenhouz’s initial reaction to the hostilities was shock and dismay. Britain had been his home for many years and had harboured his greatest friendships. Moreover, the American colonies had been a retirement option in his mind, even to the point that he planned to emigrate with his nephew’s family²⁹—an idea he never completely lost.³⁰ Since he conceived of the colonies as a refuge for the persecuted and as a harmonious society across the Atlantic, he felt personally affected when conflict broke out in the 1770s. “That country is [*sic*] become the seat of horror and bloodshed, which I took to be the seat of tranquillity and happiness,” he exclaimed to Franklin before he lamented on how it could have been

"the only seat of undisturbed human felicity."³¹ Ingenhousz's early pessimism over the war gradually gave way to the belief that the colonists were the victims and the British ministers the aggressors. The sacking of "defenceless" cities and fermenting of Native Americans against the colonists were in his mind "unwarrantable and imprudent" acts of the British forces in North America.³²

At the exact same time, however, Ingenhousz chose to share extracts of Franklin's letters with the British ambassador, trading Sir Robert Murray Keith the latest account of his "old and faithful friend" in return for introductions to elites in London.³³ Ingenhousz's transformation took place gradually rather than suddenly. Following a reunion with Franklin in Paris and upon his return to Vienna in 1780, Ingenhousz's resolve towards the patriot side hardened. For one, he never shared letters with Keith again and, moreover, he thought American independence would sufficiently hobble the British who acted so belligerently in his mind that they threatened to destabilise European peace. He spoke no longer of the calamities of the war and instead told Franklin how "necessary it is for the tranquillity of Europe that your Country should remain free" in order to undo the "haughty" British.³⁴ Within a few years, Ingenhousz had completed his journey from shocked observer to a fervent pro-American supporter.

In his writings on the American Revolution, Ingenhousz's primary motivation was to exonerate Franklin. In 1774, Franklin faced what became known as the "Cockpit Trial" in London: a cross-examination by the Privy Council resulting from Franklin leaking letters to North American publishers which demonstrated the Massachusetts colonial governor had encouraged a crackdown on colonists protesting the new, unpopular taxes. Franklin's actions had provoked a maelstrom of anger and criticism towards the governor, further inflaming an already tense situation. British ministers held Franklin accountable and raked him over the coals during the hearing.³⁵ Rumours in Vienna (and across Europe) distorted the severity of Franklin's actions, and as a result the prevailing Viennese perception was that Franklin had organised the resistance in North America.

Ingenhousz set out to correct the narrative and dispel the notions of the American Revolution being a "Franklinian plot." In his *Remarques sur les affaires présente de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (Remarks on the current affairs in North America)—written in 1777 ostensibly for Maria Theresa but shared widely among courtiers as well—he repudiated the image of Franklin as a mastermind of rebellion. Ingenhousz instead clarified that the mistreatment of the colonists was the actual "source of discord and of the current insurrection."³⁶ His explanation carried weight among his peers and superiors given his standing at

court and his close connection to Franklin. On more than one occasion Count Karl von Zinzendorf visited Ingenhousz in order to find out more about the American cause which Ingenhousz was all too happy to explain to him.³⁷

In his essays written for the Habsburg monarchs that lasted throughout the Revolution, Ingenhousz increasingly defended patriot interests, becoming a reliable mouthpiece for Franklin and the American cause in Vienna. This was arguably his greatest intervention on behalf of the Americans during the war. To be sure, Ingenhousz was feathering his own nest as well. He needed Franklin's information to keep Maria Theresa "in good humour."³⁸ But Ingenhousz went beyond merely relaying Franklin's reflections. He made translations of Franklin's works and personal letters and accompanied them with short reports of his own about the Revolution.³⁹ Without doubt, Ingenhousz was the most effective supporter of the American Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy. He did more than anyone else within the Monarchy to enable the feelings of shared interests with the American cause, to explain their revolutionary goals to a broader audience, and to elucidate sympathy for the American patriots among his circles in Vienna. But he was not alone.

Leaving the Monarchy for America

Joseph Cauffman is a name unknown in the history of the American Revolution.⁴⁰ Yet Cauffman represents the profound radicalisation from bystander to fervent patriot that was possible under the ideals of the Revolution, even in a place as seemingly remote as Vienna. Joseph Cauffman was born in Philadelphia in 1755. As the eldest of ten children, he embodied the best hopes of his merchant father Joseph T. Cauffman.⁴¹ Joseph Sr. had arrived in Philadelphia in 1749 from his native Alsace region. A spelling mistake on his Pennsylvanian land deeds forced him to adopt the name "Cauffman" instead of the original "Kauffman," but he lost nothing else of his German-Alsatian heritage.⁴² The Cauffman family upheld their Roman Catholic faith, which meant Joseph Sr. found it difficult to obtain a suitable education for his eldest son. Like many well-to-do Catholic families, he decided to send Joseph Jr. to Europe for his education. Thus Joseph Jr. was eleven years old when he left Philadelphia to go, as he put it, "abroad amidst the dangerous rocks of intrigue, wickedness and an insnaring [*sic*] world."⁴³

Cauffman studied first at St. Omer's College in Bruges in the Austrian Netherlands. At Bruges, he could still feel part of his North American roots. Prominent Catholic families, mainly from Maryland, supplied the school with pupils. One of the signers of the Declaration of American Independence, Charles

Carroll of Carrollton had graduated a few years prior and one of his relatives, John Carroll, the future first Archbishop in North America, taught at St. Omer's in Bruges until the eve of the Revolution.⁴⁴ Joseph spent five years in Bruges before he enrolled at the University of Vienna. There, he studied medicine, which entailed a two-year course in philosophy before he even saw a cadaver, but which unlocked a prestigious world for him.⁴⁵ In the middle-years of his degree, he accompanied various renowned medical practitioners on their rounds of Vienna's poorhouses and clinics such as Dr. Anton de Haen, whom he called his "particular friend" in a boastful letter to his father.⁴⁶

Cauffman was not being arrogant about his situation. In another letter, written in the fateful summer of July 1776, he informed his father that he would sit his exams early, completing his medical degree within three years of specialisation rather than the usual five, a feat "hitherto unknown in this University," he claimed.⁴⁷ Emboldened by his first-rate education, Cauffman had mulled over his future career plans for a while. In 1775 he had thought of going to London to work with the famed Dr. John Fothergill. Returning to America was no comparison. He showed little interest in "surpassing our common quacks in Pennsylvania" unless it was as an assistant to the equally famous Dr. John Morgan in Philadelphia.⁴⁸ Edinburgh took his fancy in 1776 as he hoped his father could persuade Dr. Benjamin Rush to make some introductions for him there. But by the time he had earned his degree a year later, he had abandoned all such plans.

Cauffman became the University of Vienna's first American-born graduate in 1777.⁴⁹ The year became a dramatic turning point in the twenty-two-year-old's life. For many months he had become weary of the rumblings in North America, through the newspapers he read in Vienna.⁵⁰ By April 1777, he had become convinced of the need to act, the need to do his part in the Revolution. In a letter he wrote to Franklin, Cauffman outlined his vehement attachment to his homeland, which he made clear was now the United States of America. "I shall always think it the first duty of Man to serve his Country," he proclaimed, and "touched by the present calamities" he wished to honour "one of the most glorious causes."⁵¹ Cauffman felt his excellent medical training made him an ideal candidate to serve in the Continental Army. Gone were the notions of advancing his career in London or Edinburgh. He had expunged these wishful plans from his life's narrative. "I have applied myself with an indefatigable zeal to my studies," he professed to Franklin, "in order to prove one day or another, a worthy citizen of America."⁵² Cauffman presented himself as an ardently devout patriot and also offered to spy on Franklin's behalf in Vienna. "No pains shall be thought too great, no stone left unturned, to procure you proper information," he declared.⁵³

Cauffman's contact with Franklin came through his friendship with Ingenhousz. Both were members of the medical community in Vienna. They had become friends already by the end of 1776 when Ingenhousz mentioned how he enjoyed "the company of one Mr. Kauffman [sic] from Philadelphia" in a letter to Franklin.⁵⁴ When Ingenhousz departed Vienna for London to present the Baker lectures at the Royal Society in 1777, it seems Cauffman travelled with him.⁵⁵ A few months later, he served aboard an American frigate, the USS *Randolph*, as a medic.⁵⁶ At the start of 1778, the vessel sailed along with four other American ships to raid British supply lines in the West Indies. On March 7, spotters faintly sighted a lone British vessel and over the next few hours the convoy gave chase. In the dark hours of that evening, the captain of the *Randolph*, Nicholas Biddle, ordered the first shots fired broadside into the British ship they felt was no match. It was more than a match. The British vessel was in fact a ship of the line and severely outgunned the plucky frigate. The return volley struck the powder stores on the *Randolph*, detonating upon impact and blowing the ship apart. Only four survivors made it to the other vessels as they escaped the disastrous moonlight engagement. Joseph Cauffman was not among them. Instead, he perished along with most of the crew and became a martyr to the cause he had become so devoted to after finishing his studies in Vienna. The first American-born student at the University of Vienna died fighting in the American Revolution.

Joseph Cauffman's story is important because he was not alone. In his letter to Franklin, Cauffman affixed a note that informed Franklin about the "many able officers, even of rank," who "begged" him to include mention of their "desire of taking part in the present contest."⁵⁷ Whether or not they joined him on his journey across the Atlantic cannot be ascertained, but there were some who surely planned to go with him. When news reached Vienna of his death, his friends were distraught. Dr. Joseph Pelligrini, who had studied alongside him and worked at a hospital in the Landstrasse district of Vienna, wrote to Franklin explaining his previous intention to join Cauffman in serving America. Still undeterred, the unmarried, thirty-something doctor who spoke a smattering of English offered to fund his own travel if Franklin would help him gain safe passage to Philadelphia. As he confessed to Franklin, he wished to do so out of his "secret desire for America" because he so revered "the character and morals" of the new nation.⁵⁸ Such motivation stemmed from the zeal of Cauffman's example. Whereas Cauffman had a natural attachment to the place of his birth, Pelligrini's affinity for the American rose from the inspiring actions of his friends. It was one example of how the "contagion of liberty" permeated even to places within the Habsburg Monarchy.⁵⁹

Participation, however, worked both ways in the Habsburg Monarchy. As much as there were those who wished to or did go to fight *for* the Revolution, there were also those from the Habsburg lands who went to fight *against* the Revolution. Those who fought against the patriots in the War of American Independence participated as part of the Hessian mercenary forces. Six German principalities supplied the war in North America with around 21,000 men.⁶⁰ The Hessian regiments were not just local-born fighters, however. Like many European armies of that time, they were a hotchpotch of nationalities. Some of this patchwork had arisen from voluntary enlistments; foreign men following opportunities for work or signed up by recruiters sent out to fill the ranks. As manpower stocks diminished and demand remained steady, recruiters widened their geographic scope and turned to more illicit practices: bribery, impressment, or coercion.⁶¹ Habsburg ministers denounced such activities as an "evil" because Hessian recruiters interfered with their own recruitment drives for settlement in Eastern Europe.⁶² The poaching of military personnel for service in the Hessian regiments in North America became a grave concern to the ministers in the Court War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*) who met several times throughout the war to discuss the problem. At one point, ministers recommended resurrecting an old imperial edict which curtailed unpermitted migration in order to prohibit men from enlisting in the regiments destined for America.⁶³ Complete prevention proved ultimately futile, however.

Habsburg subjects serving in so-called Hessian regiments were present at almost every major battle of the American Revolution. At least 192 identifiable Habsburgs served in the Hessian forces in North America.⁶⁴ There were certainly many more, given the concern of the *Hofkriegsrat*, but archival records cannot indicate the exact scale. Soldiers serving in the Hessian forces originated from across the Habsburg lands. There were men from core regions like Josef von Bosen, a Tyrolean officer from Innsbruck, and Antonin Masorka from Krásný Les in Bohemia. Others came from further afield such as George Frohnauer from Trieste on the Adriatic and János Messet from Debrecen in Hungary. War was always a deadly business. All four men died during the conflict. In some cases, they never reached North America. Johannes Strosser from Grieskirchen in Upper Austria and Bernard Schäffer from Graz in Styria died at sea crossing the Atlantic. In other cases, some Habsburg subjects survived the war but became displaced after their service. A good number of them may have settled in the Canadian territories, though the majority returned home.⁶⁵

Justus Eggertt was one who returned. He had seen action in almost the entirety of the war. Originally from Leipzig, he had moved to Vienna in 1771 where

he suffered a dispute with his employers, the counts of Hoym. In the summer of 1776, he found himself without a job and, perhaps with the help of a local recruiter or perhaps spurred on by the reports in the national newspapers, he decided to enlist in the Hessian service. He joined the Ansbach regiment at Amsterdam and crossed the Atlantic on a British ship, which, as his journal account of the war details, carried more cannons than mattresses for the 250 soldiers aboard.⁶⁶ After a gruelling nine-week voyage, they reached Sandy Hook, New Jersey, in mid-August 1776. Days later, Eggertt took part in the largest battle of the entire war, the Battle of Long Island, a British victory that enabled the fall of New York City a few months later, which he survived unharmed. Eggertt fought in several more battles during the New York and New Jersey campaigns. He was stationed in Philadelphia and Baltimore where he quartered with German immigrants, who, he noted with surprise, owned slaves. Eggertt encountered slavery again during his final campaign in the Carolinas, but he only remarked on the higher quantities of slaves working on southern plantations. Landing at Charleston in 1781, Eggertt fought in the “most exceptional heat and severest storms” he had ever experienced. He witnessed many plantations “ruined” by his forces.⁶⁷ In his journal, Eggertt estimated that his military life had taken him over “6,000 German miles” before he numbered among the men who surrendered at Yorktown. Eggertt eventually returned to Austria in 1783 where he found work in the military administration in the Trauenviertel region of Upper Austria. He shared stories of his experience of North America up to his death in 1823.⁶⁸

Angels of the New Republic

The military heroes of the American Revolution piqued the interests of many observers across Europe. American military leaders became famous through their depictions in newspapers and periodicals but the yearning for learning more about them was greater still. One man in the Habsburg Monarchy was determined to find out more about these generals and as a result began his own personal journey with the American Revolution. In 1778, Johann (Baptist) Zinner was a historian and prefect at the Imperial and Royal Academy in Buda.⁶⁹ He became enraptured by the War of American Independence from descriptions he read in local and regional newspapers. He found that these newspapers often provided competing accounts and contradicting facts, however. Zinner raised this problem in a letter to Franklin that year. The famous turncoat, Benedict Arnold, Zinner complained with some exaggeration, “is sometimes made out to be a German of Mainz, sometimes an American of Connecticut, sometimes a

lapsed Capuchin monk, and sometimes a grocer from Norway."⁷⁰ How was he to discern the truth? Zinner's dilemma was all the more urgent since he was at work on two books on the American Revolution, and, as a good historian, he needed to separate fact from fiction.

Zinner was deeply motivated about the American Revolution. He travelled from Buda to Vienna in 1778 to meet with the first official American envoy to the Habsburg court, who, he hoped, would be able to provide him with the right information, but he missed the American by a few weeks. He turned to Franklin instead who responded kindly to his request for help. In 1779, Zinner accepted Franklin's invitation to visit him at Passy where he personally received copies of American letters and literature.⁷¹ Equipped with this first-hand material, Zinner headed back to Hungary, where in 1780 he joined the juridical faculty at the Royal Academy at Košice as a professor of statistics and history.⁷² At the time, Košice was a provincial metropole where the university had been founded by the local bishop in 1660 as the *Universitas Cassovensis* and run by the Jesuits until their dissolution. The Royal Academy at Košice was one of five new institutions established under the *Ratio educationis* (Education Law) of 1777.⁷³ Zinner joined a relatively small scholarly community, where of approximately seventeen staff members taught 372 students in the humanities.⁷⁴ Based on his surviving manuscripts, it is clear Zinner shared his American material with his pupils.⁷⁵ Zinner, however, was not content with bringing the American Revolution only to Košice; he had bigger plans.

From his academic perch nestled on the eastern side of the Tatra Mountains, far removed from the Atlantic, Zinner worked on several manuscripts chronicling the Revolution. In his letter to Franklin, he noted how he planned two monographs but in fact he completed three in rapid succession. The first book appeared in print in 1782, titled *Merkwürdige Briefe und Schriften der berühmtesten Generäle in Amerika* (Remarkable letters and writings of the most famous generals in America).⁷⁶ In 352 pages, Zinner retold various aspects of the revolutionary struggle up to 1780 through 46 indexed letters and thirteen essays, proclamations, and excerpts. Overall, Zinner translated and published either in part or in full over 70 original letters from the leaders of both sides (American and British) of the Revolution. American patriots were the overwhelming focus of his work which included famous names like Franklin, Samuel Adams, Horatio Gates, Charles Lee, and George Washington as well as figures who were less-known to German-speaking audiences such as the politicians Thomas Jefferson and Robert R. Livingston, and generals Israel Putnam, Benjamin Lincoln, and Arthur St. Clair. Most of them received an extensive and accurate

biography. Zinner certainly offered the most detailed accounts of these individuals within the German-speaking realm at the time. On the British side, Zinner provided only two much shorter but equally accurate biographies of the British generals John Burgoyne and Thomas Gage.⁷⁷ In his introduction to the work, Zinner outlined the need to show both sides of the conflict in order to present a neutral account of the war through the most important writings of the war's leaders.⁷⁸ Yet the imbalance within his work already belies his true intentions and partisanship towards the Americans.

Throughout his *Merkwürdige Briefe*, Zinner presented Americans in a kinder light than the British. Burgoyne and Gage, in Zinner's telling, both paled in comparison to the military prowess of the American generals. He noted Burgoyne's failure to defeat the Americans at Saratoga and Gage's Pyrrhic victory at Bunker Hill and subsequent retirement to London as their most noteworthy biographical moments.⁷⁹ Both biographies are short compared to any of those of the American leaders. Franklin received the most flattering (and longest) entry which Zinner used as proof that "such a man as Franklin is never to be despised."⁸⁰ Combining Franklin's victorious role in the war with his scientific reputation, Zinner rounded out his biography of Franklin with the attribution by Franklin's great admirer, Jean-Baptiste de Beaumont, "*Alterius orbis Vindex, utriusque Lumen*" (Champion of one world, light of both).⁸¹ When Zinner contrasted the unequal treatment of prisoners of war between the Americans and British, he portrayed the British army in an almost barbaric light. He published a letter by the patriot Ethan Allen which described cruel and punitive British captivity.⁸² British officers, such as Burgoyne, who turned a blind eye to the mutilation of American prisoners by Native Americans was another point which Zinner dwelled upon and regarded as contemptible.⁸³ By contrast, Zinner provided a favourable example of humane captivity on the American side with an account by a Hessian soldier.⁸⁴ In case the distinction was not clear enough, Zinner remarked that "the Americans meanwhile have observed better the rights of man" than the British who "thought that threats and destruction would lead to victory in this war."⁸⁵

Three texts within Zinner's *Merkwürdige Briefe* aimed at rousing a sympathetic interest towards the American cause. The first was Charles Lee's open letter of June 7, 1775, to Burgoyne, a polemic wherein Lee sought to tie himself to the patriot movement and to place the incoming British general in a tight bind by forcing him to take sides either for or against the nascent patriot movement.⁸⁶ Zinner faithfully reproduced Lee's patriotic words in German translation, including Lee's assertion that all Americans "from the first-estate gentlemen, to

the lowest planters and farmers" were animated by the same spirit of liberty to "preserve their liberties or perish."⁸⁷ Zinner also included Lee's immortal refrain that America was "the last asylum of persecuted liberty."⁸⁸ Likewise, Zinner reproduced Samuel Adams's speech on the steps of the Philadelphia statehouse made on August 1, 1776. This was the same speech Habsburg censors had banned in 1780, so it is striking that Zinner dared to republish such material in translation.⁸⁹ Zinner's copy of the second edition of *Common Sense*, from which he also provided translated excerpts, would have been equally shocking for the censors.⁹⁰ Selected portions of the *Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs* featured some of the most fiery statements where Zinner paid particular attention to the justifications for the American cause.⁹¹ Zinner echoed the calls to accept the inevitability of the United States as an independent state.⁹²

Merkwürdige Briefe was Zinner's first and only published text on the American Revolution. His other two books, which he had mentioned in his letter to Franklin in 1778, were written out by hand but never published.⁹³ These works were thought lost by historians up until now but have in fact remained in Košice since Zinner's time.⁹⁴ Zinner completed the first of these two works in 1783. Titled *Notitia historica de Coloniis Americae Septentrionalis* (Historical notes on the North American colonies), Zinner divided the course of American history into three distinct periods: first, from the discovery of America by Columbus to the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763; second, the colonial disturbances in the 1760s and 1770s and their antecedents in the political history of British America; and third, the alliance with the French and concluding Treaty of Paris in 1783.⁹⁵ What purpose Zinner used his *Notitia* for is unclear but given the title and the fact he completed it in the teaching language of the university, it is possible this formed the basis for his courses in universal history at the Royal Academy.⁹⁶

In 1784, Zinner earned a promotion of sorts when he became an ecclesiastical prebendary for the Diocese of Spiš meaning he performed religious duties at the Roman Catholic cathedral of Košice, St. Elisabeth's, in exchange for a stipend.⁹⁷ His extra duties in Košice did not distract him from his scholarly output as he completed his largest and final work on the American Revolution that year. In his *Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte der verbündenen Staaten von Nordamerika* (An attempt towards a military history of the United States of North America), Zinner distilled everything he had learned from studying the American Revolution. It followed a similar pattern to his *Notitia* by outlining the entirety of American history from Columbus to the contemporary state of the postwar United States. Perhaps because Zinner wrote in his native German rather than Latin, he felt able to fully convey his thoughts; accounts of early America, of Columbus's




FIGURE 7. The first page of one of Johann Zinner's histories of the American Revolution written in eastern Hungary

voyage, and the war itself are expanded and dealt with in greater detail making the *Notitia* seem like a writing exercise in preparation for the magnum opus. Indeed, the *Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte* amounted to a gargantuan 106 chapters over 535 pages. All of this Zinner wrote by hand and attached his own index.⁹⁸

Why did Zinner take such great lengths to write these works? Zinner's motivation to chronicle the American Revolution in some of the most extensive contemporary accounts stemmed from his deep-seated sympathy for the revolutionary cause. He believed in the American Revolution and its importance in world history. In a geographically remote part of the Habsburg Monarchy, Zinner composed three monumental works on the Revolution which encompassed all of American history and provided European audiences with accurate material on its leaders and their revolutionary views. Zinner laid bare his reason for doing so in his first letter to Franklin in 1778, when he wrote,

I was born the subject of a great monarch and under a government whose rule is mild [...] but I cannot tell you what joy I feel when I hear or read of your progress in America. To speak the truth, I look upon you and all the chiefs of your new republic as angels, sent by heaven to guide and comfort the human race [...] and to give public manifestation of this sentiment, I am composing this work.⁹⁹

To "give public manifestation" was Zinner's ultimate aim; such was the conviction and admiration he held for the American revolutionaries. In 1783, he wrote again to Franklin after the completion of his *Merkwürdige Briefe* and informed him that he had dedicated the work to Congress, knowing that it supported "the bravery and courage of your heroes and the dignity of your Congress."¹⁰⁰ In this dedication, written in Latin, Zinner exclaims,

If there was ever a time so worthy of admiration, it is surely that time in which the new Republic rose, [...] when through your efforts and through your diligence, you very excellent men, the flag of freedom was raised and defended with the blood of your citizens. In this irreproachable age, some peoples and families fought for the welfare and happiness of the fatherland; others, with exhausted forces, took upon themselves in vain the struggle of the war for the capital with common, good strength, but they were pitifully defeated; the rather hard ones were given into slavery. The Senate and the people of America, on the other hand, happily built the capital in only seven years and founded a new and prosperous republic, which is your glory, in the New World. This is what amazes all peoples and even the far-away peoples. This is what moves me most: that I pass on your young origin, your tireless work for freedom and the memory, that I record the outstanding public announcement of your fame with writings. Onwards, you most excellent men, your name as an example of my fully devoted vigilance, follow the counsel of the just and the good, and you will be held by me with the most glorious praise for those who seek renewal.¹⁰¹

Zinner certainly felt part of this Revolution; he felt moved by it, hurt by the bloodshed, and jubilant by the news of American victory. His intellectual determination to chronicle the rise of the new American republic through his position at Košice and his three works reflect the sense of participation and sympathy which he, like many others in the Habsburg Monarchy, experienced. In this case, it meant that some of the most vividly detailed works concerning

the American Revolution first saw light at the hand of a Bohemian-born, German-speaking professor at the Royal Academy of Košice in the easternmost corner of the Habsburg lands.

Conclusion

Zinner was not alone. Across the Habsburg lands, people felt moved by the events in North America. Almost one hundred of them felt compelled enough to invest the emotional cost and monetary value in letters to Franklin; some to seek his aid, some to offer praise and advice for his Revolution. Throughout the Habsburg Monarchy, people who felt some level of sympathy with the revolutionary spirit in the thirteen colonies made their opinions known. Vienna, in particular, was home to one of the most ardent and diligent advocates of the American revolutionary cause, Jan Ingenhousz. Circles around Ingenhousz are a case in point. His personal conduit to Franklin through their prior friendship and scientific interests became a tradable commodity among the Viennese. His pro-American feelings were shared by one of his students, the first American-born student at the University of Vienna, Joseph Cauffman who voluntarily left to fight for the American cause. Cauffman in turn spread his revolutionary sentiment among his fellow classmates who enquired after him and sought Franklin's help to enlist.

Individuals like these confirm there was an abundant enthusiasm for the American Revolution in the Habsburg lands. It is against this backdrop that the Habsburg interactions with the new United States took place. Obscured by the negative connotation of revolution after the events transpiring in the French Revolution, these earlier American sentiments in the Habsburg Monarchy have gone largely unnoticed. Such acknowledgement might have been too controversial for academics in the late Habsburg Monarchy of 1905, but it is still possible to add that dedication to Ingenhousz's statute in the Arkadenhof where he should be joined again by his friend, Joseph Cauffman, the university's first American-born student, in remembrance of their support for the American cause.

“The Big and Furious Game”

The Difficulty of Habsburg Neutrality in the War of American Independence, 1775–1783

ON JANUARY 19, 1776, three Tuscan sailors awoke to gunpoint. Under the impression they were helping to transport hundreds of smuggled guns across the Mediterranean to the Egyptian port of Alexandria, they probably never thought such weapons would be used on them in the dead of night. But on this occasion, Captain Eastman of the American ship *Betsy* had ordered a clear out. The three Tuscans, as subjects of the Habsburg emperor's brother, were not part of the plan to haul the *Betsy* from Livorno, where they had collected wines and spices along with the smuggled weaponry, to Philadelphia rather than Alexandria. Although they spared them an execution, the crew set the Tuscan trio adrift in a small boat. After several days, they reached the port of Oran on the African coast, exhausted, parched, and barely alive. From there, they managed to cross the straits to Alicante and send word home. News of their forced abandonment travelled back to Livorno and later to Florence and London. From the Habsburg perspective, this was the latest in a series of unfortunate embroilments consequent of the War of American Independence. The three Tuscan sailors, for their part, realised that the American Revolution had a very real impact—with almost fatal consequences—on their lives.¹

A subject in the Habsburg lands did not have to be directly involved in the American Revolution in order to feel the risks. In the port of Lisbon, a few years later, the family of an imperial ambassador huddled for safety after British ships attempted to capture an American prize in the harbour near their home. They witnessed the terrifying engagement across the bay before cannon balls came screeching through the air seconds later, shattering the walls, destroying the interior but sparing them from an untimely, gruesome death.² In the port of Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands, two years after that encounter, residents

awoke to the bewildering sight of a capsizing ship lodged upon the shallows of their coastline. Soon British warships descended like hawks to guard the floundered American vessel; it was an unusual sight, which became ever more tinged with tension. Magistrates and merchants fretted over what came next in the courts and in the customs houses.³

For those who did share the risks of war—the soldiers, the deserters, the smugglers—their risks became the state's as well. Disputes between merchants over illicit cargoes or the legalities of a deserter who enlisted in a regiment bound for North America marred the delicate diplomatic balancing game which every neutral power strove to maintain during wartime, including the Habsburg realms. Habsburg interests operated in a tangled web of international trade which brought them into disrepute with one or another of the belligerent powers. This is not to say that the Habsburg Monarchy was unique regarding the difficulties associated with neutrality—far from it. Other major European neutrals such as Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were all exposed to the uncertainties of the Revolution. Swedish merchants, for example, prospered from increased trade to the West Indies with exports skyrocketing by a factor of twenty-five between 1777 and 1783.⁴ During the same period, however, Swedish merchants endured confiscation and legal disputes with the British admiralty. By 1779, no less than thirty-two Swedish merchant vessels had been tried in the admiralty courts and found guilty of smuggling.⁵ The Habsburg experience was by no means exceptional in comparison. It does, however, serve to illustrate the complexity of neutrality in the American Revolution. Habsburg officials and mariners encountered a variety of vicissitudes in attempting to navigate the unsteady world created in the wake of the Revolution.

This chapter brings to light these challenges of neutrality for the Habsburgs. Two sites were of prime contention: the ports of Livorno in Tuscany and Ostend in the Austrian Netherlands. The former, though not a direct appendage of the emperor but instead ruled by his brother, became a litmus test for British officials for the overall temperament of the Habsburg dynasty towards the American revolutionaries. Ostenders, for their part, frequently witnessed the most difficult contestations of neutrality in the Habsburg lands. Both British and American commanders chafed at the neutral principles enacted by regional officials whilst merchants there took full advantage of their lucrative position, much to the chagrin of both sides. Joining these two ports were the hundreds of ships which served as mobile micro-legalities provoking further contestations at sea and in far-flung foreign ports. The Habsburg Monarchy may be underestimated as a maritime power throughout its history, but its mercantile web

in the eighteenth century extended well into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. It was this web that expanded and contracted in the turbulent wake of the American Revolution.

Tuscan Terror

Incidents such as the abandonment of the three Tuscans were treated as serious infractions by the British ministry since they viewed the ship, its crew, and captain as British subjects. Thomas Thynne, the third Viscount Weymouth, the British foreign secretary responsible, wasted no time in informing the British Admiralty and ordering a hunt for the *Betsy*.⁶ It was his express wish that this "piratical conduct" be curbed and Captain Eastman be brought to justice for such "infamous and wicked proceedings."⁷ Sir John Dick, the British consul at Livorno, maintained a vigilant lookout and informed the city's governor to obtain the "piratical master."⁸ But the ship proved impossible to track down and with the lag of eighteenth-century communications, any alerts were too late. Fortunately for the British and Habsburgs, a number of the ship's crew mutinied while anchored in Tenerife and piloted the ship back to Cadiz, presumably leaving Captain Eastman to a similar fate as the Tuscans.⁹ Once the ship had returned to Livorno a year later, the British ministers decided to reward the sailors and compensate the local Tuscan merchants who had suffered huge losses to their investments. As the British envoy in Florence noted, the whole affair had brought "the honour of the British colours" into question by "an Englishman unworthy of the name," and warned that British trade in the Mediterranean would suffer if generosity to sailors and local merchants was not given.¹⁰ King George agreed and felt the need to apologise personally to the Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo.¹¹

A few months after the *Betsy* incident in 1776, Sir John Dick reported further disturbances in Livorno. He had noticed that a Dutch ship, the *Johanna van Vriesbergh*, had arrived from Rotterdam back in January and loaded up a cargo consisting of 142 cannons, 1,463 cannon balls, 360 barrels of gunpowder, and eighty-four chests of small firearms. What could the Dutch be doing with so many munitions? At the time he did not think much about it. In the intervening months, however, Dick came to realise that the ship's Dutch owners, *Otto Frank & Co.*, were in league with Thomas Morris, a member of the Philadelphia firm *Willing & Morris* and brother of the prominent Pennsylvanian financier Robert Morris. Dick was certain that the weapons were "destined to be reship'd for America."¹² It appeared the *Betsy* had not been an isolated case. And yet the situation deteriorated still further. In the same report, Dick recalled how

he had also learned that *Otto Frank & Co.* had ordered an additional 500 barrels of gunpowder via another ship from the Habsburg port of Trieste, where an unfamiliar “Englishman”—implying an American—had procured enough firearms for 17,000 men.¹³ The bad news did not stop there. A French ship also embarked from Trieste with equally suspicious cargo and, curiously, transported twenty-six imperial soldiers but with enough military supplies for four regiments.¹⁴ The very next day after he had sent his report, even more alarming news came to him. Another ship, this time Danish, had left Trieste with over 2,100 muskets and other munitions.¹⁵ The whole situation seemed to suggest that the Habsburgs were in cahoots with traders to supply the Americans with munitions. “Yet,” Dick wondered aloud in his report, “it is scarce possible to believe that the Emperor [Joseph II] and the Great Duke [Pietro Leopoldo] would have anything to do in such a Business.”¹⁶

Scarce possible, but certainly plausible. Otto Frank himself had met privately with Pietro Leopoldo to talk about these ships during a visit to Livorno, and his nephew had followed up these conversations with another private audience in Florence around the time of the French ship’s arrival.¹⁷ Such circumstances suggested Dick’s growing concerns were not without some truth to them. The difficulty for the British, however, was that they could not force a halt to these conversations, nor could they direct the trade of an independent state. Dick proffered one solution to his superiors, however: they could procure an edict from Pietro Leopoldo which would limit the export and reshipping of munitions from Tuscan ports so that “no Part of them be landed in America.”¹⁸ Politicking and intervention in Florence seemed the best solution.

Dick’s mind must have been full of conspiratorial musings during his wait for further instructions but before news from London arrived, he had ascertained the simple truth of the matter. The munitions were not destined for the thirteen colonies at all. Rather they formed part of the Habsburg trade mission to Asia.¹⁹ The initiative had started with Willem Bolts, “the Englishman” who was in fact Dutch and had worked for the British East India Company before he had become disillusioned and published inflammatory pamphlets denouncing the British colonial activities in India.²⁰ His subsequent exile had forced him to seek protection from the Habsburgs and, in return, he ventured the scheme to begin trade between the Habsburg lands and the Far East. The plan had originated two years prior with Bolts’s interview with the Habsburg ambassador in London and had been a plan of considerable preoccupation among bureaucrats in Vienna since then.²¹ Bolts’s project had involved a great number of merchants from all over the Habsburg lands, including Otto Frank and his company.²²

Habsburg administrators had taken great pains to maintain secrecy around the project—even going as far as having Bolts disguised as a Portuguese trader when travelling from London to Vienna.²³ The level of secrecy was so great that it had successfully dumbfounded Sir John Dick in Livorno and, for a time, the British envoy in Florence, Sir Horace Mann.²⁴ Unbeknownst to them both, Bolts had also been meeting with the Grand Duke under their noses.²⁵

Yet something positive arose out of the scare over Bolts's mission. Mann managed to extract promises from Pietro Leopoldo that "proper security would be given" so that arms and ammunition did not fall into the hands of the Americans.²⁶ Vindication came in July of 1776 when he received a copy of the octroi explicitly outlawing any handover of weapons to the Americans.²⁷ Yet British suspicions lingered. Weymouth's next instructions commended Dick's attentiveness and confirmed the intelligence about the East Indies mission, but he also informed Mann of credible links between Americans and Livornese merchants.²⁸ It was now their task to find out more about these new suspects.

Dick had other plans in mind, though. He spoke frequently of retirement and in July 1776, as the thirteen colonies declared independence, Weymouth granted his wish.²⁹ The British hunt in Livorno failed before it even began. Before his departure, however, Dick left a parting blow which foreshadowed the difficulties that his successor, Sir John Undy, would face amid rising rumours of Habsburg neutrality being betrayed in Livorno. In May, Dick had read a letter by an Irish captain printed in the *London Chronicle* which reported that he had seen "four large American vessels" fully laden in Livorno's harbour and claimed the Livornese and Americans had "carried on a considerable Trade" for the last ten months.³⁰ Dick described the account as "a fiction and a downright lye [*sic*]" in a rebuttal addressed to the editors of the *Chronicle*.³¹ The spread of disinformation harmed both the British and Habsburgs, whose relations naturally strained as a result of such rumours and hearsay. Undy did not arrive in his new post until November, meaning the British had no certain ways to verify what was exactly occurring in Livorno throughout the summer of 1776.³²

It was just as well since the British had very little idea indeed about what was happening. In early 1776, Weymouth had informed Mann of rumours that a Livornese merchant by the name of Guiseppe Bettoia was in correspondence with some Americans and tasked him to find out more.³³ By May, Mann had deduced that the person was "an Italian named Mazei [*sic*]" who had transported two ships full of corn and cargo of little consequence from America through Bettoia's trading house in Livorno.³⁴ Nothing more came of the rumour. The British did not realise the significance of this connection. Filippo Mazzei—often

Philip Mazzei—was a Tuscan by birth but had spent a great period of his life as a merchant in London where the Habsburg ambassador described him as a “cunning” but “supremely active man.”³⁵ In London, conversations with Benjamin Franklin convinced Mazzei to carry out a plan to cultivate Tuscan wines in Virginia.³⁶ In late 1772, Mazzei shuttered his business in London and returned briefly to Tuscany where he unsuccessfully tried to obtain official support for his venture before he set off for Virginia, arriving there in December 1773 on the suitably named *Triumph*.³⁷ Mazzei’s connection with Bettoia and his father’s firm *Stefano Bettoia e Figlio* began during this period and led to many successful shipments.³⁸ The disruptions brought about by the situation in North America slowly ruined the firm, however, and hampered the return of their latest venture back to Virginia. Thomas Woodford, captain of the *Norfolk* which carried the sundry goods for Mazzei and Bettoia, failed to reach the American coastline.³⁹ Instead, Bettoia sent him to the safer but less profitable Newfoundland region and re-registered the ship in Ireland. It was from there in 1776 that Woodford published his letter in the *London Chronicle* in a likely attempt to drum up trade—the same article that Dick had refused to believe was true.⁴⁰

Woodford’s next American trading venture fell under the direction of a new company in Livorno, *Antonio Salucci e Figlio*, run by Sebastiano V. Salucci.⁴¹ It did not end well. Salucci disregarded the original plan laid out by Mazzei (who knew nothing of the changeover and thought Bettoia to be “a Jesuit thief” because of his silence) forcing Woodford to travel to Paris in order to obtain corrected passports from Franklin.⁴² All went awry when Woodford’s newly renamed ship, *La Prosperità*, ran into the British blockade off the North American coastline. The ship was captured and taken to New York, where the court case rumbled on without success for Salucci.⁴³ It became the first embroilment between the British legal system and Tuscan traders. Salucci wished to recoup his losses but did not gain enough support until the end of the war.⁴⁴ In 1780, another Tuscan ship met the same fate and was captured by the British.⁴⁵

The worsening commercial situation in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean negatively affected British enterprise at Livorno and subsequently undercut the maritime commerce of Tuscany. After the French entry into the war in March 1778, British ships became prey for French privateers based along the Marseilles coastline.⁴⁶ Whilst war with the French was long expected in London, it took the British representatives in Florence and Livorno by almost complete surprise.⁴⁷ Indeed, the first news they heard of it came from a rumour that Raimondo Niccoli and the Tuscan delegation at Paris had had received advanced word from the Americans.⁴⁸ British merchants in Livorno were left drastically

unprepared as a result. Before long, their businesses dried up as each ship fell foul to French attack, and—as Spain looked to enter the war against the British—prospects of safe passage to British destinations seemed at best precarious as well. “Hardly a day passes without some French Cruiser appearing off this Port, and if some Frigates are not sent to Protect the Trade to and from this Place, no Vessel can escape them,” Undy warned in late summer 1778.⁴⁹ This dilemma came at a time when British traders were already “greatly alarmed” after months of frequent sightings of American pirates.⁵⁰ The situation intensified when the French moved decisively to crush British trade in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1778. The importance of Livorno to British trade was well-known. As Mann reported with great trepidation, if Menorca and Gibraltar were to fall then the British would have “no other Port in the Mediterranean to resort to, but that of Leghorne [Livorno].”⁵¹ The French knew this and demanded British exclusion from trading in Livorno or else a French fleet would “block up” the port. The French ultimatum sent shockwaves through the Florentine court. Pietro Leopoldo expressed “great surprise and indignation” at the startling request.⁵²

The Habsburgs faced two major difficulties arising from the War of American Independence. The first was an obvious threat to the economic vitality of their region in Tuscany brought about by disruptions to maritime trade. For decades, Florentine administrators had acknowledged the important commercial contribution of Livorno to the overall economy of Tuscany. The same was the case in Vienna, where “one did not speak of Tuscany except in relation to Livorno.”⁵³ The second difficulty arose out of the new geopolitical question which confronted Pietro Leopoldo and his ministers in Florence: how could they rehabilitate trade without showing partiality? The question came at a particularly inopportune moment as Joseph II requested the Grand Duke’s presence in Vienna to aid the War of the Bavarian Succession, and as his sister in Naples, Queen Maria Carolina, had been pushing him to “loan” his most effective naval administrator for Neapolitan service.⁵⁴ Any response therefore became rushed, more ad hoc, and relied upon older Tuscan debates over neutrality.

When the Corsican Republic had fallen to French invasion in 1768, the Livornese governor had received instructions to draft neutral contingency measures to prevent loss of trade for Livorno’s merchants. Giuseppe Francesco Pieralini, one of the governor’s subordinates, compiled the first draft which displeased Florentine ministers. Debates over specific aspects stymied its adoption until the necessity for such legislation diminished following the end of the Corsican crisis. In 1771, the Grand Duke raised the prospect of introducing such a law again before technicalities once more dragged discussion into an inescapable

quagmire.⁵⁵ Seven years later and faced with the more urgent exigencies of the American Revolution, these theoretical debates were of little importance as the older designs for a neutral policy were literally “dusted off” and quickly implemented.⁵⁶ Pietro Leopoldo issued an edict on August 1, 1778, which declared a “strict neutrality” in the port of Livorno.⁵⁷ The new edict adhered to the long-standing international precedent of Tuscany observing such neutrality throughout the centuries, but for the first time this principle became law.⁵⁸ It demarcated all coastal waters around Tuscany as neutral, disallowed the exchange of fire within its shores, and, to ensure Livornese merchants could thrive, all ships were welcome within the harbour.⁵⁹

Neutrality, however, proved a difficult position to maintain. Aside from the continued skirmishes with rogue privateers and smugglers who shirked the edict, the declaration put the Tuscans at odds with their own commercial aims and with foreign powers. The British were suspect of Article VII within in the edict, which they saw as a total inhibitor to their trade in the port.⁶⁰ The article forbade any subjects living in Tuscany to partake in any activity which supported the cause of a foreign war. As Mann pointed out to his superiors, the article’s terminology was so loosely defined that it could be construed that this included all foreign subjects living in Tuscany; in effect, prohibiting British merchants from outfitting their ships.⁶¹ Silence from the Tuscan court meant British traders struggled under this cloud of uncertainty for the remainder of the war.

At the same time, strict neutrality was not a convenient situation for Tuscan traders. When Mazzei returned from Virginia in 1779, his audiences with the Grand Duke had to be conducted with the utmost secrecy. Whereas Pietro Leopoldo had openly supported Mazzei and his ideas earlier in the 1770s, amid a European-wide war over American independence, he could not do anything to disturb Tuscan neutrality. The pair exchanged a series of discursive letters,⁶² but ultimately Mazzei’s arguments found only “deaf ears and a gaping wastebasket” in Florence.⁶³ Pietro Leopoldo simply could not countenance any official commerce with the Americans—despite the significant advantages such transatlantic trade had to offer—for fear of reprisal from foreign powers. Mazzei became embittered against him for this inactivity and his unrelenting indolence for American prospects.⁶⁴

It was not only Mazzei who Pietro Leopoldo shunned on account of neutrality. In May 1777, Congress designated the South Carolinian planter Ralph Izard as the official envoy to Tuscany. Izard was an ideal candidate. He had already visited Tuscany in 1774.⁶⁵ In Paris, Niccoli became his great friend but sought to dissuade him of any notions about venturing to Florence.⁶⁶ The ruse worked as

Izard informed Congress of the fruitlessness of such an undertaking. He argued instead that his friendship with Niccoli, "a man of ability and very friendly to our cause," enabled him to "to do my business more effectually than if I had been at Florence."⁶⁷ In June 1779, congressional members revoked Izard's commission and ceased any intentions to establish relations with Tuscany. Talk of supporting the transatlantic trade between Livorno and the United States did not occur until after the conclusion of the War of American Independence.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the codification of neutrality during the American Revolution allowed Tuscan legal scholars such as Giovanni Maria Lampredi to develop further the concept for the foundation of future neutral positioning in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.⁶⁹ In the short term, however, the attempted preservation of the port of Livorno between 1776 and 1783 had come at the cost of postponing Tuscan relations with the United States of America. Moreover, in trying to ensure neutrality between all sides, Tuscans officials had staved off an open attack by the French but at the further cost of British commerce in Livorno. The American Revolution was every bit as much problematic for the Tuscan branch of the Habsburgs as it was for the main dynasty in Vienna.

Disaster at Nieuwpoort

Within the Habsburg family, Pietro Leopoldo was not alone in facing the benefits and predicaments of neutrality in the War of American Independence. By tradition, and since the reincorporation of the Burgundian Inheritance by the Habsburgs following the War of Spanish Succession in 1714, a member of the imperial family ruled as viceroy over the Austrian Netherlands. In the late eighteenth century, the honour had first fallen to Prince Charles Alexander of Lorraine, the double brother-in-law of Maria Theresa, until his death in 1780 meant Maria Theresa's son-in-law Albert Casimir and daughter Maria Christina, the Duke and Duchess of Teschen, acceded to the position. They exercised nominal power as governors-general of the Austrian Netherlands on behalf of the Habsburgs. Below them existed a minister plenipotentiary who headed a regional government composed of several councillors of state who supervised various administrative councils.⁷⁰ On the eve of Revolution, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg occupied the post of minister plenipotentiary and along with the Prince of Lorraine, the Teschens, and state bureaucracies in Brussels and Vienna, he too faced the onslaught of difficulties arising from the American Revolution.

The first test of neutrality appeared as soon as April 1776. Captain Gustavus Conyngham was a man with a certain sense of daring about him. He was the

first in a string of captains in support of the American cause who blurred the line between naval officer and pirate as they stalked the seas and plundered enemy ships for prizes. Conyngham “terrorised” British commerce in particular, becoming one of the most successful (and notorious) commanders of the Continental Navy—in 1778, he captured twenty-four British vessels alone.⁷¹ Before he began oceanic raiding, Conyngham had focused on supplying the American colonies with war materials. In September 1775, he sailed out of Philadelphia on the *Charming Peggy* at the behest of the Maryland Council of Safety in search of military provisions. His mission led him first to Londonderry where he concealed his ship’s true origin before sailing to mainland Europe.

In late December 1775, the *Peggy* arrived at Dunkirk where the usual loading and unloading of goods attracted the scrutiny of the local British consul, Andrew Frazer. The *Peggy* caught his attention when he sensed that barrels of gunpowder had been loaded up in the dead of night—Frazer’s keen eyes had noticed how the ship sat lower in the water the next morning.⁷² However, Conyngham unexpectedly had the supplies unloaded and the vessel laid up weeks later.⁷³ Unbeknownst to Frazer, there was a snag, Conyngham had ordered further barrels of gunpowder but the Dutch shipments had not yet arrived.⁷⁴ He despatched an agent to Amsterdam to sort out the delay, but weeks passed by until word came back that a consignment from the island of Texel was on its way.⁷⁵ Conyngham prepared his ship to sail and Frazer pounced. He had the local commissioner search the ship for “warlike stores” to prevent illegal transport back to America. Instead, they found the *Peggy* was full of various articles but no weaponry save for a few cannons serving as ballast.⁷⁶ Frazer was out of luck until three of the crewmen fought with Conyngham about carrying on under his command. As Irish subjects, they applied to Frazer for protection and in doing so handed him proof that the vessel was bound for Philadelphia as well as revealing the true purpose of the voyage.⁷⁷ Determined to give Frazer the slip, Conyngham sailed away shortly before midnight on April 2 and brought the Revolution to the doorstep of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Conyngham arrived at the port of Nieuwpoort in the Austrian Netherlands, twenty miles along the coast from Dunkirk, before dawn on April 4. They halted in the main canal just outside the town.⁷⁸ The supercargo of the ship, Jonathan Nesbitt, had seen to it that a small Dutch barge, the *Eendragt*, waited for them there with nearly six hundred barrels of gunpowder.⁷⁹ Over two days, the vessels transhipped their cargoes, flaxseed for firearms; and on April 6, Conyngham notified the port authorities of the new cargo. The *Eendragt*’s crew raised suspicions for Habsburg officials by requesting that the authorities keep

the cargo secret but Louis Loot, the local customs officer, had no problem with the operation since the *Peggy's* goods were destined for St. Eustatius according to Conyngham's paperwork.⁸⁰ All seemed well until another crewman, William Bracken, decided to bolt in the dead of night. He walked the twenty-two miles along the coast back to Dunkirk to tell Frazer of the clandestine activity going on at Nieuwpoort.

The game was up. Frazer immediately informed the British representatives in the Austrian Netherlands and wrote back to London about the confirmation of his suspicions about the *Peggy*. If Conyngham had one saving grace, it was that the British officials in the Austrian Netherlands were not so well organised. The British representative William Gordon was a Jamaican-born Scot who, up to then, had been notably absent from his post. In the years leading up to 1776, Gordon had been away on leave for half of 1774 and, in 1775, he was active in Brussels for only two months.⁸¹ His inactivity turned into complete incapacity following a hunting accident in September 1775 at Enghien, where Gordon had accidentally discharged his rifle and wounded Count Louis Engelbert d'Arenberg. The incident left Gordon traumatised and d'Arenberg blind.⁸² For months, Gordon could not fulfil his duties as he shut himself away from court and gradually lost his mind. His secretary took over affairs since Gordon could not even "sett [*sic*] pen to paper" and was confined to bed.⁸³ Gordon's personal misery combined with a relatively inexperienced British consul in Ostend, John Peter, who had arrived in 1774, meant that any effective action was farfetched.

When Frazer's alarm reached Peter in Ostend, he shared the sense of panic. Peter despatched his deputy, Vice-Consul Patricius Hennessy, to Nieuwpoort to detain the ship if it tried to leave; meanwhile, knowing Gordon's difficulties, Peter personally headed to Brussels at the same time.⁸⁴ Gordon, meanwhile, had gotten up the courage to seek out Prince Starhemberg as soon as he had received word on April 9, but the meeting was fruitless. Starhemberg knew nothing of the *Peggy* and defended the actions of the Nieuwpoort authorities; if Conyngham's papers stated St. Eustatius, then who were the Habsburgs to question him. Gordon, Starhemberg insisted, would need to prove otherwise. As much as the meeting proved cordial as it did pointless, Starhemberg thought even less of the man who had disgraced himself at court only a short time ago. In his first report to State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz on the matter, he explained how Gordon had acted "indecently" by coming to him in such an urgent manner without any discernible issue.⁸⁵

Gordon's subsequent actions further inflamed the situation. The next day, he requested in writing that the Brussels government act to detain the ship since he

had proof that Conyngham's ship held munitions destined "for the Rebel subjects of His Majesty."⁸⁶ This demand greatly dissatisfied the Habsburg ministers in Brussels. Starhemberg felt insulted and one of his subordinate councillors later described the report as uncalled for and "overly passionate in tone."⁸⁷ The Habsburgs resented the presumptive questioning of their local officers and their prejudgements. When no official answer was forthcoming, Gordon decided to force matters along. As Gordon entered his carriage to see Starhemberg once again, John Peter arrived just in time. The two men moved together to press the Habsburg government into action. This meeting went worse than the previous one. Starhemberg described it as "tempestuous" in his account to Count Belgiojoso in London, whom he wished to make a complaint on his behalf to King George about the conduct of the British representatives.⁸⁸ The reason for the turbulent atmosphere was Starhemberg's refusal to act since he had received no word from Nieuwpoort and insisted that Gordon and Peter submit a written memorandum to lay out their concerns and evidence. Much to Starhemberg's dismay, Gordon and Peter produced the memorandum a few hours later.⁸⁹

Faced with the pressure to act, officials in Brussels chose to delay yet again. From their perspective, the facts were not so clear-cut. The local magistrate, they decided, would have to ascertain the situation proper and charged him to investigate matters.⁹⁰ This decision was also a careful ploy to deflect the situation back to the local authorities and to absolve the regional and imperial governments in Brussels and Vienna of the consequences. Gordon saw through the rouse. He raged to his superiors in London over the government's lethargic response, deriding the "silly, weak, timid, ignorant Minister" in the process.⁹¹ John Peter, again full of distrust, left for Nieuwpoort to ensure the magistrate would act without bias. Frans de Brauwere, the mayor of Nieuwpoort and the magistrate charged with running the investigation, knew the stakes at hand and acted impartially. He ordered interviews of everyone in question and a thorough review of all the ship's papers.⁹² The papers saved Conyngham. De Brauwere believed that the *Peggy* had arrived from Londonderry via Dunkirk and was indeed destined only for St. Eustatius. In conclusion, he found no grounds to detain the ship.⁹³

However, Peter had already seen to it to have guards quartered aboard during the investigation and now procured a civil writ for the local bailiff to confiscate the vessel in spite of De Brauwere's findings.⁹⁴ Effectively detained, and unlawfully in their eyes, Conyngham and Nesbitt staged a breakout in the wee hours of April 15. They imprisoned the guards, threatening to kill them, and made for the open sea under an almost moonless night. Disaster struck—perhaps predictably—when the *Peggy* ran aground on the sandbanks of the Nieuwpoort

shallows. She was lodged tight. Conyngham and his remaining crew—by that time consisting of four seamen and two “negroes”—made a desperate dash for the shoreline in rowboats. They escaped with their belongings, a few guns from the hold, and “a small cask of strong liquor” for their nerves. Incredibly, they came full circle, making their way back to Dunkirk and crossing over to New England on the *Industry*, an American vessel with Spanish papers.⁹⁵ The flight precipitated an unimaginable diplomatic fallout for Brussels; Conyngham had left a piece of the American Revolution foundering on the doorstep of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The situation deteriorated rapidly. The *Peggy* began to list and started taking on water. The authorities in Nieuwpoort rescued the vessel over the next six days but goods below the waterline suffered irreparable damage from flooding.⁹⁶ For John Peter, the escape and dereliction by Conyngham had devastating personal consequences since he held the civil writ for the vessel that now lay semi-submerged offshore. Nesbitt, who had refused to leave the *Peggy* when the others abandoned her, had chosen to stay in order to reclaim the cargo still technically under his purview. He now brought a lawsuit against the British consul.⁹⁷ Peter faced financial ruin if the Nieuwpoort magistrates found him guilty of damages. They declared the first hearing in the civil case to begin at the end of April. A few days before the scheduled trial, Gordon intervened at Brussels. He put it to Starhemberg that such a case was invalid as it was between two British subjects. At the same time, he revived the original argument that the *Peggy* had obviously been destined for the colonies given the vast stores of arms in the hold. All to no avail. He found Starhemberg impervious to any reasoning that would release the case to the British judiciary where, in all likelihood, Nesbitt would be the one fined for his actions, not Peter.

Gordon’s strained relationship with Starhemberg over this issue exacerbated the diplomatic tensions between the Habsburgs and the British. In his reports to his superiors, Gordon began openly questioning Starhemberg’s behaviour and voiced his concern that Starhemberg held sympathies for the Americans. “I wish very sincerely,” he confided to Lord Suffolk, “that the Minister who presides so very ably of the affairs of this country was at the American Congress. His conduct on the affairs of America proves him to be their well-wisher.”⁹⁸ Such critique, though privately held between ambassador and minister, was a damning indictment of the early Habsburg attempt at neutrality.

On the day of the trial between Nesbitt and Peter, Starhemberg received reassurances from Kaunitz in Vienna that his judgement on the matter was well placed. Kaunitz confirmed that it was indeed to be a matter for the local courts



FIGURE 8. The minister plenipotentiary in Brussels during most of the American Revolution, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg

and required no interference or oversight from Brussels. This was a curious but evidently calculated move by both Kaunitz and Starhemberg, who, despite the international gravity of the situation, both wished to leave it up to local officials. This was all the more surprising given Kaunitz's private admission to Starhemberg that Conyngham's actions had clearly demonstrated his allegiance to the American colonies.⁹⁹ Yet they had good reason for their willingness to let matters rumble on below the regional and imperial levels. On the one hand, this allowed for distance once the foreseeable anti-British outcome had been reached, but on the other hand it also abjured their direction of foreign policy to the verdict of a local magistrate. If De Brauwere ruled against Peter, then relations with Great Britain would suffer. In the end, the safeguard of being able to scapegoat a local official won out in both Kaunitz's and Starhemberg's minds.

Using the deferral to local authorities to shy away from international disputes would become a hallmark of the Habsburg approach to the dilemmas thrown up by the War of American Independence, and this strategy was first enacted in the case over the *Charming Peggy*. For John Peter, the effects of this Habsburg policy

were personally devastating. After another month of protracted legal debates, he lost and received a "compromise deal" whereby he had to shoulder the full costs of the damaged cargo, the costs associated with the rescue of the vessel, and, finally, the costs of the entire lawsuit which amounted to £72,000. He might have been thankful that he was not charged an even higher sum as the "compromise" spared him responsibility for paying the damage to the ship itself.¹⁰⁰ Conyngham, by contrast, went on to begin an illustrious career in the Continental Navy. In his memoirs about the events at Nieuwpoort, he simply mentioned that his detention there had been caused by poor winds and "other difficulties."¹⁰¹

The difficulties induced by the War of American Independence for the Habsburg government in Brussels continued long after the *Charming Peggy* affair. Indeed, complications arising from the fiasco became immediately apparent. On April 20, a British warship arrived in Ostend as part of British efforts to secure the abandoned *Peggy* in nearby Nieuwpoort. Zealous customs officers wished to inspect the ship as they did with every arriving vessel but the vice-consul protested that British warships were exempt from such scrutiny. Bemused, the officers sent off for clarification to councillors in Brussels.¹⁰² Gordon, who by this point held nothing but bile and contempt for Starhemberg, festered in Brussels and used this latest incident as a test of loyalty.¹⁰³ Eager to avoid a new political storm with Britain, Starhemberg struck down the customs request and argued for British exemption.¹⁰⁴ The prospect of a rupture with Britain had forced the government of the Austrian Netherlands into appeasement.

The *Charming Peggy* affair is one example of the intense difficulties over the construction of neutrality in the Austrian Netherlands. Throughout the War of American Independence further disturbances occurred between an increasing array of belligerent actors. In this case, an American privateer caused the conflagration but in subsequent years naval encounters between French, Dutch, and Spanish ships with the British admiralty occurred on the Habsburg coastline on the North Sea. Firefights, raids, depositions, and hearings became part of the residential experience in places like Nieuwpoort and Ostend. Appeasement by ministers in Brussels followed a purely legalistic line. Regular ordinances forbade the transportation of munitions to the American colonies in name only from 1776 until 1778 when the French recognition of the United States prompted more muted responses from Starhemberg's officials to British demands for continued restrictions on the exportation of arms.¹⁰⁵ By then it mattered for little. Infractions continued throughout the period as American merchants continued to arrive and merchants in the Austrian Netherlands awoke to the possibilities across the Atlantic.

The Limits of the Law

Times of political turbulence are always good for lawyers. The American Revolution was no different. One of the central tenants of patriot resistance was to question the legality of the political order they sought to overturn. “No taxation without representation” was as much a condensed legal argument as it was a rallying call.¹⁰⁶ But the Revolutionary pursuit threw up legal questions beyond the thirteen colonies. The patriot need for arms and the British demand for soldiers provoked challenges to the authority of European states supplying these men and goods. Across the world’s oceans and seas, captured ships—known as prizes—led to contested claims between captors and captured that demanded legal intervention and arbitration. Their mobility as transoceanic “legal spaces in motion” created collisions between imperial powers who sought to either use the law to their advantage or their defence.¹⁰⁷ Though static, neutral ports also became contested spaces as these ships entered them with their own conflicting legal traditions, priorities, and baggage.¹⁰⁸ The Habsburg Monarchy, with its neutral ports on the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, with its pool of military manpower, and its opportunities for trade, was deeply embroiled in these legal altercations. The proximity of Liège to its neutral ports made the Habsburg ports some of the most important entrepôts for sustaining the patriot war effort in the American Revolution. Without these shipments throughout the war, the conflict may have never resulted in a patriot victory. Even though the *Charming Peggy* caused a difficult legal and diplomatic dissensus to erupt in the Austrian Netherlands, it was a relatively simple case compared to the more protracted cases that emerged between the Habsburgs and belligerent powers as a result of the American Revolution.

Legal imbroglios affected the lives of ordinary people in the Habsburg Monarchy, not just the statesmen and bureaucrats in the corridors of power. When the inhabitants of Ostend stood along the shoreline to witness the dramatic fiery encounter between HMS *Kite* and *Le Cornichon* in 1778, they unwittingly became part of the legal process determined to settle the damage done to the town from the exchange of cannon fire. The British Admiralty as well as the Ostend Admiralty took depositions from the townspeople in the days afterwards in order to ascertain what had transpired exactly.¹⁰⁹ The same act of witness conscription occurred for the hundreds of Habsburg-born sailors aboard ships either seized or interrogated by British vessels during the War of American Independence. At least 132 subjects working on those vessels faced detention or interrogation by the British over fears of aiding the rebel and enemy economies.

These fears were sometimes justified as many Habsburg subjects did work on ships either belonging to or transporting goods to belligerent ports in France, the West Indies, or the Dutch Republic.¹¹⁰ Yet guilty crews impelled innocent ones along with them. Even Habsburg trade between its ports suffered as the belligerent powers raided foreign ships without much regard. Such was the case for the ill-fated Dutch ship *De Goede Hoop* which sought to carry goods between two Habsburg ports, from Ostend to Trieste. Spanish ships captured the vessel and detained the crew in Cadiz for five months before they were again captured by a British warship off the Sicilian coast. The ship was impounded at Portsmouth and its cargo undelivered; the Habsburg stakeholders subsequently lost their investments.¹¹¹

As a neutral power in the War of American Independence, the Habsburg authorities had recourse to seek justice, though this did not ensure either justice or compensation. Throughout the War of American Independence, the Habsburg consul in London, the Milanese-born merchant Antonio Songa, petitioned claims to British courts on behalf of merchants from across the Habsburg Monarchy. In fact, Songa's position had been created specifically for this reason.¹¹² Habsburg men and women lost vast sums from the misadventures incurred by the war. When the British captured St. Eustatius in 1781, Songa and his brother Bartolommeo Songa represented twenty-six disgruntled Habsburg investors, including three women, who lost goods stockpiled on the island.¹¹³ The case lasted beyond the war itself and resulted in no compensation. The same occurred with the Habsburg consul in Cadiz, Paolo Greppi, who unsuccessfully protested the loss of one of his own ships in 1779.¹¹⁴ Likewise, merchants at the Trieste Sugar Company lost several consignments of raw sugar to British warships in a single year without recompense.¹¹⁵ The losses suffered by his subjects at the hands of the British navy infuriated Joseph II as he complained of the "incredible and unbearable" burden placed on his merchants by the British "despotism at sea."¹¹⁶

Joseph's frustration reflected the broader impact of the War of American Independence. It affected all maritime commerce with the Habsburg lands, not just the consignments destined for the Americas. Intra-European trade also suffered from the reverberations of the American Revolution. In May 1779, for example, the British captured a Dutch ship, the *Zeepart*, off the coast of Falmouth on its way to the Habsburg port of Fiume.¹¹⁷ As a Dutch ship, several goods belonged to Dutch citizens but the Viennese merchant Johann Adam Bienenfeld had the lion's share of the cargo with over a thousand drums of saltpetre. Bienenfeld's cargo was worth a tremendous sum, which he sourced on behalf of the Habsburg military for the war over Bavaria.¹¹⁸ Concerned that such a

considerable consignment had been confiscated, Bienenfeld himself employed a representative to attest his case as a neutral subject and Belgiojoso, as ambassador, intervened to reclaim the costs.¹¹⁹ Failing to disprove the innocence of the captain, they resorted to the next best alternative and offered to sell the valuable cargo of saltpetre to the British Board of Ordinance for a reasonable sum.¹²⁰ The offer turned sour as the British captured a second ship, carrying yet more saltpetre in Bienenfeld's name. Suspicions arose over whether this ship, *l'Union*, had intended to sail for France. Unwilling to trade with a smuggler, the British coyly frustrated the offer and the case dragged out between the two sides until the following year. By then, however, the War of the Bavarian Succession had ended and Bienenfeld gained only a fraction of the cargo's original worth.¹²¹ In the context of his fellow compatriots, it was better than nothing at all.

The British threat was not the only danger for Habsburg traders. The War of American Independence generated greater possibilities for Habsburg merchants to trade within the Atlantic. For the first time, Ostend traders had extensive commerce with the Caribbean islands such as St. Eustatius and Dominica.¹²² Yet these new avenues also exposed them to American privateers who preyed on vessels suspected of carrying enemy goods. One particular encounter between an American privateer and a Habsburg vessel led to a court case where the Habsburg subjects and their backers were defenceless. They had reached the limit of the law.

Troubles began on August 20, 1781, in the mid-Atlantic when the American ship *The Hope* seized the Ostend ship *Den Eersten*. The captain of *The Hope*, Daniel Darby, trawled the vessel along with its captain, Peter Thompson, and his sixteen-member crew back to Boston as a prize. Upon arrival, the Admiralty Court of Massachusetts convened a hearing on September 6 to decide whether the capture was lawful. Both men procured lawyers to make their case before a jury of twelve American peers. Darby claimed that the ship carried cargo belonging to English merchants destined for French-occupied Dominica that had originated in London and therefore, as property of the enemy, he was entitled to seize the goods. He further alleged that Thompson knew this fact and discarded the ship's papers by throwing them overboard during the capture.¹²³ Conversely, Thompson argued these claims were "false and groundless" and that Darby had forced him under duress to sign an English affidavit stating the goods had come from London.¹²⁴ The surviving documents found aboard *Den Eersten* proved incriminating, however. True, the ship belonged to the Ostend firm, *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* but there were dozens of letters between English merchants and Dominican planters who sought to undermine the French blockade.¹²⁵ The

ship's Ostend owners charged a hefty premium for transporting building materials to plantations which had suffered damage from the French invasion in return for usual Caribbean goods of rum, indigo, and sugar for London's mercantile houses.¹²⁶ In his cross-examination, the ship's supercargo, Johann Baptiste Pol, denied these claims and supported Thompson's defence that he "could not read two English words" and Darby had sought to trick them.¹²⁷ On November 24, both the jury and the presiding judge, Nathaniel Cushing, declared the ship's cargo to be a legal prize on the basis of the English letters. Cushing deemed the ship itself to be a neutral vessel and therefore not a legal prize.¹²⁸ Though mixed, the verdict meant another group of Habsburg merchants and sailors had lost out as a result of the Revolution but this time, and for the first time, in an American court.

The case did not stop in Massachusetts, however. Matters grew more contentious when Darby protested the judgement that the ship was neutral property and won the right to appeal in early 1782. Cushing passed the case to the newly created Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, the first federal court in the United States, established two years earlier.¹²⁹ By the time of the *Eersten* appeal in January 1782, the court had only heard one previous case, meaning this Habsburg case was the second federal court case in American history.¹³⁰ Over three days in Philadelphia, Darby and his lawyers set against Thompson and Pol who acted as the attorneys for *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.*¹³¹ The case revolved around whether or not the ship could be considered as a fair prize since, as Darby argued, they had breached the terms of the Dominican capitulation and, by transporting supplies to the English inhabitants, Thompson had not acted in a neutral way. Pol found it difficult to deny this claim since there had been plenty of evidence in the previous trial showing the consignments of British goods destined for the planters on Dominica. His only defence lay on the grounds that the ship had not reached Dominica before Darby had captured them and therefore had not broken any capitulation. In short, he conceded there may have been intent, but no law had been broken and the ship had still acted in a neutral manner. After a short recess, the presiding judges, Cyrus Griffin and William Paca, reached their verdict in early February 1782. The news was not good for Thompson, Pol, the Ostend firm, or the Habsburgs in general. Griffin and Paca found the *Eersten* fair game and therefore not a neutral vessel. They found Thompson and Pol had done "more than a mere intentional offence with regard to the capitulation."¹³² In their eyes, the undertaking with British merchants had violated their neutrality in the first place before the ship had left Ostend. As Paca wrote in the final opinion,

The subjects of a neutral nation, cannot, consistently with neutrality, combine with British subjects, to wrest out of the hands of the United States and of France, the advantages they have acquired over Great Britain by the rights of war; for, this would be taking a decided part with the enemy.¹³³

The result could not have been more damning for the merchants of the Habsburg Monarchy. The ruling of Griffin and Paca entailed that all Habsburg ships violated their neutrality which protected them against capture by American and allied vessels if they acted in league with British subjects. As Paca put it, such “fraud and stratagem” only resulted in the “garb of neutrality” rather than lawful neutrality.¹³⁴ Whereas Habsburg merchants had enjoyed neutral protection up until that point (because of the longstanding international observance that “neutral ships made neutral goods”) this new precedent endangered their position.¹³⁵ It is not surprising that this verdict came months after the British envoy in Brussels made a similar charge against Habsburg neutrality:

The fact indeed is that the Imperial flag is become [sic] almost as suspicious (not to use a stronger word), both in these seas and in those of America, as that of the Dutch was at the beginning of the war, the merchants of this country [are] treading very fast in the steps of their neighbours the Dutch, both in supplying the French West-India Islands with provisions and bringing home their produce.¹³⁶

The news of American condemnation proved unsettling to the Habsburgs across the Atlantic. News quickly reached Vienna via the ambassador in Paris and ministers in Brussels.¹³⁷ The three owners at Ostend, Jean Baptiste Liebaert, Lieven Baes, and Alexandre Derdeyn launched a petition against the court’s ruling with support from Brussels.¹³⁸ Their petition claimed Darby had captured the ship under false pretences and therefore this “direct act of piracy” ought to have precluded any jurisprudential process.¹³⁹

Franklin warned chances of overturning the decision were low, especially since the firm lacked the financial resources in Philadelphia and Boston and had no means of proper representation.¹⁴⁰ Franklin’s blunt warning ignited questions of whether the Habsburgs should establish a representative in the United States, and it certainly rang true for the trio in Ostend. In the following year, they submitted another petition and empowered an agent as their legal representative in anticipation of a rehearing.¹⁴¹

In the meantime, Thompson lost his own petition to reopen the case in May 1784.¹⁴² The agent sent by the firm, Mark Prager, did not arrive until 1785 but he was immediately successful in urging Congress to allow the Court of Appeals the right to decide whether to retry the case.¹⁴³ The move backfired. During the hearing in November 1786, the opposing side mustered a lethal witness: John Baes, the nephew of Lieven Baes, who had left the company in 1783 and moved to Philadelphia. Baes testified that the company's directors knowingly entered into agreements with the British merchants and had set up further expeditions. Indeed, the ship's name, *Den Eersten* (*The First*), implied it was one of many more to come. Alexandre Derdeyn, according to young Baes, had himself gone to London in order to procure cheap ex-British ships and fill them with British cargo before he sailed to Ostend to reship the goods and obtain clean papers for the vessel's voyage across the Atlantic.¹⁴⁴ "Founded upon a culpable reliance," the judges of the Court of Appeals found no issue in denying any rehearing and effectively upholding their original verdict.¹⁴⁵

The *Eersten* case was the most high-profile court case between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States during this period. It resulted from the lure of commercial opportunity offered to merchants in the Austrian Netherlands by the upheavals of American Revolution and their willingness to act as surrogates within imperial economies even if it meant supplying resources for plantation owners in the Caribbean. Jean Baptiste Liebaert, Lieven Baes, and Alexandre Derdeyn, of course, were not alone in acquiescing to this temptation. The trade in munitions and colonial goods skyrocketed in the ports of the Austrian Netherlands during the American Revolution, facilitating surrogate trading lines from there to the Caribbean, Africa, and the United States. Hundreds of firms, businessowners, and investors like *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* participated in this Habsburg interjection into the colonial maritime world of the Atlantic during the American Revolution and its immediate aftermath.¹⁴⁶ Not all endeavours lasted but historians who have recently pointed to the complicity of Habsburg merchants, industrialists, and officials partaking in colonial economies of the nineteenth century may do well to dwell upon the eighteenth-century precedents of such actions and connivances.¹⁴⁷

Conclusions

The War of American Independence embroiled many Habsburg subjects into difficult, often lethal situations. British "despotism at sea," as Joseph II called it, and the audacity of American privateers to supply the patriot struggle brought

these subjects into the disruptive arena of international conflict. To be certain, Habsburg smugglers were aware of the risks and chose to compete within a contested imperial commercial world.

For officials in the Austrian Netherlands and in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the complexities of international commerce and the legal entanglements arising from it were a treacherous political minefield. The American Revolution produced domestic changes in the ways these regions operated. The Grand Duke of Tuscany declared a strict neutrality in the port of Livorno which reconfigured the prior trading relationships of the merchants there. In the Austrian Netherlands, officials found it difficult to appease both sides. Prince Starhemberg, as head of the regional government, exacerbated the situation by inflaming British suspicions of his pro-American bias. Accusations of bias also occurred in the opposite direction as American admiralty and appellate courts ruled against Habsburg merchants as agents of British aid and called into question the sincerity of Habsburg neutrality.

Throughout the War of American Independence, officials in the Habsburg Monarchy encountered challenges arising from the conflict; it was not a war they could easily disentangle themselves from, nor was it a war confined solely to the Atlantic powers. The American Revolution took place in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. It was a war in Europe as well as North America, the Caribbean, India, and further afield. It was, as a result, an inescapable challenge for the Habsburg Monarchy.

“The Long, Laborious, and Most Odious Task”

The First Struggle for Recognition between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America, 1776–1779

UNDER THE COVER OF darkness on the night of Saturday, May 23, 1778, a carriage clattered along the road before the glacis of Vienna. The worn-down wheels kicked up dirt along the way, adding to the “dust desert” which often hindered the firing line of the armaments adorning the embankments, bastion walls, and watchtowers overlooking the approach. Inside the carriage, the sole occupant tried his best to shield his face from the lanterns which faintly illuminated the way, hiding his visage from the multitude of guards defending the city’s entryway. If he could look outside, the growing shape of the city’s defences would have been his only distinguishable destination. The first contact came at the mouth of the sconce where a guard from within the small sentry stepped out. Toll paid, luggage fumbled, books—some suspiciously in English—thoroughly thumbed, and his French papers presented, the occupant and his driver were allowed to proceed across the first bridge into the huge triangular monolith of the Schottentor. At the second checkpoint a paid informer clocked the new arrival and sent word into the bowels of the city. As the carriage proceeded along the second and final bridge over the defensive ditches and into the protective welcome of the streets near Schottenhof, the traveller breathed a momentary sigh of relief. The long journey had come to an end, but his task had just begun. Vienna, his goal, was a fortress city: impregnable to conquerors, safe harbour to the imperial dynasty. Except, as far as the Habsburgs were concerned, the most dangerous man in Europe had just slipped in. The first American envoy had arrived in Vienna.¹

Why did William Lee, this first envoy, enter Vienna under darkness? Why did the Habsburgs see him as a threat? The first diplomatic mission between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States is one of the most fascinating

and illuminating episodes in their rich historical relationship. Lee's mission not only reflected the embryonic state of American diplomacy but also the cultural clash between entrenched court etiquette and "militia diplomacy"—the American practice of sending uninvited envoys to European states. This clash is one reason, but not the only reason, for the ultimate failure in the American struggle for recognition from the Habsburg Monarchy during the War of American Independence. The fact that Lee's mission failed has often been the point of fixation in largely one-sided accounts of this episode. The simplified narrative holds Lee accountable for the mission's failure. One historian deemed Lee's diplomatic character was "better suited to the role of prosecuting attorney than peacemaker."² Others have felt content to argue that his sour demeanour led him to "whiling away [his] time in Paris, venting [his] frustrations on Franklin."³ Some have stumbled in determining which Lee brother made it to Vienna⁴—in fact both William and his brother Arthur Lee made the journey—whilst some believed Lee never reached the Habsburg capital despite copious material evidence.⁵ When faced with assigning who or what caused the failure of the mission, one historian concluded, "such a question is, of course, difficult to answer conclusively."⁶ The futility expressed here, however, underscores the misdirection such a focus on Lee's character brings.

If we decentre William Lee from the story and focus instead on the wider context of his mission and time spent in Vienna, a far more interesting and refreshing tale emerges: a tale of the unlikely successes of the first American experiments in statecraft at the court of Vienna. It was here that militia diplomacy created a cult of fascination. In breaking diplomatic norms, American patriots also broke new diplomatic ground. Indeed, it goes against Horst Dippel's still accepted remark that "The sporadic appearance of American negotiators in Berlin and Vienna does not seem to have had any noteworthy influence."⁷ Focusing only on Lee's handling at court dilutes this wider perspective and the overall importance of his mission. By adopting an expanded viewpoint, I highlight the impact of an official American visitor on Viennese society and individuals within the Habsburg lands. Lee's mission, his interactions, his supporters, his detractors, his enemies, his visitors, and even those who only heard of him and never got to meet him, demonstrate the wider influence of Lee's mission in Vienna as well as the continued openness of Viennese elites towards the American Revolution and its cause. Rather than reducing Lee's mission to an episode of failure, this more complex encounter illustrates the wider stakes at play in the in first struggle for recognition between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.

From Normandy Shores to Bohemian Fields

When members of the Continental Congress resolved on July 4, 1776, to establish a "separate and equal station" for the thirteen colonies of mainland North America, they also established the need for diplomatic recognition. In the political transition towards independence, the new United States of America required international recognition to obtain legitimacy for itself and to engage with other nations on the world stage.⁸ The leaders of the self-proclaimed United States understood the necessity of these external relations since they were fighting a war of survival against the preeminent military power of the day. Therefore, uninvited patriots, the "militia diplomats," attempted to force themselves into European courts in the hope of procuring recognition, military resources, and perhaps alliances.⁹ Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg dynasty, was one of these targeted courts.

From the outset, the patriot strategic view included the Habsburg Monarchy, but most narratives of the American Revolution do not acknowledge this fact. Yet it is imperative to recognise that the patriot revolutionaries incorporating one of Europe's most powerful dynasties into their political plan made complete sense. The Habsburg monarchs, after all, ruled a vast European territory with the second-largest European population, commanded a substantial military, and owned the lands surrounding one of the largest weapon manufactories in the world at Liège.¹⁰ Given that the exigencies of the war forced the patriots to seek military supplies such as uniforms, gunpowder, and monetary loans from across Europe, approaching the power that controlled the transit network around Liège became a high priority. Moreover, Joseph II's role as Holy Roman Emperor, and therefore nominal head of all the German princes, including the Duke-Elector of Brunswick-Lüneberg (Britain's King George III), was a considerable weight in the scale of patriot consideration. Joseph, the revolutionaries came to hope, could halt the flow of Hessian mercenaries that swelled the British forces in North America using this position. Indeed, since the Hanoverian succession in 1714 had rendered Great Britain not only an Atlantic power but also a continental one in Europe, George III's German holdings in Brunswick would constitute an exposed front if the Habsburgs—the ally of their ally France—could be brought onto the patriot side. The British would have to divert additional resources to defend it. Tensions between George III as an elector and Joseph II as emperor within the Holy Roman Empire was another noted weakness by Americans.¹¹ Combined, these British weaknesses and the strengths of Joseph II appeared as favourable incentives to target the Habsburg Monarchy.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany provided another impulse for patriots to approach the Habsburg Monarchy. Prior to Pietro Leopoldo's edict of neutrality in 1778, he and his ministers had attempted to keep vital trading lanes with North America open for business. Tuscan merchants in Livorno had traded extensively with British North America for cod from the New England fisheries long before the outbreak of revolution. By 1775, Livornese merchants traded in Baltimore, Charleston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, Virginia.¹² When hostilities flared between colonists and the British in 1775, Pietro Leopoldo declared Livorno open to all traders. One of the American commissioners in Europe, Silas Deane, interpreted this as a friendly overture to the patriot cause, although it was not intended as one. Deane described Pietro Leopoldo as "being zealously in favour of America," whose actions to take off "all duties on American commerce, [were] to give it encouragement."¹³ The Tuscan agent Filippo Mazzei, who had arrived in Virginia in 1773, encouraged the emerging leaders of the American Revolution to conduct a private mission to Florence, which he suggested would be "very beneficial to us in our present struggles."¹⁴ At the same time, Thomas Jefferson, in contact with Mazzei and various Tuscans, mused on whether loans could be obtained given this sincerity.¹⁵ In early 1777, a patriot supporter published a *Memoire and Supplemental Observations* which argued, "the wisest plan of Conduct will be to engage some of the powers of Europe to recognize the Independancy of the Colonys [*sic*]; Perhaps the Emperor, the King of Prussia, with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, might be induced to Concur with France in making such a recognition."¹⁶ From Pietro Leopoldo's simple action, intended to protect trade, patriots gained the impression that the Habsburg dynasty, by extension, had shown support for their cause. One of the Americans' major convictions to bring about relations between the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy rested on the assumption that Pietro Leopoldo's actions reflected a sentiment shared by his brother Joseph.

In the spring of 1777, Arthur Lee travelled unofficially to investigate the German courts. He followed in the footsteps of Deane's secretary William Carmichael who Deane had sent to Hamburg and Berlin to gather intelligence in the autumn of 1776.¹⁷ Lee's mission included Frederick II's court at Berlin, which, patriots generally believed, had also shown sympathetic signs.¹⁸ Lee travelled with another patriot revolutionary, Stephen Sayre, who served as his secretary.¹⁹ Lee and Sayre left Paris on May 12 and arrived in Vienna around May 27, 1777. They became the first patriot revolutionaries to reach Vienna. The British ministry in London knew of their plans—even to the point that they travelled in a carriage "painted deep green"—but this information never reached

the British representatives in Vienna.²⁰ Lee and Sayre spent three days in the city before leaving on May 29, for Berlin. During their stay the pair met with commercial agents in and around Vienna. A few months later, from nearby Eisenstadt, a Jewish textile merchant by the name of Barruch Pincus wrote in order to answer Lee's enquiry about the quality, quantities, and relative costs of his fabrics which could be used for uniforms.²¹ Since Lee had no commission to deal with the Habsburgs, it is unlikely he attempted to meet with any Viennese officials. In one of the two short letters that he wrote to Benjamin Franklin from Vienna, Lee conveyed the error of earlier impressions about the Habsburgs. "There is," he remarked, "a Cold tranquillity here, that bodes us no good" and added in French, "We cannot warm up the German coldness."²² His warnings came too late. Congress had already issued a dual commission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, along with one for Florence, *before* Lee's cautionary reports arrived. The ill-founded hunch about the Habsburgs had become an objective of patriot diplomacy.

The man chosen for the dual venture was Arthur's elder brother, William Lee. This elder Lee is one of those figures relegated to the margins of history, largely because, as his biographer Alonzo T. Dill concludes, his abilities went "unfulfilled by the wartime tasks imposed upon him."²³ Although Lee belonged to the illustrious Lee dynasty, he was overshadowed by the more familiar exploits of his older siblings Richard Henry Lee and Francis Lightfoot Lee. After growing up at Stratford Hall situated on the tidewaters of the Potomac River along the Northern Neck of Virginia, in the 1760s he relocated to London and established himself as a businessman in the city. There he stayed with his uncle in a "nice house on Craven Street, next door to Franklin."²⁴ By the 1770s, Lee, along with his brother Arthur, had become immersed in the liberal politics of the day. As the situation between Britain and the colonies became increasingly agitated, Lee found fertile ground to make powerful allies amongst those who defended the rights of the colonists. His influential associates, mainly the radical John Wilkes, promoted him and Sayre, then a merchant in London, for election as sheriffs. In 1773, William Lee and Sayre became the first American-born sheriffs of London. Franklin wrote to his son in astonishment: "The new Sheriffs-elect are—could you believe it?—both Americans!"²⁵

Election as sheriff of London strengthened Lee's political experience.²⁶ As conflict escalated in the colonies, however, Lee's high office and colonial heritage became a focal point of contention. Twice he was attacked and denounced before the end of his term in 1774. Undeterred, Lee ran unsuccessfully again and again for public office in numerous parliamentary by-elections. In one, the

Southwark constituency, one witness noted how people were “whipped into a Republican frenzy” after Lee entered the running.²⁷ On May 19, 1775, Lee regained his political standing by winning a wardmote at the Ironmonger’s Hall to become the first and only American-born alderman of the City of London.²⁸ Yet this office earned him greater vilification as worsening news of revolutionary conflict reached the metropole. Lee faced a personal crisis as the prejudice against him made his public presence untenable. After war had broken out, Lee “guessed that American tobacco would be pouring into France” and saw an opportunity to exit London.²⁹ In the summer of 1776 he travelled for the first time to Paris where he discovered the impossibility of trading tobacco against the monopoly of the French government.³⁰ A further blow came from his painful first encounter with Deane, who had taken a dislike to William’s brother Arthur and opposed any “meddling” with his own trading and political efforts in Paris.³¹

Upon his lamentable return to London, Lee sowed the seed for his role in the interaction between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America. Along the exposed Normandy shores at the town of Dieppe, he penned a desperate plea to his brother in Congress, Richard Henry Lee. “Can’t you fix upon some employment for a certain friend of yours,” the younger Lee insisted, referring to himself, “[something] that is equal in his station of life, and his capacity, such as it is?” Given that Lee faced returning to London in the wake of the publication of the Declaration of American Independence, he sought to make use of his brother’s congressional influence to save himself, hinting to him that “it would have been prudent to have had the Declaration of Independence authoritatively proclaimed to every Court in Europe.”³² As Lee crossed the channel back to London, he had little idea what this letter would set in motion.

Congress originally appointed Lee as a commercial agent for Nantes a few months later in February 1777. Discord among the American diplomats in Paris boiled over around this time, especially between Deane and Arthur Lee, whose personal difficulties arose from their competing aims and culminated in Lee accusing Deane of fraud and embezzlement.³³ Their spat had severe repercussions for William Lee’s new career. Most importantly, Congress sent his commission to Paris rather than directly to London for fear of interception. Deane took responsibility to inform him but exercised little urgency. On March 3, Deane forwarded the commission via ordinary, vulnerable post and consequently word of the appointment spread through London before Lee himself received confirmation on April 21, adding to his vilification as one of the “aliens and improper people [put] to office.”³⁴ Lee endured this hostility in London until the birth of his first daughter Portia Lee in early June, after which he felt free to move to Paris.

In Paris, Lee discovered his first appointment was as commercial co-agent to the ineffective and often drunken Thomas Morris. Moreover, Deane had conspired with Franklin to replace Lee with Franklin's grandnephew. To solidify their attempt, Deane persuaded Lee to wait in Paris rather than go directly to Nantes, arguing that another agent there, John Ross, should settle Morris's accounts beforehand. Without any allies—both his brother Arthur and Sayre were abroad—Lee reluctantly remained in Paris throughout the summer of 1777, but after realising Deane's ploy and the unlikelihood of Ross finishing anytime soon, he left embittered for Nantes. On August 4, Lee arrived to find Morris a "strange lost man," who was blind drunk and had barricaded himself in his room. Distressed, Lee wrote to his brothers to complain of the rotten situation and fumed at Deane for the debacle, likening the appointment of Franklin's grandnephew to "ordering your Servant to take my Coat off my back and put it on your own!"³⁵ Seeing no good in Nantes, he returned to Paris on October 6, 1777. There, the situation had declined further. Accusations of fraud amongst the commissioners had reached an unresolvable point. Franklin despaired how "in a court [. . .] where every word is watched and weighed [. . .] one of them is offended if the smallest thing that is done without his consent."³⁶ The Lee brothers agreed the best solution would be to rid themselves of Deane by sending him to Amsterdam and Franklin to Vienna. They began petitioning their contacts in Congress for such an outcome.³⁷

Instead, Lee learned that Congress had already entrusted him to be the representative to both the courts of Vienna and Berlin back on July 1, 1777. Congress instructed him to petition Joseph as Holy Roman Emperor to stop German princes providing Britain with mercenaries; to gain Habsburg "acknowledgement of the independence of these States," and finally, to "propose treaties of friendship and commerce."³⁸ The day after he returned from Nantes, Lee accepted his newest commission but warned that he had not been able to "conference on the subject with the commissioners." At the same time, he offered his resignation as an alderman of London.³⁹

Winter precluded any immediate travel and instead Lee set to work preparing his affairs. He received the indirect help from the Habsburg ambassador Count Florimond Mercy-d'Argenteau in Paris, who observed immediately an "imperfection" in the commission. As it was, Lee's papers permitted him only to deal with Joseph and not Maria Theresa, whom Lee informed Congress was "extremely jealous of her power and authority, not permitting her son to interfere in any manner."⁴⁰ Such a transgression of courtly protocol became an increasingly common feature of the first American interaction with the Habsburgs.

The difficulties of his task emerged over successive months. Lee confided to one brother how, as a commercial agent, “I could and assuredly should have been of great use to the Public,” but as a diplomat he had grave concerns. He confessed:

I doubt my abilities, for however anxious and zealous, it must require both much time and more capacity than is common for a man not versed in the crooked paths of courts to get into the mysteries of the most subtle cabinets of Europe and besides [at] about 40 years old, it is somewhat awkward to go to school to learn languages.⁴¹

Lee’s own acknowledgement of his inadequacies for the mission stemmed from his unfamiliarity with German and, by Viennese accounts, his poor command of French. Lee also faced financial pressures, earning little as a commercial agent.⁴² In 1777, he attempted to use his knowledge of political events to manipulate the stock market but his trading order transacted too late and lost him his hedge.⁴³ To compound matters, his wife Hannah Philippa Ludwell Lee arrived in France with their children which precipitated the move to larger, more expensive premises on the Parisian outskirts at Chantilly.⁴⁴ In desperation, Lee pressed Congress for additional funds citing Vienna as “such a gay and lavish court as any,” but receiving no answer, he took out a personal loan of 3,000 French livres to cover the costs of the mission.⁴⁵ No ordinary diplomat in Europe faced such difficulties, and Lee’s financial difficulties would have a profound effect on the first diplomatic interaction between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.

Further problems emerged as soon as the new year dawned. On January 31, Morris finally succumbed to alcoholism, which forced Lee, now sole agent for commerce, to dash once again to Nantes to resolve commercial affairs. There, Lee clashed again with Ross over documents that belonged to Morris. Ross accused Lee of unrightfully meddling by confiscating Morris’s papers, which Lee did regardless before he returned to Paris on February 25—only to face the same dispute with Franklin.⁴⁶ Deane, aided by an angered Franklin, delayed Lee further by withholding documents provided by Congress, which Lee thought necessary to take to Vienna.⁴⁷ They also attacked Lee’s legitimacy of holding two positions.⁴⁸ Indeed Lee faced an uphill battle in asserting his legitimacy as a diplomat. George Mercer, an American military officer, who sojourned at Paris that year, wrote to his old friend George Washington,

Neither Chance [n]or Accident could ever have named William Lee a Commissioner to the first Court in Europe or indeed to any Court in



FIGURE 9. Portrait of the first American envoy to the Habsburg Monarchy, William Lee

the World. America herself cannot believe—tell it not in the Streets of Philadelphia nor let it be known in Virginia: William Lee an *Ambassador* to Vienna and Arthur Lee an *Ambassador* to France—but to do Justice to Arthur Lee, he has every Kind of Sense and Knowledge, expect common Sense and a Knowledge of the World, and he is a Man of Learning, but what Apology can be made for the Appointment of William Lee?⁴⁹

Lee’s time in service at Paris and Nantes had been the most testing period of his life so far, and it made for ill-preparation ahead of a more trying time in Vienna.

At the same time, Vienna increasingly became the fulcrum of European diplomacy as foreign ministers competed to influence the Habsburgs. The fact that the Americans were not at all alone in their designs on the Habsburg court exacerbated Lee’s naivety and ill-preparedness. Many European powers, particularly Britain and France, were desirous to steer the Habsburgs to their own ends. In the last major European conflict, the Seven Years’ War, the position of the German powers had heavily determined the outcome, so much so that William Pitt the Elder famously quipped, “America was conquered in Germany.”⁵⁰ As the Revolutionary war escalated, the same, it seemed, would be the case again. The British desire to induct the Habsburgs towards their side in the fight was not a sudden development. Rather it was a theme that had long dominated British

diplomatic aims on the continent. From 1763, the British lamented the loss of their powerful ally, and reversing the outcomes of the so-called Diplomatic Revolution of 1756—when the Habsburgs became allies of France and Britain allied with Prussia—became an outright objective. In 1765, then Secretary of State John Montagu, the fourth Earl of Sandwich, had informed the Habsburg ambassador “how much it was to be wished that the union which formerly subsisted with the House of Austria might be re-established.” “We were,” Sandwich concluded, “the natural allies of each other,” especially since the British sought security for their Hanoverian interests and an additional bulwark against French expansionism in Germany.⁵¹

It was a persistent belief. In 1771, George III declared that “England, in conjunction with the House of Austria and the [Dutch] Republic” seemed the “most secure barrier” against France and Spain.⁵² As the situation intensified and open war with France ebbed closer towards reality, British efforts increasingly centred on Vienna. There, the British ambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith wrote proudly to his superiors that anti-French temperament existed in Joseph II who, he argued, “is so totally unlike a Frenchman, above all, a French monarch.”⁵³ The Habsburgs seemed an ideal counterweight. If they could be dislodged from the French alliance and wed to British interests, then the French might reconsider their involvement in the American war, British Hanover would be less strategically exposed, and Britain would gain a powerful military ally on the continent. By 1778, the Secretary for War, Charles Jenkinson, remarked how Britain’s fate now lay with those “great military powers in the interior parts of Europe.”⁵⁴

French policy makers were acutely aware of this situation and sought to isolate the British from any continental connection, especially Vienna. The French ambassador, Louis Auguste le Tonnelier, Baron de Breteuil, repeatedly attempted to convince the Habsburg monarchs of British aggression as responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. The initial clash between *La Belle Poule* and HMS *Arethusa* in 1778 was, Breteuil claimed, the result of such British belligerence and justified the defensive actions of France.⁵⁵ Yet this narrative did not wash with the Habsburgs, particularly the emperor, who during his recent journey through France had noted thousands of uniforms being smuggled across the Atlantic.⁵⁶ To Joseph, British aggression was in fact retaliation in a war already begun by French action.⁵⁷

The French situation deteriorated further following the death of the Bavarian Elector Maximilian Joseph. By late 1777, French officials had committed themselves to supporting the American cause despite the consequences with Britain. News of the elector’s death in late December arrived in Paris by January 5, 1778.⁵⁸

The timing proved troublesome for French strategy. The elector's passing had extinguished the main Wittelsbach line before the question over the inheritance of Bavaria had been settled. Habsburg forces were now poised to take the Bavarian lands, which the dynasty had claimed for decades.⁵⁹ Concerned by the potential Habsburg acquisition of Bavarian territory along with its revenue, and, importantly, the electoral role within the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick II of Prussia immediately protested against Habsburg claims in favour of a more agreeable, if not neutral succession.⁶⁰ The succession crisis pitted the two competing German dynasties, the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, against one another and had severe consequences for the stability of continental Europe. By April, both sides had raised armies and Frederick marched his troops into Bohemia.

The French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, had worked to avoid this very situation for years. In 1775, he had sought to curb Joseph's expansionist tendencies when the emperor gained the province of Bukovina from the Turks. Vergennes had made it clear that the French would not support any further acquisitions.⁶¹ He maintained this policy, knowing any war between Austria and Prussia would sap France's ability to deal a decisive blow to Britain through the opportunity afforded by the rebellion in America.⁶² In the eyes of Vergennes and other French ministers, Joseph had no legal right to the Bavarian lands. As much as Joseph would not recognise the French interpretation of the War of American Independence, King Louis and Vergennes would not support the Habsburg outlook on the War of the Bavarian Succession. This geopolitical tit-for-tat imperilled the French alliance with the Habsburgs, who argued that Frederick's invasion of Bohemia had invoked their defensive alliance of 1757 and, accordingly, France now owed 20,000 troops to the Habsburg cause. As 1778 wore on, the alliance weakened and both sides insisted on neutrality vis-à-vis Prussia and the Americans, respectively, to spite the other.

Lee's mission to the Habsburg court thus came at a fortuitous moment for France. The American mission offered a chance to break the Bourbon-Habsburg stalemate by potentially persuading the Habsburgs towards the American side without risking a French commitment to the Bavarian issue. At the very least, any acceptance of the patriot emissary would signal sympathy towards the Americans. The stakes were even higher since the French had officially recognised the thirteen colonies as the sovereign United States of America in the Franco-American alliance. Any degree of Habsburg recognition, even tacitly through accepting an envoy, became the biggest concern for Britain's minister at Vienna, Keith, who, upon first hearing of Lee's mission, sought immediate assurances from Habsburg ministers that an audience with Lee would be refused.

He worked to avoid such a situation where France, as he put it, could build “a thousand false stories upon that single circumstance.”⁶³ The French meanwhile offered all means of assistance for the mission. Breteuil would chaperon Lee in Vienna, hopefully gaining him an audience with either monarch. The American mission presented France with a golden opportunity to widen the American conflict and further isolate Britain with little political risk attached. War was coming to Vienna.

These strategies created a precarious international situation for the Habsburgs. A few weeks before Lee left Paris for Vienna, Joseph II engaged Breteuil in conversation at a Viennese dinner party. The pair discussed the two major wars now facing Europe: one for America, the other for Bavaria. Each of them held contrasting views. For Breteuil, the two conflicts were inextricably linked; for Joseph, they were two distinct events.⁶⁴ The French conflagration held little interest for the emperor. First and foremost, Habsburg policy had grown divergent from French strategic interests as Eastern territories had become a greater political magnet for Joseph’s ambitions. He had acquired Galicia through the First Partition of Poland in 1772, Bukovina from the Ottomans in 1777, and further Ottoman territories remained a continual object of future aspirations.⁶⁵ By contrast, French fixation on the Atlantic counted for little except for potential disturbances to the balance of power. Maria Theresa’s reflections on this situation to her daughter, Marie Antoinette, should be remembered here. In order to achieve success in Bavaria, the Habsburgs needed to avoid any involvement in the Anglo-French dispute. Hence Joseph preferred to view the two wars as two distinct confrontations. Neutrality became the only viable Habsburg position out of necessity given their own aims.

Given this broader European context, certain aspects of Lee’s mission were already pre-determined by wider geopolitical events. The Habsburgs, increasingly wary and displeased by the French, looked upon his mission before it even began as an extension of Bourbon policy to press them into a conflict in which they did not desire to partake. The French meanwhile considered it an opportunity to break the diplomatic logjam. The British, for their part, would stop at nothing to prevent it from succeeding. The American patriots showed no awareness of these troublesome aspects, however. From their viewpoint, Lee’s mission was merely part of a broader strategy to attempt to secure support from any European court in their struggle. It was only later that Lee and his colleagues became aware of this paralysing geopolitical climate. Lee, therefore, was not the overall decisive element in determining the mission’s success. To be sure, his personal suitability for the position of envoy was questionable, ranging from his inabilities in French

to his frictions with other Americans in Paris. This ill-fated setup of militia diplomacy made the task at hand even more arduous, but it would have always been a Sisyphean task. Little wonder then, that as Lee left Paris in the spring of 1778, he was beginning the journey he would later describe as the "long, laborious, and most odious task" of his life.⁶⁶

"You Know Mr Lee is In Town?"

William Lee set out from Paris on March 24, 1778, without any real aim. Aware of the growing rupture between the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, Lee sensed war over the Bavarian crisis was on the horizon. His last report to Congress a day before his departure had laid out his concerns. He explained how Berlin represented the greater chance of success given Frederick II's earlier overtures to recognise the United States as soon as France had done so, but, he warned, "at this critical moment it is impossible for any man in the world to form a decisive opinion because the issue will depend on events that are yet in the womb of time." Lee elected to move to a midpoint in the German lands instead and wait for "the first opening that is made on either side in our favour."⁶⁷ He reached the Free Imperial City of Frankfurt in early April. There, he hesitated further about the war, which, "if once commenced," he believed, "promises to be the most bloody and desolating that Europe has known for this century past."⁶⁸ Berlin remained Lee's primary objective but in Frankfurt, word reached him that Frederick had reneged on his vow, and so Lee's plan shifted towards Vienna. An anxious letter sent to his brother Arthur at the end of the month revealed his indecisiveness and worries:

If [I] should not be properly received at Vienna, in case the course should be bent that way, do you think [I] ought to remain there, to wait the course of events? Perhaps it may not be improper to stay and the point of indignity may be got over from the mistake in the commission.⁶⁹ No decided resolution can be taken yet for some days in consequence of what was communicated [on] the 23rd [to Congress] but as far as any judgement can be formed at present Vienna will be the course at last.⁷⁰

Lee's Viennese mission was completely ad hoc. Not only had he settled on prioritising Vienna at the eleventh hour, but his reordering set his affairs in further disarray. In the first week of May, Lee desperately urged the commissioners back in Paris for help in securing his French host in Vienna but he had little hope that Franklin and Deane would comply. On May 10, Lee confided to a

friend, "One line from [them] would make everything go smoothly, but without it very little can be expected in the present situation of things . . . [and] unless Franklin can be counteracted, I am not to expect anything."⁷¹ The next day, exactly one month after his arrival, Lee finally left for Vienna. The time spent deliberating in Frankfurt added to the complexity of Lee's mission. During his stay there, the *Wienerisches Diarium* had announced Lee's role in Vienna. The newspaper identified Arthur and William Lee, "the brothers of Heinrich Richard Lee [*sic*], the famous member of Congress," who were assigned respectively to Spain and "some other court."⁷² Of course certain members of the Habsburg court had been well aware of Lee's intended mission from rumour and espionage. The British were aware, too. Keith had already informed his superiors in London on April 22 that "Lodgings are taken here for Mr William Lee, who is daily expected."⁷³

Lee's numerous delays in Paris and in Frankfurt afforded Keith ample time to prepare for his arrival. He successfully sought assurances from the State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz that Lee would be denied an audience. Kaunitz gave these willingly as he resented the French imposition in the first place. King George found them to be "very satisfactory" and instructed Keith to "take an Opportunity of assuring the Prince that His Majesty is very sensible of this Mark of Her Imperial Majesty's Attention and friendly disposition, which the King is ever desirous to procure."⁷⁴ By early May 1778, Keith and his superiors in London had placed their trust in Kaunitz and were quietly confident Lee's mission would result in abject failure. However, they overinterpreted this goodwill to mean the "court is desirous of breaking off the Connection with France, and renewing the Old System."⁷⁵ The British deluded themselves by thinking a Habsburg alliance against France in the War of American Independence was within reach. Lee's mission in Vienna would prove the ultimate test for such an alliance, and so Keith monitored the situation with great attention.

As Lee arrived under the cover of darkness on the evening of Saturday, May 23, Keith received "immediate information of his Arrival" from one of his informers at the gates. For his part, Breteuil, his French equivalent, sought out Kaunitz at one of his usual billiard parties. He shared the news of Lee's arrival towards the end of his conversation with Kaunitz by mentioning how he would "take the liberty to present [a] gentleman traveller, Mr William Lee, who has brought recommendations." It seemed as if Breteuil had underestimated Kaunitz's foreknowledge of the mission. The next day Keith, ever anxious, paid Kaunitz a visit. "You know Mr Lee is in town?" Kaunitz asked to raise the matter. "I am sorry for it," he added, "[since] I am surprised at the Court of France



FIGURE 10. Portrait of Sir Robert Murray Keith, the British ambassador in Vienna during the American Revolution

persisting in sending such a Person to Vienna.” As Kaunitz explained the French ambassador’s desire to present Lee as a “gentleman traveller,” it became clear to Keith that this would wreck any attempt to keep Lee out of the court entirely. The plot hinged on the freedom of any ambassador to present private persons rather than having to request an official audience in order to present a foreign emissary. In devising such a plan, Breteuil knew it counted for very little to observers whether Lee would be met as a traveller or as an American emissary since any reception would be enough for their aims. For the British, it was vital that Lee not be received at all, and so Keith replied, “I shall be very sorry, Sir, if you receive Lee under any Shape or Denunciation.”⁷⁶ Kaunitz had been warned and Keith pressed further the stakes involved by meeting Lee.

It was at that point in their conversation that Breteuil arrived at the scene. Keith naturally avoided his French counterpart, which allowed Breteuil and Kaunitz to resume their conversation from the night before. Keith later noted how the “conversation was not very long, and the Ambassador seemed uneasy at quitting the Prince.” In other words, he sensed Breteuil’s desperation. Before Kaunitz left, he confidentially told Keith, “I have not been able to dissuade Mr de Breteuil from taking this rash step; He says he has positive orders . . . and must obey them by presenting [Lee] to me.”⁷⁷ Kaunitz was caught between both sides.

The manoeuvres of Breteuil and Keith already affected Lee's chances of success. Keith held the advantage. He was a gifted linguist and experienced diplomat in Vienna since 1773 who had fostered great respect among his Viennese colleagues. The only chink in Keith's armour was the relationship with his superiors in London. His constant lack of sufficient instruction or information from them hampered his effectiveness at court. "I am forced to feed upon the scraps," he decried to one friend.⁷⁸ Keith's dilemma became more acute during Lee's mission because of the ill-health of his direct superior, Henry Howard, twelfth Earl of Suffolk, whose sickness prevented him from responding in full or within time. By July 1778, Suffolk had become so incapacitated that Thomas Thynne, Viscount Weymouth took responsibility for instructing Keith.⁷⁹ Breteuil by contrast enjoyed a good line of communication to and from the French court.⁸⁰ He was, however, severely disadvantaged when it came to his relationship with the ministers in Vienna. His interactions with Kaunitz had turned sour when Breteuil had rebuffed Kaunitz over the legitimacy of Habsburg actions in the Bavarian crisis. Kaunitz "at first smouldered, then he flew into a rage" according to eyewitnesses.⁸¹ It was one of several instances when Kaunitz lost his temper at the French representative.⁸² By April 1778, it had become impossible to hide the "coldness between the cabinets of Versailles and Vienna."⁸³

For all his occasional outbursts, Kaunitz was a brilliant statesman. His experience had accrued over some twenty-five years by 1778.⁸⁴ The Viennese, however, noted his peculiar personality. Kaunitz was by all accounts a paranoid hypochondriac, prone to sudden headaches and illnesses that would remove him from courtly life, and from which sprang a pedantic vegetarian diet. His predilection for brushing his teeth after every meal was another point of eccentricity noted by his acquaintances.⁸⁵ Yet Kaunitz was quite sociable despite his unusual mannerisms. The British traveller Sir Nathaniel Wraxall provided a rich portrait of Kaunitz during his visit to Vienna in the late 1770s, a city he believed "offers more resources to a stranger" than any other.⁸⁶ Wraxall experienced Viennese social life centred upon the "common rallying point of pleasure and relaxation" at Kaunitz's townhouse at Freyung, which was "open every evening for the reception of company and constitutes a principal source of amusement at Vienna."⁸⁷ Kaunitz was easily accessible, "usually engaged at billiards . . . or in conversation as his inclinations may lead." "Everything," declared Wraxall, "conduces to put a foreigner at his ease, and insensibly to divest him of the awkwardness or embarrassment . . . in the midst of a society, with whose habits and common topics of conversation he is unacquainted."⁸⁸ This was a far cry away from the type of reception William Lee would encounter at Kaunitz's home.

When Breteuil took Lee to meet with Kaunitz after dinner on May 26, 1778, Mr. Ernest, the British chargé d'affaires, was intentionally present to keep watch on the meeting. "The Prince," reportedly "without speaking one Single Word to either, made Lee the coldest Bow possible & turned away, leaving the Room a moment after and taking no taking no farther notice of the Ambassador or of his Traveller."⁸⁹ Although other visitors also found Kaunitz "remarkably cold and inattentive to strangers, sometimes scarcely deigning to speak," Breteuil's actions led Kaunitz to act deliberately cold in this instance.⁹⁰ Duped, Kaunitz wrote furiously to Maria Theresa about the encounter, stating he "received [Lee] with a simple politeness but without saying a word." "I will give him no invitation to dinner," he added, "and will continue to receive him coldly if he comes again" and so advised his sovereign "under no circumstance grant audience to this man in his capacity or as a private individual."⁹¹ Keith summarised the event to his superiors by noting how Kaunitz seemed "a good deal nettled" and was "not much pleased with the Ambassador."⁹²

Other dinners went smoother for Lee. After taking leave of the awkward situation, Breteuil and Lee went house-calling to leave visit cards among the local Viennese nobility and foreign dignitaries before they headed to the ambassador's box at the theatre.⁹³ Fortunately for the cash-strapped Lee, Breteuil was "the only member of the diplomatic corps whose establishment enables him to entertain in a style of magnificence."⁹⁴ Accordingly, two days later Breteuil hosted a dinner party to honour and introduce the Viennese to his foreign guest. First impressions fixated on Lee's appearance as "rich, thoroughly ugly, [and] marked by the smallpox."⁹⁵ Lee's popularity declined as his inability to converse fluently in French became apparent.⁹⁶ Under scrutiny from Count Johann von Saint-Julien, "a great partisan of the Americans" who "continuously questioned the said American about hundreds of things of his country," Lee's communicative abilities came undone.⁹⁷ Another observer noted, Lee "possesses a good head and reasons very well," but "speaks little French and expresses himself very badly."⁹⁸ This dinner was Lee's first exposition, but more were to follow. Despite linguistic mishaps, however, Lee acquired a level of notoriety amongst Viennese socialites.

The dinners connected Lee to a sympathetic Viennese audience, hailing from a variety of important offices and backgrounds. Among his fellow diners were Count von Saint-Julien who, at the age of twenty-one, was starting a promising career in the imperial army, and Countess Maria Elisabeth von Waldstein.⁹⁹ Countess Maria Carlotta von Hatzfeld was married to the influential statesman Count Karl Friedrich von Hatzfeld, the imperial chamberlain. Lee had

obviously charmed the latter as she later introduced him to her husband. Another notable guest at the dinner table was Prince Wenzel Johann Joseph Paar, a well connected noble and the imperial postmaster general.¹⁰⁰

The obvious absentees, however, were the courtiers who had already expressed their sympathies for the American cause. The most significant absence was Jan Ingenhousz, who had left for London in order to present the Baker Lectures at the Royal Society.¹⁰¹ Ingenhousz, who had been the most forceful advocate for the Americans, was completely unaware of Lee's mission. The animosity between Franklin and the Lees had robbed the mission of a vital ally in Vienna. Similarly, Lee's name was unknown to Count Karl von Zinzendorf who, with equally unintended misfortune, had departed for Trieste three weeks before Lee's arrival.¹⁰² That summer in Trieste, he began to read *Common Sense* just as the Revolution's representative resided a few hundred miles away. Emperor Joseph II was also away on military manoeuvres in upper Bohemia. Joseph's time away from court and his frequent disagreements over the Bavarian crisis meant foreign policy lay effectively in the hands of his mother and Kaunitz.¹⁰³ This afforded Maria Theresa a greater level of autonomy in her son's absence; a further disadvantage for Lee's success. On May 31, she responded to Kaunitz's memorandum on his encounter with Lee by venting her anger at the French ambassador. She instructed her own, Mercy-d'Argenteau, to reaffirm to the French court that she "cannot possibly receive him . . . not even as a simple traveller." Such a meeting, she fretted to Kaunitz, would "breed factionalism and cause incivility."¹⁰⁴ For Maria Theresa, the anxiety that she would be "driven against her will" by the American issue, as she had expressed already to her daughter, seemed a plausible reality.

Lee had, after all, come knocking on her door. On May 27—in between the disastrous nocturnal encounter with Kaunitz and the first dinner party the night after—Lee and Breteuil had travelled to the palace of Schönbrunn outside the city walls. The pair "made all the usual Visits there to the *Grandes Maitresses* of the Empress and Her Daughters as likewise to the Great Chamberlain in the manner which is customary [for] the Presentation of a Stranger patronised by a Foreign Minister." These conventional greetings were as far as Lee was permitted. Kaunitz reassured an increasingly concerned Keith the next day by reconfirming "Her Royal Mistress's firm Resolution that Lee should have no Admission whatever either publick or private to Her Presence." "Since," Kaunitz continued, "she is so sincerely disposed to cultivate with His Majesty, [and] had thought proper to render Her Determination as clear indubitable and peremptory as possible to preclude all false surmises and Conjectures of distant nations." Within just five days of Lee's arrival, the door at Schönbrunn had shut.

Keith declared, with a sigh of relief, "I believe that I may now look upon the Affair as wholly terminated."¹⁰⁵

Lee's own inabilities combined with the embryonic nature of patriot diplomacy had forced him to rely upon the French ambassador, whose shambolic efforts jeopardised the mission. By so hastily forcing Lee upon the court, Breteuil had gambled away the American's chances. As Keith supposed, "His Excellency probably imagined that by this means he would leave little Time for deliberation and procure Access to the Empress before any Resolution could be taken to shut the Door against Mr Lee." Ostracised by Kaunitz since the Bavarian crisis, Breteuil could have hardly been aware of the extent of Kaunitz's preparedness and the sincerity of his guard against Lee. To attempt to bypass courtly etiquette in Vienna, where "little is ever to be gained by surprise," was to provide the fatal blow to Lee's mission overall.¹⁰⁶ Besides, Lee himself realised the ruse of masquerading as a simple traveller would not work: "all the world knows my design," he wrote to Arthur.¹⁰⁷

In a second effort to speak with the court gatekeeper, Lee made another appearance at Kaunitz's home on June 2, but crucially, without Breteuil. Even without him, this latest ploy failed as he "remained in the room for a considerable Time but Prince Kaunitz took no Notice."¹⁰⁸ A week later, Breteuil devised a new strategy by presenting Lee to the ageing Imperial Vice Chancellor, Prince Rudolf Joseph von Colloredo, who harboured deep misgivings about the French and argued with Kaunitz for a rapprochement with the British. The meeting, predictably, did not go well. Lee presented himself to the "Prince and Princess and to most of the principal People present" at the same time as they were receiving English guests through Keith. "The unexpected Appearance at that house and in that Place," Keith reported later, "stirred up an Indignation in my Breast which I was at no Pains to conceal."¹⁰⁹ Within no time, the whole court heard of "a real comic scene [filled] with sourness and emotion."¹¹⁰ Kaunitz, in his latest memorandum on French indecency, informed Maria Theresa, "it was a deliberate indiscretion on [France's] part, designed to compromise us vis-à-vis England."¹¹¹ The Colloredo debacle seemed to cement the impossibility of Lee's mission.

Perhaps revealing his inexperience, Lee appeared blissfully unaware of his perilous situation and the gross insults done to the court by his repeated unwelcome appearances. The next day, on June 10, Lee wrote jubilantly to his brother: "the American cause seems to engage conversation much more than the differences in this country."¹¹² Lee did not admit this resulted from his controversial actions. As for Breteuil, Lee naïvely expressed admiration for the man "who is

polite, able, and extremely well-versed in the management of such an intricate business . . . and has in short done everything that I could wish."¹¹³ The irony was completely lost on Lee. Breteuil's decision to force Lee into several high-profile encounters within the first few days of his mission had endangered the whole undertaking. But controversy at the soirees of Princes Colloredo and Kaunitz gave Lee an unexpected second wind. Whoever could enrage the high nobility of the capital was suddenly of great interest to the Viennese nobles. As the Swedish ambassador wrote home, "Mr Lee is causing quite a stir here."¹¹⁴

During the first half of June, Lee's celebrity reached a zenith. On June 13, Keith lamented, "It has been a matter of great Uneasiness to me, to remark within these few Days, that the Treatment of Mr Lee is very much changed in his Favour." Lee "has not only been well received in several visits to Count Colloredo,"¹¹⁵ Keith bemoaned, "but he has dined with very large Companies at Count Hatzfeld's and is to have the same Honour at Prince Schwarzenberg's, Great Master of the Household."¹¹⁶ The latter two were particularly influential. Both Count Karl Friedrich von Hatzfeld and Prince Joseph Adam von Schwarzenberg were members of the Privy Council and advisors to Maria Theresa. Interestingly, Schwarzenberg's daughter was married to Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf. American interest travelled further. Prince Johann Rudolf Chotek von Chotkow und Wognin, for example, had erected a "maison américaine" at one of his Bohemian estates.¹¹⁷ Lee also met with Antonia Elisabeth Susanna Forster, daughter of the celebrated naturalist Johann Reinhold Forster, who worked as a governess for a rich mercantile family in Vienna.¹¹⁸ Lee had finally made a breakthrough.

Lee's controversy in Vienna served to make the American Revolution more widely known in the Habsburg lands. His unorthodox methods of diplomacy garnered him an air of notoriety which extended beyond the city. News of Lee's activities travelled to all parts of the Monarchy. In Habsburg Lombardy, a friend of the wife of the imperial commissioner in Milan kept her abreast of Lee's disastrous encounters at the Viennese court, describing in detail Lee's animus for such clashes, and the American cause.¹¹⁹ In Buda, the aspiring scholar Johann Zinner heard of Lee's presence in Vienna and desired to meet him in order to compile his books on the American Revolution, but could not make it to Vienna in time.¹²⁰ In Vienna itself, Lee's brash behaviour elevated him to an object of curiosity among the Viennese who invited him to dinner after dinner in early June. Whereas Lee's mission to pry open the imperial court and obtain support from the Habsburg monarchs for the America cause was certainly a near-impossible task given Kaunitz's reservations and Keith's talent for keeping British interests

front and centre, Lee's blunders at court ensured the American Revolution remained a topic of special interest among courtiers and their networks throughout the summer of 1778. Failure at court boosted his success in the salons and at the dinner tables of the Viennese elites.

Fortunately for Keith, Lee's success stopped at the dinner table. Despite his tenacity at "having appeared three or four Times" at Kaunitz's home, Keith was still able to take comfort in the fact that "the Prince has not hitherto opened his Lips to him."¹²¹ This included one occasion when Kaunitz attended Breteuil's recurring dinner parties on June 12. Keith now felt exasperated at the "gall to be daily exposed to meet with Lee at Houses, from which [he could] not wholly withdraw." Keith had identified his rising popularity among courtiers who could not be persuaded to shun the Virginian. Yet before long, Keith reported with satisfaction how Lee "had thought it proper not to make his Appearance at Prince Kaunitz's," and that Lee had become alienated from the diplomatic corps which Keith managed to press into line.¹²²

The shift came from Lee's own melancholy about his prospects in Vienna. On June 24, as Keith presented more English guests to Maria Theresa at Schönbrunn, Lee whiled away writing letters.¹²³ He lamented in one how his "Austrian associates have become somewhat cooler toward him . . . [especially] since the Emperor and King have taken their high line, mouths are in some measure shut."¹²⁴ In another, he revealed how his mind was turning to Sweden and Denmark as more likely allies, especially as they "will be much more useful than either Austria or Prussia."¹²⁵ By the end of the month, Vienna was awash with rumours that Lee would soon depart the city but with little idea about his next destination.¹²⁶ Keith of course was more spirited to report home, "Mr Lee appears very little in Publick, never at Prince Kaunitz's; and the other Colloredo is in the Country. It is said that Lee's stay here will be very short."¹²⁷

Lee had indeed decided to move on. As June began to end, Lee thought the unending stalemate over Bavaria was "sapping attention towards Germany from the American situation," reducing his opportunities in Vienna.¹²⁸ There seemed little sense to remain when the ardently isolated Maria Theresa was his only hope, especially as she would soon become even more reclusive during her annual period of mourning for her late husband. Towards the start of July, Keith noted how Lee "has been shut up [for] several Days and constantly writing," but he suspected Lee would leave "in the Hands of a private Person some wild project of Commerce, a Bait for all others, which the People of this Country are the most ready to swallow."¹²⁹ Keith was half-right. Lee lingered on for the arrival of his new secretary Samuel Stockton, who reached Vienna around late June.¹³⁰

In the meantime, Lee had tried to compel other diplomats at court to listen to his case. Filippo Vivalda, Marquess of Castellino, the ambassador for the Kingdom of Sardinia, became a focus of Lee's efforts. Prior to Lee's arrival, Castellino had been instructed to follow the prevailing opinion about Lee in Vienna; if Lee were to be recognised by a majority, then he would follow suit.¹³¹ Over the course of June, Lee set himself to dissuade Castellino of his instructions and, by July, he had almost succeeded. Castellino agreed to meet Lee but only in an unofficial capacity as a "Virginian merchant." The pair discussed the prospects of trade between Sardinia and the United States—but without much substance in Castellino's mind, the talks amounted to nothing.¹³² Once Stockton had arrived, the pair attempted to convince another target with only a modicum of success. Confirming Keith's intelligence, Lee and Stockton delivered papers to Nils Bark, the Swedish envoy at Vienna, who was not in when they called.¹³³ On suspicion of their interaction, Bark was later called to Schönbrunn and "passed a considerable time with her Imperial Majesty [and] the French Ambassador with whom he had a long conference."¹³⁴ The climate of fear surrounding Lee prevented any further diplomatic initiatives in Vienna.

On July 4, Keith, who had not heard from London since May, finally received instructions. In his reply he triumphantly noted how Lee and Stockton had already left for "the post road back to the Empire and Frankfurt." Relishing Lee's defeat, Keith wrote how it was rightly so; Lee "was losing Ground instead of gaining it" as his "publick Mission must certainly have proven fruitless as it was contemptible."¹³⁵ Indeed, Lee had left Vienna on July 2, 1778. This departure, however, was not the end to the effects of the American Revolution in Vienna but merely a continuation. In many ways, Lee's visit had stimulated further the keen interests of the Viennese, imparting to them a tangible example of the Revolution.

Conclusion

American diplomatic failure in Vienna resulted from multiple factors, not just one man's deficiencies. Lee functioned precisely as we would expect from an inexperienced diplomat thrust into the most rigidly ceremonial court in Europe. Failure instead arose largely from two decisive factors: one, the miscalculations made by the French ambassador, Breteuil; and two, inroads made by the British minister resident, Keith, to obtain political promises, which impressed upon the Habsburgs the wider gravity of the situation. The Habsburgs could not acknowledge Lee because doing so risked a delicately established neutrality, created to protect Habsburg interests. In part, because they also wished to

spite the French. Sheer bad luck did play a role in Lee's demise as well—notable sympathisers were not in town—but geopolitical exigencies proved more fatal. Diplomats in the court understood this. The Ragusan ambassador reported extensively on Lee's predicament and dismissal by the court, where, he noted, "most people believe he won't be received," but crucially added, "this is an effect of the harmony that reigns between the courts of Vienna and London."¹³⁶ The personalities of Breteuil and Keith were pivotal in the first interaction between the United States and the Habsburg Monarchy.

However, just as we assign blame, we should also acknowledge success, and this is a crucial point: there was success in Lee's mission. First, if nothing else, his weeks in Vienna demonstrated the resolve of patriot intentions to form their own diplomatic connections within the European system. It bolstered American sovereignty. Secondly, Lee's visit to Vienna kindled a further degree of interest in the American Revolution. Lee's culinary companions were powerful figures within the court; their informal receptions of him were enough to drive Keith to despair. Even through failure, Lee triumphed. His celebrity increased after his diplomatic faux pas with ministers. Lee left Vienna with nothing to show, but his legacy was the intangible, indelible impression he left behind. The first struggle for recognition may have been mismanaged, it may have failed in its aims, but it was the beginning of a connection between the United States and the biggest continental European power.

“Wedded to the System They Have Embraced”

The Habsburgs as Mediators and Profiteers in the War of American Independence, 1780–1783

THE FINAL YEARS of the War of American Independence created new possibilities for the Habsburg Monarchy. In the Austrian Netherlands, Ostend flourished in the later years of the conflict as the only neutral port in northwestern Europe. The influx of foreign ships and investments carried with them new prospects for local firms and business. Trading opportunities, which had been impossible due to the British monopoly before then, now became reality as Habsburg firms reaped the benefits of supplying the Caribbean and North American markets for the first time. For as long as peace remained elusive, profit would continue. Elsewhere in the Habsburg Monarchy, merchants desired the same fortunes. Traders and bankers in the city of Trieste, the major Habsburg free port in the northern Adriatic, clamoured for a share in trade. Many of them attempted to create the first direct trading routes between Trieste and the North American mainland. In doing so, their profits rivalled those of the imperial expeditions to India and China. Overall, private enterprise and economic expansion in the Habsburg Monarchy benefitted greatly from the disruption of the American Revolution and the prospect of an independent United States.

New political challenges and opportunities also emerged for the Habsburgs during the War of American Independence. In 1779, the Habsburgs suffered a humiliating conclusion to the War of the Bavarian Succession, which thwarted Joseph II's designs on Bavaria and heralded a Prussian victory within the eyes of European powers. Co-mediation of the Peace of Teschen assured the Russians the prestige of arbiter of the Holy Roman Empire. Relations between the Habsburgs and France waned as a result of French participation in the peace process. For the Habsburgs, the War of American Independence offered the possibility to correct this humiliation in failing to secure Bavaria. Maria Theresa dreamed of bringing

about a general peace within Europe, and State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz and Joseph II worked tirelessly to realise this aim after her death. Chasing a conclusion to the American Revolutionary war, therefore, took precedence over the economic advantages presented by its continuance. At stake was a restoration of dynastic pride, an opportunity to control the fortunes of Europe, and the chance to inflict painful revenge upon the French and Prussians. Yet few today recall Maria Theresa’s dying dream of peace or Kaunitz’s longed-for Congress of Vienna which, had it come to pass, would have supplanted Paris as the diplomatic birth-place of a recognised United States of America.

“We Must Bide Our Time” – Ostend and the Atlantic

Across Europe, merchants vied for new commercial opportunities occasioned by the War of American Independence. Nowhere was this rush more present than in the port of Ostend. As the only neutral port on the European mainland at the ligature between the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, Ostend’s mercantile classes benefitted immensely from the conflict. British raids first brought French merchants to Ostend to protect their vessels under the neutral imperial ensign. Dutch merchants followed suit during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Between 1778 and 1780, Ostenders witnessed an almost seven-fold increase in the number of ships using their harbour.¹ Exports to the British Isles, where British merchants also utilised imperial neutrality for their vessels to the Caribbean, soared in same period: Ostend-England trade more than doubled by 1780 whilst exports to Scotland rose from virtually nothing to £45,803 in 1781 and doubled in 1782.² The meteoric rise of Ostend as a commercial entrepôt arose from two main factors, both of which were influenced by the American Revolution. First, Ostenders supplied munitions to belligerents owing to its neutrality and proximity to Liège, one of the largest munition manufactories in eighteenth-century Europe; and secondly, masking ships under imperial colours and ownership protected against foreign infractions at sea. Throughout the American Revolution, Ostend was an indispensable port of call for all warring powers.

The independent Prince-Bishopric of Liège was the source of Ostend’s tremendous success during the Revolution. The capital Liège, as well as the towns and hamlets in the environs surrounding the city, bisected the Austrian Netherlands and were a manufacturing hub for small arms, rifles, muskets, bayonets, and occasionally cannons. Powder mills, nail factories, and rifling workshops signified the town’s way of life. Along the Vesdre River alone, forty different workshops carved out barrels for rifles. The region produced 240,000 guns on

average per year for export abroad.³ All belligerents sourced weapons from Liège. The thirteen American colonies were the most in need. They suffered from the lack of powder mills and ammunition producers in general. Consequently, procuring arms became a major patriot priority. In little more than two months in 1775, the Committee of Safety in Pennsylvania spent nearly £25,000 procuring necessary weapons for their militia.⁴ This was excellent news for Liège—and for Ostend. Benjamin Franklin, as a Pennsylvanian agent, fulfilled orders with weapons from Liège and before long, he received unsolicited samples and promises from Liègeois manufacturers hoping for a “channel of arms for the Free States of America.”⁵

The completion of the system of canals and roadways connecting Liège with Ostend on the eve of the Revolution allowed for easy transportation of the munitions, especially after the Dutch prohibited military exports.⁶ Initial arms traffic between Liège and North America took a circuitous route via Lisbon. British, French, and Habsburg agents in the Portuguese capital tracked the consignments destined for North America.⁷ In 1776, the Mayor of Liège declared, “our traders, great and small, are giving work to our men; we see nothing but crates of guns in the streets.”⁸ Liège’s bustling streets in 1776 actually represented a low point of munitions exports. In subsequent years, an extraordinary amount of weaponry transited the Austrian Netherlands to supply the War of American Independence. By the end of the war, Ostend had shipped around two million pounds of munitions.⁹ The War of American Independence turned the region into a profitable powder keg.

From 1781 until the end of the war, Ostend was the only neutral port along the northwestern European coastline. The maritime convention of “neutral ships made neutral goods” protected any ships sailing under the Habsburg flag. Ostend merchants offered to “neutralise” foreign vessels through use of the flag. This “neutralisation” trade operated in several ways. The simplest measures involved ships entering Ostend where goods would be unloaded and then reloaded, which involved new cargo papers stating the goods came from the Austrian Netherlands. English ships utilised this method extensively through so-called “Algerian passports” obtained at Ostend, which cleared any cargo heading past the Iberian Peninsula irrespective of the destination.¹⁰ The other method involved re-registering ownership whereby Ostend merchants took ownership of a vessel in name only. The owners were neutral, but the ship, captain, and cargo remained the de facto property of foreigners. These “paper” companies operated through merchants in the Austrian Netherlands who acted as commissioners for large international syndicates. But foreign merchants also relocated to Ostend or

established shell companies to reap the same benefit. Merchants from Dunkirk were the first wave of such competitors. One Dunkirk trader, François de Vinck, masked a fleet of 157 ships. His company *De Vinck & Co.* became the major commissioner for European traders to the Atlantic during the Revolution.¹¹

Neutralising ships and masking ownership became so prevalent that a new verb emerged: *Ostendisieren* (to Ostendize).¹² This process precipitated an explosion of ship traffic around Ostend. From 1780 to 1783, between 6,000 and 9,000 ships entered Ostend. This was a remarkable increase from the roughly 480 ships which entered each year from 1775 to 1778.¹³ In 1782, over fifty foreign firms registered their operations in Ostend and the entirety of the Dunkirk fishing fleet had swapped their flag for the imperial one. Ostend authorities issued 1,944 passports that year and the Admiralty granted firms 268 new passes between 1781 and 1783. The rise was so great that the walls of Ostend had to be torn down and a new neighbourhood and harbour facilities constructed.¹⁴ The American Revolution ushered in an era of considerable economic growth for Ostend and the Austrian Netherlands.

The growth in trade volume increased Ostend's Atlantic connections. New trade avenues opened in the West Indies where the British, Danish, Dutch, French, and Swedish sought to supply their colonies through the neutral imperial flag. In 1782 alone, 126 ships listed the Greater Antilles as their destination in the *Gazette van Gent*. From 1778 until 1785, a constant flow of ships travelled between Ostend and the Caribbean.¹⁵ British traders maintained vital supplies of gin, tea, and tobacco from Caribbean plantations to London by migrating to Ostend. In 1781, a government report noted how, on a single day, 68,970 pounds of tea arrived in London from Ostend.¹⁶ Ostend's merchants even encompassed slave traders. Friedrich Romberg became one of the most successful in this trade in the Austrian Netherlands.¹⁷ Romberg first sought to capitalise on the burgeoning munitions trade to America under his new maritime company *Romberg Fils & Ricour* in Ostend but his request to transport arms to St. Thomas was denied by the authorities in 1782.¹⁸ Romberg expanded his fleet, with almost half of his 327 ships under ownership by established merchants in the Austrian Netherlands.¹⁹ He then founded a maritime insurance company in Bruges and founded two further companies to enter the slave trade; *Romberg & Cie* in Ghent, which focused on forced transportation to Cuba and Saint-Domingue, and *Romberg, Bapst & Cie* at Bordeaux with a German financier and help from Brussels-based bankers, which Romberg fronted through his son Henry. This firm rose to become one of the major slaving houses in France.²⁰ The Ghent-based branch sent ten ships from Ostend in 1782 destined for Angola and West Africa.²¹ Joseph II

ennobled Romberg in 1784 for his pioneering efforts, but it was the American Revolution to which Romberg owed his success.²²

Whilst connections between Ostend and the Atlantic embedded trade links with the Caribbean, fewer merchants dared to enter the warzone directly around mainland America. Direct trade between the United States and Ostend only occurred towards the close of the war, when safer passage seemed assured. Ostend merchants were eager to start, however. John Fottrell, one of the longstanding Irish merchants in Ostend, exemplified this cautious excitement. Fottrell planned to send a ship, *De Stad Weenen*, under imperial colours to Philadelphia but feared an American ban on British products. He solicited Franklin for advice before he continued.²³ Franklin could not help Fottrell against the importation ban, but he did provide a list of wares and contacts in the United States.²⁴ In his letter to Franklin, Fottrell explained how trade with the United States was a matter of particular interest for local Ostend magistrates. "In consequence of orders from Government," Fottrell noted, the local authorities wished for him to "acquaint all my friends" with Franklin's information so that "every encouragement and facility that can be desired will be granted to the American trade here."²⁵

Fottrell's successful trade with the United States spread among Ostend merchants.²⁶ Franklin received numerous petitions from them in quick succession. In late January 1783, Jean-Guild Wets, a merchant at Bruges, wrote on behalf of a consortium "composed of fourthy of the most Substantial marchants of Flandres [*sic*]," desiring direct trade with the United States.²⁷ The next day, on January 31, another representative of *Veuve d'Aubremé & Fils* from Brussels wrote on the occasion of "a striking and glorious Epoch in the Annals of the Century" and begged of him to send a list of contacts in Boston and Philadelphia.²⁸ A few days later, an Irish firm based in Dunkirk and Ostend, *Connelly Sons & Arthur*, informed Franklin of their plan to divert ships from the West Indies towards Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York with linens in exchange for tobacco. They also asked to become American consuls and included a portfolio of ten references from American and European merchants.²⁹

Administrators in the Austrian Netherlands were keen to oversee the continuation of profiteering from the American Revolution. When the first wave of emigrant merchants came to trade out of Ostend following the French entry into the war in 1778, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg, the minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, ordered the Council of Finance to start preparing suggestions for how to develop a market presence in North America.³⁰ The short memorandum, submitted by Councillor Denis-Benoît, baron de Cazier, argued American commerce would benefit the Austrian Netherlands but the merchants

would organise this themselves. Starhemberg expected more, especially on the prospects for direct trade, so he proposed that the treasurer general have it more “thoughtfully debated” at the Council of Finance. In the meantime, he forwarded the memorandum to Kaunitz as “a work of foresight.” Kaunitz’s response was muted.³¹ Unlike Starhemberg, he was more aware of the perilous state of neutrality since Lee visited Vienna at the same time Starhemberg forced these discussions. Kaunitz thought any advances by Brussels towards the Americans would undermine their neutral position, so he ignored further discussion.³² But Starhemberg did not relent. After further deliberation with his councillors, he urged enticements for American traders in order to stimulate business.³³ Pressed again by Starhemberg, Kaunitz acquiesced at the end of October 1778 but he limited Starhemberg’s actions to merely pursuing a commercial relationship with the Americans, nothing political.³⁴

Starhemberg felt dissatisfied with his remit and over the next few years, he pushed its limits. For a time, he pursued a channel to Franklin through Jan Ingenhousz, but this plan failed due to Ingenhousz’s sojourn to London.³⁵ Kaunitz would not countenance any overtures to the dozens of Americans living in the Austrian Netherlands so Starhemberg turned instead to the consul in Bordeaux for ideas, but nothing came of it.³⁶ By 1781, the conversation had no clear direction without accepting a political connection via representation and a treaty of commerce.

The issue seemed more urgent than ever following the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and the highpoint of Ostend’s commercial influence. Profits ran so high that it was inconceivable and impractical to relinquish it. Franklin’s indirect response to the legal dispute over the *Eersten* case in the American courts seemed to offer a solution. In his letter on the matter, Franklin pointed out that legal representation could be ensured through a consul general, who “might at all times assist his compatriots with his Counsels and Protection in any Affairs they might have in that Country.”³⁷ Ministers in Brussels interpreted this as an invitation to send a consul but without requiring a treaty or recognition. On March 24, 1782, the Council of Finance met in Brussels to discuss Franklin’s idea.³⁸ Their lengthy memorandum considered the logistical ramifications of such an undertaking, but unanimously agreed a consul general should be established, since it would provide “useful information” and could “support the general interests of commerce and direct the speculations of traders in the various provinces of the monarchy.” In conclusion, they envisaged a grand system of several vice-consuls “given the scope of the United Colonies”; one for each American state, under the direction of a Consul General, a “learned man”

from the mercantile class who “would be the means by which the government, either here [in Brussels] or in Vienna, would gather good information on the local circumstances [in America], especially in relation to trade.”³⁹ Starhemberg approved the council’s measure and sent it to Kaunitz for deliberation with the emperor. His adjoining comment, however, highlighted the problem of recognition which was inherent in establishing any formal consular network. Starhemberg sensed Franklin’s plan was “to get our Court to recognise the Independence of the United Colonies” which he felt unable to recommend “as long as the fate of the Colonies remains undecided.”⁴⁰ On April 13, 1782, Kaunitz discussed the recommendations in an audience with the emperor and afterwards replied to Starhemberg. Kaunitz agreed to the necessity of a consul for ensuring the future trade with the United States but he could not allow any appointment to occur since it risked ruining his role as a mediator. “We must first bide our time,” Kaunitz argued, “until we will see what the fate of the colonies will be.”⁴¹

The Peace that Would Have Been

May 13, 1779, is not a date well remembered by historians of the American Revolution, but it should be. The Peace of Teschen sealed the fate of Central Europe on that day, bringing an end to the War of the Bavarian Succession and preventing any European war from distracting the Atlantic powers. British dreams of a German confrontation which would sap French resources had not materialised and thus the aim of forcing France to fight on multiple fronts vanished. Joseph II’s hopes were also dashed. His plan to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for the Bavarian territories had been thwarted under the terms of the treaty. His recompense was a sliver of land called the Innviertel, now incorporated into the Archduchy of Austria above the Enns. Joseph and his ministers had spent nearly 100 million florins in financing the war.⁴² The 2,200 square kilometres of the Innviertel was a bitter and meagre compensation in return.

May 1779 influenced the course of the American Revolution in another way, too. In her customary note of thanks to the co-mediators of the peace, Maria Theresa offered the same service to bring about peace between the French King Louis and King George in the War of American Independence.⁴³ The offer of mediation to an ally who had just arbitrated a humiliating peace seemed a strange act. A bemused French ambassador Breteuil certainly thought so. He outlined his suspicions to ministers in Paris, believing the Habsburgs sought to humble the French and to extract a warmer relationship with Britain at France’s

expense.⁴⁴ The French decided inaction was the best course and simply chose to ignore the polite suggestion. A cordial remark maybe, but Maria Theresa had made the offer with sincerity. It was a sentiment she expressed to her daughter Marie Antoinette.⁴⁵ Advancing in age, she desired peace and stability for her dynasty in Europe.

But the mediation offer was also a calculated ploy. Maria Theresa still feared the influence of Prussia’s Frederick II, especially as she believed he manoeuvred to dislodge her strained, but still necessary, alliance with France.⁴⁶ A mediator role between the Atlantic powers had a lot to offer her. In this role, the Habsburgs would be able to raise themselves above Prussia after such a calamitous war. Whether or not the Americans would gain independence, being the arbitrator would put the Habsburgs in a position of strength among the European powers at a time when alliances and rivalries seemed to be shifting. The war against Prussia may have ended in Teschen, but the struggle resumed in the diplomatic realm. Maria Theresa accordingly set about convincing the French of her honest intentions through indirect means. She urged her ambassador to portray it as a “courtly compliment” from one monarch to another.⁴⁷ She was, as usual, blunter in discussing the matter with Marie Antoinette. She declared how her interests were the same as those of the French crown and pressed the young queen to ensure the king would accept only her offer.⁴⁸ Maria Theresa’s efforts were utterly in vain, however. On May 27, 1779, King Louis graciously declined the invitation citing the prior refusal of Britain to accede to a similar Spanish-led mediation.⁴⁹ In reality, rejection stemmed from the French foreign minister Vergennes’s distrust of his Habsburg allies since he sensed the upset in Vienna caused by the Peace of Teschen.⁵⁰

Joseph II’s posturing did not help his mother’s efforts any either. The emperor had disliked Breteuil’s obstinate attitude over Bavaria from the beginning. His regard for the French ambassador had declined following the impertinence of the Lee affair, and his barely dry signature on the humiliating treaty at Teschen was the final straw. Joseph disparaged Breteuil whenever he could and mentioned as much in his letters to Marie Antoinette so courtiers in Versailles would know too.⁵¹ Rumours swirled whether Breteuil would quit his post but he endured the abuse for several years more—the unfortunate man went on to become the French monarchy’s last prime minister on the eve of the French Revolution.⁵² In 1783, Joseph aired his grievances about France in a striking letter to his sister. He believed France had always undermined Habsburg interests within and outside the Holy Roman Empire. Joseph had not done the same to them. He had not complained even when French enlargements were harmful

to Habsburg interests such as the acquisition of Corsica “which had been very prejudicial to the interests of the House of Austria and its branches in Italy.”⁵³ Joseph’s frustration with French actions had smouldered before 1779 and then severely impaired the French willingness to hand him or his mother primacy in potential peace negotiations over America. Joseph’s actions, furthermore, gave the French little confidence in a fair mediation. During a lengthy conference with the Dutch ambassador, for example, Joseph argued for them to abandon their anti-British approach, warning of the dangers if the French and Spanish were to unseat the British in the Atlantic.⁵⁴ Making matters worse, Joseph also planned a visit to England, which never materialised and perhaps had no other reason than to antagonise the French further.⁵⁵

Whereas Habsburg overtures had fallen on deaf French ears, the situation in Vienna gave some encouragement that the British would take up the offer. In May 1779, Maria Theresa—acting through Kaunitz—ventured the same proposition to the British ambassador Sir Robert Murray Keith, who reported back to London that the offer was cordial and open, meaning if they were to decline, it would do no harm.⁵⁶ Months went by before Keith received further instruction. The British ministers were willing to accept the invitation but stipulated in mid-July that foreign support of the colonies must be dropped before negotiation could begin; a demand designed to preclude any chance of negotiating their independence. Conditional acceptance reflected British good faith in the Habsburgs, who, they thought, were more pro-British than anything else. But this did not mean complete trust was forthcoming. Keith’s first objective was apprehending the origin of the offer. Had Maria Theresa thought of it herself or had the French some part in it? The answer was paramount as the British suspected France would not (or could not) betray American independence, and so any intermediary power agreed by them might have accepted this premise already.⁵⁷

Keith acted quickly. He rushed to the countryside palace at Laxenburg where Kaunitz was staying to make his enquiry and signal the conditional acceptance. His secretary accompanied him so that he could produce a verbatim report of what happened next. Kaunitz confirmed the independent origin of the offer. France had no part in it. Instead, the Habsburgs were animated by the desire to tend to the “increasing flame,” as Kaunitz characterised the American Revolution.⁵⁸ His next words were music to British ears. Kaunitz offered to work in total “candour and openness” with Keith for a mediation under Habsburg supervision. His plan involved renewing the overtures to France and Spain without informing the courts of the British tacit acceptance. Instead, Kaunitz would instruct his ambassadors to merely insinuate that the British were willing to

accept and that terms of peace must be put forward by all parties. Kaunitz’s plan met British expectations since he spoke plainly of the “three courts” (Britain, France, and Spain) as the intended participants, ignoring the Americans. Kaunitz then moved on to matters more delicate for the Habsburgs: would there be a co-mediator and where would such a negotiation be held? Kaunitz made clear that the Prussians could not be contemplated, but some other state might join if so wished. The venue would be Vienna, pending confirmation. The final obstacle was Breteuil, whose spies, Kaunitz knew, had followed Keith and who would raise suspicions about their extraordinary meeting in the countryside. Together they concocted a plausible explanation about Keith handing over papers of ill-consequence from his latest despatch. Plans concluded, Keith took his leave.⁵⁹ And so in the idyllic settings of Palace Laxenburg just outside Vienna, the first real hopes had been kindled for an end to the War of American Independence.

Meanwhile, Maria Theresa had lost all hope for the mediation. Winning over one side was not enough. She felt British interests were too strong in Vienna and knew the French would not trust Joseph over the fate of North America.⁶⁰ “The predilection here for England is always manifesting itself more and more,” she lamented to her ambassador in Paris.⁶¹ In the intervening months, both Maria Theresa and Joseph sounded out the opinion of Marie Antoinette concerning the French position. Only a handful of the letters between her and Joseph survived the destruction of another revolution, so we are left to wonder what they might have discussed during this period.⁶² Maria Theresa’s enquiries, however, did survive.⁶³ Their letters reveal a mother and daughter of the same mind on the importance of peace for Europe. “My heart desires it more than anything else in the world,” Marie Antoinette wrote.⁶⁴ She did not expect peace any time soon, however. In 1779, France had just secured Spanish entry into the war, pitting Britain against two continental enemies with a superior combined force at sea. From the French perspective, it was time to strike whilst the iron was hot rather than time to strike a deal.

Kaunitz pondered the impasse with his subordinates in Paris and Madrid. News from the latter was promising. Despite initial rejection, the Habsburg ambassador in Madrid, his son Count Dominik Andreas von Kaunitz-Questenberg, was optimistic in September 1779.⁶⁵ He had immediately gone to Spain’s chief minister José Moñino y Redondo, conde de Floridablanca, who responded well to the idea. Floridablanca tentatively accepted the invitation but would only confirm Spain’s participation after consultation with France.⁶⁶ Kaunitz-Questenberg prodded for an answer two months later but without much luck. In an empty memorandum, Floridablanca confirmed general desires for peace and insisted



FIGURE 11. Portrait of Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg

on a congress but revealed precious little in terms of Spain's demands or thinking about how such a meeting could be achieved.⁶⁷ It had become clear that the Spanish would not act alone and would only follow France's lead, which would then entail American participation and in turn scupper any British involvement.

The question became, therefore, how likely was American independence and could the British withstand the revolutionaries' demands for their separation? More exposed to the pro-American euphoria around Franklin at the French court, Count Florimond Mercy-d'Argenteau believed that the American side held the upper hand. At best, their position afforded them "absolute independence" and at worst, a modified existence within the British empire. The recent troubles in Ireland over the anti-papist acts passed by the British Parliament strengthened his opinion.⁶⁸ Kaunitz thought otherwise. He was more susceptible to Keith's opinions on the matter.⁶⁹ From Kaunitz's perspective, American independence was not at all assured. The British could withstand the financial stresses of the war better than the other belligerents. Prolonged conflict would lead the powers involved to peace eventually, but he supposed Britain's situation would improve before then.⁷⁰ As 1779 drew to a close, Kaunitz resolved to await any changes in the fortunes of the belligerents, which would then bring about the prospects of peace.

Events in 1780 exacerbated Maria Theresa's failure to secure a Habsburg mediation. The Habsburgs had been one of the first to issue such a proposition

among the European powers, but they were no longer alone. In December 1779, the Russian Empress Catherine II sought to build upon her prestige at Teschen by instructing her foreign minister Count Nikita Ivanovich Panin to pursue a Russian-mediated peace.⁷¹ In March 1780, King Ferdinand IV of Naples-Sicily made similar overtures through his representative in London.⁷² Indeed, by then some peace talks had begun. The Spanish had entered the war with limited objectives—primarily the conquest of Gibraltar and Minorca—and were willing to concede their participation as leverage towards these aims in secret negotiations started with an informal British delegation.⁷³ Habsburg officials tracked the course of these meetings intently but sensed nothing would come of them.⁷⁴ New military developments in North America further frustrated the prospects of peace. When the Siege of Charleston ended with the British occupation of the city, both Maria Theresa and Marie Antoinette despaired. They were not distraught for the American loss—the “miserable defence” of the Americans was to be expected from “such bad troops” in Marie Antoinette’s opinion—instead, they feared the British victory would protract the war further and diminish the chances of Maria Theresa’s “long-hoped for” peace.⁷⁵

Despite renewed pessimism, obstacles, and competition, Kaunitz pursued a solo Habsburg mediation throughout 1780. He sought in vain to appease all sides by tempting each of them to the table with incompatible or incredible offers. In Paris, Mercy-d’Argenteau reportedly proposed an immediate armistice to last nine years upon the current status quo.⁷⁶ In Vienna, Breteuil faced audience after audience with the monarchs on the issue. He conceded nothing and was repulsed by the good-cop, bad-cop tactics of Maria Theresa and Joseph, where the former pleaded for peace on behalf of Europe’s salvation and the latter threatened Breteuil—over the course of a three-hour interview—with tales of how the British would never accept a sovereign United States and the Spanish would never allow such an example in the Americas.⁷⁷ At home and abroad, the indefatigable efforts to secure a sole mediation under the Habsburgs failed time and again.

Events soon took away the initiative from Kaunitz. In January 1780, Admiral Rodney relieved the Gibraltar garrison following defeat of the Spanish fleet. In March, Catherine II founded the League of Armed Neutrality as an open international system for neutrals to fend off harassment of their mercantile fleets by belligerents. The League was detrimental to the British capacity to wage war. It marked a stunning failure for the British aim to secure an alliance with Russia, while it brought France’s Vergennes further pleasure to see Russia not only maintain neutrality but to defend it.⁷⁸ The League’s creation prompted neutral powers to join in order to protect their commerce and profits from carrying war

supplies to the belligerents. In quick succession, the northern neutrals entered the system.⁷⁹ In November, the Dutch Republic seemed poised to join, but the British could not allow one of the largest foreign carrying fleets to supply their enemies, and so a confiscated plan for American aid from a few Dutch financiers was trumpeted as a breach of their neutrality and the British declared war before the authorised Dutch delegation to St. Petersburg could subscribe to the League.⁸⁰ The beginning of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war, alongside the War of American Independence, marked the lowest point in Britain's estrangement from the European powers.⁸¹ The Dutch conflagration came at an inopportune time for the French. Exhausted by the costs of the war and fearful that Spain would abandon the fight given the failure to take Gibraltar, the French council decided in December 1780 that the need for peace had arrived.⁸² Peace, at last, seemed assured.

Although the belligerents in the war had arrived at the point which Kaunitz had long awaited, a sole Habsburg mediation was not guaranteed. In fact, it now seemed more unlikely. For one, the belligerent powers had all viewed the proposal as Maria Theresa's invention. Her death on November 29, 1780, weakened the credible impartiality of her son and increased French distrust towards his intentions. In his private correspondence, Keith wrote candidly about the positive change in British fortunes after Maria Theresa's death. "Our Emperor has behaved like an angel ever since his accession," he exclaimed as he boasted of his "friendly disposition to this country, which at this hour is in a state it never found itself before."⁸³ French ministers sought out an effective counterweight. The earlier Russian offer (from December 1779) appeared to solve both problems; France could sue for peace under a more favourable power, and it would aid their standing with Catherine II.⁸⁴ The Franco-Russian plan was no secret among Europe's courts before the offer had been accepted and widened to Britain and Spain. Both Kaunitz in Vienna and British ministers in London had heard the rumours from multiple sources and both sides hoped for a compromise.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, Keith's new superior in London, David Murray, Viscount Stormont was an Austrophile. Throughout the summer of 1780, Stormont tried to curry favour with the Habsburgs in the hopes of an alliance.⁸⁶ In September, Keith offered Kaunitz British support for the reopening of the River Scheldt, a vital economic waterway in the Austrian Netherlands which had been shut off to maritime commerce by Dutch forts since the sixteenth century.⁸⁷ In return, Keith demanded Habsburg co-mediation if the Franco-Russian initiative became real.⁸⁸ Keith's overtures chimed perfectly with the Habsburg position. Joseph and Kaunitz viewed co-mediation as a success. Not only would it honour the wish of Joseph's late mother, but it would allow a recovery of their prestige

after Teschen and included the possibility to make the French wince as terms were deliberated. Moreover, a co-mediation with Russia furthered the diplomatic pivot pursued by Joseph who favoured warmer relations with Russia, working toward an alliance, even, which would enable them to focus on joint expansion against the Ottomans.⁸⁹ Positive reception in Vienna allowed Stormont to demand co-mediation when the Russian offer arrived in London, which the Russians readily accepted. The Congress of Vienna seemed, at last, to be confirmed. Kaunitz rejoiced at the news, reportedly declaring, "Lord Stormont has baptised the baby!"⁹⁰

Kaunitz worked tirelessly to ensure the Congress of Vienna would be held in the summer of 1781. He insisted on all parties putting forward terms for a mediation. In a memorandum issued to all courts involved, he tasked them with devising terms which they would only accept if they were in the opposing position.⁹¹ The British were pleased by the call. Stormont endeavoured to influence the co-mediators further towards his cause by offering the Russians the island of Minorca and the reopening of the River Scheldt for the Habsburgs.⁹² A plan to award the Habsburgs the island of Tobago was also mooted at one point but nothing came of it.⁹³ Kaunitz rebuffed Keith for such obvious bribes.⁹⁴

For their part, the French were dismayed by the suggestions emanating from Vienna. In mid-February 1781, Breteuil confronted Kaunitz about the trickiest question of all: what was to be the fate of the Americans? Kaunitz understood that the French position demanded their independence but he also realised this was incompatible with British aims. The middle ground, the two men realised, might be partition. If some colonies were to become independent and others returned to the British, then perhaps both sides could be appeased.⁹⁵ Kaunitz forwarded the plan to Mercy-d'Argenteau wherein Canada would be returned to the French, Britain would retain the Carolinas and Georgia, and the rest would form a sovereign American republic.⁹⁶ It is notable that Kaunitz was indifferent to American independence. From his perspective, it was merely a hurdle to surpass in the negotiations; if a diminished American state were the result, then it would be up to the Americans to survive. Vergennes agreed with the idea but felt that it could not originate from the French as it would be too painful to the Americans, it would have to come from the mediators instead.⁹⁷

In March, Joseph met with Breteuil to thrash out the problem of American attendance at the Congress of Vienna. Joseph could not reconcile admission of the Americans with British opposition. If any congress were to be successful, then it had to be restricted to the three powers plus the two mediating courts. Joseph mused through possible solutions with Breteuil.⁹⁸ What if a separate peace

could be arranged? What if the British regained America in exchange for Gibraltar? Such thoughts were infeasible but demonstrated Joseph's different thinking. Whereas Kaunitz perceived that the Americans had a plausible chance as a reduced state, Joseph saw their independence as a bargaining chip. Years before he would wage a short war against the Dutch over the issue of the River Scheldt, Joseph seemed tempted by the bait laid out by the British.⁹⁹ John Adams thought as much from rumours he heard in Amsterdam. In June 1781, he shrewdly called out Joseph's position. "The Emperor," he declared, "appears to be more intent at present upon taking a fair Advantage of the present Circumstances, to introduce a flourishing Commerce into the Austrian Flanders, than upon making Treaties with England or waging War in its favour."¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, Kaunitz continued to work on the American conundrum. In a conversation with Breteuil, he hit upon the idea of each state sending its own representative rather than a single American representative.¹⁰¹ The idea was shrewd. The Americans would be present, perhaps even as plenipotentiaries rather than actual delegates, but they would be so divided among themselves that the British could have their separate peace, picking off the Carolinas and Georgia following the preferred plan of partition. John Adams described this idea decades later as "the most insidious and dangerous Plott that was ever laid to insnare Us and deprive Us of our Independence"; but for the time being, he had no idea of what Kaunitz planned nor how he close he came to seeing it become reality.¹⁰²

On May 21, 1781, after many months of diplomatic wrangling, Kaunitz and the Russian representative in Vienna, Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn, sent off the preliminary terms for peace at Vienna. The Americans were to be invited and a separate peace worked out exclusively between them and Britain unless either side requested mediation. In trying to please everyone, however, Kaunitz pleased none. The call for a one-year armistice upset the French who feared the British would consolidate their position, while the absence of anything about Gibraltar alienated the Spanish.¹⁰³ The British raged at the American invitations. Count Belgiojoso, the Habsburg envoy in London, received a thorough dressing down for the impertinent terms.¹⁰⁴

This harsh awakening meant that the British outright refused any participation on these terms and placed their hopes instead on the summer campaigns of 1781. The result was disastrous for them as much as it was for concluding peace in Vienna. On October 18, 1781, General Charles Cornwallis surrendered after a lengthy siege at Yorktown. The decisive blow collapsed British hopes for subjugating America and preventing independence. The defeat also signalled a death knell for the Congress of Vienna. The British had lost the ability to hold

out and so peace, it seemed obvious, would take place under American, French, and Spanish terms. Upon hearing the news, the Spanish special envoy sent to Vienna as the provisional representative packed up his bags and left.¹⁰⁵ Kaunitz attempted in vain to keep alive the prospects for an international summit in Vienna. The fall of the North ministry in London in March 1782 confirmed the new reality when his successor despatched an envoy to Paris to sue for peace.¹⁰⁶ Kaunitz could do little more than concede the ultimate loss of the Habsburgs’ cherished congress.

Cold-shouldered by the victors, Kaunitz and Joseph resented the new peace plans and abhorred the French disregard for their earnest attempt to secure a universal peace. In 1783, Joseph still spoke bitterly of it. “Could France have achieved the same and come out of the last war with England with such advantages,” he scorned, “if not for the assuredness and security of my involvement.”¹⁰⁷ Stormont had failed to accommodate any meaningful role for his perceived saviour in the new negotiations; the Americans and French refused any mediation outright. Besides, Joseph and Kaunitz wanted nothing to do with the new congress. “I am afraid no real assistance can be expected from the Court of Vienna,” Stormont despaired, “who are wedded to the system they have embraced, and will not suffer themselves to see how much their own interests are concerned in the great contest in which we are engaged.”¹⁰⁸ The great contest over America ended not in Vienna but instead in Paris.

Philadelphia in Europe

Writing from Philadelphia almost twenty-five years after the end of the Revolution, Count Charles-Albert de Moré—a nobleman and former aide-de-camp to Lafayette and Washington—responded with great elation to the news of his older brother’s intention to emigrate from Switzerland. His brother’s choice of destination, the younger Moré commended, “is the most suitable and certain for success,” one where “true pioneers [are] flocking from the most diverse of lands in order to make a new life for themselves.” This attractive place, he continued with praise, “is the port in which castaways find shelter and a new, promising life.” Despite the resemblance, the port Moré spoke so highly of was not his own Philadelphia but instead a place which Moré concluded “is the Philadelphia of Europe”—Trieste.¹⁰⁹ Trieste merited such a comparison; in 1700 it had still been a sleepy trading village nestled along the northernmost end of the Adriatic Sea. By the end of the century, it had transformed into a vibrant cosmopolitan centre of interregional and international commerce. Such transformation came from

the policies of the Habsburgs, who saw the ports of Trieste and Fiume as natural entrepôts for international trade. In 1718, Maria Theresa's father removed tariffs to make Trieste a free port in emulation of the Spanish trading hubs on the Atlantic coast.¹¹⁰ In 1775 during one of his visits, Joseph II named Trieste the main port for the hereditary lands and Fiume as the primary outlet for Hungarian goods. In this way, his reforms established a geographically closer trade hub and lowered reliance on the faraway ports on the North Sea. Triestines received even further privileges; a mercantile college and a new stock exchange alongside one of the largest docks along the Adriatic coastline.¹¹¹ By the time of the American Revolution, the sleepy harbour had woken up.

The American Revolution excited Triestine merchants for the opportunity to trade directly with North America. Previously, Triestine goods went via the Atlantic ports, especially Cadiz, and American goods arrived via the British Isles and the Austrian Netherlands.¹¹² An independent United States opened direct trading avenues for Trieste's merchants for the first time. Habsburg consuls across Europe were assiduous to this fact and urged the Triestine governor to explore this trade. Christian Ludwig Hofer, one such consul in Hamburg, reported sales of Bohemian and Silesian goods from there to America, which, he suggested, could be more cheaply supplied from Trieste.¹¹³ Within twelve months, Hofer sent four more detailed reports including extracts of goods demanded by the president of the Congress.¹¹⁴ Merchants in Trieste were supremely aware of such possibilities themselves. Months before the adoption of the Declaration of American Independence one informed authorities in Vienna that "the current situation of the English Colonies in America seems to me to merit considerable attention, and more than ever before [. . .] to have commerce, which has especially made the Dutch and English so rich and respectable."¹¹⁵ Such insistence was not a singular occurrence. Ministers received numerous petitions agitating to exploit the revolutionary turmoil. Petitions came from serious members of Habsburg society. During the summer of 1782, amid rumours of a definitive peace, Jean Gabriel, comte de Raineval et de Fauquembergue proposed a Central and North American trading mission to Kaunitz, but received refusal days later.¹¹⁶ Johann Zollikofer von Sonnenberg, member of a large Swiss mercantile dynasty, proposed several ships for an expedition from Trieste to the United States. Joseph personally scrutinised the proposal but eventually rejected it because of the "extraordinary claims necessary" to fund the operation.¹¹⁷

Domestic petitioners for new transatlantic trade were not alone. Petitions for direct trade between Trieste and the United States reached all sides. In November 1779, a local captain introduced the Governor of Trieste Karl von Zinzendorf

to Dr. George Logan, a Pennsylvanian medical graduate of the University of Edinburgh who toured Europe after his studies.¹¹⁸ Zinzendorf surmised Logan was an unofficial “agent of Congress” who “without an audience in Vienna [...] now comes here to inquire if trade relations between this port and the United States might be born after the peace.”¹¹⁹ In January 1782, Franklin noted an extraordinary meeting in his diary. Willem Bolts, the architect of Habsburg trade with the Far East, came to propose how a circumnavigational route might take goods from Trieste to China and from there to the United States and back to Trieste. Franklin entertained “much Discourse” about the idea and gave Bolts “Hopes of it upon a Peace,” but nothing more.¹²⁰ At the same time, François Emmanuel Joseph Baraux, an Antwerp merchant who had relocated to Trieste, wrote to John Adams on behalf of the Imperial Privileged Trading Company in Trieste. He requested “an extensive list of the best Merchants in the different towns of America” so his company could “get into a reciprocal, advantageous connection.”¹²¹ In his reply, Adams noted how after peace “there will probably be a considerable Trade between the several Ports of the United States of America and Trieste, through which place I fancy several American Productions will find their Way into the Interior of the Austrian Dominions.”¹²² In both encounters, Adams and Franklin expressed their belief that commerce with Trieste could only establish itself once a general peace had been concluded.

Triestine merchants were rather more impatient, however. Ignaz Verpoorten, another merchant who had swapped Antwerp for the Adriatic, became the first pioneer. As director of the Trieste and Fiume Sugar Company since 1776, Verpoorten had an obvious interest in American markets, but his position also afforded him important contact within the local and Viennese administrations.¹²³ Through these channels, he urged for peace in the Americas and support for a trading mission to the United States. He met with Zinzendorf to discuss the expedition in January 1782.¹²⁴ In order to realise this scheme, Verpoorten had to obtain a patent for the ship’s use of the imperial ensign, granted only by the Aulic Chamber (*Hofkammer*) in agreement with the vessel owners, the captain, and local officials—in this case Zinzendorf and the head of the municipal stock exchange. Verpoorten applied for the imperial patent for his ship *l’Americano*, which the authorities approved on May 31, 1782, long after his intended departure.¹²⁵ The *Americano* set sail for the northern Caribbean and Carolinas a few weeks later with a crew of twenty and 286 tonnes of goods.¹²⁶ The *Americano* became the first ship to sail directly between Trieste and the New World. The cargo featured textiles, metalwares, glass, and wines for export and imported sugar, rum, and indigo from the Caribbean and Carolinas.¹²⁷ It was a risky but

profitable venture. Verpoorten established a new company to solidify his gains. The *Verpoortische Assecuranz und Handlungs-Compagnie* received its imperial grant on June 21, 1782, and became the first American-Triestine company as a result. The company's charter reflected the seriousness of the ambition to trade with the United States. An endowment of four million florins, imperial protections, and tax exemption on domestic goods set to last for twenty years ensured considerable interest in the new firm. News of its announcement made front-page headlines in the *Wienerisches Diarium* and featured in mercantile journals in Hamburg and Weimar.¹²⁸ In early November 1782, Verpoorten sent two further ships from Trieste to North America.¹²⁹

Verpoorten was the first merchant to trade directly between Trieste and North America, but only just. In 1781 three additional applications arrived at the Aulic Chamber but they had faltered for one reason or another. In March, the Serbian-Greek merchant Jovo Kurtovič had applied for his ship *La Città di Vienna* (or *La Bella Vienna*) but fell foul to scrutiny.¹³⁰ Safeguarding neutrality, Aulic Chamber officials prevented merchants from trading military contraband without official sanctions. The respected merchant Count Johann Berchtold de Proli, who was part of a famous mercantile dynasty in the Austrian Netherlands, scuppered Kurtovič's application with a disapproving report raising concerns over contraband.¹³¹ Proli's damaging report was likely a dubious manoeuvre since he had intervened—this time favourably—in another proposal by Johann Jakob Kick, the imperial consul in Marseilles and a close associate of the Proli family. Kick's plan intended for the *Comte de Cobenzl* to sail from Trieste to Africa and onwards to North America. Yet there was a hitch with the captain and main financiers of the expedition who were not natural-born imperial subjects. Strict maritime laws prohibited foreign-born subjects from enjoying imperial protections—in Verpoorten's *l'Americano* mission, six merchants signed an affidavit to confirm the Italian captain owed his allegiance to the emperor.¹³² Proli's interjection argued that Kick and other financiers were imperial subjects and constituted a majority of the interested parties, and, therefore, the mission should go ahead. But officials remained unconvinced. Kick received an outright refusal in mid-August.¹³³

A week after Kick's application failed, Zinzendorf met with the director of the Imperial Privileged Trading Company in Trieste, Johann Heinrich Frohn, who, together with Baraux and Proli, proposed another American scheme.¹³⁴ The new plan involved *La Città di Trieste*—perhaps the hastily renamed *La Città di Vienna*—under a Milanese captain and backed by prominent Triestine and Hungarian nobles such as Count Samuel Gyulay von Maronsnémeth.¹³⁵

Recommendation by Zinzendorf preceded official approval in Vienna but despite success with the court bureaucracy, no further records exist of their mission to America. By 1783, the Aulic Chamber had received four proposals for direct trade between Trieste and America, two of which gained approval.

Direct trade with North America arose out of its perceived profitability, but how valuable was this new trade? Statistical tables showing Trieste's imports and exports are patchy throughout the eighteenth century, but thankfully a statistical table compiled in 1783 upon the arrival of a new governor shines light on the initial year of Triestine-American commerce.¹³⁶ Administrators already recognised the economic contributions of North America by listing it under a separate heading, *l'Amérique Septentrionale*, which they further subdivided into the "Antilles" or "America Septentrionale." The table also allows for precise valuation as it shows the amount and value of each product. In 1783, forty-nine products featured under the "America Septentrionale" heading, ranging from ironware to gypsum, and from quicksilver to luxury woods. Textiles formed the largest export group (thirty-two percent of American exports) with a value of 30,400*fl.* Textiles combined with glassware (fourteen percent) and agricultural equipment (seven percent) comprised the majority of exported goods to the United States. It is likely that this table reflects Verpoorten's voyages to North America in 1782 since he carried a large amount of agricultural and metalwares for a Boston firm.¹³⁷

Table 1 below reveals Verpoorten's strategy of carrying diverse goods to America, as forty-six other products constituted the remaining fifty percent of export value. On a national scale, this trade already represented the size of a large-scale firm. The firm *Artaria & Co.*, for example, was the first major music publishing house in the Vienna. In 1787, the company's stock value totalled 74,373*fl.* and made the owner Domenico Artaria one of "the richest merchants in Vienna."¹³⁸ The twofold larger income from the United States made Verpoorten and other merchants in Trieste comparatively richer and underlines the reasons behind the popularity and excitement over his new American trading company.

Triestine merchants sourced a mix of domestic and foreign products to export to the United States. Administrators distinguished goods between "*prodotti della Germania*" and "*commercio di Economia*" to delineate products imported from abroad (commercio) and those sourced from markets within the Holy Roman Empire (Germania).¹³⁹ Domestic products featured textiles from Bohemia and metalwares from Carinthia and Styria whilst foreign products included *dolci* (currants, raisins, sultanas) and *legno bosso* or *legno scodano* (boxwood and unseasoned wood). Wood products originated from around the Adriatic region whilst

TABLE 1. Highest Valued Exports to the United States from Trieste, 1783

Product Name (Orig.)	Product Name (Eng.)	Percentage of Total Exports to US	Value (£)
<i>Telerie Diversi di Germania</i>	German Linens	31.6	30,400
<i>Vetri e Cristalli</i>	Glass and Crystals	13.7	13,200
<i>Ferramenta Lavorata</i>	Agricultural Tools	7.0	6,750
<i>Rame</i>	Copper	3.6	3,497
<i>Lanerie</i>	Wools	3.4	3,200
<i>Setarie</i>	Millet	3.1	3,000
<i>Cordami</i>	Rigging/Cording	2.7	2,613
<i>Acciario</i>	Steel	2.7	2,600
<i>Uvapassa</i>	Raisins	2.4	2,331
<i>Solfo</i>	Sulphur	2.2	2,118

SOURCE: FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780-1785), fols. 1003-1020.

currants came from the Eastern Mediterranean. Merchants sourced these goods to export almost exclusively to American markets. Table 2 below highlights goods for which at least one-fifth of the total import into Trieste was then reshipped to the United States. These products were predominantly industrial or luxury goods.

The commercial importance of the United States is underscored when compared with other international destinations. In 1783, the value of exports to the United States amounted to 96,177*fl* or less than one percent of total export value. This sum might not appear very high, but it is substantial, especially for a nascent trading route. Among Triestine export destinations that year, the United States ranked twelfth out of twenty total countries. Triestine merchants exported more commercial value to the United States than Holland, the West Indies, Malta, England, Flanders, Sicily, the Barbary States, or the Republic of Ragusa. The Habsburg Monarchy had begun trading ventures to India and China in 1775. No separate values were given for either India or China but the combined value of exports to these two markets in 1783 was only 26,161*fl* higher than those to the United States. In other words, within the first year of direct American trade, Triestine merchants obtained seventy-eight percent of the value of the expeditions to India and China. It was a testament to the profitability and desirability of the new transatlantic route within the Habsburg ambition to trade globally.

TABLE 2. Triestine Exports to the United States procured from foreign markets, 1783

Product Name (Original)	Product Name (English)	Percentage of Product's Total Original Import to Trieste	Value (fl)
<i>Spongie</i>	Sponges	74.9	250
<i>Solfo</i>	Sulphur	64.2	2,118
<i>Verderame</i>	Copper sulphate	29.8	382
<i>Cordami</i>	Rigging/Cording	24.0	2,613
<i>Galla</i>	Gall	23.9	1,560
<i>Vino ordinario</i>	Ordinary Wines	21.7	299
<i>Capari [Capperi]</i>	Capers	21.4	126

SOURCE: FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780-1785), fols. 1003-1020.

Trieste remained a predominantly Mediterranean port, however. The vast majority of export value lay in the Italian regions around Venice, Ferrara, Lombardy and the Papal States. No more than five percent of total export value flowed beyond the Mediterranean. These destinations included India, China, the United States, the West Indies, England, the Dutch Republic, the Austrian Netherlands, Hamburg, and the United States. When compared to these other extra-Mediterranean destinations, however, the importance of the United States market becomes clearer; the United States ranked first in value.¹⁴⁰ It cannot be doubted that for such initial commercial connection, the United States quickly outperformed other trade routes which had been established for far longer. This rapid rise validates the interest of Triestine merchants to capitalise on new transatlantic commerce and to gain profits from the newly independent United States of America.

Conclusion

The later years of the American Revolution provided two ports of the Habsburg Monarchy with unparalleled economic opportunities. Neutrality had been a difficult position to maintain in the early stages of the war, but as new belligerents entered the war, neutrality became an increasingly beneficial stance. New direct trading routes, either through novel mercantile initiatives in Trieste or the influx of masked shipping via Ostend, allowed Habsburg merchants the unique chance to profit from the chaos of revolution. Access to Atlantic markets opened

opportunities for Habsburg merchandise. The desire to maintain these new avenues of trade fuelled debates among Habsburg ministers on the best methods to secure it for the long term. The first ideas of official relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States were born out of these debates which rested upon the establishment of diplomatic ties through treaties of commerce and consular representation.

Yet the impatience to recognise the United States did not outweigh the consideration for international conventions. If peace remained elusive, so did any prospect of Habsburg interaction with an independent United States. The same elusive peace evaded the best efforts of the Habsburg rulers themselves along with Prince Kaunitz who ardently sought to utilise the international desire for peace to their benefit. The failed hopes for a Congress of Vienna in 1782 represented the end to a serious initiative on behalf of the Habsburgs to end the War of American Independence under their mediation in Vienna. The rationale for doing so included little consideration for American independence and was more concerned with appeasing the belligerents into entering peace talks which remained the primary aim of Kaunitz's efforts. He failed in this process and in doing so, ensured the Peace of Vienna became the Peace of Paris as we remember it today.

“A New Set of Merchants”

The Development of Postwar Commerce between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America, 1783–1785

ON FEBRUARY 4, 1783, Great Britain recognised the independence of the United States of America and agreed to an armistice. The news reached Vienna within two weeks.¹ On February 18, the emperor pondered this news in his correspondence with his ambassador in Paris. Joseph II did not concern himself with the political fallout at all. “The object of trade with the Americans,” he noted instead, “will be of the greatest importance for the future.”² These words foreshadowed the primacy that economic interests would assume when it came to the relationship between his lands and those of the new United States. In other words, attentiveness to the importance of transatlantic commerce replaced difficult political considerations of neutrality. As a result, the years between 1783 and 1785 witnessed growing mercantile speculation across the whole Habsburg Monarchy, from Ostend to Trieste, from Fiume to Florence. Joseph’s memorandum initiated a new policy for a new age, as economic concerns trumped the ideological gulf between monarchy and republic. Benjamin Franklin’s America and Joseph’s Austria no longer seemed so far apart.

Central to this new world of opportunity for the Habsburg Monarchy were those who sought to bridge the transatlantic divide: the traders, the fundraisers, the businessmen, the sailors, and the chancers. Together they embarked upon commercial ventures which bound together Habsburg ports and American cities. Collectively they were what Franklin deemed “a new set of merchants [who] have grown up into business.”³ In some cases, these undertakings consolidated trading lines forged during wartime. Others resurrected older pre-war economic ties that had been disrupted by revolutionary mayhem. Yet for many, trading with America meant something ground-breaking, untested, tempting, and now possible for the first time. Merchants at all of the major Habsburg ports of

Livorno, Ostend, and Trieste were ready to reframe, renew, or to establish for the first time commercial ties to the newly independent United States.

Integrating events and a flurry of activities in these ports into the picture of early American independence reveals the wider connectedness that independence ushered forth for the former thirteen colonies. The American Revolution was not just an event with political ramifications, but also one with deeply interwoven economic reverberations. In creating a new nation, the American Revolution also created a new state with commercial interests to be incorporated into the balance of power in eighteenth-century Europe. American independence was a new world replete with new friends, new foes, and among them, a new set of merchants.

Livorno: Attempts at Reconnection

Commercial connections had existed between Livorno and North America long before the outbreak of the American Revolution. North American vessels were a frequent sight at the Tuscan port; fifty of them had arrived between 1770 and 1774 alone.⁴ Many carried cod from New England fisheries along with a small amount of American goods. Dating back to the 1740s, this trade, modest at first, had been cemented by a generation of sailors and merchants by the time of the Revolution. And then it all came to a halt. War disrupted these trade flows, and merchants crossing the seas in either direction found it increasingly hard to avoid predatory British, Spanish, and French ships seizing their wares. For Filippo Mazzei, the most ardent proponent of Tuscan-American trade, nothing could be done until the cessation of fighting came about officially in 1783.⁵

The man who led the Livornese charge to return to American markets was Antonio Francesco Salucci. The firm he fronted, *Salucci & Figlio*, had lost the ship *La Prosperità* to the British already in 1779 and his associate Sebastino V. Salucci had been embroiled in a court case over another ship, the *Teti*, captured by the Spanish in 1780. Spurred on by peace, Antonio was determined to reignite Tuscan transatlantic commerce. He purchased a large brig and christened it *Il Diligente*, which set sail for Philadelphia in May 1783. When it successfully returned to Livorno in December with a cargo of tobacco, wax, and dyewood, it became the first successful Tuscan ship to sail to the United States for some time.⁶ Confidence restored, Salucci wrote to Franklin with excitement in August 1784. He was proud to inform him about the “flourishing Commerce between our Tuscan State and your united States of America.”⁷ He was certain “no State in Europe is better calculated” for such commerce “as we have almost

every article Europe furnishes and can take off in Return every American produce." Success emboldened Salucci. He sent further ships to the United States. *Il Diligente* repeated its transatlantic journey in February 1784, this time to Virginia.⁸ *l'Etruria* left Terricciola (near Livorno) for Philadelphia and followed a more innovative route, selling Tuscan goods in Philadelphia before sailing up to Boston for cod and arriving back in Livorno in January 1785. The largest of the three ships, the 500 tonne *Teresa Geltrude* repeated the same route between 1784 and 1785.

Ministers in Vienna followed the success of these voyages intently. Although the Grand Duchy of Tuscany fell under a secundogeniture ruled by the emperor's younger brother, the representatives of the Viennese court kept ministers aware of the latest developments.⁹ Officials in Vienna hoped to understand the vitality and nature of commerce with the sovereign United States and Tuscany. They wished to know the substance of this direct trade and its prospects for enriching the lives of the Tuscan inhabitants. The actions of Tuscan merchants, after all, could inform similar projects of traders in the hereditary lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. Moreover, as subjects of an autonomous state, these merchants were also competitors for the domestic vendors in the Habsburg lands. Such concerns spoke to the tight nexus between the economic and political realms where mercantilist instincts of one nation could jeopardise the political interests of another, even between states ruled under the same dynasty.

In 1785, Salucci expanded his prospective voyages: *La Cinque Sorelle* and *Il Diligente* to Virginia; *l'Etruria* and the *Teresa Geltrude* to Boston.¹⁰ *Salucci & Figlio* had clearly established a foothold in the transatlantic trade with the United States, and his firm's promoters felt potential gains were still to be made. That year, Salucci selected a young associate within the firm, Filippo Filicchi, as the company's representative in the United States. Filicchi received a share of the profits under a new subsidiary company, *Filicchi & Co.*, and the support for a three-year mission in America. Prior to Filicchi's departure, *Salucci & Figlio* had used the New York house *William Seton & Co.* as their primary contact and goods handler in the United States. Filicchi arrived in New York in mid-summer but did not stay there for long. He undertook trips to Philadelphia, Boston, and Providence, Rhode Island, in order to scout out lucrative trades and send back valuable reports.¹¹

Filicchi's tenure in the United States certainly benefitted *Salucci & Figlio* through the supply of information but upon his return to Livorno in 1788, he learned that the pioneering firm had gone bankrupt. The legal battle over the *Teti* in the Spanish courts had rumbled on since 1780 and the mounting legal costs ruined company finances.¹² From the ashes of one company grew another,

however. The collapse allowed Filicchi to act with full autonomy and he returned to the United States a year later as the partner in a new firm, *F. & A. Filicchi*, established with his brother. The new firm picked up the American trade from *Salucci & Figlio* and, thanks to Filicchi's firsthand knowledge, became the most successful transatlantic company in Livorno.¹³ In a testament to his importance, Filicchi became the American consul for Livorno in 1794, after years of repeated attempts to gain that office.¹⁴ The Filicchi and Salucci endeavours were the success stories of the initial postwar years in Tuscan-American relations. On the official level, however, the outlook was less optimistic.

Attempts at a commercial treaty between Tuscany and the United States began in October 1783 when members of Congress instructed American commissioners to pursue treaties with several European nations, including various Habsburg territories. Recognising the sovereignty of Tuscany under the terms of Habsburg secundogeniture, the Americans pursued a separate treaty with the Grand Duchy. Yet all of these schemes were beset with difficulties. In the Tuscan case, the American commissioners—Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson—sounded out feelings in Florence through Francesco Favi in late September 1784.¹⁵ Finding a warm reception to the idea, they forwarded the treaty proposal to Favi in December. The proposed draft was in fact a copy of the semi-concluded treaty with Prussia, which they hoped would serve as a model for Tuscany and elsewhere.¹⁶ The Tuscans responded enthusiastically and returned an amended version in April of the following year.¹⁷ Jefferson led the deliberation on the counter-proposals and compiled a summary on the alterations.¹⁸ Further debates within the American circles rolled on until they submitted their *Observations* to Favi in response.¹⁹ Another round of wrangling came from the Tuscan side in the form of a forty-six-page *Nuova minuta del trattato* (New treaty draft) with further revisions.²⁰ By the time Jefferson and Adams came to study the latest proposals, nearly a year had elapsed since the initial offer to Tuscany. Jefferson seemed displeased. "The order of the articles," he complained to Adams, "is entirely deranged and their direction almost totally changed."²¹ Jefferson believed nothing could be rescued from the Tuscan negotiations. In a letter Jefferson wrote to Filippo Mazzei in the summer of 1785, he noted how any prospect of a "rational connection" with Tuscany was now "barren."²²

Difficulties on the Tuscan side had arisen as soon as the American commissioners had made overtures in September 1784. Although Pietro Leopoldo was receptive to schemes aimed at enhancing his dominion, he first sought the opinion of local officials.²³ One of them, a Livornese tax inspector named Fierallmi, expressed doubts that any worthwhile offer could be made to the Americans.

Tuscans could not give them much incentive beyond proposing equal status with all other merchants in the city, he argued.²⁴ This issue became more pressing when the American proposals reached Florence. Favi had insisted to his superiors that the Americans understood the concerns of Fierallmi and that no extraordinary privileges could be granted to American merchants; their latest response, however, seemed unaware of this limitation. Things came to a head when the governor of Livorno Count Federigo Barbolani di Montanto received the draft treaty and proceeded to comb through the articles individually.²⁵ Barbolani found many points to be entirely incongruent with Tuscan customs. His extensive commentary on Article Four laid out this dissonance clearly. One provision stated that trading benefits were to occur for Tuscan and American ships arriving in the ports of the two nations. Barbolani pointed out how this undermined the Tuscans who lacked a sufficient fleet and would trade many goods indirectly aboard vessels belonging to other nations.²⁶ Furthermore, he worried that American vessels would hold an unequal advantage over Tuscan merchants since they would have the benefits of the treaty in addition to the rights of every nation at Livorno. In effect, he argued, this would also go against the American insistence, according to Favi, that both Tuscany and the United States would be equals in the treaty. The only solution Barbolani saw was to establish an "unlimited reciprocal freedom" between them which would include Tuscan and American goods on any vessel and only to the degree which Tuscany held with other nations already.²⁷ Barbolani and Fierallmi's insights, as part of the *Nuova minuta di trattato*, were what Jefferson likely referred to as the "deranged" order and "changed" direction of the negotiations. Both sides had reached an impasse.

Barbolani resisted further overtures. In February 1785, an intrepid American entrepreneur, Eliphalet Brush, visited Tuscany. John Quincy Adams described him as "full of vivacity and life."²⁸ Indeed he was. Originally from Connecticut, where he had served during the early part of the war, Brush had turned to a commercial life in New York.²⁹ Brush had met the Adamses—father and son—in Amsterdam in 1781 when he first toured Europe on behalf of his New York firm *Broome, Platt & Brush*.³⁰ Four years later, Brush travelled again to drum up trade for the company. Livorno seemed a prime target. Brush regarded Tuscany as an "emporium" of Mediterranean goods, which sold wares "better calculated for our [American] market than any other."³¹ In Livorno, Brush met with Barbolani as well as with the Grand Duke in Florence.³² He spoke of the "great advantages" of trade between the United States and Tuscany.³³ Brush even presented a list of suitable goods; Tuscan oil, hemp, and silks offered for American cod, tobacco, and spermaceti.³⁴ But the mission created the impression that

the American commissioners had sent Brush to restart the stalled negotiations. Pressed by Tuscan officials, Brush explained how he lacked any official powers to conclude a treaty and acted purely as a private agent. Nevertheless, he had made a good impression in Tuscany, since several individuals supported his subsequent mission to Naples where he chased the same scheme.³⁵

Agents such as Brush were part of a concerted effort to re-establish and expand the pre-war economic ties between North America and Tuscany. The enthusiasm for this reinvigorated connection came from both sides as Tuscans such as Salucci and Filicchi tried to enact the wartime dreams of Mazzei. Motivated by potential success, these venture capitalists sought out old and new markets and contacts on the other side of the Atlantic. Yet this mercantile impulse did not translate into a tangible political connection in the form of a commercial treaty. The stumbling block for any such agreement lay in the personal negotiations between American and Tuscan officials. As will be discussed later, Jefferson's outlook on the entirety of the Habsburg Monarchy clouded his approach to such dealings. Meanwhile, Tuscan officials like Barbolani interpreted American demands as incompatible with their own pre-existing arrangements. The Tuscan case is the first instance—but not the last—in US-Habsburg relations where a disconnect appeared between two sides and between economic entrepreneurs and political representatives.

Ostend: Prosperity or Poverty?

In 1783, the postwar fate of Ostend erupted onto the pages of the *Augsburgische Ordinari Postzeitung*. It was an open question for one of the largest official newspapers of the Holy Roman Empire: would prosperous Ostend survive the Peace of Paris? An April edition carried the first murmurings of impending ruin. "One can easily discern that they are partisan," noted the editors who reported on the relocation of many Dutch traders following the peace. "Whilst it is true that Ostend cannot remain so prosperous," they conceded, "American independence will certainly keep Ostend afloat."³⁶ By the end of the year, reports began to contradict this prediction, though the editors attempted to minimise the negativity: "Ostend's trade has fallen since the end of the war, as foreseen, but not by so much that the trade is not higher than before the war began."³⁷ Another issue detailed how Ostend had become one of "the most spacious and convenient ports in Europe."³⁸ In Vienna, the newspapers there had little to say about the rumours of harder times for Ostenders. As far as the public were informed, one of the richest Habsburg ports would continue to thrive. Indeed, one article noted

how America "drunken with joy" about peace continued to import vast amounts from Ostend.³⁹ So what did, in fact, lay ahead for Ostend? Prosperity or poverty?

The answer depended in part on the actions of officials who sought to maintain the benefits gained during the Revolution. In 1781, the Brussels government elected to found a new committee to oversee the recent surge in international trade.⁴⁰ Under the superintendence of the Secretariat of State and War, the six members of the new *Comité de Commerce Maritime* had dealt with the inundation of paperwork associated with the blossoming trade. Now the committee would play a leading role in defining the port's postwar position. On January 23, 1783, Minister Plenipotentiary Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg ordered committee members to investigate ways "to render permanent a portion of the advantages already existing, to multiply resources and relations, and to make greatest use possible of the current circumstances, namely the imminent peace and, seemingly, the independence of the United States of America."⁴¹ Starhemberg's request reveals the apparently low ambition—or, perhaps, realism—with which the Brussels officials approached the matter: he aimed to preserve "a *portion*" of the advantages. It was already taken as a matter of fact that not all the wartime gains could be sustained.

Three of the six committee members responded to Starhemberg's request.⁴² Two of them proposed standard measures such as lowering tariffs on American goods and ensuring domestic cargo suitable for Atlantic markets.⁴³ One of them proposed something quite different. Henri Deplancq had been a member of the committee since its inception and, like the others, held high-ranking positions elsewhere in the Brussels government. In his case, he also served on the Council of Finance and as the director of the Board of Customs.⁴⁴ In pondering the Ostend question, Deplancq explored the situation with great scope and pragmatism. In his *Mémoire* submitted to Starhemberg, there were opportunities as well as challenges.⁴⁵ First of all, Deplancq argued some countries should be written off without hesitation. Russian trade amounted to nothing more than a small exchange in sawdust whilst trade with Denmark-Norway centred on crayfish. Great Britain and the Dutch Republic always presented the greatest challenges from their dominant commercial positions, which was "very ruinous" for the Austrian Netherlands unless importations from these nations could be reduced.⁴⁶ The stagnant position with France, Portugal, and the Mediterranean states was unlikely to change except negatively as French traders moved back to Dunkirk. Spain represented a small hope for improvement since port duties were low enough to allow a sliver of profitable trade in places like Cadiz, so Deplancq saw North America as the only real chance for growth.

Deplancq advocated shifting interests from the Caribbean to the United States. He predicted that before long, France and Britain would raise tariffs to protect their islands as the Dutch had already done. As he concluded, “with this uncertainty, it seems to me that is premature to form any policy on Caribbean trade and that it is enough to merely watch for what happens next.”⁴⁷ The stabilised position of the United States of America as a fully independent and sovereign nation allowed for more opportunity. Deplancq felt American trade was “extremely interesting” as it gave all European traders an equal playing field. This meant Flemish textiles would fare well. In return, rice and tobacco could be sourced from the Carolinas and Virginia. He noted that American tobacco might harm the nascent Flemish tobacco industry which had sprung up to meet domestic demand during the war, but that it could be reshipped for a profit if the American price was low enough.⁴⁸ To these ends, he argued it was necessary to gain representation and a treaty with the Americans as soon as possible. He even envisioned a system where there would be three consuls in the United States: one each in New York and Charleston with a central authority in Philadelphia to oversee them.⁴⁹ In Deplancq’s view, a focus on the United States clearly demarcated the way forward.

In deciding the best course for the economy of the Austrian Netherlands, Starhemberg had chosen not to rely solely on his councillors. His directive also included merchants. Seven responded, with the imperial consuls in London, Antonio Songa, and Dunkirk, François Joseph de Lattre, also providing input.⁵⁰ As for the merchants, William Herries of the firm *Herries, Keith & Co.* in Ostend suggested the founding of a national bank in order to serve as guarantor on prospective voyages to North America.⁵¹ Others sought government support in terms of subsidies and lower tariffs.⁵² The most interesting proposition was the desire to acquire an island in the Caribbean. Several respondents backed the idea including Herries and de Lattre along with Charles André Melchior de Proli, the widow (*Veuve*) van Schoor, and Friedrich Romberg in Brussels.⁵³ The latter two seemed especially keen, perhaps given their slave trading activities.⁵⁴ They insisted anywhere would do and Van Schoor included a list of suitable places from Curaçao to Honduras, and from Mexico to Suriname. De Lattre held the island of Tobago more firmly in mind. All proponents argued this would ensure continued access to the Caribbean, maintain a competitive advantage, and would open a beachhead into the United States markets and possibly into Spanish North America via the Mississippi river. In spite of these perceived benefits, the Brussels government declined further consideration on the grounds that foreign pressures to abandon colonial ambitions had been too great in the past and the sums needed

to purchase an island such as Tobago, if the French could even be persuaded of relinquishing it, as well as the non-existent navy to protect it, would be enormous.⁵⁵

Starhemberg may have felt his grand survey of opinions had been a failure, but he dutifully sent the reports on to Vienna. There, as in Brussels, the merchants' either tepid or harebrained schemes met with little enthusiasm. In this light, Deplancq's more calculated approach appeared the most reasonable and suitable way forward. The need for a solution had become more urgent in Brussels following the news that Spanish port authorities had begun making conditions increasingly unfavourable for foreign traders. The singular hope for improved European commerce receded with news of complications in selling Flemish cargo onboard the Danish ship *Anne Sophie* in March 1783. To make matters worse, the ship had been sailing to Philadelphia via the Spanish ports and, as one Ghent merchant involved in the transaction claimed, costs had now risen by twenty to twenty-five percent as a result.⁵⁶ Officials struggled to find alternatives but nothing appeared practical beyond Deplancq's suggestion to send consular representatives.

In the meantime, the prevailing thought was that the merchants themselves would preserve trade with North America. This notion was not without merit. Merchants had a clear incentive to continue transatlantic trade. Flemish firms established partnerships in the United States to secure their presence in American markets. This involved either starting business associations with American firms or sending a representative to the United States. The first Ostend firm to take this direction was *Herries, Keith & Co.* run by two Englishmen, George Keith and William Herries. They sent over John Paterson—about whom little is known—to travel between Charleston and New York for one to two years. In anticipation of his mission, they focused on their contacts in England to reach out to Americans, most notably through an associate to William Temple Franklin.⁵⁷

In the immediate postwar period at least four additional Flemish companies followed the example of *Herries, Keith & Co.* The firm of *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* established a partnership with Mark Prager in Philadelphia, the son of the Amsterdam-London family conglomerate run by Yehiel Prager, which had traded through Ostend during the Revolution.⁵⁸ Prager proved highly effective in Philadelphia. George Washington described him as a “gentleman engaged extensively in trade” and recommended him to his friends after Prager had won Washington's approval within a year of his arrival.⁵⁹ It was one of many useful friendships throughout Prager's time in America.⁶⁰ Whereas during the war *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* had sent ships along the lucrative route to the Caribbean, their new partner advised them of better opportunities. In this case, *Liebaert & Prager*—as the new association was known—specialised in trading

American wheat to Lisbon in exchange for Portuguese wines to Ostend.⁶¹ Prager's efforts were diluted, however, by the ongoing court case over the *Eersten*, which sapped his energies and forced him to lobby Congress on at least one occasion.⁶² In 1785, the firm suffered another court case involving another ship, *l'Empereur*, diverting Prager's attention yet again.⁶³ Beset with difficulties, the partnership did not outlast the 1780s as Mark Prager traded under his own company by 1791.⁶⁴ Its existence, however short, still demonstrated the tenacity and new direction of Ostend firms postwar.

Firms across the Austrian Netherlands mirrored the new American initiatives of *Herries, Keith & Co.* and *Liebaert & Prager*. In Antwerp, *De Heyder, Veydt & Co.* formed a close connection through the insurance house of James Vanuxem in Philadelphia.⁶⁵ Vanuxem functioned as the main insurer and his son's future father-in-law, Herman Joseph Lombaert of *Ghovaere & Lombaert*, served as the clearinghouse for *De Heyder, Veydt & Co.* in North America.⁶⁶ Through these two unofficial partners, *De Heyder, Veydt & Co.* sold large amounts of textile goods from Lier and Antwerp and earned a profit of around twenty-five percent on their North American sales.⁶⁷ New connections such as these required a great deal of trust and transatlantic cooperation between firms without formal business ties or which lacked a connubial link.⁶⁸ The *De Heyder, Veydt & Co.*–Vanuxem–*Ghovaere & Lombaert* trading nexus ultimately proved too deficient in trust as business ceased in 1787 and arguments erupted over the payment of debts.⁶⁹ Seeking to continue their exports to the United States, *De Heyder, Veydt and Co.* sold off their remaining stock via *Samuel Wetherill & Sons* in Philadelphia but failed to attract any other substantial partnerships.⁷⁰ The failure to sustain such bonds of business confirmed what the British envoy in Brussels, George Byng, Viscount Torrington, had to say about the trade with the United States: "The want of faith in the Americans—and the various stories told of the dishonesty of their merchants, will prove a great obstacle to any confidence [as] these wary people here are not easily inclined to risk their money."⁷¹ Given the British reluctance towards American independence and the efforts in the 1780s to regain much of the lost American commerce, Torrington was undoubtedly prejudiced against such endeavours. His words, however, reflected the difficult reality in establishing viable long-term connections across the Atlantic in the late eighteenth century.

Philadelphia attracted the greatest postwar interest, but other American cities became prospective sites also. One Ostend ship, the *Ceres*, arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1786, for instance.⁷² The largest port in the southern states, Charleston, became the focal point of other concerted efforts to establish a beachhead

in American markets. Two Flemish firms established connections with companies in the city. These connections proved rather poor, however. In the first instance, Charleston functioned as an indirect port of call for the Ostend firm *De Kuyper*, which sailed its namesake ship to Philadelphia in 1784. There, the company's associates, Pennsylvanian partners *Biddle & Tellier*, sold the Flemish goods and loaded the *De Kuyper* with flour and other provisions for sale in Charleston and Curaçao before it would return from South America to Ostend a year later.⁷³ This exchange meant that whilst an Ostend ship technically arrived in Charleston, it was carrying on an intra-American trade rather than beginning a new transatlantic venture between Charleston and Ostend. The second case attempted to achieve direct transatlantic trade but failed to sustain it. A native of Ghent founded the firm *De Surmont* in Charleston sometime in late 1783 or early 1784 and received the ship *Jacoba et Isabella* from Ostend in mid-1784 carrying a variety of Flemish goods to exchange for tobacco.⁷⁴ The expedition faltered in profitability since the company's director understood little about the tariffs in South Carolina and barely made anything from the trade. He sold his wares at cost and returned home with the ship.⁷⁵ South Carolina seemed too distant an opportunity for the merchants of the Austrian Netherlands.

Whilst the firms *De Kuyper* and *De Surmont* failed in their attempts to trade with a second American city, there were other merchants in the Austrian Netherlands who traded with North America but did not establish any lasting presence. At least fifteen ships sailed from Ostend to the United States between July 1783 and 1788.⁷⁶ Compared to four ships that sailed to the Caribbean from 1783 to 1785, this number was significantly higher and represented the shift away from the Caribbean for Ostend traders.⁷⁷ Merchants in the Austrian Netherlands sensed the new direction in trade. Applications to be the Habsburg consul in the United States arrived on Deplancq's desk from 1782 onwards.⁷⁸ But Deplancq recommended that these pleas be left unanswered until the American situation had stabilised and a policy regarding consular presence had been worked out in Vienna.⁷⁹

At the same time, merchants approached American representatives to open Flemish trade with the United States. Sir Robert Herries penned a forty-eight-page memorandum on the prospects of British and Flemish goods in American markets which he sent to Silas Deane in 1783.⁸⁰ Edward Browne, a British subject in Ostend, approached John Adams for the position of American consul and enlisted other merchants in London to support his cause.⁸¹ Browne's desire rested on the wish to continue trade with William Lee, who had retired to his Green Spring plantation in Virginia during the summer of 1783.⁸² Their bond was one of friendship as well as business. Lee's wife Hannah Philippa Ludwell

Lee and their children moved in with the Browne family at Ostend and Lee entrusted a large sum of money to Browne, which he could draw upon more easily than sending remittances from across the Atlantic.⁸³ Together with Dennis de Berdt, a merchant friend from Lee's London days, the trio sought to rehabilitate Virginian trade through exporting Flemish and British goods via Ostend in return for cheap tobacco from Lee's Virginian neighbours.⁸⁴

Yet by 1785, the venture had produced little. Lee suffered a wave of personal tragedies; first, the death of his wife as she was about to embark from Ostend to America in 1784 and then the slow erosion of his eyesight which had worsened upon his return to Virginia, so much so that he could not read by candlelight. Plans were waylaid by the unhelpful nature of transatlantic communication, too. In 1785, Lee had already complained to Browne that he had not heard from him for over a year when he wrote bluntly and painfully,

It seems that added to the other misfortunes that have persecuted me in a successive habit for two years past, I have lost a friend; a loss that at my time of life is generally not easy to be repaired [*sic*] and in my Case perhaps it is impossible, but I will still address you by that sacred title.⁸⁵

Lee's loss subsided with his receipt of a handful of letters from Browne during the years up to 1788. They reveal how little of their plans actually transpired. Through Browne's company *Browne & Perryman*, Lee managed to trade Madeira wines instead, meaning the trade had nothing to do with Ostend except for Browne's presence as his European agent.⁸⁶ The Madeira trade, however, did not prove successful as Lee's contacts in Brussels reported that they suffered losses on the venture.⁸⁷ By the late 1780s, Lee seemed unable to lead a new direction. In 1791, he underwent a rudimentary cataract operation which rendered his eyes useless. Blind, enfeebled by the many years of travel and the personal devastation of his wife's death, Lee died in 1795. The man who had once been a celebrity in Vienna, the first representative of the United States to the Habsburg lands, and a self-exiled resident in Brussels, could achieve no further meaningful connection in the postwar years.

Lee and Browne were not the only American merchants to attempt transatlantic trade from Ostend, however. The New York merchant Nicholas Low made a concerted effort. Prior to the end of the war, Low had no commercial ties with Ostend. But an unsolicited letter from an English mercantile firm in Ostend, *William Williams & Co.*, got his attention, even though Low did not reply to the opportunity to sell "tobacco, rice, turpentine, slaves, and indigo" through the firm.⁸⁸ Instead, by 1785, Low had made contact with the Antwerp firm of

Werbrouck & Mellerio through whom he procured hats to sell in Philadelphia.⁸⁹ The venture made good returns and *Werbrouck & Mellerio* sent a representative to Philadelphia the following year to act as their representative with Low and his associate, Joseph Lacoste.⁹⁰ At its peak, however, the collaboration abruptly ended, perhaps because *Werbrouck & Mellerio* operated through their new Philadelphia representative. Low's Antwerp business dealing was the rare instance of an American-led interaction with Ostend.

Most other American merchants shut up shop in Ostend. Thomas Barclay had commanded a large presence in Ostend's American wartime trade but relocated to Paris where he embarked upon a diplomatic career.⁹¹ Three merchants, William Bingham, Samuel Ingliss, and Robert Gilmor, had likewise benefitted from directing ships from Ostend to Philadelphia during the war as *Bingham, Ingliss & Gilmor*. Gilmor operated out of Amsterdam during that period and from there he sought to continue direct trade to the United States, particularly to his native Baltimore.⁹² The initiative did not last long as the trio liquidated their endeavours in February 1784.⁹³ One American firm showed interest in establishing a trade in Ostend but only to a limited degree. In 1784, the Baltimore firm *Samuel & John Smith* sent out a circular advertisement titled "A New Scene of Commerce has opened with the Country" to thirty-eight European port-cities. Re-establishing ties with Great Britain was clearly the priority for them but Ostend featured as one of the six non-British ports featured on their roster. Nothing came of it.⁹⁴

No American presence lasted in Ostend beyond 1786. Symptomatic of the attitude by the late 1780s, a petition to Thomas Jefferson to use Ostend as the main entrepôt for Irish commerce in 1785 went without reply.⁹⁵ The heydays of American trade at Ostend ended in these postwar years. Whereas wartime produced a boom for Ostend's transatlantic trade through the international use of a neutral naval flag, the peace that followed brought hardship and ruin as foreign merchants upped sticks and returned to their respective countries. In most cases, it was a foreseeable result—one questioned openly in the Augsburg press and resoundingly answered by poverty rather than prosperity. What was unforeseen, however, was the tenacity of local merchants to continue the good times and to fight for a piece of the lucrative American trade. Like many Habsburg moments in the American Revolution, Ostend and its transatlantic trade was a brief episode of boom and bust, but it was one which mattered greatly and affected the course of action vis-à-vis the Americans during this decade. Ostend's commercial rise was instrumental in shaping the urgency from ministers in the Austrian Netherlands for a political connection between the Habsburg Monarchy and

the United States. Its fall would cement an eventual malaise about the utility of America on the eve of a homegrown revolution in the Austrian Netherlands. Ultimately, it would not be until the Napoleonic Wars that commerce would again pick up and Congress would deem a consular representative necessary in the former Austrian Netherlands.⁹⁶

Trieste: The Maturity of Direct Trade

By the time of the Treaty of Paris, only two groups of Triestine merchants had been successful in their aims to established direct trade between America and the Adriatic: Frohn and Baraux on the one hand, and Verpoorten and his new company on the other. Verpoorten was in fact the only Trieste trader to complete a roundtrip with the crossing of his *l'Americano* in 1782. He was among the new set of merchants but by no means alone. The voyages of *La Città di Trieste* and *l'Americano* during the war (see chapter 6) signalled new opportunities to other merchants in Trieste. Spurred by his example, this new generation of post-war merchants now sought to consolidate and expand the direct transatlantic trade between Trieste and the United States.

Domenico Francesco Belletti, a merchant of considerable repute, became one of the most enthusiastic merchants for transatlantic trade. Belletti directed Trieste's Mercantile Insurance Chamber and headed the firm *Belletti & Zaccar Compagnie* which traded extensively in the Levant.⁹⁷ Belletti began a furious letter campaign to Franklin in order to secure his appointment as the official consul for the United States.⁹⁸ Belletti's first letter, written in February 1783, spoke of his admiration for the American republic.⁹⁹ Belletti obviously intended to flatter Franklin, wishing to be "employed in the service of your respectable Republic here and across the whole Austria Littoral in the role of a Consul General, through which [flows] the commerce of your states with that of our august Monarch."¹⁰⁰ Belletti received no response from Franklin but persisted regardless. In April, Belletti sent Franklin four letters within eighteen days, demonstrating his seriousness in establishing his own trade with the United States. In his first letter, Belletti outlined his lobbying efforts to convince the emperor of the viability of American trade and his company's preparations to trade goods from the hereditary lands and the Levant.¹⁰¹ His final three letters took an increasingly desperate tone, pleading with Franklin for a letter of recommendation and at least a show of support for his commercial expedition. Met again with silence, Belletti mustered support from the French consul in Trieste but this letter arrived too late to help.¹⁰²

Despite Belletti's inclusion of two recommendations—including one by Count Karl von Zinzendorf—Franklin did not seem to care.¹⁰³ His rescue came from intervention by Charles André Melchior de Proli, an influential merchant and banker in the Austrian Netherlands, who lobbied Franklin successfully in May 1783 to procure American contacts for Belletti's venture.¹⁰⁴

Belletti's commercial expedition had many backers. A conglomeration of successful merchants formed around him including Antonio Rossetti along with Giacomo Francesco Maria Gabbiati and the Flemish-born Ambrosius von Strohlendorf, the head of the Triestine stock exchange. These sophisticated pioneers acquired the right connections both geographically and politically to obtain trade with the United States. Rossetti and Gabbiati functioned as Levantine contacts, Belletti pushed Franklin for support though Proli, and Strohlendorf provided the ship for the mission, *La Capricieuse*.¹⁰⁵ This ship had crossed the Atlantic from Ostend in 1781 but Strohlendorf repurposed it to "go to America."¹⁰⁶ For the expedition, the quartet planned to sail under imperial colours and therefore had to first navigate treacherous court scrutiny before navigating ocean waves. Belletti once again began a furious campaign. He personally travelled to Vienna to submit the application to the Aulic Chamber in May 1783. One immediate problem occurred. The intended captain of the ship, George Simpson was a Scottish-born sailor and not an imperial subject. The quartet arranged for Frohn and Baraux to exert their influence. In their attestation, they praised Simpson's qualities and argued for honorary citizenship.¹⁰⁷ The directors also addressed secondary concerns over smuggling arms since, as one treasury official noted, America was still "presently full of soldiers from all over the world."¹⁰⁸ Eventually the officials granted the patent but, as in previous cases, it included a list of prohibited goods.

With clearance awarded for the mission, Belletti wrote to Franklin again in September 1783. "It is certain," he declared, "the Port of Trieste has *more than any other port* a very solid commercial enterprise with America."¹⁰⁹ Simpson set sail that month with Franklin's letters of introduction.¹¹⁰ *La Capricieuse* became the largest Triestine vessel to sail directly to the United States with 350 tonnes of cargo. Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Simpson brokered contact with the influential merchant and financier Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, and with the trading house *Bache & Shee*, operated by Franklin's son-in-law Richard Bache and his associate John Shee. *Bache & Shee* handled most of the goods from *La Capricieuse*. Franklin's son-in-law was delighted at this opportunity and thanked his father-in-law for,

Your kind introductions in the Mercantile line [which] have thrown a pretty large scene of business into Bache & Shee's hands, and we have a good prospect before us of its being profitable, [as] our connections with Trieste in the Empire of Germany [Holy Roman Empire], are likely to be very considerable, and our prospects very flattering.¹¹¹

Bache & Shee operated as distributors, selling the Triestine products easily. On December 10, 1783, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* listed the first advert of goods from *La Capricieuse* featuring "dates, spices, and currants" brought from the Levant and sold by the shopkeeper Samuel Garrigues in Philadelphia.¹¹²

Simpson and the quartet developed an ingenious strategy for increasing their yields from the American trade. Sailing out of Trieste with Simpson was a Captain Wouters, a native of Antwerp who travelled to Baltimore over the winter of 1783 and purchased an American ship which they renamed the *Comte de Brigido* in honour of the new governor of Trieste, Pompejus Brigido von Bresowitz.¹¹³ Wouters took command of this vessel laden with American products, and they left their respective ports in late summer 1784. Both ships arrived in Trieste on November 9, 1784.¹¹⁴ News of their arrival and the success of the venture, especially the method of one-out, two-back travelled fast through the Habsburg lands. Governor Brigido wrote a letter to *Bache & Shee* thanking them "for their friendship and support which they [gave] Cap. Simpson during his stay." In it, he expressed his joy at "our commerce between our countries which has been started and will become more considerable" given "the remarkable boundaries of the New Republic and the New World."¹¹⁵ Belletti, Simpson, and the other backers shared the same opinion and embarked on planning their next voyage.

The success of *La Capricieuse* depended upon the quality and suitability of the merchandise for sale. Fortunately, the statistical table of 1783 provides an insight into which wares sold well. Although it is unclear which voyages the table includes, the figures allow for some indication of overall trends commensurate with the *Capricieuse* expedition. Firstly, metalwares from Carinthia and Styria produced some of the largest profits (see table 3 below).

Most of these metal goods focused on agricultural use and accounted for a tenth of the net worth exported to the United States in 1783. Metalwares sold exceedingly well in Philadelphia. According to Wouters, iron strips used for constructing barrels achieved a fifty percent return on their original value.¹¹⁶ American traders purchased these products since iron manufacturing in the United States had not yet matched the Austrian standard. The rich opportunities of the American markets prompted one of the Styrian sailors to write home to an acquaintance in Graz. He shared his "absolute conviction that the American trade

TABLE 3. Metalware exported to the United States from Trieste, 1783

Product Name (Orig.)	Product Name (Eng.)	Quantity (Tonnes)	Value (fl)	Percentage of Trieste-US Export
<i>Acciario</i>	Steel	26	2,600	0.8
<i>Ferramenta lavorata</i>	Agricultural tools	21	6,750	7.0
<i>Ferro in ancore</i>	Iron weights/anchors	4	480	0.5
<i>Ferro in fasci</i>	Iron straps/strips	17.50	1,571	1.6
<i>Ferro in filati</i>	Iron rods	5.25	499	0.5
<i>Ferro in vomere e badilla</i>	Iron ploughs/shovels	9	1,344	1.4
	Total	82.75	13,248	11.8

SOURCE: FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780-1785), fols. 1003-1020.

offers the biggest advantages possible for the emperor's merchants," especially, he noted, because "it is commonly known that American factories desperately need Austrian goods [and] what is more, few factories even occupy this Republic." Editors of the *Wienerisches Diarium* published the letter, commenting that other merchants were following suit.¹¹⁷

Indeed, another ship from Antwerp, *La Poste*, arrived on July 21, 1784, laden with iron strips and bands (*fer spaté en ruban*) produced by one of the best iron manufactories in the Austrian Netherlands.¹¹⁸ The official Habsburg representative in Philadelphia (discussed in the next chapter) explained that the high quality of these goods as well as the comparatively low wages in Austrian mines gave ironware a significant advantage over the competition from British and Swedish iron producers.¹¹⁹

Carinthia, Styria, and the Austrian Netherlands were not the only Habsburg provinces to absorb the new American trade. Manufactories in Bohemia as well as the former Habsburg territory of Silesia benefitted from direct transatlantic trade. These provinces predominantly accessed Atlantic markets through Hamburg, but Prussian aggression drove Bohemian merchants to trade along southern routes via the Mediterranean.¹²⁰ Under this old system, merchants constantly complained of their profits being eroded by Spanish trading houses.¹²¹ Direct trade from Trieste to American markets proved one of the simplest and most cost-effective avenues for inland Central European manufacturers, so much so that Silesian manufacturers

under Prussian rule also elected to redirect their commerce towards Trieste. Textiles and glass products were the principal goods exported to the United States from these areas. Glass products included crystal goblets and various tumblers that were already noted across Europe for their fine quality. Textiles—hats, fine cloths, clothing, drapes, and linen—became the second most successful product overall.¹²² The direct trading value of linens amounted to 30,400 Austrian Gulden (*fl*) alone in 1783.¹²³ *Bache & Shee* initially produced returns of around forty percent on these goods. Such business attracted considerable interest. Karl Anton Fitz, a textile factory owner in Budišov, Moravia, brokered personal contact with *Bach & Shee* in Philadelphia through the Simpson-Wouters mission, for example.¹²⁴ The ability to trade directly proved irresistible.

Simpson and Wouters reinvested profits from exports to purchase the main import from the United States: tobacco. Eighteenth-century Europeans imported large quantities of tobacco, and inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy were no different. Domestic production of tobacco in the Habsburg lands centred around the Hungarian plains. However, Hungarian producers cultivated a different species that was less desirable than the American variety. Europeans preferred the taste of “English” tobacco to the so-called “*Bauern-Tabak*” (farmer’s tobacco) grown in Hungary.¹²⁵ Tobacco cultivation and selling was also heavily regulated in the Habsburg Monarchy. The government legalised tobacco in 1701 but exercised a state monopoly over sales and the distribution of licenses in the Austrian lands for much of the century. In 1783, the state monopoly became a permanent feature, ending only with the Republic of Austria’s accession to the European Union in 1995.¹²⁶

In the Hungarian lands, a more liberal regime persisted despite attempts to install the same state-controlled monopoly. Looser regulation and private industry enabled constant cultivation following the first tobacco factory in 1722, but also exposed Hungarian producers to greater effects in market fluctuations. There was both opportunity and peril at stake. When war interrupted production and exportation from North America, Hungarian tobacconists rushed to supplant the fall in American supplies which forced European consumers to accept whatever variety of tobacco was on offer. There was still a preference for American tobacco when it could be had, which caused some shipments of Hungarian tobacco to be cancelled or returned, but scarcity of American tobacco created a significant boom for Hungarian merchants.¹²⁷ Tempted by easy success, the director of the Austrian tobacco monopoly, even resigned his post in order to devote himself to trading tobacco out of the Hungarian port of Fiume in 1777.¹²⁸ By 1783, revenues from Hungarian tobacco reached the unseen heights

of nearly three million florins in value.¹²⁹ For entrepreneurs in Hungary, the boom was a golden opportunity since many other Hungarian products received harsh tariffs from Vienna in order to protect Austrian industry.¹³⁰ Yet, with the cessation of hostilities, boom inevitably turned to bust as American exportation resumed and Hungarian suppliers could not compete with the influx of cheaper, more popular American tobacco, which traders like Simpson and Wouters now returned through local ports.¹³¹

Merchants and Hungarian officials did not relinquish their hopes of reviving the Hungarian tobacco sector, however. As part of a programme to stimulate the Hungarian economy in anticipation of his great institutional reforms of 1785, Joseph II allowed some efforts to alleviate the position of the tobacco farmers in their postwar plight.¹³² Tolls were lowered on the main road to Fiume and a new watermen's guild enabled smoother transit on rivers.¹³³ The man overseeing these improvements was the new Governor of Fiume, Count Pál Almásy von Zsadány who thought the Simpson-Wouters expedition offered Hungarian farmers a renewed opportunity. Almásy requested the pair gather tobacco seeds from Virginia and Maryland so that they might be used and tested in Hungarian fields where, he hoped, the better American species would thrive and could compete in European markets.¹³⁴ Though Almásy got his seeds, it was too late. The tonnes of tobacco leaf Simpson and Wouters brought back confirmed the insurmountable inferiority of Hungarian tobacco. The new direct trade between Trieste and America guaranteed the plentiful and cheap supply of American tobacco and ensured that Hungarian production would only serve smaller domestic and regional markets within the Habsburg lands and Central Europe.¹³⁵ Fond memories of the boom times during the American Revolution remained firm in many Hungarian minds into the nineteenth century and many hoped to still challenge the American predominance in European markets.¹³⁶ By then, however, Southern politicians and planters sent out "special tobacco agents" to ensure their hegemony continued in places like the Habsburg Monarchy.¹³⁷

Although results of the Simpson-Wouters mission proved hard for Hungarians, it was an all-round achievement for Triestine merchants. The quartet was keen to continue their exploits and so, as 1785 began, both ships again sailed for Philadelphia and Baltimore, reaching their destinations by March 1785 with a similar but more refined cargo.¹³⁸ This was the first time Trieste merchants had directly exported to Baltimore and before the year was out, advertisements for Bohemian glassware appeared in the city's newspaper.¹³⁹ Triestine merchants now had a foothold in two ports of the United States. Based on this success, there was enough conviction to form an entirely new company specifically

designated for transatlantic trade. In July 1785, Belletti, Simpson, and Strohlendorf formed a new “quartet” alongside newcomer Karl von Maffei, the Maltese and Papal consul in Trieste. Together they established the *Compagnia di Commercio per l’America Settentrionale* also known as the *Compagnia Austriaco-Americana* (Austrian-American Trading Company), and served as its board of directors.¹⁴⁰ Announcements reverberated across Austria and America that summer.¹⁴¹ The founding of the Society was a massive undertaking with an initial fund of 500,000*fl* divided into 1,000 shares costing 500*fl* each. Participation in such a firm was therefore restricted to the wealthy mercantile and noble classes. The first general assembly took place in Trieste in November 1785. The founding of the Austrian-American Trading Company and its stock offer made news in Vienna and across continental Europe.¹⁴²

In order to establish such an undertaking, privileges and permission had to be obtained from the Aulic Chamber. The quartet submitted a charter for approval at the same time they went public with the initiative. Governor Brigido supported their application. In August, Brigido wrote to the emperor personally about the company and petitioned him to grant them official privileges. Brigido explained in the most positive terms how the “several well-meaning, intelligent and experienced merchants” came together to form the company after the successful Philadelphia mission, which had “by no means completely satisfied their patriotic zeal.”¹⁴³ In addition, Brigido stressed how the firm’s previous mission had “exported almost exclusively domestic products, of which there is the greatest abundance” and added,

The important utility of [this] impending enterprise, and the honesty with which the direction of the new commenced trading society is arranged, impresses me so much that I cannot refrain from recommending this new enterprise of the highest grace and mercy unquestionably.¹⁴⁴

Brigido went a step further than simply endorsing the latest mercantile project with the United States. Given the numerous applications, missions, and ferment then present in Trieste, he advised the emperor,

A new commerce on such firm grounds and for the greatest mutual utility may not fail, especially if Your Majesty, with all righteousness, permits maximum protection, and in the meantime achieves at establishing friendly agreement with the Republic of the United States of America much wanted on the most permanent footing.¹⁴⁵



FIGURE 12. View of the free port of Trieste
by Ferdinand Runk and Anton Herzinger (ca. 1800)

The application met with success in Vienna. Joseph sanctioned the status of a privileged company in early September 1785, thereby acknowledging their endeavours as something of value to the state.¹⁴⁶ In essence, the conferment seemed a realisation of Joseph's original aim of extending trade with the Americans back in 1783. By 1785, he had been fully convinced of the merits of such a trade. At the same time as Joseph received Brigido's petition, he held an audience with Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, who later, with joy, informed Jefferson that American commerce "was a great object" in the emperor's mind. Indeed, Joseph was not the only one in Vienna fixated on this topic. Lafayette also informed Jefferson of a visit from Kaunitz who had come to speak to him "very willingly" about the substance of American trade.¹⁴⁷ Lafayette's visit was coincidental; the court had already set on the priority of trade with the new United States, and Trieste had played a fundamental role in establishing that conviction.

The maturity of direct trade between Trieste and the United States represented a fundamental cornerstone in the Habsburg attitude towards pursuing a political connection between the two states. Triestine merchants had been equally tenacious as Ostend and Livornese traders in forging direct ties with North America and, crucially, in convincing local and Viennese officials of the worthiness of their endeavours. The Austrian-American Trading Company

embodied the new, emboldened spirit of transatlantic opportunity rife in Trieste and with official imperial support of its missions. The rapidity and intensity of transatlantic trade with the United States in these postwar years ensured the United States remained one of the most valuable commercial routes outside of the Mediterranean for the imperial entrepôt on the Adriatic.

Conclusion

The development of postwar commerce between the Habsburg lands and the United States of America took place in the three major ports of Livorno, Ostend, and Trieste. In those towns, new merchant adventurers aimed to profit from the opportunities ushered in by American independence. Major American ports, from Charleston to Boston, became targets of Habsburg mercantile ambitions. In several cases, Habsburg merchants established considerable footholds in the American economy by sending representatives, entering partnerships, and creating contacts with American businesses. Though in some cases these connections proved short-lived, their existence testifies to the extensive commercial spaces in which both the Habsburgs and Americans operated.

In spaces beyond the Atlantic—in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the North Sea—merchants created new trade flows, and, in the case of Tuscany, expanded upon the earlier trading scene. The effects of this postwar commerce emanated from these centres and affected wider regional markets. In the Habsburg Monarchy, this produced positive and negative effects. The hopes of reviving a Hungarian tobacco market crashed after the reintroduction of cheap, popular American tobacco. Yet, in Transylvania, new ventures inspired local businessmen to seek out their own routes to American markets.¹⁴⁸ As Franklin had put it, a “new set of merchants” had come into existence. The zeal and determination of the mercantile classes to exploit the new situation in North America impressed the ruling elites who supported such initiatives at the state level. In Trieste, officials even wrote to the emperor in support of the newly established trading company. The belief in an independent United States as a source of economic potential emerged from the mercantile world, moved into the political realm, and combined to create an urgency to nourish this nascent trade.

In the postwar aftermath, the question of American commerce loomed large in the minds of administrators across the Habsburg Monarchy. Emperor Joseph II pondered its “greatest importance” already in 1783 and Prince von Kaunitz sought out Lafayette to parley with him about the subject a few years later. The successful missions of traders both during and after the war convinced a

previously hesitant bureaucracy of the need for a political connection in order to defend and sustain the profitable commercial ties to the United States. The emerging urgency was, however, one-sided. Although American merchants attempted trade with Habsburg markets such as Ostend, these efforts paled in comparison to the overwhelming interest of Habsburg merchants and administrators in the United States. It was a significant development given the American insistence on brokering contact with the Habsburgs during the War of American Independence and the mission of William Lee in 1778. During the American Revolution, the question for Habsburg officials had been how to mitigate against the negative effects while profiting from the neutral carrying trade. Now, in a time of peace, the question had become how to secure Habsburg trade as one among equals. The time for action had arrived.

“If His Imperial Majesty Should Think Fit”

The First Habsburg Representatives in the United States of America,

1783–1789

AN ORDINARY HOUSE in New York City hosted an extraordinary meeting in the late summer of 1785. A middle-aged father and his seventeen-year-old son entered a parlour room fitted with a large wooden table in the centre. On top were eleven glasses of finest Madeira wine. Their host, who towered over them at an impressive 6'6", rose to greet them but failed to offer the opulent drink on display. Instead, he boasted how the wine had been a personal gift from the marquis de Lafayette, given to his colleague who sat stubbornly in one corner of the room, his facial scars on show. Two more men looked on from the leisure of a chaise lounge. All of them, the father noted later, “mutilated” their ears with silver pendants and pierced each nostril with large silver rings which distracted from faces covered in bear’s grease and black hair powdered copiously, but unevenly, with dazzling red vermilion. The host’s attire also struck him as worthy of record; the gentleman who stood throughout the entire meeting wore a dark blue robe overlaid with delicate red, yellow, and white lines whilst around his neck hung a solid gold English gorget and fourteen rows of decorative brown beads. The gentleman also showed off these beads to his guests, pressing them into their hands for a short while. When asked where someone might acquire such ornaments, the gentleman faced the son and with a piece of chalk drew a large map on the table, pointing out to the boy the distances from his house to Fort Schuyler and from there to Schenectady, to Albany, and finally, to the lands of his own Oneida Nation. “370 miles,” the boy counted. But the Oneida chief had not realised the distance his two guests had already come; he had just lectured the son of the first representative of the Habsburg Monarchy to the United States.¹

Such an encounter resulted from the Habsburg desire to secure trade with the United States, and the fear of losing it. At the start of 1783, the Habsburg Monarchy had no commercial representatives in the United States for its avid mercantile traders whatsoever. By the end of that year, three individuals resided permanently in the new United States for this purpose, but only one functioned in any official capacity as far as the Habsburgs were concerned. None of them, however, gained bilateral recognition and likely for this reason, their presence in the early republic has been overlooked by historians. These individuals, their families, their missions, and their fates, however, merit a detailed account. The establishment of commercial representation in the United States was a major step for the Habsburg Monarchy in acquiring formal ties with the Americans and protecting the nascent trading links between both lands. Prior to 1783, only two other places beyond the Mediterranean commanded enough attention to warrant consular representation from the Habsburg Monarchy. Both places were in East Asia. The missions of 1783 were the first representations of the Austrian Habsburgs in the Americas.² The pivot towards North America, and the efforts undertaken to create an official presence there, reflected the new primacy of commercial interests for Habsburg officials beyond Europe. Following the conclusion of peace, the United States became the focus of economic aspirations beyond European seas.

Representation brought the Habsburgs more gains than anticipated. New contacts, such as the meeting with the Oneida leaders, created opportunities previously unimagined in Vienna. The window into American society, commerce, and industry also brokered new understandings of fragility and competition within the American economy. Yet the highly compartmental nature of the Habsburg Monarchy affected the ability to construct effective policy that would take advantage of these economic opportunities. Divisions over representation in North America between regional officials in the Austrian Netherlands and imperial officials in Vienna was an important symptom of this discord. Distrust within the bureaucracy and mercantile communities of the Habsburg Monarchy not only resulted in more commercial representation in the United States than anywhere else beyond Europe but also exposed the continued importance of American commerce and the rising struggle to retain its benefits. The first Habsburg representatives in the United States signified the scramble to harness the bounty of transatlantic trade among imperial ministers and merchants alike.

The Internal Debate over Representation

Commercial connections forged by merchants during and after the Revolution indicated the potential richness of the American market. In the Austrian Netherlands, the carrying trade produced an exuberant wealth and the same gains incentivised merchants at Trieste towards the first direct trading ventures with American ports. These merchants were not alone, however. Across Europe, merchants and government officials recognised the need to solidify their share of lucrative transatlantic trade with the United States and to impede the share of other nations. Habsburg merchants like Bertin de Jaure were the first to panic at the mercantilist manoeuvres of other European states. He petitioned the regional government in Brussels for action by opening up direct relations with the Americans and securing representation in the United States.³ In April 1782, the minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg recognised the threat, siding with merchants who begged for some kind of treaty protection by arguing for representation in the United States.⁴ His plan chimed with the recommendations of the Council of Finance in Brussels which advocated a large consular system in the United States with the aim of directing trade from the individual states to the Habsburg lands. A system of several vice-consuls, one for each American state, under the direction of a consul general, ideally in Philadelphia, would be enough in their opinion.⁵

Benjamin Franklin's apparent support spurred on Starhemberg's actions. For his part, it seemed that Franklin invited treaty negotiations and a consular system from the Habsburgs.⁶ Yet Franklin could not speak for the Americans entirely. American diplomacy was still a rather ad hoc business throughout this period when the lack of unified central institutions hampered the development of concrete foreign representation. During the War of American Independence, members of the Continental Congress had appointed several envoys to the European powers but did not enjoy fully reciprocal relations with many of them. Franklin became the first accredited diplomat to France in 1779 but he continued to respond to other matters and foreign requests.⁷ Under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union adopted by Congress in March 1781, a new Department of Foreign Affairs would oversee the administration of diplomatic ties and the creation of American consuls abroad. Yet the system proved weak and ineffective given the lack of empowerment for the secretary of foreign affairs and his ministers overseas. Such problems would not be solved until the introduction of the federal constitution in 1787.⁸ By the effective conclusion of the war, very little had cemented the American diplomatic presence in Europe or

smoothened the process of conducting foreign relations back home in Philadelphia.⁹ Expanding commerce remained at the heart of American foreign interests but, given the nature of American diplomacy, the urgency had to come from the Habsburgs side in order to broker relations.¹⁰

The timing seemed right in 1782, but without the consent of the emperor or State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz, nothing could be done. The problem for the ministers and merchants of the Austrian Netherlands was that the Viennese officials did not share the same sense of urgency. From their view, North American trade was in a nascent state. Although Kaunitz agreed it would be "advantageous for the [Austrian] Netherlands, and for the other States of his Majesty, to have a Consul in the United American Colonies," he remained steadfast on his decision to wait "to see what the fate of the colonies will be."¹¹ The disapproval dampened ambitions but also raised concerns in Brussels.

On November 30, 1782, Great Britain concluded the Preliminary Articles of Peace with the United States, now internationally recognising its former colonies as a sovereign and independent state. For ministers in the Austrian Netherlands, the news removed any doubts over treating with the Americans. In Brussels, Starhemberg was convinced the Habsburgs needed to act soon in order to secure their share. Merchants continued to press for representation; the latest, Pierre-Jean Bouvier from Namur, who established his apothecary business in Port-au-Prince in Saint-Domingue, nominated himself for the role of "Consul Imperial" for the Americas.¹² On January 22, 1783, Starhemberg wrote another letter, but not to Kaunitz, whose cool feelings he remembered. Instead, he directly contacted the imperial ambassador Count Florimond Mercy-d'Argenteau in Paris to set the wheels in motion. Starhemberg concocted the story that the emperor had asked him to report on the possibilities and necessities of trade with the Americans, but he hinted,

It would be easy to respond effectively to one or the other of these issues if we had *here*, as there also, some sort of emissary or US agent, who I can confer secretly or at least discuss this important subject with, but the failure of this means I will only be able to tell His Majesty of general things and not provide a concise enough answer.¹³

Starhemberg explained to Mercy-d'Argenteau how Franklin once suggested such an arrangement but because "we had too much to fear from England," the discussion was dropped. Starhemberg urged Mercy-d'Argenteau to open channels with the Americans and make insinuations towards beginning such an arrangement. Yet such actions without official sanction from Vienna were

dangerous. Seemingly aware of this, Starhemberg instructed Mercy-d'Argenteau not to make "mention of anything" to courtiers in Vienna and, secondly, any "insinuations with Mr Franklin ought to be only in the manner of a conversation which could never comprise yourself." Finally, perhaps most tellingly of all, Starhemberg ordered Mercy-d'Argenteau to "kindly burn this letter."¹⁴

Starhemberg's ploy was risky on multiple levels. First, he acted without permission. His actions subverted imperial authority. If Mercy-d'Argenteau's insinuations on his behalf came across as an offer of Habsburg recognition before the official treaty of peace had been concluded, then it would change the emperor's policy without his consent. Second, Starhemberg's actions ignored diplomatic norms. Unlike other European powers, the Habsburgs could not approach another nation, especially leaders of a recent rebellion and new republic, unless it was in response to a solicited offer.¹⁵ Joseph II was Holy Roman Emperor and held dozens of other titles. His position as an emperor, a king of kings, was intended to outrank all other rulers.¹⁶ In essence, the emperor could not go knocking on the door of the Americans, although Starhemberg seemed to be prying the door open already.

Given the risks associated with Mercy-d'Argenteau's delicate operation, it is not known what exactly occurred. Any mission report Starhemberg would have received most assuredly burned in his fireplace—presuming he followed his own instructions. Mercy-d'Argenteau likely received the letter in early February of 1783 and did indeed raise the conversation with Franklin, but again, no material proof or correspondence from either side survives. This scenario, however, explains Starhemberg's next action. A few weeks later, he sent off a proposal to his superiors in Vienna arguing for "the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce and Amity with the American States without delay and the prompt sending of an accredited Minister or Resident to America" in order to represent the Habsburgs.¹⁷ Starhemberg outlined his reasoning, noting that the Americans would be friendly to such an offer but without giving away his actions with Mercy-d'Argenteau. Starhemberg even nominated his preferred candidate for the position of consul general. Indeed, the ministers in Brussels had already run an internal search for suitable candidates.¹⁸

Starhemberg's rashness troubled Kaunitz. In presenting the proposal to the emperor on March 19, Kaunitz appended a large memorandum outlining his concerns. Although Kaunitz agreed it was "desirable to both sides for the swift connection to be made, it cannot be done for the time being." Kaunitz cautioned, "It is necessary for the American States to take the first steps to your Imperial Majesty on account of their status of recognition, until then there can

neither be an accredited person sent to the United States nor a Treaty concluded with them.”¹⁹ The question of recognition posed a problem in Kaunitz’s mind, especially since diplomatic etiquette and rank held sway over Habsburg officials’ desire to obtain American commerce. At the same time, Kaunitz acknowledged the rising need to secure American trade for the Monarchy and meditated an interim solution to this issue:

In order not to lose any time for all practical and preparatory steps towards a trade connection, however, between the hereditary lands (*Erblände*) and the American States, it would be best in my opinion, to send an official Commercial Advisor to America entrusted to learn about the terrain and to prepare the first principles for mutual recognition and commerce, and only then, when the recognition of American sovereignty has been made by Your Majesty, will he be bestowed with a ministerial character.²⁰

Kaunitz masterfully articulated several profound changes to Starhemberg’s strategy within these few lines. First, he reoriented the focus to the hereditary lands and, by their sole mention, promoted their interests over the Austrian Netherlands. Secondly, Kaunitz effectively divorced representation from the conclusion of a commercial treaty. The new title of “commercial advisor” rather than consul general absolved any requirement for Habsburg recognition since it became a non-diplomatic undertaking. This stopgap, in essence, solved the troublesome issue of American recognition and imperial diplomatic hierarchy whilst, hopefully, laying the groundwork for commercial connections between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.

Kaunitz, however, held reservations about Starhemberg’s suggestion of who should be sent, and his objections again reflected the rising sense of competition between the different regions of the Habsburg Monarchy. Starhemberg had nominated Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Bertholff. Beelen, an experienced bureaucrat in the provincial administration for over twenty years, served as secretary for the Council of Finance in Brussels where he drafted official reports, copied letters, and understood the commercial interests of the Austrian Netherlands as a result.²¹ He also spoke several languages, including English.²² Starhemberg knew Beelen had served as a secretary to Kaunitz during his ambassadorship in Paris in the 1750s and hoped this would secure favour for Beelen in Vienna. He was mistaken. Kaunitz strongly advised against his old colleague’s promotion to the new post. Kaunitz feared that Beelen would represent only the Austrian Netherlands at the expense of the interests of the hereditary lands. He argued that Beelen “is someone wholly unsuited for the position, since the entire hereditary lands

and their mercantile interests are completely unknown to him.”²³ Kaunitz had a major problem in dislodging Beelen as the main candidate, however, as Beelen had officially applied for the post in February.²⁴ Kaunitz hastily nominated one of his civil servants, Franz Anton von Blanc, but the emperor approved Beelen as his new “Counsellor of Commerce and Navigation” for North America on March 22, 1783.²⁵ Kaunitz had lost the first battle but did not give up the fight.

The administrations in Brussels and Vienna also clashed over the instructions for Beelen’s unique mission to Philadelphia. The Habsburg Monarchy had not established a position in such a capacity ever before. In Brussels, Starhemberg set to work immediately and deliberated in conjunction with the Privy Council and the Committee of Maritime Commerce *before* news of Beelen’s acceptance by the emperor had reached them.²⁶ Together they drafted a set of twenty-two points for Beelen’s projected five-year term. The first nine articles explained Beelen’s presumed role, with the very first instruction being entirely incongruent with Kaunitz’s view. It stated the primary aim of “the Imperial Minister” was the creation of a treaty of commerce and amity with the Americans on principle of mutual reciprocity. The subsequent eight points clarified Beelen was to report on the sales of listed goods which the Austrian Netherlands wished to trade with North America and the goods which might interest merchants in Ostend for importation. These opening articles also outlined two sensitive objectives. Firstly, Beelen was to negotiate a reduction of the two-and-a-half-percent American tariff on exports for Ostend merchants. Secondly, he was to discover whether any commercial treaty could extend their rights to trade with the Antilles via American ships. Caribbean trade was, after all, an important consideration given the intense commerce between there and Ostend during the war. However, Starhemberg noted that France’s commercial treaty with the Americans did not afford such privileges.

Articles ten to thirteen highlighted Beelen’s role and seniority. Although he was subservient to the Privy Council in Brussels, he would enjoy superiority over all imperial subjects and merchants as the sole “sovereign officer” in North America. His designation, other than that of “Imperial Minister,” was “Consul General” as he would advise on how to establish future vice-consuls. Articles fourteen to sixteen allowed him to speculate on any mercantile enterprise during his tenure, and he would also report any potential speculative ventures to Brussels. Beelen’s main task was to supply Brussels with constant reports on relevant American commercial developments. The final five articles dealt extensively with these reports’ structure and composition. Firstly, he was to order them into topics concerning either regions or specific goods and the news relating to them.

Article eighteen stipulated that all reports should be written in French as to avoid the delay of translation or inaccuracies in expression. Two articles outlined that he was to keep a rolling record of all European ships entering American ports and to collect all American trade ordinances. The final instruction contained the only mention of the hereditary lands, ordering reports into two categories, one for the Austrian Netherlands and one for the hereditary lands, with duplicates of the latter to be sent to Vienna. In short, the instructions compiled by Starhemberg and his associates focused entirely upon the advantages and representation of merchants in the Austrian Netherlands with very little attention to the concerns of those in the hereditary lands.

Unsurprisingly, Kaunitz amended these instructions. He made several alterations before he returned them to Starhemberg. Beelen's instructions grew to a total of thirty-eight points. Specific references to merchant circumstances in the Austrian Netherlands gave way to equal provisions made for merchants in Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. In the first redraft, perhaps as a concession, Beelen provisionally received "the commission of consul of the emperor and the honour of an accredited person by His Majesty to the Congress of the United States of America."²⁷ This description ensured Beelen's status as the first Habsburg representative to the United States. The first five instructions retained many of the general points: to communicate American commercial opportunities for the emperor's subjects and render any assistance for his merchants and their interests in North America. Articles six to twelve now referred exclusively to the Austrian Netherlands whilst the interests of the hereditary lands featured in the remaining twenty-six articles. It took until June for his formal instructions to be accepted by the Brussels and Viennese administrations, but Brussels officials began preparing for Beelen's departure in late May already.²⁸ In the decision to appoint a Habsburg representative to the new United States, Brussels officials had forced the issue and led the way. In doing so, an internal division arose over the mission in the Habsburg Monarchy.

The Mission of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff

On July 6, 1783, Beelen left Brussels for Paris with his secretary Pierre Gourland.²⁹ Beelen's wife Jeanne-Marie Thérèse (née de Castro-y-Toledo) and his two sons, François Eugène and Constantin Antoine, and their daughter Clemencé Auguste accompanied them.³⁰ The departure severed a family as the Beelens left behind their other two daughters, Thérèse Eugénie de Beelen-Bertholff and Philippine Josephine de Beelen-Bertholff.³¹ In Paris, the Beelens stayed with

Mercy-d'Argenteau close to the Tuileries Palace. Mercy-d'Argenteau instructed Beelen further, procured letters of recommendation, and introduced the family to John Adams.³² On August 1, they arrived at Le Havre and boarded the *George Washington*. From there, they first sailed to Poole, England, before sailing to Philadelphia.³³ However, Beelen was not the only European commercial agent heading across the Atlantic. That month, the Saxon representative Philipp Thieriot also made his crossing.³⁴ In September, the Portuguese representative departed as well.³⁵ The haste in Brussels had not been in vain; the Habsburg Monarchy ensured their representative became one of the first to arrive. Yet the infighting between Brussels and Vienna made Beelen's mission harder than those of his contemporaries who worked for a single administration.

On September 9, the Beelen-Bertholff family reached the United States—a week after the country formally obtained independence following the Treaty of Paris. The voyage was difficult, especially for Beelen. His situation deteriorated upon arrival in Philadelphia.³⁶ The city convulsed under the “Fall Fever” which at its height that autumn claimed the lives of thirty people per day. Less than twenty-four hours before their arrival, Franklin's son-in-law warned that “more frequent changes to Hot and Cold were never known in America.”³⁷ Weakened by the transatlantic crossing and now in the midst of an epidemic, Beelen fell ill. Matters were complicated further by their accommodation. First, the family lodged with a well-known hotelier James Oellers—a trader from Aachen whose brother, a priest in Brussels, might have been their only connection. In the spring, they moved into their own house at 578 Front Street on the banks of the Delaware River.³⁸ Luckily, Beelen made a recovery a few short weeks after his arrival, but if he had died, the mission and the family's new American life would have been over before it began.

Philadelphia in the 1780s must have been an unfamiliar sight to the Beelens. There was a simple charm compared to the elaborate surroundings they had left behind: the grand boulevards of Paris, the medieval streets of Brussels, or their ancestral Bellenhof manor house. This was certainly the impression for the younger son, Constantin Antoine, who had reportedly played with the dauphin of France during his father's tutelage with Mercy-d'Argenteau.³⁹ Young Constantin kept a record of his impressions in his sketchbook.⁴⁰ The local flora and wildlife surrounding his new rustic homestead piqued his interest as did the figure of George Washington whose likeness he also sketched.⁴¹ Appearance was everything for the family. Beelen made good use of his title in all correspondence and kept his private life in the same vein. He noted in a letter to his relatives back home that his living room was the only one in Philadelphia to be covered in damask wallpaper.⁴²



FIGURE 13. Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Bertholff, the first official representative of the Habsburg Monarchy in the United States of America

Before long, Beelen got to work. On September 24, 1783, he met with Ralph Izard, the former envoy to Tuscany. Beelen and Izard had a mutual acquaintance in common, the Tuscan representative Francesco Favi, who had prepped Izard ahead of his Tuscan mission and had now supplied Beelen with his letter of introduction. That evening, Izard presented Beelen at a dinner party in the home of Robert Morris, an important Philadelphian merchant and the superintendent of finance in the United States. The French ambassador, Anne-César de la Luzerne also attended. In Philadelphia, just as in Vienna, the dinner table was an important site of conversation and connection, but this could also be an embarrassing site for hierarchy. During the meal, Morris confronted Beelen with a difficult question: what exactly was his role in the United States? Not wanting to tread on the toes of la Luzerne, an official ambassador, Beelen stuck to Kaunitz's prescribed line that he was a trade commissioner seeking to encourage commerce with the Habsburg Monarchy.⁴³ The resulting conversation went well enough for Beelen to have something to write home about. The following day he began the first of his numerous reports.

Meanwhile, antagonisms continued over Beelen's mission in Vienna. The Viennese press took a sceptical view. The *Wiener Blättchen* newspaper referred pointedly to Beelen as the "Niederlander" ("the Dutchman") and remarked how he was "without any accreditation" in America.⁴⁴ Earlier in the month, the *Wienerisches*

Diarium had noted a major problem for Beelen's mission: the American Congress was not in the city.⁴⁵ One of the fundamentals of Beelen's mission was to enable a treaty of commerce between the two countries and report on American legislative activities. However, in the months before Beelen's arrival, a band of militiamen had gathered in protest and marched on Philadelphia because the almost-bankrupted government had not honoured their service payments. The event became known as the "Philadelphia Mutiny" and caused congressmen to flee first to Princeton, New Jersey and later to Annapolis, Maryland.⁴⁶ Congress became an itinerant assembly moving between cities and would not meet again in Philadelphia until the constitutional convention was organised four years later in 1787.

Throughout the turmoil of the early republic's politics, Beelen did his utmost to follow congressional events, however. By October 1783 he compiled the first list of congressional acts related to commerce for his superiors in Brussels. Beelen also collected regional ordinances from state assemblies. These changes in regulations were of great importance in order to inform Habsburg merchants of fluctuations in American prices or tariffs.⁴⁷ In the early years of Beelen's mission, the port of Charleston became a particular concern where merchants enjoyed a booming trade fuelled by the postwar reconstruction of plantations. Importation of necessary agricultural equipment was a particular object of interest. Merchants in Ostend responded quickly to Beelen's advice, sending the *Jacoba et Isabella* in mid-1784. Beelen wrote favourably of this venture and recommended further voyages from Ostend and Trieste.⁴⁸

Beelen's mission reflected the need for rapid responses to changing economic situations. In South Carolina, French merchants from the Antilles created a financial bubble by using illicit tactics to undercut foreign merchants in the plantation reconstruction business.⁴⁹ As a result, they oversaturated the market, depressed export prices, and threatened the economy. Charleston officials responded with ordinances restricting imports, which naturally harmed the opportunity for Habsburg trade with the southern states. Concerned for potential trade, Beelen received further instructions to provide solutions for the Charleston ordinance. Although Beelen met with Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay whilst in New York to protest on behalf of the Ostend trading companies, he reported that nothing more could be done.⁵⁰ By mid-1785, Beelen reported similar initiatives by the state legislatures in Massachusetts and North Carolina and called strongly on the emperor to secure a treaty of commerce to avoid any further exclusion from American trade.⁵¹ American economic volatility represented a continual concern for Beelen and his superiors. Beelen voiced concerns over paper money

and its susceptibility to counterfeiting, and the Brussels administration looked sceptically at the health of American finances as a result.⁵² In expressing unease over the circulation of paper money, the Habsburgs were no different from other European observers who fretted over the instability of paper notes compared to hard currency. Saddled with debt after the War of American Independence, state legislatures resorted to raising money by fiat through the issuing of printed notes and raising loans. Americans were aware of the negative connotations and the effect on foreign relations, but the problem persisted until the ratification of the Constitution and the consolidation state debts into a national deficit.⁵³ Yet Habsburg officials were willing to overlook these concerns as long as reasonable returns could be made on trade with the United States. Beelen's reports were an influential factor in deciding on the probability of those returns.

Through his friendship with Morris, Beelen gained privileged knowledge on the commercial state of the union, but in 1784 Congress abolished Morris's position as superintendent of finances. Beelen wrote to Brussels dismayed that three financiers in New York, whom he did not know, were now in charge.⁵⁴ Yet Beelen did befriend several congressional presidents including Richard Henry Lee and Elias Boudinot.⁵⁵ Beelen's reputation spread quickly, thanks in part to Morris's letter of endorsement to Congress. In November 1784, Henry Lee stopped in Philadelphia where Beelen "took the opportunity to spread promotions for the Ostend merchants."⁵⁶ One of the earliest instances of Beelen's renown came from Commodore John Paul Jones who visited Beelen before he departed for Paris and requested letters of recommendation to the emperor since he intended to travel to Vienna.⁵⁷ Such instances reveal how Beelen's reception by Americans in Philadelphia was more on par with the reception of an official representative rather than just a mere "commercial advisor." In other words, Americans interpreted Beelen's mission as a *de facto* form of representation despite his best intentions (and instructions) to act in a non-diplomatic manner.

Important friends mattered, but Beelen also ventured to the new congressional location in New York City in September 1785 in order to monitor the situation more closely. Beelen brought along his eldest son. It was at this point the father-and-son duo met with the leaders of the Oneida, the Native American nation who travelled there to petition Congress about encroachments on their lands.⁵⁸ Beelen described the opportunity as "too favourable to let it escape" and arranged the meeting under "the pretence of a foreign traveller" wishing to learn more about the Oneida.⁵⁹ His true motive, however, aimed at finding new avenues of trade between the Native Americans and the Habsburg Monarchy. In

his reports afterwards, he propositioned the emperor continually about opening direct trade with the Oneida. One of his main arguments stemmed from their importance in the fur trade:

The fact that peace between the many different and numerous wild nations has occurred, seems worthy of our attention, given the amount of interest in furs of Your August Monarch's subjects in several of Your kingdoms and Hereditary States [and because] they will soon be able to get the best price from our direct navigation from Trieste.⁶⁰

Beelen's suggestion might seem fanciful, but it was entirely serious and entirely in accordance with his instructions to find new commercial opportunities. Beelen argued for the suitability and viability of such a trade. In his meeting with the four Oneida gentlemen, he learned what products might be exchanged with them "and neighbouring friends" for furs, vermilion, and jewellery. Beelen left the meeting inspired but "with still many questions to ask."⁶¹

Beelen maintained his fascination for direct trade between the Habsburg Monarchy and Native American nations. His frequent reports featured details about Indigenous developments and economic situations as a result. Beelen monitored and described, for instance, the American commercial endeavours with the Chippewa, Delaware, Ottawa, and Wyandotte Nations which culminated in the Treaty of Fort MacIntosh in 1785.⁶² In a private letter to Count Belgiojoso, the new minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, he stressed the peace between the formerly warring nations.⁶³ He later expanded this report to include a full summary of the political alliances between the Mohawks and Cohnawaghans which "brought peace to the Great Lakes Region" and bode well for future trade.⁶⁴ And to drive home the point, Beelen studied their treaties with the British and argued that these could serve as a model, should the emperor be willing to agree to it. In doing so, Native American trade appeared to be a consequential advantage for the Habsburgs based on its one official's interaction with the United States.

In addition to his observations of Native American nations, Beelen also maintained a strict surveillance of other European nations' political interactions with the United States. Beelen listed all foreign consuls who resided in the United States by the end of 1784 and informed his superiors each time a significant development occurred.⁶⁵ One of his earliest reports that year detailed Thieriot and the Saxon project for a commercial treaty with the United States.⁶⁶ In November, he followed the arrival of Antoine René Charles Mathurin, comte de Laforêt as the French Consul in Charleston and covered the nomination of John Temple as the British Consul General.⁶⁷ In September 1785, Beelen filed a lengthy

TABLE 4. Distribution of Topics in Baron de Beelen-Bertholff's Reports, 1784-1789

Year	Date	Topics	Pages	Trade	Politics	Foreign	Misc.
1784	25 Apr.	19	96	13	4	0	2
	12 Aug.	12	83	7	3	2	0
	22 Sep.	11	77	6	0	3	2
	14 Nov.	11	74	4	2	5	0
	13 Dec.	9	37	4	1	3	1
	Total		62	367	34	10	13
1785	21 Mar.	17	175	11	1	3	2
	17 Jun.	40	135	15	8	15	2
	10 Sep.	17	152	9	4	4	0
	20 Oct.	3	20	2	0	0	1
	Total		77	482	37	13	22
1786	25 Feb.	24	166	15	3	4	2
	19 Jun.	25	141	16	3	5	1
	12 Sep.	16	100	6	1	6	3
	22 Dec.	15	88	4	4	6	1
	Total		80	495	41	11	21
1787	20 Mar.	17	70	8	4	0	5
	24 May	16	81	7	5	2	2
	28 Jul.	12	82	7	2	1	2
	7 Nov.	11	35	9	1	1	0
	Total		56	268	31	12	4

(Cont.)

Year	Date	Topics	Pages	Trade	Politics	Foreign	Misc
1788	22 Mar.	13	81	4	3	3	3
	31 May	13	64	7	2	3	1
	28 Sep.	12	35	8	1	3	0
	27 Dec.	13	56	4	3	4	2
	Total	51	236	23	9	13	6
1789	27 Mar.	12	28	6	4	2	0
	22 Jun.	11	55	4	3	2	2
	Total	23	83	10	7	4	2
Grand Total	349	1,564	176	62	77	34	

SOURCE: HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, K. 182b, K. 182c, K. 182d, and K. 182e.

memo on the “public character” of Don Diego de Gardoqui, who became the first Spanish envoy to the United States.⁶⁸ Beelen even monitored Spanish policies within South America.⁶⁹ In 1786, he provided Vienna with information regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce between Prussia and the United States, which (as discussed in the next chapter) had profound consequences for US-Habsburg relations.⁷⁰ Beelen also monitored European trade with the individual states. He scoured almanacs, newspapers, and local advertisements for lists of ships in major American ports and collated these into his quarterly reports. At first, he only covered Philadelphia, but he rapidly began to monitor most major ports such as Baltimore, New York, and Charleston but also smaller hubs like New London, Connecticut, and Hampton, Virginia.⁷¹ Beelen’s exhaustive efforts to catalogue maritime trade in America undoubtedly made his reports one of the most insightful views into early American economic life for ministers and merchants in the Habsburg lands.

Beelen’s reports resulted from the diligence of a man who did the job of the entire consular system which had been envisaged in Brussels in 1782. He sent detailed information drawn from first-hand inquiries, carefully curated material, and painstakingly summarised these details into comprehensive memoranda. Although many other European nations established consular and diplomatic relations with the United States during this period, their correspondences do

not appear to match the quality and quantity of Beelen's reports. Neither the British consul John Temple nor the Swedish representatives supplied their respective courts with more information than Beelen.⁷² As a result, Beelen's mission ensured that the Habsburg Monarchy was among the most well-informed of the European powers on the political, domestic, international, and economic developments of the early United States. It might be hard to imagine the breadth and depth of Beelen's efforts, but table 4 above shows a breakdown of Beelen's reports from the United States.

It is clear that Beelen maintained a high level of commitment and professionalism in his role in the United States. He sent 1,564 pages back to Europe during his mission. Half related to trade, in accordance with his main role as a commercial advisor, but the second most important topic of discussion regarded the actions of other foreign representatives, reflecting Beelen's political purpose as well. Beelen's reports usually travelled via Le Havre and Bordeaux to Mercy-d'Argenteau who forwarded them to Brussels. This communication route was slow. On average, Beelen's reports took about four months to arrive. On a few occasions, Beelen used ships going directly to Ostend or asked trustworthy captains sailing to London to pass reports to the Habsburg embassy there.⁷³ In 1784, he sent five bundles back to the Austrian Netherlands, but from then on settled into the regular rhythm of one large quarterly report. Although Viennese ministers were privy to these reports, not all arrived at the State Chancellery—early reports from 1783 are still missing from the Viennese archive as a result.⁷⁴ Beelen had only one direct interaction with Kaunitz, concerning Triestine competition with French and Swedish merchants.⁷⁵ For the entirety of the mission, Beelen received orders directly from Belgiojoso in Brussels and addressed reports to him.

In Brussels, Beelen's reports were treated with great interest and seriousness. During the planning stage for the mission, several members of the Committee for Finances had suggested founding a completely new committee which would compile the results of Beelen's reports and see to their implementation.⁷⁶ Henri Deplancq, the high-ranking bureaucrat and director of the Board of Customs, received the task of combing through Beelen's recommendations.⁷⁷ From Deplancq and Belgiojoso in Brussels, Beelen's reports were disseminated across the Habsburg lands. In the Austrian Netherlands, the administration shared Beelen's suggestions with local industrialists such as the owners of a fabric factory in Tournai who received a copy of Beelen's report on “the use of carpets in North America.”⁷⁸ Likewise, Kaunitz forwarded relevant duplicates to the Aulic Chamber as well as to governors in Trieste and Fiume, who shared these amongst local merchants.⁷⁹ Indeed, Beelen followed his instructions to send

reports concerning the whole geographic spread of mercantile interests for the emperor's subjects. In fact, from 1783 to 1786 the majority of his reports dealt specifically with the commerce of Habsburg lands outside the Austrian Netherlands.⁸⁰ Several reports detailed prospects for Hungarian or Tuscan trade in the United States.⁸¹ Beelen also responded to requests from the hereditary lands, such as Governor Pál Almásy von Zsadány's request for tobacco seeds in Fiume. Beelen, in this regard, took seriously his role as representing all imperial subjects. He even supported efforts fostering cooperation between the regions of the Habsburg Monarchy. For instance, when it became clear iron goods were extremely profitable in American markets, Beelen informed Belgiojoso that it would be prudent for manufacturers in Namur to contact merchants in Trieste to learn from their experiences and not to compete against one another.⁸²

Beelen jealously guarded his position as the official representative of all Habsburg subjects, and nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in his interactions with the Simpson-Wouters mission from Trieste. When *La Capricieuse* arrived in late 1783, Simpson called on Beelen in Philadelphia. Both men seemed threatened by each other's presence and mission. Simpson, although courteous, clearly saw Beelen's presence as an obtrusion from the Brussels administration. During his stay in Philadelphia over the harsh winter of 1783, George Simpson attempted to build his own connections outside of Beelen's circle, through his contact with the firm *Bache & Shee*. In a subsequent report to Belgiojoso, Beelen complained that Simpson had been so active that local merchants confused him for the representative from Trieste. The final straw came when the *Pennsylvania Gazette* also confused the pair on two occasions, and Beelen requested confirmation that he was still the only legitimate imperial representative.⁸³ It was a telling symptom of the compositional nature of the Habsburg Monarchy playing out in North America. Although plagued by difficulties arising from the internal tensions between different regions of the Habsburg Monarchy, Beelen's mission fulfilled its brief. Beelen acted as the diligent observer for Habsburg officials in North America. His mission represented the concerted effort to scout out American trading possibilities and to secure the ties already existing between the Habsburg lands and the sovereign United States of America.

Rival Imperial Missions

Beelen faced a more serious challenge to his authority from subsequent individuals who acted as additional representatives for trade between the Habsburg Monarchy in the United States. One of them disembarked from *La Capricieuse*.

Francesco Taddeo Reyer represented various merchants in Trieste but predominantly worked as the main contact for the Austrian-American Trading Company (see chapter 7). When Simpson and Captain Wouters left for Trieste, Reyer acted as their spokesman. His primary preoccupation concerned the distribution of goods through *Bache & Shee* and helping to expand this enterprise with their new associate Charles Lennox in Baltimore. Reyer spent several years in Philadelphia as their agent.⁸⁴ Upon his return to Trieste in 1786, Reyer kept in touch with his American colleagues who became instrumental for his later career. In 1788, Reyer founded a new firm to trade in the West Indies, which made him one of the major traders in Trieste. He also invested in a cane sugar manufacturing business near Wiener Neustadt and relied upon his American associates to act as blockade runners during the Napoleonic Wars, when he shipped goods from the United States and Britain to Eastern and Central Europe. He subsequently established company branches in London, Spain, the United States, and the Far East by sending family members to act as his informers and representatives. The house of *Reyer & Schlick* developed into one of the largest importers of colonial goods for Habsburg markets, acquiring sugar, coffee, cotton, rum, and spices.⁸⁵ In the 1830s, Reyer became the first president of the Austrian Lloyd.⁸⁶ If it were not for Reyer's formative experiences in the United States, the Austrian Lloyd would not have developed into such a successful worldwide enterprise.

Reyer's departure from Philadelphia wrought great difficulties for the merchants of the Austrian-American Trading Company and testifies to the independence Reyer held from Beelen. In 1787, now without their self-appointed representative, two merchants, Antonio Righettini and Giacomo Serera, wrote to Beelen on behalf of the company since they had not heard from *Bache & Shee* for over six months. "The great distance does not serve them an excuse for their silence," they complained, "since it is our opinion that a more exact correspondence is required than if we were situated closer to each other."⁸⁷ The rest of the letter conveyed the seriousness of the situation. *Bache & Shee* had failed to pay their share of the latest sales. Distressed, Righettini and Serera empowered Beelen "for this purpose, as for any other . . . [with] full power and declare that all steps taken by you will be recognised and well received by us."⁸⁸ This promotion for Beelen reflects how the merchants of the Austrian-American Trading Company had not seen Beelen as their representative beforehand.

A further challenge to Beelen's authority in the United States came from another representative. Not content with Beelen as sole representative, Kaunitz supported the parallel mission of the wealthy Austrian warehouser and

commercial advisor to the emperor in Vienna, Joseph Paul von Weinbrenner.⁸⁹ Weinbrenner was eager to establish his own trading ties with the United States, and he tried to secure Franklin's help in creating a commercial presence in America. In February 1783, he informed Franklin that he and others in Vienna desired to trade freely with American merchants who are "happy and abundant" with goods like cotton and tobacco.⁹⁰ Weinbrenner needed solid information, however. He asked Franklin for a list of suitable mercantile houses in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York that would entertain his business. Franklin ignored this request, as he did so many other merchant pleas, but Weinbrenner tried again a few months later.

In this second attempt, Kaunitz supported Weinbrenner by enlisting the help of Jan Ingenhousz, the great American partisan in Vienna who had Franklin's ear. Kaunitz instructed him to pass on Weinbrenner's message again and Ingenhousz did as ordered, explaining to Franklin how he was to "press [you] for the favour of an answer."⁹¹ This time Franklin responded, but not with the merchant list the trio hoped for in Vienna. Instead, Franklin insisted his absence from America "for these last twenty-five years" had robbed him of all useful acquaintances.⁹² By the time Franklin's reply arrived in June, Weinbrenner had selected the Bohemian-born Joseph Donath, a fellow freemason, to be his agent in America.⁹³ Donath had sufficient experience from his work in one of Vienna's mercantile houses.⁹⁴ Before the end of the month, the Ingenhousz-Weinbrenner team again pressed Franklin, this time for letters of recommendation for this new commercial agent, who, they informed him, "will set out in a few weeks for Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, where he will spend two years."⁹⁵ Donath duly travelled to Hamburg where he departed on August 15 for Philadelphia, just two weeks after Beelen had commenced his trip. He arrived carrying samples of Weinbrenner's products of shoes, hats, fabrics, and Bohemian glassware, which he intended to sell or trade for furs. He set up a shop on a corner of Chestnut Street and reported back on the sales directly to Weinbrenner and Kaunitz in Vienna.

Beelen and Donath failed to strike an amicable chord. The two men met in person sometime before April 1784 and although Beelen described him as an "intelligent man," he was dismayed that Donath had not registered with him upon arrival.⁹⁶ Beelen extracted the details of Donath's mission, which he then reported to his superiors in Brussels. Donath's instructions, Beelen noted, stipulated he should explore the fur markets of North America and try to establish a connection directly to these markets for the Bohemian lands. Beelen had little faith that he would succeed, given Donath's paltry salary and harsh winter, which prevented any venture until the summer months. "For these reasons," he

concluded, "this is a lost year, and Mr. Weinbrenner would have been wiser to send his emissary three months sooner."⁹⁷ Beelen gave Donath little encouragement whatsoever.

Donath, by contrast, cooperated well since he offered Beelen the use of his prospectus of fabrics. Beelen secured samples, which he passed along to Belgiojoso, noting how "our Flemish fabric merchants might find them useful when deciding their cargoes for America."⁹⁸ Beelen monitored Donath's activities throughout the successive months. In one report, he noted how Donath's products performed well and Weinbrenner made a thirty percent profit on Bohemian fabrics, but remarked this was lower than the forty percent margin attained by the Bohemian and Silesian drapes brought over on *La Capricieuse*.⁹⁹ The pair met again where Donath explained his urgent need to procure furs. Beelen delighted in demonstrating his advanced knowledge over Donath. He informed Brussels how he had to explain that the cheapest but highest quality furs were to be found in upstate New York. This scheme was, in other words, Beelen's idea to trade with the Oneida. Donath subsequently travelled several times along the line the Oneida chief had drawn for Beelen's son, through New York to Albany and Schenectady. Donath planned future ventures to Fort Pitt and Fort Detroit in search of suitably inexpensive fur producers amongst the Native Americans, but his time was up as Weinbrenner's original commission expired in 1785.

Donath chose to remain in the United States, however. He continued life as a merchant in Philadelphia, eventually forming his own business as *Donath & Co.*, which acted as a conduit for Habsburg goods. In October 1786, Donath recognised his indebtedness to Franklin by presenting him with a case of Hungarian wines.¹⁰⁰ In time, Donath's Bohemian wife Rosalia joined him in Philadelphia where they raised three children as Donath expanded his commercial empire.¹⁰¹ At Spring Mill on the Schuylkill River, he acquired several acres of land and dabbled for a while in apiary.¹⁰² He traded extensively but above all handled wares from Central Europe.¹⁰³ Though he maintained commercial ties in the Habsburg lands, his intellectual world shifted firmly towards the American republic. In a series of letters to his friend František Antonín Steinský—who had befriended Franklin in 1780—Donath pondered the difference between his former and adopted homelands. He called out Steinský, somewhat playfully, as being complicit in an intolerable regime. "As a public professor," he declared, "it is your duty to keep out every ray of light and darken even darkness itself." By contrast, Donath enjoyed "the birth right of every American," namely freedom.¹⁰⁴ Donath's choice to remain and continue his new life in the United States would not be the last time a Habsburg national made this decision.

The representative missions of Reyer and Donath were a continuation of private firms establishing their own contacts in the United States. Firms in Tuscany and Ostend had utilised their own partners and employees as commercial representatives in the United States; Reyer and Donath's missions, however, were more direct challenges to the imperial authority of Beelen. The directors of the Austrian-American Trading Company preferred Reyer's handling of their business affairs and only turned to Beelen once he returned whereas Donath's presence represented a direct rebuke to Beelen's position. Weinbrenner's posting of Donath to Philadelphia with Kaunitz's support reflected the perceived fears of Beelen's suitability to serve the interests of all of the Habsburg lands equally and not just the Austrian Netherlands. These fears were of course unwarranted and Beelen demonstrated a clear desire to improve the commerce of all the emperor's territories, but the existence of these concerns in 1783 had resulted in two rival private representatives who sought to improve trade for their respective employers above all else.

The Demise of the Beelen-Bertholff Mission

In 1787, Beelen's tenure as the official commercial advisor in the United States came up for review since his instructions stipulated a five-year term. On February 29, 1787, Henri de Crumpipen, Vice-President of the Privy Council instructed Count Balthazar de Proli, the brother of Charles André Melchior de Proli who interceded for Belletti's *La Capricieuse* expedition in 1783, to compile a summary report on Beelen's mission within a year. Initially, the plans from 1782 called for a renewal or replacement to be made, but in light of the deteriorating relationship Proli's report would influence whether the mission would continue at all. One year later, Proli submitted his initial findings followed by a more detailed report in April 1788.¹⁰⁵ The first prognosis seemed favourable: Beelen had dutifully fulfilled his office and supplied Brussels with a steady and valuable stream of information. Proli, however, was critical. Although Beelen's diligence and assessments had their value, the results did not justify the enormous costs of the mission especially in light of collapsing trade between the Habsburg lands and North America.¹⁰⁶ "It is certain the stay of Mr Beelen in this distant country has never produced any advantage proportionate to the expense which it causes," he argued, and he was uncertain whether a treaty of commerce could now change anything.¹⁰⁷ Proli drove home this fact with a table enumerating the origins of all the ships entering American ports according to Beelen's reports.¹⁰⁸ "Out of

1,076 foreign vessels," Proli declared, "only seventeen of His Majesty's ships have arrived there in four years."¹⁰⁹ The futility seemed clear.

When Beelen's half-brother Maximilien de Beelen visited Vienna in 1787, he learned that the Brussels administration contemplated recalling Beelen and reappointing him to a lower position. Maximilien failed to disclose his conversation directly to Beelen but did mention it to his son-in-law Charles François Maurice de Janti who immediately warned Beelen. As a result, or perhaps because his commission neared its projected end, Beelen began to stress the state of his poor health in the covering letters of his reports. In September 1788, Beelen explained, "I have, Sir, the misfortune of not being able by fault of ill-health to produce for Your Excellency a more extensive and refined work under my usual zeal" and divulged news of a surgery he had undergone to alleviate a tumour "which compresses my stomach and must be cleared."¹¹⁰ Beelen's strategy was to appear too sick to once again cross the Atlantic.

In June 1790, a final report ended Beelen's mission. The "unfortunate Beelen" had been "abandoned" without payment or instructions since the official end of his mission in 1787, though his reports continued until the last was sent on June 22, 1789. In spite of his diligence and the copious information provided to the Habsburg administration, US-Habsburg trade by the close of the decade was negligible. Beelen's mission was "therefore without object" and the recommended policy became a reliance on merchants to "make their own arrangements with the United States."¹¹¹ The need for representation had ended. On July 30, 1790, Brussels notified Beelen of his mission's termination. He was commended for "the ardour and intelligence shown" in his mission, but it was over and he must prepare to return home. Beelen's mission represented in many ways the pinnacle of the Habsburg determination to establish a commercial footing in North America during the 1780s. The demise of the mission ensured Beelen remained the sole official Habsburg representative to the United States in the eighteenth century.

In February 1791, Beelen received his contractual termination but he protested any journey to the Austrian Netherlands, citing his ill-health and debts which he still owed in America.¹¹² By 1792, he had won the fight for his future. After Joseph II's death in 1790, his brother Pietro Leopoldo succeeded him briefly as Leopold II before his own sudden demise led to his son becoming emperor in July 1792. The new Emperor Francis II granted Beelen a state pension and the freedom to choose whether or not to return. Beelen had good reason to forsake Europe. Life in the United States had been a glorious foundation

for the Beelen family. Confirming the suspicions of some in Brussels, Beelen had invested in American land speculation.¹¹³ He bought and developed a large plot of land in Pennsylvania straddling Chester and Lancaster counties where he constructed several sawmills and established a botanical garden. The main house became known by locals as “the castle” on account of its grandeur and style.¹¹⁴ In addition to this estate, Beelen owned ten land tracts in Philadelphia County, a vast 2,100 acres in Western Pennsylvania, and a further 2,000 acres each along the Scioto River in Ohio and the Green River in Kentucky. In the 1790 census his “castle” property listed thirty-four occupants alone. The spending spree also included a two-hundred-and-fifty-dollar property in Hellam, Pennsylvania which Beelen purchased in February 1798. The Beelens even helped finance the building of a local Catholic church. In the late-1790s, the Beelens relocated to another lavish property in Bottstown, West Manchester—then on the edge of York Town in York County, Pennsylvania—a red brick house surrounded by groves of Lombardy poplar trees. The house no longer stands, but along South Forrest Road in the old Bottstown section of nowadays York, Pennsylvania, some of these trees still grow.¹¹⁵ Around that time, Lewis Miller, a local folk artist, witnessed the Beelens driving in their “fine phaeton” coach to Sunday mass at Conewago Chapel. He later sketched the impressive sight from memory.¹¹⁶ On his estates, Beelen acquired many indentured servants. His household of thirty-four individuals likely counted many whom he owned in this fashion. In March 1795, for example, Beelen leased one of his servants, Amos Michael, to another local landowner for \$19.10s.¹¹⁷ His final estate accounts of 1805–1806 listed his fortune at \$10,471.¹¹⁸ All this proves to an undeniable extent that the Beelens lived a prosperous lifestyle after the termination of his mission.

Wealth did not shield the Beelens from disease. In summer 1804, yellow fever swept the United States and the Beelen family fell sick. On September 11, the baroness died before her son Francis, who lived in faraway Millerstown, arrived on horseback despite suffering from the disease himself. Though Francis missed his mother’s last moments, he witnessed the agonising decline of his father over the next six months. On the morning of April 5, 1805, Frederick Eugene de Beelen died of kidney failure brought on by the fever. His body was taken to Conewago Chapel immediately and left outside for fear of contamination. That evening, the parish priest arranged for two enslaved people to bury the body and erect a marble slab over the gravesite.¹¹⁹ It was enslaved people who interred the first representative of the Habsburg Monarchy to the United States. When Beelen died, the Habsburgs had no official representation in the United States. It took thirty-three years until another baron, Wenzel Philipp de Mareschal,

presented his credentials in October 1838 that the Habsburgs finally had full representation in the United States.¹²⁰

Conclusion

Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Bertholff represented the Habsburg Monarchy as a commercial advisor in the United States for almost six years. He went beyond his brief to seek out new economic opportunities for the Habsburgs in North America. His detailed reports facilitated a direct exchange between Habsburg ministers and merchants with their counterparts and interested parties in the United States. His mission manifested the concentrated efforts to gain a foothold in the United States by the Habsburgs. Beelen, the sole state-appointed representative, was the vanguard of this new venture, and his diligent investigations fuelled the interests of others in the Habsburg Monarchy. It placed the Habsburg Monarchy on par with other European powers seeking to reap the benefits of commerce with a new sovereign American republic. Although those benefits proved to be elusive and ultimately marginal, the lure of expectation drew Habsburg ministers to take bold steps and considerable expense in establishing a permanent mission in the Americas for the first time.

Beelen's responses to the Simpson and Donath infringements illustrate the tensions that haunted the Habsburg initiatives in the United States. It was a dynamic also at work between Brussels and Vienna. It is telling of not only the importance of American commerce but also the difficulties in dealing with an emerging nation. Habsburg efforts to secure part of American trade involved both state-led and privately initiated endeavours. Merchants in Trieste as well as industrialists in Vienna like Weinbrenner launched their own crusade to secure transatlantic trade with the United States. From Ostend to Trieste, Namur to Styria, Brussels to Fiume, there was an insurmountable wave of interest in the United States developing in the mercantile and political classes within the Habsburg Monarchy. This broad economic interest had large repercussions for the development of the relationship between the new United States and the Habsburg Monarchy. Up until now, economics had been the driver, but the government in Vienna felt compelled to take the lead. A treaty of commerce had to be achieved.

“A Trifling Personage”

Thomas Jefferson and the Second Struggle for Recognition between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America, 1785–1786

ON MARCH 30, 1826, less than a hundred days before his death, Thomas Jefferson wrote his last letter to then President of the United States John Quincy Adams. Adams, as he so often did, had sought advice from Jefferson; this time, he had inquired about the elder statesman's role as a diplomat in Europe and procuring commercial treaties with the European powers in the 1780s.¹ Jefferson replied with an extensive summary of the international situation then facing the new republic. In a moment of openness with his New England colleague, Jefferson made a curious admission about the Habsburg Monarchy. “Austria,” he noted, “became desirous of a treaty with us, and her Ambassador pressed it often on me, but our commerce with her being no object, I evaded his repeated invitations.”² Jefferson wrote no more on the subject. Yet both his actions and attitudes towards the Habsburg Monarchy echo louder than these elusive words and illuminate the fatal struggle in the relationship between the new United States and the Habsburg Monarchy; one in which Jefferson played the most decisive, but destructive of roles.

Jefferson is widely acknowledged as a central figure in the establishment of the United States of America, perhaps even *the* central figure for some, as he was the primary author of the Declaration of American Independence and an enigmatic emblem for the new nation proclaiming freedom whilst also enslaving thousands. But without doubt, Jefferson was the pivotal figure in determining American relations with the Habsburg Monarchy.³ It was largely in his hands that the issue fell during his time serving as the United States' minister plenipotentiary in France. Yet in the popular mind, his flirtations with Maria Cosway seem all too often his only discernible activity in Paris.⁴

That said, as crucial a figure as Jefferson was for the shape that US-Habsburg relations ultimately took, he was not the only factor. Great difficulties lay in navigating diplomatic norms between an entirely new nation on the one hand and states of the *ancien régime* on the other; one endowed with a cohort of inexperienced diplomats up against life-long aristocratic politicians. These two worlds collided on Jefferson's watch in the mid-1780s. For centuries, Europe had acclimated to the New World, but it had always been a subservient relationship. Now, largely under Jefferson's management, the Old World had to accept a new-world member as an equal. None found this process more treacherous than the Habsburgs, but they trod this path diligently, inveigled by visions of economic enhancement.

Attempts Towards a Commercial Treaty

Throughout the 1780s, Joseph II's foreign policy oscillated between half-realised plans. First was his renunciation of the project to trade away the territory of the Austrian Netherlands for the Bavarian lands, which came to naught. Second, he attempted to reopen the River Scheldt to commerce—which had been denied by international fiat since the late sixteenth century, crippling Antwerp's commerce—despite the tensions it created with the Dutch Republic. Third, a new alliance with Russia in 1781 brought with it unfinished schemes for Joseph, such as the so-called "Greek Project" of Catherine II, which would carve up Ottoman territory in the Balkans and restore the Byzantine Empire under her grandson. The period was a turbulent shifting between Joseph's expansive reform agenda at home and semi-realised plans abroad, which Joseph's biographer Derek Beales acknowledges was "contemptible in its manner as in its achievement."⁵ One goal remained constant, however. The aim of securing American trade was a continual focus. In February 1783, he outlined his desire to shore up transatlantic commerce with the United States and noted how American trade "will be of the greatest importance for the future."⁶ The early months of 1783 witnessed the turnaround in US-Habsburg relations when the Habsburgs committed to sounding out ties with the United States.

The only problem, however, was the Habsburgs could not be seen to initiate contact with the Americans. For one thing, the cessation of hostilities had not yet been converted into an internationally ratified treaty. The Treaty of Paris was signed in September 1783 and ratified by the Americans in January and the British in April 1784 during which time European powers scrambled to secure a share of commerce with the new sovereign American state. International legal

norms of European states had emerged earlier in the century as more concrete codifications of the laws of war and nations.⁷ In this line of thinking, the American entry into the European international system had to follow the established doctrines of international law and relations. Intervention in another state's affairs—in this case, in Britain's affairs via the recognition of the United States by approaching them for a commercial treaty—broke the accepted norms of the inherent rights of nations and of the international *jus gentium*.⁸ There could be no formal conversations between the Americans and Habsburgs in early 1783 until a formal peace had been pronounced. Moreover, the preeminence of the Habsburg dynasty as elected rulers of the Holy Roman Empire caused further problems. The conventional diplomatic order of preference among European powers dictated that the Holy Roman Empire—and by extension, Joseph II—traditionally took precedence before all other Christian nations and was only below the Roman papacy in order of preference as a universalist and imperial title.⁹ In other words, the Habsburgs as an imperial dignity took precedence over the new American state and were the higher power. Such ranks and deference mattered to the Habsburg dynasty, especially in dealings with other imperial dignities such as Russia, Persia, and later, Napoleonic France, although these norms were not properly established until the early nineteenth century.¹⁰ They, therefore, could not be seen to interact with a lesser power—especially former “rebels.” No matter how much they desired American commerce, the Americans had to be seen to make the first offer.

Americans were aware of this obstacle. Back in 1779, John Adams had explained to members of Congress how international concerns meant Joseph “will be one of the last Powers to acknowledge our Independence.”¹¹ In April 1783, he renewed his warning. “The Emperor has an inclination to treat with us,” he informed his friends at home, “but the House of Austria never makes the first Advances.”¹² Yet Congress neglected to act and initiate the first step by the early months of 1783. With pressure mounting from the fears of losing the lucrative commerce gained during the war, the imperial ambassador in France, Count Mercy-d'Argenteau, had no option but to find a discreet and indirect channel with the Americans and try to provoke an offer to negotiate.

In early 1783, Mercy-d'Argenteau attempted to broker these indirect channels. He first sought communication through the Tuscan representative in Paris, Francesco Favi, and the Tuscan legation. Favi acted as the representative for the viceroys of the Austrian Netherlands and consul for the Republic of Ragusa.¹³ These three roles gave Favi the flexibility to contact the Americans, unlike Mercy-d'Argenteau. On his insistence, Favi cultivated a close friendship with Benjamin Franklin. The



FIGURE 14. Portrait of the imperial ambassador to France, Count Florimond Claude Mercy-d'Argenteau by an unknown artist.

link provided much information. Even Jan Ingenhousz was surprised to learn from Favi's reports, which passed from Tuscany to Vienna, that Franklin was determined to make a southern tour of Europe and stop in Vienna before his final departure back to the United States.¹⁴ Three of Favi's reports from January and February detailed the Americans' European treaty efforts.¹⁵ Through Favi, Mercy-d'Argenteau created the backchannel which enabled him to correspond with the Americans without breaking diplomatic norms.

Mercy-d'Argenteau's headache, however, was that Franklin as minister to France and Adams as minister to the Dutch Republic had no powers to deal with the Holy Roman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy. His second option was more convoluted but aimed at securing a connection with someone who he believed to be the empowered minister: Francis Dana. Congress had appointed Dana to St. Petersburg with instructions to treat with the powers of the League of Armed Neutrality, which included the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁶ Mercy-d'Argenteau's counterpart there, Count Johann Ludwig von Cobenzl, would lead the negotiations whilst Adams advised Dana "immediately to communicate your Mission to the Minister of the Emperor" to ensure wheels started turning.¹⁷ Unknown to Adams and Mercy-d'Argenteau, however, Dana was not properly empowered. He declined Adams's request since he believed he had "no authority to make any commercial Treaty with the Emperor."¹⁸ Adams did not receive Dana's letter until May 1783, by

which time Mercy-d'Argenteau had reported gleefully to Starhemberg, "I regard the communication between these gentlemen and myself as open."¹⁹ Miscommunication, as always, seemed to threaten the relationship between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States.

Believing Mercy-d'Argenteau had a diplomatic channel, ministers across the Habsburg Monarchy worked towards an American treaty. In Brussels, Starhemberg and his councillors hosted William Lee.²⁰ On February 18—the same day Joseph issued his American priorities to Mercy-d'Argenteau—Lee wrote to Adams with the news, "I am advised from very good authority that the Emperor is desirous of entering into a treaty of commerce with the United States of America on terms of quality and mutual advantage." Lee explicitly warned Adams about the issue of the order of preference,

It is an invariable rule with the Court of Austria never to make Officially the first advances to any other Sovereign Power, therefore if Congress approve of a Commercial Treaty being enter'd into with his Majesty, it is necessary that the formal Proposition for that purpose shou'd be first made on the part of America.²¹

In Vienna, when Ingenhousz wrote to Franklin about the Weinbrenner mission, he also hinted that propositions about a commercial treaty from Vienna were imminent since it was the court's wish "to get a share of that source of riches, enjoyed formerly by England alone."²² Meanwhile, news broke across Europe of Beelen's mission to the United States. The overtures from the Habsburg side were hard to ignore.

When the Dana-Cobenzl route appeared closed, however, Adams did not admit to his mistake nor did he alert Mercy-d'Argenteau to the problem.²³ Mercy-d'Argenteau waited but broke his silence as negotiations for the Treaty of Paris concluded. On the evening of July 3, 1783, Adams sat at his desk drafting his latest report to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Robert R. Livingston, when his servant interrupted him with the arrival of a guest. Mercy-d'Argenteau came in response to Adams's previous unannounced visit whilst Mercy-d'Argenteau was out in order to thank the imperial ambassador for his role in the peace negotiations. The fact that Adams had called on him first gave Mercy-d'Argenteau the pretext of returning the favour as if the Americans had initiated contact—it had only taken from January to July. Mercy-d'Argenteau made it clear he visited in a personal rather than official capacity to form "an acquaintance" with Adams, which he hoped would be improved into "a more intimate one." The pair

quickly "fell into a Conversation of an hour" and ran "over a variety of Subjects" including migration to the United States and the "sober, frugal & industrious Character" of the inhabitants of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Mercy-d'Argenteau's friendliness surprised Adams since Mercy-d'Argenteau spoke frankly throughout.²⁴ One subject dominated the conversation: potential trade. Adams shared Mercy-d'Argenteau's ideas about its advantages and routes via Trieste, Fiume, and the Austrian Netherlands. Mercy-d'Argenteau's experience as an estate owner appealed to Adams's farmer side and impressed upon Adams the value in such a trade.²⁵ The amicable session ended with Adams's invitation to a future dinner. His newfound friendship bewildered him. He got back to his report, where the last line he had written talked of "a Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain."²⁶ Adams, however, turned his mind to securing one with the Habsburgs as well.

Ten days later, on July 13, 1783, Adams wrote the first of two memoranda on his ideas and impressions about such an opportunity with the Habsburgs. Adams had considered a commercial treaty seriously in the intervening days. He believed Joseph had clearly "caused to be intimated, several ways, his inclination to have a Treaty of Commerce with us" and he outlined five reasons why such a deal would be advantageous,

1. Because, as Emperor of Germany, and King of Bohemia & Hungary, he is at the head of one of the greatest Interests & most powerfull Connections in Europe [. . .]
2. Because the present Emperor is one of the greatest men of this Age [. . .]
3. Because that, if England should ever forget herself again so much as to attack us, she may not be so likely to obtain the Alliance or Assistance of this Power against us [. . .]
4. Because the Countries, belonging to this Power upon the Adriatic Sea, & in the Austrian Flanders, are no inconsiderable Sources of Commerce for America [. . .]
5. Because, altho' we have at present a pleasant & joyfull prospect of friendship & uninterrupted Alliance with the House of Bourbon, which I wish may never be obscured, yet this friendship & Alliance will be the more likely to continue unimpaired for our having the friendship & Commerce of the House of Austria: [. . .] we may find in the Alliance of Austria, England and Holland a resource against the Storm. Supernumerary Strings to our Bow & provisions against possible Inconveniences, however improbable, can do us no harm—²⁷

Adams made clear his reasoning for a commercial treaty with the Habsburgs in these lines. He recognised the true importance and influence of the Habsburgs among the European states. From the American perspective, Adams regarded the Habsburg Monarchy as one of the greatest powers in Europe. Joseph II's titles were not only reflections of his own power but were also markers of how deeply enmeshed the Habsburg Monarchy was within the European balance of power. Moreover, Adams saw him as a suitable and respectful ally whose character he admired. He was also convinced of the wealth of the Austrian Netherlands as a result of his repeated visits on his way back and forth to the Dutch Republic from Paris. His reasoning also demonstrated the effects of his friendly conversation with Mercy-d'Argenteau who evidently assured Adams of the value of commerce in places such as Trieste in Adriatic. Finally, a Habsburg alliance allayed Adams's own concerns about the French influence in American international strategy. He famously disagreed with the French foreign minister Vergennes during his time as a commissioner at the French court and, unlike some other American leaders (Jefferson in particular), he was not of a French persuasion or outlook.²⁸ Anticipating the emerging split between Federalists and Democratic Republicans in later years, Adams already voiced his concerns over the true intention of France and sought other European allies to counteract French influence over American diplomatic and commercial relations with other powers. In this effort, Adams considered the Habsburg Monarchy a worthy and appropriate partner.

Adams urged this connection to be made as soon as possible, even suggesting sending an American envoy to Vienna. He had clearly been taken in. Joseph was "one of the greatest men of this Age," Adams extolled.²⁹ In his second memorandum, sent the following day, Adams continued his praise. "The Emperor is vastly powerful" and, Adams predicted, would soon expand his dominion into the Ottoman territories alongside Russia, in reference to the growing sabre rattling against the Turks and the "Greek Project" of the Empress Catherine II.³⁰ Adams believed this would produce "a great Revolution in the Commerce of Europe," where trade would revolve around the Danube, Don, and Dnieper Rivers flowing into the Black Sea. If successful, Adams foresaw "this would be such an Accession of Wealth, Commerce and Naval Power" that it certainly merited the consideration of fostering relations with the Habsburgs in case these plans ever became a reality.³¹

Franklin also recommended a commercial treaty with the Habsburgs. A week after Adams, he also wrote to Livingston. "I have it also from a good hand at the Court of Vienna," Franklin informed him, "that the Emperor is



FIGURE 15. Portrait of John Adams as a diplomat by John Singleton Copley (1783)

desirous of establishing a Commerce with us from Trieste as well as Flanders, and would make a Treaty with us if proposed to him.”³² There is no mystery who Franklin’s “good hand” was. Back in April, Ingenhousz had informed him of Mercy-d’Argenteau’s new powers to treat with the Americans. He divulged more, sharing the news that the “Emperour is ready to acknowledge the united states as a souverain and independent power as soon as you or any one authorised makes any Steps towards that purpose [*sic*].”³³ It was another indirect route utilised by the Habsburgs to prod the Americans into action. Franklin, in a very similar vein to Adams, noted his excitement over the prospect of a commercial connection. “Many useful Productions and Manufactures of Hungary may be had extremely cheap there” he argued to Livingston.³⁴ Both Adams and Franklin were convinced of the necessity to conclude a treaty with the Habsburgs and lobbied their insistence with Congress.

In late October 1783, Congress members decided to empower Adams and Franklin to enter into negotiations with Joseph’s representatives. They ordered them to announce “the high sense which the United States in Congress assembled entertains of his exalted character and eminent virtues, and their earnest desire to cultivate his friendship, and to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce for the mutual advantage of the subjects of his Imperial Majesty, and the citizens of these United States.”³⁵ The sedentary pace of transatlantic communication

subsequently delayed arrival of these new and crucial instructions, however.³⁶ Mercy-d'Argenteau began to question the sincerity of his American counterparts in the meantime. Had they ignored the emperor's overtures? On October 1, 1783, he had confronted the French foreign minister Vergennes about the lack of American rapidity. Mercy-d'Argenteau recorded Vergennes's response verbatim and forwarded it to State Chancellor Prince von Kaunitz in his latest update on the situation. The reason, he echoed, was Franklin, "who is old, tired of business, and careless," and the other commissioner, John Jay, "lacks energy and vivacity," leaving only Adams "who cannot be entirely trusted since his veins are filled with English blood."³⁷ Vergennes was of course biased given his ill rapport with Adams but Mercy-d'Argenteau lacked any other clue or answer on the state of the negotiations.

Franklin ended Mercy-d'Argenteau's diplomatic purgatory nine months later on July 30, 1784. "By various Circumstances been long delayed," Franklin stated unashamed, he could now communicate the desire to "cultivate the friendship of his Imperial Majesty" and begin negotiations.³⁸ To add to Mercy-d'Argenteau's probable relief, Franklin informed him "the late Governor of Virginia," Thomas Jefferson, would join Adams as a commissioner. Mercy-d'Argenteau acted hastily to account for the lost time. First, he responded magnanimously to Franklin's letter. "The sentiments which the Emperor entertains for the United States of America," he replied, "make me foresee the satisfaction which his Majesty will have in entering into engagements with them."³⁹ He quickly informed Kaunitz and requested new instructions for negotiating.⁴⁰ Kaunitz's response took another month since he had to consult the emperor about his final decision first, and to do so required a full account of the situation. In his report, Kaunitz reiterated the problem of recognising a former "rebel" nation, especially since the Treaty of Paris still awaited proper ratification.⁴¹ Kaunitz maintained only when American sovereignty was assured "in a legal manner throughout the whole of Europe by the peace treaty" could negotiations begin.⁴² In addition, he reaffirmed the order of international precedence whereby "the American States should make the decent first steps to be recognised by Your Majesty as true independent sovereigns."⁴³ Such comments demonstrated the Habsburg commitment to upholding the international norms and diplomatic conventions among European powers. Kaunitz, who had absorbed the ideas of leading theorists on international order during his education, valued these norms in his interaction with the Americans.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Kaunitz articulated how representatives of the United States had to respect the order of preference enjoyed by the imperial dignity of the Habsburgs. In his mind, an advance by the Americans had to be

made formally to the Habsburgs. This rigidity of diplomatic etiquette reflected the difficult incorporation of a new nation into the international order of the *ancien régime*.

Kaunitz, however, thought it prudent to prepare terms for a hypothetical treaty despite the unrecognised status of the United States. He recommended any agreement must "for the most part consist of only generalised stipulations."⁴⁵ Any special articles of the negotiation, Kaunitz opined, needed discussion with the composite regions of the Habsburg lands, including the Bohemian and Hungarian Chancelleries and especially the Austrian Netherlands.⁴⁶ The emperor regarded Kaunitz's proposal lukewarmly. "A Commercial Treaty with those Americans," he scribbled in the margins, "will not be much use for our country, but the conditions may be discussed."⁴⁷ Joseph's tepidness belied his earlier enthusiasm over American commerce and his support of the official mission of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff to Philadelphia but reflected his latest intention to exchange Bavaria for the Austrian Netherlands, his realm which stood arguably the most to gain from such a treaty. Such an exchange project had been a perennial pre-occupation for Joseph, who had failed to acquire the Bavarian lands during the War of the Bavarian Succession in 1778, as it would have granted him a more solidified border to the West and an additional elector within the Holy Roman Empire.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, he consented to the preparations for an American treaty.

Kaunitz forwarded the good news to Mercy-d'Argenteau in early September 1784.⁴⁹ In Kaunitz's version it was indeed good news; he omitted the emperor's lukewarm response and instead instructed Mercy-d'Argenteau to inform Franklin that Joseph "had gladly heard the demand of the United States, and would gladly offer his hands to all these states, as the foundation of a mutually friendly agreement and the commercial interactions of subjects on both sides."⁵⁰ Simultaneously, Kaunitz informed the various regional chancelleries of the negotiations. He requested information be shared with officials in the Austro-Bohemian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian regions so they might offer their specific "insight and early expressions" on any future treaty with the United States.⁵¹ This consultation of the entire Habsburg lands not only resulted from the compositional nature of the monarchy but also reflected the belief of officials in Vienna that American trade might benefit the Monarchy as a whole. Lastly, Kaunitz issued orders to Count Ludovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso, who replaced the retiring Starhemberg as the minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, to contact, instruct, and advise Mercy-d'Argenteau during negotiations with the Americans.⁵²

In late September, Mercy-d'Argenteau acknowledged his new powers from Kaunitz, but in his reply he noted three problems. The first was the health of

Franklin, whom he explained “is very sick on sand and stone,” a reference to Franklin’s troublesome problems with gout. The second was the appointment of Jefferson, who Mercy-d’Argenteau did not know because Jefferson had failed to report to him after his arrival.⁵³ This was the first news of Jefferson’s arrival to reach Vienna as well as the first sign of disconnect between the two men. The final issue was Kaunitz’s deferral to Belgiojoso and requests from the various chancelleries, which left Mercy-d’Argenteau with “no other choice but to await these further orders.”⁵⁴ In the meantime, Mercy-d’Argenteau forwarded a copy of his new powers to Franklin. Crucially, Mercy-d’Argenteau informed him of Kaunitz’s decision to delegate to Belgiojoso and to gather information from the chancelleries. “When the Particulars respecting this Matter shall be sent me,” he wrote, “I shall instantly communicate them and I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the Assurances.”⁵⁵ Franklin interpreted this as an instruction to wait on Brussels before anything could be done further.⁵⁶ This simple misunderstanding threatened the entire undertaking, but nobody realised it at the time.

Thomas Jefferson Lies

On September 13, 1784, the new minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, Count Belgiojoso, received his new instructions. He turned to the Treasurer General and member of the *Comité de Commerce Maritime*, Baron de Cazier, who helped process Beelen’s reports. Cazier presented his preliminary drafts of commercial expectations for a treaty on October 21, 1784.⁵⁷ A week later, Belgiojoso sent on the results to Mercy-d’Argenteau who informed Kaunitz of the draft for the first time on November 6. Kaunitz responded with provisions particular to the merchants in Trieste and Fiume.⁵⁸ The internal competition over the regional interests of the Habsburg Monarchy had not ceased. Yet, from a wider perspective, everything had begun to take shape. It only required the Americans to respond in kind. At this point, however, the Habsburg dynasty could still not be seen to initiate such negotiations as their imperial dignity and order of preference outranked the Americans. Mercy-d’Argenteau received everything by late November, but he did not pass the stipulations onto the Americans since it was their turn and duty to start the negotiations proper. Any action by him would jeopardise Habsburg preeminence. As 1784 turned into 1785, the pressure to conclude a treaty with the Americans rose ever higher; that year the Austrian-American Trading Company had begun in Trieste and Beelen’s reports detailed the endless potential in North America. No overture came from the American side, however. And this was the moment when Jefferson entered the fray.



FIGURE 16. Portrait of Thomas Jefferson as Minister to France by Mather Brown (1788)

Jefferson had arrived in Paris in August 1784 as a representative in commercial negotiations and then succeeded Franklin on May 17, 1785, as the American minister to France. Jefferson's first introduction to the French court had been relaxed. His enjoyment came more through the salons where Franklin's influence had won him "a door of admission [. . .] to the circle of literati."⁵⁹ His friends were primarily these literati.⁶⁰ As Franklin departed France in July 1785, and after Adams's appointment to London, Jefferson became the sole American representative. This situation gravely affected the negotiations with the Habsburgs.

Jefferson's original outlook on American commercial relations recognised the postwar challenges facing the United States in 1783. At this time, Jefferson acknowledged the necessity in re-establishing international commerce but viewed foreign commercial connections as supplementary to the agrarian basis of the American economy. International trade was not the path to prosperity, but a secondary motor, in his thinking. Jefferson's primary concern was preventing reconnection with British merchants since, he feared, such a commercial reunion could reduce the Americans' hard-won independence. Jefferson, as part of the congressional "Committee of Three" responsible for drafting the new commercial strategy, favoured a wide engagement with as many friendly European nations as possible in order to preserve their economic independence from Britain. This strategy aimed at converting Europe to the "commercial principles of the

American Revolution”—that is, foreign relations predicated upon mutually advantageous trade.⁶¹ Congress, as a result, listed sixteen nations, practically most of Europe, for American representatives to treat with equally. Jefferson saw this goal as “part of a system, wise and advantageous if executed in all its parts,” that would achieve the economic connections needed to guarantee continued independence.⁶² In some sense, when Jefferson succeeded Franklin and inherited his half-negotiated plans in the summer of 1785, his political outlook still engendered him towards treating with all European powers, including the Habsburg Monarchy.

Yet Jefferson’s thoughts changed during his negotiations for commercial treaties. He neither stuck to his idealistic vision of an agrarian America nor acted in a strict realist fashion. Instead, Jefferson reacted to commercial offers from European nations with a rationalist mindset, driven above all by his sense of whether it was in the best interests for the ideal future of the United States. Such pragmatism came to define Jefferson’s later statecraft, but it was brought home to him during these years in Paris when he began to appreciate the relative weakness of the United States.⁶³ It was a lesson other Americans were learning as they adjusted to the new American borders in the Midwest and encountered stiff opposition from European neighbours.⁶⁴ Jefferson’s own humble pragmatism is clear in his diplomatic negotiations with the European states. He soon felt the principle of mutually advantageous trade should necessitate treaties with powers most valuable to the United States: powers with territory in the Americas. Trade benefits from these nations, he believed, were numerous and bountiful. As a result, he gave greater importance to the Portuguese treaty than a Habsburg deal; Portugal was an Atlantic power whereas the Habsburgs were not. Sweden, owning the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean, also superseded the Habsburgs whose lack of Atlantic possessions led him to dismiss their commerce as inconsequential. Jefferson’s hierarchical thinking certainly guided his actions in the negotiations.

Jefferson’s aversion towards treating the Habsburg Monarchy as a priority began to show immediately. In September 1785, Jefferson received a letter from the marquis de Lafayette, which detailed his friendly audience with Joseph (see chapter 7). Lafayette had seized this opportunity to act as an unofficial trade ambassador for the young republic. “I directed, and sometimes forced the conversation,” he revealed to Jefferson, resulting in the discovery of the emperor’s preference for “liberal treaties, [which] would open the door to American importations in order to pay for Austrian goods.” That same evening, Kaunitz had approached Lafayette. The pair discussed the situation of American and Austrian

goods—Kaunitz knew already from Beelen's reports—but Lafayette noticed he was bemused. "Why," asked Kaunitz in cutting straight to the point, "don't they make advances to us?" Lafayette could only respond that the Americans had done so, but as Kaunitz clarified, their "demand had been an indirect one." In other words, Kaunitz was dissatisfied with the American initiation since it had largely been Mercy-d'Argenteau who orchestrated contact and requests up until then. Habsburg ministers were meant to be responders not the initiators. He made clear to Lafayette that nothing could go on "without reciprocity."⁶⁵ In his eyes, it was a matter of fairness and of mutual respect. Lafayette recommended swift action but relied on Jefferson to communicate the news to Adams in London and to Congress across the Atlantic.⁶⁶

Jefferson, at first glance, complied. On September 24, he conveyed Lafayette's findings to Adams. Yet the placement—a few short lines sparing any detail at the end—and his overall tone reveal his hesitation about a Habsburg treaty. "In the present unsettled state of American commerce," Jefferson declared, in reference to the new opportunities and challenges for trade with Europe, he wanted to "avoid all further treaties except with American powers. If Count Merci [*sic*] therefore does not propose the subject to me, I shall not to him nor do more than decency requires if he does propose it."⁶⁷ Jefferson's words here are striking. He openly declared his intention to counteract congressional instructions "to cultivate the Friendship of his imperial majesty" with a treaty. Jefferson also demonstrated his disdain for such a treaty owing to the limited influence of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Atlantic and the Americas. Lastly, Jefferson's playing dumb to Mercy-d'Argenteau's request was rather coy, since he was fully aware of the diplomatic etiquette that dictated the interactions with the Habsburg ambassador. Jefferson's deceit emerged again a few weeks later as he reported Lafayette's letter to John Jay, Congress's new foreign secretary. In the sole line Jefferson spared for the news, he mentioned "a possibility of an overture" from the Habsburg court. He omitted a full explanation of the present state of the negotiations.⁶⁸ In this initial action by Jefferson, we can already discern the sentiments he expressed to John Quincy Adams forty years later.

Jefferson had a problem, however. Lafayette's visit to Vienna had not only revealed the deadlock but had sprung Kaunitz into action. Lafayette informed Jefferson, "I am apt to think he [Kaunitz] may order His Ambassadors to talk with you or Mr. Adams."⁶⁹ Indeed the order came. On October 1, 1784, Kaunitz informed Mercy-d'Argenteau about the Austrian-American Trading Company in Trieste which required better trading terms in order to compete successfully with foreign merchants in the United States. Kaunitz requested that he discuss

this matter urgently with Jefferson.⁷⁰ For Mercy-d'Argenteau, this provided yet another headache. By mid-October he admitted his difficulties to Kaunitz. He had been unable to fulfil these instructions due to Jefferson's "continued lengthy absences."⁷¹ Although Jefferson undertook several tours of Europe during his time as minister in France, these absences were in fact Jefferson's attempts to "avoid all further treaties" with non-Atlantic powers.⁷²

The evasion worked. Jefferson's preference for the salons and infrequent attendance at the regular diplomatic corps events made it easy for him to elude Mercy-d'Argenteau. It took until January 1786 for Mercy-d'Argenteau to meet with Jefferson and discuss the situation. Mercy-d'Argenteau's frustration must have eroded his usual decorum since the confrontation was not very diplomatic by Jefferson's account. "The imperial ambassador took me apart the other day," he complained to Adams. He explained Mercy-d'Argenteau's anger that he had not received anything for "about eighteen or twenty months" since corresponding with Franklin in September 1784. The seriousness of the deadlock became clear to all. Mercy-d'Argenteau had promised to pass on the preliminary articles once his superiors in Brussels and Vienna had finalised them, but he still expected the next move to come from Franklin, or Franklin's replacement on the American side. Jefferson refused to take accountability for this mishap. He explained to Mercy-d'Argenteau that "we had always supposed it [the offer to negotiate] was unanswered and had therefore expected the next step from [you]." Mercy-d'Argenteau became angry, especially since Jefferson informed him that his negotiation powers were set to expire.⁷³ Mercy-d'Argenteau and Jefferson ended their conversation without either one accepting fault but with plenty of animosity. That evening, Mercy-d'Argenteau sent his secretary, Franz Paul von Blumendorf, to deliver to Jefferson a copy of his last correspondence with Franklin to extricate any negligence from his side.⁷⁴

Jefferson fretted over the next steps since he still wished to avoid concluding a treaty with the Habsburgs. He relied upon Adams in London for instruction, especially as Mercy-d'Argenteau continued to "make advances" and he endeavoured to "evade" until he could receive word from Adams.⁷⁵ Jefferson's fears were becoming real. Mercy-d'Argenteau's assiduity made him "anxious" to receive Adams's advice. Unfortunately for Jefferson, Adams's response was slow. By early February, he had still not heard anything. He prodded Adams again, stressing how he was "anxious" to receive an answer.⁷⁶ Finally, Adams's reply came a few weeks later. He implored Jefferson to act without delay. "I am clearly for treating with the Emperor's Ambassador immediately," he explained, "and even for the [Austrian] Netherlands only, although it would be better to extend

it to all the rest of his Dominions." Adams could not have given a clearer line of instruction to Jefferson, especially with his final lines on the matter, "I pray you to proceed in the Business, *as fast as you please*. Treaties commercial with the two Imperial Courts [meaning Brussels and Vienna] cannot possibly do us any harm that I can conceive."⁷⁷ Adam's sentiment contrasted sharply with Jefferson's. Adams had experienced the Austrian Netherlands in person and had been convinced of commerce with the Habsburg lands from his interactions with Mercy-d'Argenteau. On the other hand, Jefferson, who had no such experience, felt the opposite and continued to stall.

Jefferson interpreted Adams's line "as fast as you please" liberally. He received Adams's response amid his preparation for one of his first European tours.⁷⁸ He left Paris for London in mid-March without a single word to Mercy-d'Argenteau. In a letter to Jay, Jefferson later accounted for his inaction, explaining, "Tho I received Mr Adams's opinion in favour of our proceeding in the treaty [. . .] those which called me to London, a treaty with Portugal, was more important."⁷⁹ Here Jefferson clearly articulated how the the Atlantic dimension was of greater importance in his commercial calculations. For Jefferson, this was a matter of priority and the Habsburgs counted for little in his mind compared to the potential trade from a country such as Portugal. His own personal preferences overrode the advice from Adams to seal the treaty with the Habsburgs and his trip to London allowed gave him the perfect excuse to stall yet again. Notwithstanding his personal preferences, there was little excuse for his failure to inform Mercy-d'Argenteau. Jefferson was away for seven weeks.

In the meantime, Mercy-d'Argenteau prepared for Jefferson's return. He reported to Kaunitz on the latest developments, hinting at Jefferson's duplicity. After explaining their first meeting, he mentioned Jefferson's revelation that his commission would expire on May 12 but he hoped "something definite" could be accomplished by then.⁸⁰ Kaunitz too had been diligent. The final treaty proposal had been confirmed by the various chancelleries and laid before the emperor as the basis for negotiations.⁸¹ "His Majesty has deigned to approve the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States," he declared to Belgiojoso and Mercy-d'Argenteau.⁸² The highly compartmental nature of the Habsburg Monarchy made for a convoluted process, but one which could have come to a happy conclusion if not for the expiration of Jefferson's commission.

Jefferson returned to Paris twelve days before his powers were due to expire. Mercy-d'Argenteau sought him out urgently but when they did meet, he was gravely disappointed. Jefferson protested that no negotiation could be completed in the time remaining. Mercy-d'Argenteau pleaded for an extension or for the

negotiations to continue until Congress could renew them, but Jefferson signalled that nothing could be done.⁸³ Jefferson's mind had been firmly fixed. On May 10, he reported the meeting to James Monroe, reiterating his belief that "no great good" could be gained from such a treaty despite his congressional instructions and Adams's optimism.⁸⁴ Jefferson's economic prejudice deterred him from completing the treaty negotiations with the Habsburg Monarchy. In the end, his determination prevailed and Mercy-d'Argenteau admitted defeat. It was like a game of chess where one grandmaster had won by running out the clock.

Relations deteriorated between Mercy-d'Argenteau and Jefferson from this point onward, reflecting the greater dissolution of Habsburg interest in the United States. The Prussians had some indirect role in this divergence. They concluded a commercial treaty with the United States in September 1785. Belgiojoso heard of this from Beelen, who relayed the news from New York in February 1786, when Congress was poised to ratify the treaty.⁸⁵ How could the Americans finalise a deal with the Prussians and not the Habsburgs? Mercy-d'Argenteau received fresh orders to confront Jefferson again. "[One of the] greatest deceptions," decried Mercy-d'Argenteau in his report to Kaunitz, "the American Minister, Mr Jefferson, as I asked him, seemingly would not admit to this actuality!"⁸⁶ Jefferson indeed denied all knowledge of the Prussian-American treaty despite his signature on the parchment. In other words, he lied. And his response outraged the Habsburg minister and cemented the end of their interaction.

There were several reasons behind the failure to conclude a commercial treaty between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States. Miscommunication existed on both sides. Officials from both states awaited replies without realising their own need to act. Almost a year was lost between 1784 and 1785 because Mercy-d'Argenteau waited on Franklin's reply and vice versa. Protocol was another reason. Kaunitz's adherence to diplomatic preeminence undoubtedly caused these delays. Yet the Americans were cognizant of this practice and certainly knew the onus fell on them. But the political arrangement of both states also caused delay. On the one hand, negotiations with the Americans were a matter for the whole Habsburg Monarchy and entailed input from various regional administrations. Ministers in other nations obtaining treaties (Denmark, Prussia, Portugal, Sweden for instance) did not encounter such an obstacle.

On the other hand, the American situation caused similar delays. Congress worked through three commissioners before Jefferson and Adams became responsible for negotiating with European courts. Added to this were the slow communications between them and across the Atlantic as well as the need to consult Congress. The two-year commission period proved a decisive

element, curtailing negotiators and allowing Jefferson an excuse. His critical delays brought on either through absence or aversion exacerbated this time constraint. Crucially, Jefferson's decision to travel to London to finalise the Portuguese treaty not only constituted delay at a critical juncture but was a conscious evaluation of its importance over a treaty with the Habsburgs. Jefferson's actions make clear his negativity toward a potential treaty with the Habsburg Monarchy and his deliberate action to avoid its realisation. Jefferson's predisposition and his actions ultimately undermined the efforts to bring together the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States after three years of attempted negotiations.

Jefferson and Joseph

Jefferson's actions clearly wrecked the chances of a conclusive commercial treaty between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States of America in the 1780s. His actions helped set back the progress of US-Habsburg relations for a generation. In the immediate period before the outbreak of revolutionary maelstrom across Europe, this decade represented the opportune moment for such commercial ties to be cemented before the convulsions of war waylaid any Habsburg interest or ability in transatlantic trade with the Americans. Jefferson's deliberate mishandling, therefore, derailed the negotiations and ultimately set the Habsburgs on the path to be the last European great power to recognise and establish formal ties with the United States.

Jefferson's aversion seemingly arose from his prioritisation in concluding treaties with European powers which had possessions in the Atlantic. The Habsburgs, without much of a foothold in the Atlantic, could not offer Americans very much in his mind. Unlike Adams, he did not have the conviction of potential Habsburg commerce in the eastern Mediterranean or along the Danube nor did he share Franklin's positive outlook formed by years of incessant mercantile enquires from the Habsburg lands and his friendship with people like the court physician Jan Ingenhousz. Instead, Jefferson acted upon his own instincts and according to his own sense of political economy and commercial utility.⁸⁷ Rather than outright deny the Habsburgs a right to negotiate, Jefferson shied away from interpersonal conflict and preferred to undermine the negotiations via dilatoriness and deception. To be sure, Jefferson's thoughts on international commerce were influential, but he was not entirely consistent with his own priorities. Seeing this thinking as the reason for his aversion to a Habsburg treaty is plausible but does not account why Jefferson concluded a treaty with Prussia

in September 1785—a power without any American stakehold.⁸⁸ Why, then, did Jefferson allow a treaty with Prussia but not one with the Habsburg Monarchy?

Considering only Jefferson's geopolitical thought is an incomplete explanation of his foreign policy as minister in France. It was only one calculation among many in his mind at the time. Jefferson's personal outlook also heavily shaped his negotiations with European powers. Jefferson was informed not just by his interactions as a diplomat but also as an observer and individual living in Europe. His digestion of news, politics, and personal relations also shaped his diplomatic outlook. His perception of contemporary events gave rise to an intrinsic "mental map" of European powers that influenced his interaction as a diplomat. An individual's mental map reflects the cognitive biases and environmental framework constructed from the world around them.⁸⁹ In Jefferson's case, such worldviews may have been unwarranted or misinformed but were nonetheless his perception and outlook. Jefferson's interaction with the Habsburg Monarchy is a clear articulation of this influence. Jefferson's views of the Habsburg Monarchy fundamentally affected his interactions in negotiating a treaty with the Habsburg Monarchy. Nowhere is this more acute than in his discussions of Joseph II through his private and personal correspondence.

The figure of the emperor was pivotal in shaping Jefferson's perception of the wider Habsburg Monarchy as a potential economic partner. Joseph, as a head of state, signified the values and position of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the beginning of the 1780s, there were many commonalities between the two men. They were both men of the enlightenment and believed in its core values. Joseph's reform efforts in domestic matters impressed Jefferson greatly. His Tolerance Patents, for example, issued first by Joseph in 1781 granted limited freedoms to religious non-Catholic minorities for the first time.⁹⁰ Similarly, Joseph's ardent anti-papal inclination reduced the monastic influence in education and chimed with Jefferson's sensibilities on the separation of church and state, something which he formulated in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* around the same time.⁹¹ From these "public acts," Jefferson concluded on more than one occasion that Joseph's character was "far above the level of common men."⁹² There were other Americans who agreed with Jefferson about Joseph's early reign. Adams and Franklin both let their positive opinions be known. Jay wrote well of Joseph's reforms and how "he seems to be seriously preparing to be great and formidable."⁹³ Gouverneur Morris, a Massachusetts congressman and later successor to Jefferson in Paris, viewed Joseph's eastern ambitions as something beneficial to the United States, especially if a commercial connection with the Habsburg Monarchy could be obtained through a treaty. "As an American," he declared, "it is my hearty wish

that she [Catherine II] and the Emperor may effect their schemes, for it will be a source of great wealth to us, both immediate and future."⁹⁴ Jefferson, however, viewed these plans with disapproval. If they did come to pass, then he likened it for people there as an exchange of "one set of Barbarians for another."⁹⁵ Although Jefferson had seen some good in the emperor at the beginning of the 1780s, he increasingly acknowledged some poorer tendencies of Joseph II.

As the 1780s progressed, Jefferson gradually viewed Joseph as an unwise and ineffective figure. "We have here under our contemplation," he wrote in December 1784, "the future miseries of human nature, like to be occasioned by the ambition of a young man, who has been taught to view his subjects as cattle."⁹⁶ Jefferson viewed Joseph's diplomatic efforts critically. "It is a pity," Jefferson remarked, "the emperor would not confine himself to internal regulation, in that way he has done much good."⁹⁷ Jefferson witnessed the news of half-completed designs on Europe with disapproval. As he confided to one friend, Joseph "is a restless, ambitious character, aiming at everything, preserving in nothing, taking up designs without calculating the force which will be opposed to him, and dropping them on the appearance of firm opposition."⁹⁸ Jefferson viewed this lack of attentiveness in Joseph's foreign policy as indicative of a man oddly "whimsical," "bizarre, and eccentric, particularly in the dog-days."⁹⁹ Jefferson saw these flaws transpire into "perilous" situations for the emperor as he "dwindles to that of a petty bully, and is marked, as his enemies denote it, with eccentricity and inconsistency." "If he persists," Jefferson concluded in a letter to George Washington, "the probable combination against him seems to threaten his ruin."¹⁰⁰

As Jefferson's time in Paris continued, his views of Joseph diminished further. This "trifling personage," as he referred to him, seemed to grow weaker by his endless schemes, especially, Jefferson noticed, in the Holy Roman Empire. In 1785, the rulers of Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover joined together to form what became known as the *Fürstenbund* or League of Princes aimed as a bulwark against the emperor's expansionist policies as espoused in his desires on Bavaria and the corrupt election of Joseph's brother to the powerful Electorship of Cologne.¹⁰¹ The more Jefferson learned of the *Fürstenbund* from the salons and newspapers of Paris, the more Jefferson realised it weakened Joseph, leaving him in "a solitary situation" and "much wounded."¹⁰² As a union of smaller provinces united against the tyranny of an overbearing figurehead, the *Fürstenbund* certainly enjoyed some sympathy from Jefferson who delighted at the successive victories that thwarted Joseph's plans on Bavaria and within the Holy Roman Empire. To Jefferson, the League was perhaps a vindication of the belief in the success of confederacy against tyranny and resonated with own part in the struggle against

Great Britain. In August 1785, Jefferson believed Joseph had been tarnished by the *Fürstenbund*. "In truth," Jefferson concluded, "he undertakes too much."¹⁰³

Jefferson perceived Joseph's ambitious nature as his most glaring detraction as it often brought him into disadvantageous conflagrations. Joseph's preoccupation with reopening the River Scheldt to free commerce caused an international scene. The resulting small war between the Austrian Netherlands and the Dutch Republic in October 1784, known as the "Kettle War" since only an iron kettle was struck by cannon fire, was one clear example in Jefferson's mind. From his viewpoint, Joseph's decision to sail two warships into Dutch waters in protest of the closed River Scheldt had escalated an already precarious situation.¹⁰⁴ Jefferson's perception of Joseph increasingly became one of a despot and warmonger as a result. He complained of Joseph's bellicose nature to several friends. "Not a circumstance can be produced, not a symptom mentioned in the conduct of the emperor which does not breathe a determination for war," he declared.¹⁰⁵ Jefferson acknowledged Joseph as a particular threat to European stability. Joseph's schemes would sooner or later provoke further war.¹⁰⁶ He explained to Franklin that it was merely a question of "with whom the emperor will pick the next quarrel."¹⁰⁷

Taken together, these impressions were a consistent feature of Jefferson's time in Europe. From his arrival in August 1784 to the failure of the treaty in May 1786, Jefferson digested contemporary events and, with increasing disdain, conceived of an insolent emperor determined to destabilise the international community through his grand designs. The emperor's reputation and actions affected Jefferson's perception of the viability of the Habsburg Monarchy as an international partner. These geopolitical concerns eroded Jefferson's confidence in Ostend and Trieste as desirable trading locations.

Further south, Jefferson's Mediterranean views were undoubtedly influenced by Filippo Mazzei, his neighbour in Virginia during the early to mid-1770s. In 1778, Jefferson had written to Richard Henry Lee,

In the present very prosperous situation of our affairs I have thought it would be wise to endeavour to gain a regular and acknowledged [*sic*] access in every court in Europe, but [of all] the Southern [ones]. The countries bordering on the Mediterranean I think will merit our earliest attention. They will be the important markets for our great commodities of fish, wheat, tobacco, and rice. [. . .] I have been led the more to think of this from frequent conversations with Mazzei, whom you know well, and who is well acquainted with all those countries.¹⁰⁸

By 1785, Jefferson's Mediterranean views had altered. In Europe, he had come to increasingly appreciate (and abhor) the threat of piracy sanctioned by the Barbary States along the north African coastline. "Our trade to Portugal, Spain, and the Mediterranean is annihilated," he despaired. The alternative trading option (in Jefferson's mind) was Ostend. But the war clouds over the nearby River Scheldt persuaded Jefferson against such an entrepôt for trade. In his response to William Wenman Seward's scheme to make Ostend the major trading conduit to the United States for Irish goods, Jefferson explained he could not think why the more "dangerous" port offered any more benefit than the French port Lorient, "which," Jefferson argued, "is a freeport and in great latitude, which is nearer to both parties."¹⁰⁹ The major ports of the Habsburg Monarchy dealing in transatlantic trade were therefore of little interest to Jefferson.

Moreover, Jefferson was personally far more insulated from the Habsburg lands. "I know of none, have no correspondent or even acquaintance at Ostend," he wrote at one point.¹¹⁰ True, Jefferson did not command the attention of Europe in the same way as Franklin. As a result, he did not inherit the same networks as Franklin. Compared to him, Jefferson had very few attachments to Vienna. The main conduit for Franklin had been Jan Ingenhousz but as Franklin ended his time in Paris so did this vital interpersonal link. Although Franklin and Ingenhousz relied on Jefferson to relay their correspondence, Jefferson did not strike up any personal friendship with Ingenhousz. This disconnect was despite his regard for the scientist to "whose researches the lovers of science are so much indebted."¹¹¹ In contrast to the scores of letters exchanged between Franklin and Ingenhousz, Jefferson's writing to Ingenhousz amounted to a mere two letters and were simple expressions of regard attached to the latest parcel or letter from Franklin. Jefferson clearly did not make use of Ingenhousz despite Franklin's advice that Ingenhousz was "a proper Correspondent in case he [Jefferson] should have anything to insinuate to that Court."¹¹² The loss of Ingenhousz for Jefferson severely limited his connection to Vienna.

Jefferson's relative obscurity in comparison to Franklin also exacerbated this disconnection. The vast volume of correspondents Franklin enjoyed from across the Habsburg lands were not so interested in Jefferson, a man of far less renown in Vienna than his predecessor. Whereas Franklin had received over two hundred letters from Habsburg inhabitants during his time in Europe, Jefferson could count only a handful. Moreover, Jefferson's only impressions of the inhabitants of Vienna were secondary through Lafayette's 1785 letter and a conversation with John Adams's son-in-law Colonel William Stephens Smith, who had travelled to Vienna in late 1785 with the future South American revolutionary

Francisco de Miranda.¹¹³ Smith had been captivated by Joseph's simple manner and disregard for pomp during his observations of him at the opera. "You very rarely see any person, not even the military looking," he noted, "this is very singular." Smith spent the duration of the entire opera wondering how such a towering dynastic figure could be so normal and humble. "In a republic," he noted, "Washington is revered and adored by all[; . . .] in a tyrannical government, as Prussia, *Le Roi*, is their terrestrial God and his subjects will freely sacrifice their lives to his caprice and humour." The fact that Joseph "laid aside the pomp and parade" yet still commanded such respect from his subjects greatly impressed Smith and rattled his developing political views. A military man, Smith previously felt that display, rank, and pageantry were essential to a ruler's persona, but he now began to question whether this was entirely correct. Joseph II, who ruled a "mild government though not republican but not tyrannical either," could have important "lessons for republicans" back home, he concluded.¹¹⁴

If Smith shared these imperial impressions with Jefferson during his stop in Paris on his return to London, then they did not produce any effect. Federalists like Adams and Smith might have been wooed by the figure of the emperor but Jefferson, a republican, was not.¹¹⁵ Jefferson became diametric to Joseph. His perception of the Habsburg Monarchy during the 1780s gave rise to his apathy for any kind of political connection. This reason in addition to his developing thoughts on political economy is a more complete explanation for his lethargic and dilatory tactics used in his interactions with Mercy-d'Argenteau.

Conclusion

Jefferson's intercession in the struggle for recognition via a commercial treaty between the Habsburg Monarchy and the United States underscores how personalities and styles of diplomacy undermined the economic interests of two states. Jefferson occupied a pivotal role in the negotiations for a treaty. Under Franklin, negotiations had progressed comparatively smoothly. Franklin's interactions with Mercy-d'Argenteau as well as his informal network in Vienna provided a comfortable base for both the American and Habsburg negotiators to work from. This situation changed suddenly following Jefferson's arrival. His absence and then personal awkwardness in the encounters with Mercy-d'Argenteau were detrimental. As we have seen, his evolving personal biases certainly informed these interactions as well; Jefferson's disdain for the emperor and his actions combined with his thoughts on the future political economy of the United States to produce an ardently negative attitude towards a treaty of commerce

with the Habsburg Monarchy. Jefferson's attitude stood in stark contrast to the more open and favourable perspective of his joint negotiator John Adams, but his role as the main interlocutor in Paris enabled him to dodge, stall, and ultimately derail negotiations. The result was great annoyance on the Habsburg side, exacerbated by the discovery of the conclusion and then deceitful concealment of the treaty with Prussia by Jefferson. As a consequence, Jefferson's interactions with the Habsburg Monarchy marked a watershed moment in US-Habsburg relations. No longer would the Habsburg Monarchy seek a diplomatic connection with the United States. No longer would the Habsburg reach into the Atlantic be pursued. The interests of the revolutionary era had come to a close and a new era of divergence had begun. It would last well into the next century.

“I Am Happy Only When I Can Find a New World
for Myself”

The Residue of Revolution in the Habsburg Lands, 1787–1795

WHEN THOMAS JEFFERSON RETURNED to the United States in late 1789, he harboured plans to renovate his mountain-top home at Monticello and his other property at Poplar Forest, Virginia. He was inspired by the classical architecture of Europe in his designs for more lavish plantation houses. Although delayed by his appointment as the first Secretary of State, Jefferson realised his architectural plans over the course of the 1790s and much of the early 1800s. Both houses at Monticello and Poplar Forest made extensive use of natural light.¹ At Monticello, Jefferson masterfully employed architectural designs to allow for an abundance of light. Standing in the central hallway, one can view the outside in four directions thanks to Monticello’s multiple glass doors and windows. For Jefferson, the harmony of natural light satisfied not just the practical purpose of illumination but also reflected the man himself as an enlightened thinker in tune with the natural world.² Throughout his renovations, Jefferson relied upon Joseph Donath to meet his construction needs. Donath, the former representative of the Weinbrenner firm in Vienna, supplied much of the glass needed for the windows of Jefferson’s estate. Jefferson used Donath’s company in Philadelphia because he preferred the quality of Bohemian glass to any other.³ Beginning in 1792, he made the first of several orders which continued over two decades. In total, Jefferson obtained at least 1,630 panes of Bohemian glass and paid Donath hundreds of dollars for his service.⁴ There was a certain amount of irony in this transaction as well. Jefferson, the man who viewed Habsburg trade as having little value, now imported one of the staple Habsburg products at an inflated price since Donath secured his glass orders through Hamburg rather than Trieste merchants.⁵ It was the price Jefferson paid for having subverted the commercial treaty with the Habsburg Monarchy.

Jefferson's subversion helped usher in a long period of malaise in US-Habsburg relations, a period which stretched deep into the nineteenth century and arguably characterised the entirety of the relationship.⁶ Jefferson's snub of Count Mercy-d'Argenteau undoubtedly produced economic consequences. By the time the treaty negotiations between him and Mercy-d'Argenteau failed, many other European states had already or were beginning to benefit from official relations with the United States: France (1778), the Dutch Republic (1781), Sweden (1783), Prussia (1785), and Portugal (1786). As other nations also established relations with the United States in the 1790s and 1800s, such as Denmark (1796) and Russia (1803), the Habsburg Monarchy increasingly diverged from the transatlantic world. Without the advantages and protection of a treaty of commerce, Habsburg merchants found themselves unable to compete in North American markets. Styrian iron was more costly than comparable Swedish ironware; Levantine goods flowed more cheaply to the United States via ports in France and Spain which enjoyed lower tariffs; and Flemish merchants realised their textiles could not compete with the mass of other products. Bohemian glass proved the sole outlier. Besides Jefferson, Donath also supplied the architect Henry Latrobe with Bohemian glass for many new federal buildings in Washington, DC, including the White House.⁷ But Bohemian glass was not enough to sustain an entire trade route alone, especially one which now relied upon ports to the North rather than Trieste.

From 1786 onwards, direct transatlantic ventures from the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy slowly ceased operating. In Trieste, Ignaz Verpoorten's company collapsed spectacularly with debts of over 200,000*fl* in 1786. That same year, the Austrian-American Trading Company ended. Its leaders sought emergency capital from Vienna, but with profits waning and the four directors deemed too "greedy and unscrupulous" by locals in Trieste, no rescue came.⁸ The situation in Ostend fared little better. Ephraim Murdoch, a "furious partisan of the American cause" who traded from there to Philadelphia and Virginia, moved his business to Dunkirk in 1787. Francis Bowens, who had carried mail for Franklin during the war and sent ships to Philadelphia and Baltimore, declared bankruptcy at the same time. By the end of the decade, the agreement between the firm *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co* in the Austrian Netherlands and their associate Mark Prager in Philadelphia had collapsed.⁹ Undermined by private representation and diminishing official belief in the benefit of American commerce, the Habsburg Monarchy's designated representative in the United States, Baron Frederick Eugene de Beelen-Bertholff, ended his mission in 1789. Meanwhile his brother Maximilian de Beelen-Bertholff advised the minister

plenipotentiary in Brussels that the port of Ostend would be ruined imminently “if measures are not taken to prevent it.”¹⁰ The brief window of opportunity for Habsburg entrepreneurs in the Atlantic created by the turbulence of the American Revolution was over by the end of the 1780s.

Habsburg interest in transatlantic trade waned in subsequent years. Dynastic succession changed the outlook in some ways. After Joseph II died unexpectedly in 1790, his younger brother Pietro Leopoldo (the Grand Duke of Tuscany) who had favoured American constitutional ideals succeeded him as Leopold II. However, he too died suddenly in March 1792. His son and Joseph’s nephew, Francis II, reigned during the heady years of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars that briefly brought the Habsburg Monarchy to its knees with humiliating military defeats and several territorial losses including the coastline along the Adriatic. Waging war against the revolutionary turmoil in Europe defined Francis II’s early reign and sapped his attention for much else. American interests, which once commanded serious attention at the Viennese court, now took a back seat. After Beelen’s mission ended, Giuseppe Mussi, a Milan-born merchant residing in Philadelphia, petitioned the Aulic Chamber to become Beelen’s replacement, but his application was refused. In their concluding response, ministers explained the new Emperor Francis’s view that “no advantage would be gained from formally accrediting any person with the Congress which had been so favoured by his late Majesty Emperor Joseph.”¹¹ Francis did not alter his view in 1794 when Mussi reapplied or in 1796 when another merchant requested the same honour.¹² Habsburg merchants evidently remained more intrigued by North American commerce than the state did.

Across the Atlantic, the opposite was true. American officials sought to secure trade with the Habsburg port of Trieste. In 1797, Washington appointed Konrad F. Wagner as the first American consul.¹³ A few years later, the first documented American vessel arrived to unload cotton, sugar and coffee.¹⁴ The growth of American imports in subsequent years convinced Viennese officials of the need for an American representative. In 1804, Francis received the proposition again but declined to act.¹⁵ It was not until after the restoration of the Illyrian provinces and the acquisition of Venetian territory following the Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonic wars in 1815 that Francis decided to entertain the idea.¹⁶ However, the process of finding and appointing a consular representative proved difficult as the lead candidate did not wish to end up in the United States.¹⁷ The issue was finally resolved in 1820 with a consular officer officially named in New York but by then Habsburg representation in the Americas functioned through Count Emanuel Joseph Eltz, the first ambassador to Brazil.¹⁸

By that time the Habsburgs lagged behind other European powers in establishing American representations. Helvetia (Switzerland), for example, enjoyed an official representative presence in the United States long before the Habsburgs.¹⁹ Much like the time of the American Revolution, Central European firms became impatient and arranged their own private representatives. The Imperial Tobacco Monopoly (*Österreichische Tabakregie*) named Antonio E. Perez as a representative in New Orleans after 1815. Perez was so effective that he even provided Viennese officials with reports and made suggestions for the further expansion of Habsburg diplomatic posts in the Americas.²⁰

The economic imperative to connect with the United States of America declined concurrently with the political belief in the United States as a viable sovereign nation. During the 1780s, Viennese newspapers discussed at length the poor state of the American economy and political system. The new republic seemed enfeebled and beset with political calamities. The Philadelphia mutiny of 1783, Shay's rebellion of 1786–1787, as well as reports of paper money further compounded the image of a destitute situation.²¹ Some Hungarian and Flemish newspapers featured similar disparagements.²² The negative depiction of America angered John Adams who decried how "all the Gazettes of Germany teem with Lies to our Disadvantage."²³ Fictitious or not, the air of negativity stuck. Beelen's reports painted a dire picture. In 1785, he commented how the president-elect of Congress was "in such tottering state of health" that it was doubtful "whether and when" he would be able to assume office. By contrast, Beelen, besotted with the idea of Habsburg-Native American commerce, forwarded laudatory descriptions of the Muscogee Creek and a portrait of their former leader Mico-Clucco whose title was "equivalent to our title of emperor."²⁴ The impression of instability and weakness rendered through these mediums further eroded the Habsburg resolve to form any political connection with the United States. By 1787, Joseph II asked, "What has the Revolution given them?" during the height of the Constitutional Convention that summer. "Nothing," he retorted, "but general imbecility, confusion, and misery."²⁵

By the late 1780s, Habsburg ministers became increasingly weary of the negative effects of American independence. Concerns rose over emigration in the direction of the Atlantic rather than to the Habsburg provinces in the East. Throughout the eighteenth century, recruitment plans to populate the *neo acquista* of the eastern Habsburg territories competed against transoceanic destinations.²⁶ After independence, the desire to emigrate to the new American republic increased. From his vantage point in London, Adams sincerely believed that "half of Germany," which to Adams included the Habsburg territories, was

on “tiptoe” ready “to fly to America for relief.”²⁷ The writer Dositej Obradović from the Banat of Temesvar desired to emigrate to America, as did Jan Ingenhousz from Vienna.²⁸ A sovereign United States seemed a temptation even to members of the imperial court. In 1783, a member of the Imperial Aulic Council (the *Reichshofrat*), one of the most powerful institutions within the Holy Roman Empire, petitioned Franklin for help in retiring to the United States since he knew the new nation would need “experienced and accomplished men” such as himself. His preference was for Georgia, either of the Carolinas, or even Virginia, “if it were not too remote.”²⁹

In London, the Habsburg consul Antonio Songa sounded alarm over the siren calls of transatlantic migration. In February 1783 already, he argued how the issue of emigration was more pressing than ever as “Americans will try in every possible way to induce people from all the countries of Europe.” Songa foresaw how, post-Revolution, the United States would expand its industry and require an even greater skilled workforce. “[This] emigration, which the independence of America may cause, is perhaps the first point which Europe must endeavour to prevent,” he noted. The second point Songa observed had to do with the futility of ordinances and laws to prevent emigration. “There are always ways to escape these laws,” he reminded his superiors. Instead, Songa suggested Habsburg officials should be braced to sacrifice their “lowest inferior workers” to “American temptations.”³⁰ Confirmation of Songa’s fears and predictions rang true following similar reports by Beelen. Within a year of his arrival in September 1783, Beelen observed the effects of American westward expansion into the newest counties of North Carolina annexed from Cherokee lands. The soil there was rich, the rivers plentiful, and the air clean but the land sparsely populated. The solution for the landholders, Beelen reported with alarm, rested on recruiting migrants from the Habsburg lands. “It is my knowledge,” Beelen stated, “that seven emigrant subjects of Your Majesty the Emperor—natives of the environs of Ghent, Kortrijk, Brussels and further—have already arrived at Philadelphia since my sojourn in this country.”³¹ Combined with the perceived political instability of the post-independent United States, such fears stoked the emerging negative view of America among Habsburg officials.

In the war’s aftermath it became increasingly clear that all of Europe had cause to fear the repercussions of the American Revolution. Beginning in the 1780s, successive waves of revolutionary ferment stalked the Habsburg lands. These rebellions were either reactive against the far-reaching Josephine reforms or the perceived injustices within Habsburg society. All of them were united by parallels to the American example. In 1784, an uprising broke out among

villagers in the mountains of Transylvania where tensions between the different ethnic groups in the region—Hungarian Szekels, German-speakers (known as Transylvanian Saxons), and Romanians often referred to as Wallachians—reached a tipping point. Wallachians had first appealed to the Habsburg monarch for a redress of grievances via several delegations to Vienna but when the imperially sanctioned extension of privileges proved difficult to enact back in Transylvania, the fighting started.³² Although Joseph had been sympathetic to their pleas, he now instructed the imperial army to restore order and end the bloodshed. In December 1784, two of the Wallachian leaders of the rebellion faced execution after they issued a proclamation demanding an end to the excessive abuses by feudal lords and the distribution of their lands to local peasants.³³

Although the Principality of Transylvania had suffered several spikes of social unrest in the eighteenth century,³⁴ observers in and outside the Habsburg Monarchy regarded Horea's rebellion, as it became known, as something different. In 1785, the sensationalist writer Jacques-Pierre Brissot drew the most obvious parallels between the Transylvanian situation and the American Revolution. He penned an imputation against Joseph II, alleging the emperor had denied the right of protest to the Wallachians by crushing the rebellion. In Brissot's eyes, the revolt was a "beautiful monument erected to liberty" which followed the American example before them. "They [the Wallachians] must say," he argued "if the American has been able, why not I?"³⁵ If the propositions of the Wallachians were unjust, Brissot further explained, "it must also be said that the declarations of the United States of America were equally unjust for they are exactly the same."³⁶ Brissot's comparison of the two rebellions in defence of peoples' rights echoed louder in Europe than the actual uprising itself. German and Italian translations quickly followed, bringing the criticism of the emperor's policy more directly to his subjects. In doing so, Brissot not only made Habsburg inhabitants aware of the parallels between their situation and the successful American Revolution, but he also made clear the rights Americans now enjoyed as a result of their independence. Article IV of the Maryland constitution of 1776 adorned the frontispiece of his pamphlet.³⁷ Purposefully selected by Brissot, it spoke directly to the Wallachian struggle: "Whenever the ends of government are perverted and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may and, of right, ought to reform the old or establish a new government."³⁸

Inspiration from the American Revolution existed across the Habsburg lands. The War of American Independence, in the eyes of many Habsburg inhabitants, had not been a bloody conflict or civil war but rather the just defence of liberty

against tyranny and a virtuous struggle to protect the inherent rights of the governed. Nowhere was this impression of the American Revolution stronger than in the Austrian Netherlands, where the inherent rights of subject became a flashpoint in the late 1780s. At the beginning of that decade, Joseph had endeavoured to reform the ancient customs and archaic privileges of the various estates under his dominion in order to create “just one body, uniformly governed.”³⁹ In the Austrian Netherlands this entailed sweeping reforms aiming to rid the region of, as one historian has candidly phrased it, the “museum of late-medieval corporate liberties.”⁴⁰ Joseph’s centralising crusade overhauled judicial, political, and religious apparatuses, provoking severe discontent at first and then open disagreement with the provincial estates. Aware of the mounting resistance to his plans, Joseph consoled his ministerial representative in Brussels by saying “do not be discouraged, dear Count, we will struggle together for the good of the state.”⁴¹ The people of the Duchy of Brabant within the Austrian Netherlands, however, saw to it that they were discouraged. Students’ protests erupted over the proposed changes to the seminary in Louvain/Leuven and they were joined before long by the estates themselves who issued a defiant proclamation against the continual abrogation of their endowed rights.⁴²

Amid the growing furour in Brabant, many leaders of the resistance drew parallels to their situation with the American Revolution. Information coming to subjects in the Austrian Netherlands via newspapers had been more pro-American in tone than elsewhere in the Monarchy. American constitutionalism seemed a realistic model based on coverage in the pages of the *Courrier de l’Escaut*, among others.⁴³ Those opposed to the Josephinian reforms emphasised the favourable results of the American Revolution, an event which had enriched the Austrian Netherlands, after all. At the outbreak of unrest in early 1787, Charles Lambert d’Outrepoint, a member of the provincial council of Brabant, gave a rousing speech which later reached the populace in print. In his view, the eighteenth century was one of revolution. Liberty had shone in Corsica and Poland before being extinguished; only America had been successful and now it was the time for the inhabitants of Brabant to decide whether or not to lift the torch.⁴⁴ D’Outrepoint expounded the opportunities awaiting the people of the Austrian Netherlands if they would only follow the “American example” and embrace a “government which approaches republicanism rather than despotism.”⁴⁵

D’Outrepoint was the first among a chorus of resisters who lauded the American cause as their rightful counterpart. A flood of lyrical verses hit the streets which Habsburg officials collected assiduously before forwarding them to ministers’ desks in Vienna.⁴⁶ “Be born free, fear the shackle, imitate America!”

instructed one placard; "I invite you without mercy, Poor Belgians, [and] Tyrannical Emperor, follow America," demanded one more; and "Poor Belgian people," announced another, "do as in America: shake off the yoke of your emperor!"⁴⁷ In Vienna, Kaunitz fretted they would actually succeed in imitating the Americans. If such a situation were to pass, he worried, then the people of the Austrian Netherlands who, he thought, enjoyed "so many attractive prospects for independence," could join the Americans as "the happiest peoples in the universe."⁴⁸

Two major anti-reformist groups emerged in the spring of 1787: the "traditionalists" and the "democrats."⁴⁹ Common to both parties was a consensus on the relevance of the American example.⁵⁰ The first group called for the defence of the ancient privileges against Joseph's modernising reforms and coalesced around the Estate of Brabant member Hendrik van der Noot, whose nickname—perhaps derogatorily—in Vienna was "the Franklin of the Austrian Netherlands."⁵¹ The second group centred on the more radical jurist Jan-Frans Vonck who argued in favour of reform but not without the democratic consent of those he governed. The "Vonckist" or "Democrats," as this group became known, clung more tightly to the American model.⁵² Some within this circle had either attempted to fight for the Revolution or had seen action in the War of American Independence.⁵³ Leading pamphleteers advocated emulation of the United States as resistance turned towards revolt and open rebellion throughout 1788 and 1789.⁵⁴ When the Vandernootists and Vonckists merged to form a revolutionary committee in 1789, they issued a manifesto on behalf of Brabanters in October 1789 "written in the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence."⁵⁵ The declaration led to the short-lived United Belgian States (*Verenigde Nederlandse Staten/États-Belgiques-Unis*) a few months later. Both the name and the resulting constitution directly referenced the American beacon across the Atlantic.⁵⁶

Revolution in the Austrian Netherlands helped the American Revolution to resonate even more loudly through the Habsburg lands. Although ultimately crushed by Habsburg forces within a year of existence, the road to the United Belgian States had created a lasting impression on Habsburg inhabitants. A young Hungarian noble named Gergely Berzeviczy passed through Brussels during the first stirrings of rebellion in 1787 and remarked how "uplifting" it was to witness the "courage and resolve" among the people "for the sake of freedom."⁵⁷ The scenes in Brussels only served to strengthen the democratic convictions of Berzeviczy, who was returning to Hungary after a sojourn to the British Isles. "England," he noted at the same time as he watched with interest the "ferment" in Brussels, had "shaped my political understanding and opinions,

which had previously been unclear.”⁵⁸ Upon arrival in Buda, Berzeviczy became an ardent advocate of consensual governance at a time when Hungarians defended their relationship and rights under Habsburg rule.

Like many of his fellow Hungarian noblemen, Berzeviczy believed in purported parallels between Hungary under the Habsburgs and the Americans formerly under British rule. The idea was so widespread that one Göttingen professor, who had taught many Hungarians, bemoaned how much he had suffered from hearing about this “pet idea of the Hungarian aristocracy.”⁵⁹ Hungarian nobles clung to the persistent fiction that Hungary was an independent kingdom ruled only via a personal union with a member of the House of Habsburg.⁶⁰ Rulership existed only with consent of the ruled in this train of thinking. When abuses by the ruler forced the ruled to break that contract, then any dissent was lawful and even necessary, as the Americans had shown. Joseph’s imposition of reforms prejudicial to the Hungarian people constituted, so the logic ran, a rejectable abuse of power.

In the summer of 1789, Berzeviczy gave a speech in which he advanced the notion that Joseph had repeatedly infringed upon the rights of Hungarians; his list of grievances was a clear imitation of the Declaration of American Independence, of which he had obtained a handwritten copy during his travels.⁶¹ He elaborated on these charges after Joseph’s death in early 1790 when effective change in Hungary seemed possible. His pamphlet *De dominio Austriae in Hungaria* (On the rule of Austria in Hungary) specifically referenced the United States and United Belgian States as examples of people “blessed by freedom” after years of subjugation. When rule turned to tyranny, their rebellions seemed “natural” and righteous in Berzeviczy’s eyes.⁶²

By the time Berzeviczy’s *De dominio Austriae* passed privately among liberal circles in Hungary, the revolutionary scene in Europe had changed, however. The French Revolution in July 1789 captivated many Hungarians much like the American Revolution had previously done. One Hungarian poet, János Nagyváthy, considered the present moment in 1790 as the beginning of a future utopia for Hungarians. Imagining himself as an observer in the year 1900 and looking back on history, he saw how freedom had begun first with the English, then the Americans, followed by the French, and finally the “noble-hearted” Hungarians.⁶³ There were those who were determined to bring the example of the American Revolution to Hungary sooner than Nagyváthy envisioned.

Radical elements within Hungarian society were labelled “Jacobin” at the time for their inspiration by the French Jacobin faction of anti-royalists. This group, however, also took considerable inspiration from the Americans. Among

them was the legal theorist József Hajnóczy, whose pamphlets urged liberal civic and juridical reform in the Hungarian lands. His ties to American revolutionary thought stretched back earlier than his political writings. During the War of American Independence, Hajnóczy had received a commission from the Hungarian magnate Ferenc Széchényi to assemble a library for his county seat. Today it forms the core of the Hungarian National Library and contains some of the rarest Americana from this period, which means that Hajnóczy took an avid interest in obtaining American works.⁶⁴ Hajnóczy also utilised his employer's assembled materials for his own personal systematic study.⁶⁵ His fascination with American political principals continued up to the French Revolution, when he supplied material and articles to the periodical *Hadi és Más Nevezetes Történetek* (Military and other notable stories), which had looked favourably on the new American republic throughout the 1780s. Hajnóczy supplied the editors with his personal copy of the French translation of Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man* for reprinting in 1791.⁶⁶ Reflecting his legal background, Hajnóczy also published his own works extolling the wisdom and virtue of the American laws. In one, he recommended introducing a Hungarian version of the Virginia statute for religious freedom. "There is no doubt," he declared, "that this law, breathing with humanity, could take root here just the same as there."⁶⁷

Hajnóczy's admiration for American laws and his desire to implement them in Hungary brought him into contact with the future "Jacobin" circles. Central to this group was Ignác Martinovics, who, while less intellectual than Hajnóczy, was just as passionate about the American example. Historians generally identify Martinovics as the first embodiment of the Age of Revolutions in the Habsburg Monarchy, without realising his proper motivations or his alleged "conspiracy" movement.⁶⁸ Descended from a Habsburg-Serbian family, Martinovics taught natural sciences at the University of Lemberg (Lviv) where he was admitted as a Freemason in the "Honest Man" lodge. He became engrossed in masonic mythology and helped propagate the proliferation of lodges across Hungary in the 1780s. Martinovics led a double life, however. He had been recruited by the court intelligence service in Vienna to infiltrate and report on the masonic movement. In 1792, Martinovics filed a report with the director of court intelligence, alleging a list of names of the Viennese Illuminati who swore oaths to defend "in writing, in speech and with arms the current situation of France and America against all despots."⁶⁹ In other reports, he warned of a growing "French-American fever" in the Habsburg lands.⁷⁰

Although Martinovics worked as an informer for the Habsburg court, he remained loyal to revolutionary ideas, explicitly referring to the United States



FIGURE 17. The execution of the Hungarian “Jacobins” in 1795

as the “immortal American Republic” and ranking foreign rulers against Washington or Paine.⁷¹ In one of his most incendiary pamphlets, Martinovics encouraged aristocrats to introduce changes “in the Pennsylvanian way,” and lauded the results of the American constitution. “I adore the Philadelphia Convention,” he stated openly.⁷² The boldness of his prose had alienated Martinovics from the court and cost him his position as an informer, but it did not matter much. In 1794, he began actively recruiting members for his own societies, modelled after the Jacobin clubs in France.⁷³ He named Hajnóczy as one of four directors and co-authored pamphlets calling for the overthrow of monarchism. According to the radicals, sovereignty rested entirely within the people, who were responsible to exercise it themselves, and not the monarchy.⁷⁴ Habsburg authorities might have tolerated allusions to American constitutionalism and the defence of rights but emulating the seditious extremism of the French Jacobins triggered a crackdown. Faced with arrest and certain death, Martinovics surrendered himself and betrayed his accomplices who were subsequently located and arrested. In May 1795, he and six others—including Hajnóczy—were publicly executed in Buda.

The execution of the Hungarian Jacobins marked a point when the American Revolution could no longer serve as an open ambition. Works by the most prominent American revolutionaries that had been permitted during the 1770s and 1780s now entered censorship lists for the first time. Franklin's novel *The Speech of Polly Baker* from 1747 received a retroactive ban in 1794, followed by a French translation of his autobiography.⁷⁵ Books published as late as 1827 on American themes showed evidence of censorship.⁷⁶ Following the executions, the Bishop of Agram (Zagreb) Miska Verhovacz, a councillor named Jakob Szecsenacz, and the jurist Paul Lukács were all arrested for their ownership of texts by Thomas Paine or for publishing works related to Franklin.⁷⁷ The poet, Mihály Vitéz Csokonai, expressed his despair at the changing freedom in 1795. In a letter to a friend following his expulsion from the Reformed College of Debrecen on account of his liberal ideas, he wrote:

I, an exile in my own country, carry on my days in boredom. I am happy only when I can find a New World for myself, and build there a Republic, a Philadelphia. At least there, like Franklin, I can snatch lightning from heaven and the sceptres from tyrants.⁷⁸

The conservatism of the 1790s and 1800s could not completely eradicate the legacy of the American Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, however. "I still hold to the great American sage, Franklin," Csokonai admitted privately to a liberal friend in 1803.⁷⁹ And adherents of American ideals discovered new ways of conveying its ideas. Berzeviczy, who had narrowly avoided the fate of Hajnóczy and Martinovics, focused instead on the economic power of the United States and frequently used it as validation for his free-trade plans for the Hungarian lands.⁸⁰ Praise of American military figures such as George Washington became the new focal point as he embodied the more positive virtue and patriotic good of the Revolution. When Hungarian-Americans later chose to erect a monument to a prominent American in Budapest, they chose Washington who best represented "the embodiment of both American ideals, and of the ideal of Hungarians on both sides of the Atlantic."⁸¹ Franklin, who throughout this period was the paragon of the Revolution, underwent a sanitised retelling during the early years of the post-Napoleonic order. A biographical account by Ferenc Szilágyi, published in Transylvania in 1818, presented Franklin first and foremost as a scientist and publicist who happened to play some role in the Revolution's course.⁸² For a generation of later Hungarian nationalists and revolutionaries such as Count István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth, Franklin represented only

a moral figure through his writings and sayings.⁸³ His revolutionary activity no longer mattered in the way it once had.

RESIDENTS IN THE Habsburg Monarchy never lost sight of the American Revolution. Its flame smouldered but was not extinguished. The dilution of the explosiveness of the first revolutionary experience in Central Europe during the early nineteenth century ultimately gave way to a period of greater unrest. In the revolutions of 1848–1849, the United States again became a symbol of a utopia created out of courageous adherence to righteous, unalienable principles.⁸⁴ Kossuth, the new “Washington of Hungary,” solicited American support by nurturing a Hungarian martyrology in which the Emperor Francis Joseph I became George III and the Hungarians were either the Puritans seeking freedom and liberty or republicans in search of their independence.⁸⁵ In Habsburg Lombardy, protagonists agitating for reform and Italian nationalists aiming for independence both drew inspiration from the American example. They aimed to break the lucrative state monopolies in order to gain political leverage. The tobacco boycott, begun on New Year’s Day in 1848, allowed an easy parallel to the infamous Boston Tea Party. “Franklin’s fellow citizens abstained from tea; as of today you ought to refuse tobacco,” ran the refrain.⁸⁶ For moderates like Carlo Cattaneo, who initially resisted Italian unification in favour of greater autonomy for Lombardy within the Habsburg system, American federal government served a possible blueprint for the future. Like many Milanese publicists and jurists, Cattaneo interpreted the American Revolution as a useful justification for federalisation and as a balm against the more fervent calls for secession and unification with the Italian peninsula.⁸⁷ Cattaneo and his companions were not alone in finding an American model. In 1849 and in 1906, two separate plans would have reformulated the Habsburg Monarchy towards a federalised American structure.⁸⁸ From the immediate post-Napoleonic aftermath known as the *Vormärz* to the twilight decades of Habsburg rule in Central Europe, the American political example and its republican style of government continually beckoned.⁸⁹

The American experiment shone gradually brighter as the antithesis to the old regime in Europe. At his nadir after successive defeats by Napoleon, Emperor Francis reportedly said that he should emigrate to America to atone for his political failings.⁹⁰ If true, the emperor was implying that the United States was a suitable punishment for his inability to defend the principles of monarchy and his imperial power. Many of his subjects were inclined to disagree. Travellers and migrants from the Habsburg Monarchy in the United States recognised it as a land entirely different to their own. Some, like Joseph Donath, began to question

their former homeland. People there, in his estimation, were "deprived of civil liberty" and "vassals" who required "the flame of liberty" to spread among them.⁹¹ Writing from Philadelphia in his "happy hemisphere," he looked upon the scene of Europe and Francis's coronation in July 1792 with great haughtiness. "What animal is the emperor?" Donath asked his friend in Prague before concluding that the emperor was, "in plain English, a butcher of men."⁹² Being in America confirmed or awoke such bias in Habsburg migrants looking back on their land of origin. Maria von Born, daughter of the celebrated Transylvanian mineralogist Ignaz von Born, spent twenty years in the United States. She returned to Vienna in 1815 and disapproved of its poor education system, its lack of public welfare, and the insufficient intelligence of its inhabitants. "How has Vienna fallen behind," she exclaimed, "because young America is growing up fast!"⁹³

The lure of America as a promised land, a free land, became increasingly stronger throughout the nineteenth century. The Austrian poet Nicholas Lenau characterised his emigration to the United States as a journey "towards freedom."⁹⁴ István Széchenyi extolled America as "the country where the Rights of Mankind are most equal and where the constitution is best."⁹⁵ He desired most of all to travel to the United States in the 1830s but like many compatriots, he faced discouragement and prevention from Viennese authorities who distrusted the influence of the American republic in an era after the French Revolution. The Austrian Chancellor Prince Klemens von Metternich thought Széchenyi bizarre for wanting to visit America and viewed his travel plans with suspicion. In his personal diary, Széchenyi decried such derision. "By heaven, there are people who do not understand that some want to visit a free country!"⁹⁶ Though Metternich and his colleagues could dissuade Széchenyi from his American travels, subsequent generations of Habsburg ministers could not prevent the ever-rising tide of movement between the Habsburg lands and the United States. Széchenyi's oldest son, Béla Széchenyi, realised his father's dream by touring the northern United States during the American Civil War and publishing an instructive account of his journey in Hungarian, which extolled the marvels of American progress.⁹⁷ In the second half of the nineteenth century, the trickle of migration turned into a flood. By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, nearly four million Habsburg subjects had crossed the Atlantic for a new life in the nation forged by the American Revolution. Few were aware, however, that tens of thousands of them migrated along the Adriatic-Atlantic route first established during the selfsame revolutionary period.⁹⁸

Like them, we too may have lost sight of the Habsburg moment in the American Revolution, but simply because it is forgotten does not reduce its

importance. If we are to understand the Age of Revolutions, we must appreciate the areas where revolutionary sentiments smouldered for longer rather than erupted on short fuses. The American Revolution exerted a profound influence on the eighteenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Lives were shaped by its war, fortunes were made in its shadow, and policies altered in its wake. The Revolution was a difficult opportunity, a challenge of adaptation for the Habsburgs as much as it was an invitation to emulate the Atlantic powers of Europe. The American Revolution and its influence in the Habsburg lands did not come out of nowhere, but rather through a sustained and intensive interest by people made curious by the events and rhetoric from across the ocean. The impulse to chase economic gains cemented the Monarchy's interests further into the Atlantic, but this imperial outreach was short-lived. The Habsburg exigency of securing new relations with a sovereign United States faltered at the hands of Thomas Jefferson, who, unlike some of his contemporaries, viewed the monarchy with a critical eye. Nevertheless, in the later decades of the eighteenth century, the embers of revolutionary zeal smouldered on to flare up on distinct occasions throughout the Monarchy's existence. Infused with the radicalism of the French revolutionary movement, the original American imprint within the Habsburg mentality could no longer continue unchallenged. The once revolutionary pull, which had animated so many individuals across the Habsburg lands during the 1770s and 1780s, succumbed to the ideological pressure of the 1790s and emergence of a new reactionary conservatism at the dawn of a new century.

When young Benjamin Silas Arthur Schuster came of age during this period, his world was fundamentally different from the one of his parents. In theirs, the American example shone like a beacon, and they were unafraid to declare openly their enthusiasm for its cause, bold enough to name their "petit Américain" after its illustrious leaders and daring enough to inform Franklin of their prayers for him and his fellow revolutionaries. In place of their world was a new regime, tighter and more reactionary to the revolutionary murmurings such actions could divulge. It was a stark cry from the Habsburg Monarchy of the 1770s and 1780s which harboured interested enthusiasts such as the Schusters and where even the rulers themselves read the latest thoughts of American leaders. We may never know whether Benjamin S. A. Schuster lived on with pride in his name, becoming a "grand Américain," or whether he chose to conceal it, shunning his godfathers in absentia. But we do know the reality of an expansive revolutionary movement which affected greatly the inhabitants of the Habsburg lands and, for a time, compelled many of them towards a more open, oceanic, and expansive interaction with the world. Though the Habsburg moment in the American Revolution was brief, it was intense and influential.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Domarchiv St. Stephan, Wien, Geburts und Taufbuch der Dompfarre St. Stephan, Tomus 94, fol. 153r.

2. The original letter is lost but referenced in the next citation below.

3. Library of the American Philosophical Society [APS], Franklin Papers, Series VI, Letter No. XXVII, 92.5, Jean-Chrétien Schuster to Franklin, 8 February 1783.

4. I have found no trace of Maria Schuster's death in the *Sterbebücher* of the appropriate diocese. Johann Schuster, according to the baptismal register, worked for *Steiner & Co*, the sabre and blade manufactory belonging to the Swiss-born Melchior Steiner, see Mentschl, "Steiner, Melchior (II.) von (1762–1837), Großhändler, Fabrikant und Bankier," in *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon*, 13:176.

5. John Adams, diary entry of 10 October 1782 following a study of the journal of Guy Claude, comte de Sarsfield through Bruges and Ostend in *The Adams Papers*, 3:10–40; *Magyar Hírmondó*, 17 November 1780; Klíma, "Glassmaking Industry and Trade in Bohemia, 520.

6. Diekmann, Lockruf der Neuen Welt; O'Reilly, *Agenten, Werbung und Reisemodalitäten*, 109–120; O'Reilly, *Alluding to Alternatives*, 159–184.

7. Sir Robert Murray Keith to Thomas Bradshaw, 5 March 1774, in Smyth, *Memoirs and Correspondence*, 1:461.

8. Singerton, "Knowledge of and Sympathy for the American Cause," 128–158; Singerton, "A Revolution in Ink," 91–113.

9. Dippel, *The American Revolution and the Modern Concept of 'Revolution'*, 124–129; Bödeker, *The Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth-Century German Thought*, 35–52; Stourzh, *Liberal Democracy as a Culture of Rights*, 11–41.

10. Kazinczy, "Pályám emlékezete [Remembrance of My Career]," in *Versek, műfordítások, széppróza, tanulmányok* [Poems, Translations, Belles-Lettres, and Studies], ed. Mária Szuander, 1:252; Závodszy, *American Effects*, 29.

11. O'Reilly, "Lost Chances," 53–70; O'Reilly, *A Life in Exile*, 66–90; Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 118–167.

12. Pace, "Franklin and Italy since the Eighteenth Century," 243–244; Szilassy, "America and the Hungarian Revolution," 180–196; Halácsy, "The Image of Benjamin

Franklin in Hungary,” 9–25; Katona, “The Hungarian Image of Benjamin Franklin,” 43–60; Závodszy, *American Effects*, 15–16, 20–24.

13. Hochedlinger, *Austria’s Wars of Emergence*, 281 and 300–301; Dickson, *Finance and Government*, 2:Appendix, fig. A:1.

14. De Dorlodot, “Les ports d’Ostende et de Nieuport,” 141–157; Van Gucht, “*De trans-Atlantische handel vanuit Oostende*”; HuiBREchts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*.”

15. Ronkard, “Les répercussions de la Guerre Américaine,” 51–90; Parmentier, *Profit and Neutrality*, 206–226.

16. Dull, *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*; Ferreiro, *American Independence and the Men of France and Spain*.

17. Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, 393; Scott, *British Foreign Policy*.

18. Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence*; Gould, *Among the Powers of the Earth*.

19. On Russia: Golder, “Catherine II. and The American Revolution,” 92–96; Griffiths, “Nikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy, and the American Revolution,” 1–24; Bolkhovitinov, *Rossiiia i voina SShA za nezavisimost’ 1775 - 1783* [Russia and the War of the United States of America for Independence]; Bolkhovitinov, “The Declaration of Independence,” 1389–1398. On Sweden: Benson, *Sweden and the American Revolution*; Johnson, *Swedish Contributions to American Freedom*; Elovson, *Amerika i svensk litteratur*; Johnson, “Swedish Officers in the American Revolution,” 33–39; Barton, “Sweden and the War of American Independence,” 408–430. On Poland: Marraro, “Philip Mazzei and His Polish Friends,” 757–822; Libiszowska, “Polish Opinion of the American Revolution,” 5–15; Sokol, “The American Revolution and Poland,” 3–17; Tazbir, “Knowledge of Colonial North America in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Poland,” 99–109. On the German lands (in addition to those cited below): Kapp, *Friedrich der Grosse und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*; Gallinger, *Die Haltung der deutschen Publizistik*; Haworth, “Frederick the Great and the American Revolution,” 460–478; Dippel, “Die Wirkung der amerikanischen Revolution,” 101–121; Overhoff, “Die transatlantischen Bezüge der hamburgischen Aufklärung,” 57–84. This list here is far from extensive.

20. Atwood, *The Hessians*; Crytzer, *Hessians*; Szyndler, Tadeusz Kościuszko, 1746–1817; Pula, Tadeusz Kościuszko; Wrangel, *Lettres d’Axel de Fersen*; Barton, *Count Hans Axel von Fersen*.

21. Bailyn, “The Idea of Atlantic History,” 19–44; Bailyn, *Atlantic History*; Canny, “Atlantic History: what and why?” 399–411; Elliot, *Afterword: Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation*, 233–249, esp. 239.

22. Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” 741–757.

23. “It is possible that we are reaching the limits of its [Atlantic History] utility for historians of the Revolution.” Cogliano, *Revolutionary America 1763–1815*, xv; Games, et al., “Forum: Beyond the Atlantic,” 675–742.

24. Calderón and Thibaud, *Revolucion en el mundo Atlántico*; Griffin, *American Leviathan*; Saunt, *West of the Revolution*; DuVal, *Independence Lost*; Taylor, *American*

Revolutions, 4–5; Spero, *Frontier Rebels*; Langley, *The Long American Revolution*; McFarlane, *The American Revolution and Spanish America*, 37–61.

25. Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds,” 764–786; Cohen, “Was there an Amerindian Atlantic?” 388–410; Bushnell, *Indigenous America and the Limits of the Atlantic World*, 191–221.

26. Wulf, “No Boundaries? New Terrain in Colonial American History,” 7–12; Wulf, “Vast Early America.”

27. Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique/Algemeen Rijksarchief van België [ARB], Secrétaire d’État et Guerre [SEG], 2151/2, Rapports du 18 Juillet et du 26 Septembre 1782 sur un projet d’acquisition de l’Isle de Tobago; Nicolaus Fontana, “Tagebuch der Reise des k.k. Schiffes Joseph und Theresia nach den neuen österreichischen Pflanzorten in Asia und Afrika,” orig. trans. Joseph Eyerel, Joseph (Leipzig, 1782) in G. Pilleri, ed., *Maria Teresa e le Indie orientali: La spedizione alle Isole Nicobare della nave Joseph und Theresia e il diario del chirurgo di bordo* (Bern: Verlag de Hirnanatomischen Institutes, 1982), 9; Bolts, *Précis de l’Origine*, 14.

28. The same can be said for the Baltic and other ports on the North Sea, see Pohl, *Die Beziehungen Hamburgs*; Weber, *Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel*; Evans and Rydén, *Baltic Iron*.

29. Haus-, Hof und Staatsarchiv [HHStA], Staatskanzlei [StK], Spanien, Karton [K]. 109–1, Paolo Giusti, ‘Considérations sur l’état présent de l’Espagne’ (1 April 1780), Part XXVIII ‘Examen de la question s’il seroit de l’intérêt de la cour impériale que Gibraltar tombât au pouvoir de l’Espagne.’

30. Armitage, Bashford, and Sivasundaram, *Oceanic Histories*.

31. For a good example of this, see Abulafia, *The Great Sea*.

32. Randa, *Österreich in Übersee*; Babudieri, *Trieste e gli interessi austriaci*; Markov, “L’expansion autrichienne,” 281–329. The recent work of Dr. Klemens Kaps is especially illuminating in this respect, see, for example, his “Handelsverflechtungen,” 445–464; and his *A Gateway to the Spanish Atlantic?*, 246–264.

33. Weber, *Deutsche Kaufleute*; Kossok, *Die Bedeutung des spanisch-amerikanischen Kolonialmarktes*, 210–218; Zeuske and Ludwig, “Amerikanische Kolonialwaren in Preußen und Sachsen,” 257–301; Steffen and Weber, *Spinning and Weaving*, 87–108.

34. For a useful discussion on the hybrid imperial nature of the Habsburg Monarchy, see Frank, “Continental and Maritime Empires,” 783.

35. Hertz, “England and the Ostend Company,” 255–279; Narang, “The Ostend Company’s Records,” 17–37; Everaert, *Willem Bolts*, 363–369.

36. De Dorlodot, “Les ports d’Ostende et de Nieuport,” 141–157; Huibrechts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*.”

37. *Magyar Hírmondó*, 1 November 1780.

38. Two notable exceptions are: Strohmeier, *Die Habsburger Reiche* and Rady, *The Habsburgs*.

39. Pollack-Parnau, *Eine österreich-ostindische Handelskompanie*; Tschugguel, “*Österreichische Handelskompanien*”; Hatschek, *Sehnsucht nach fernen Ländern*, 85–99; Navrátilová and Mišek, “Austrian Diplomacy in the Orient,” 199–204; Botez,

"Maximilian Hell," 165–174; Klemun, "Space, State, Territory, Region, and Habitat," 414–415; Madriñán, Jacquin's American Plants; Walsh, "*Between the Arctic & the Adriatic*"; Do Paço, L'Orient à Vienne; Do Paço, "Patronage and Expertise," 48–64.

40. Brechka, Van Swieten and His World; Lindner, Ignaz von Born; Schmidt, "Franz von Dombay," 75–168; King, "William Bolts," 1–28; Aspaas and Kontler, Maximilian Hell. We need only to think how apparent this is in the field of music with many composers imbibing new cultural dimensions in Vienna.

41. O'Reilly, *Habsburg Eighteenth-Century Global Contexts*. I am grateful to the author for sharing his preliminary draft. For now, see O'Reilly, "Global, Regional and Small Spaces," 201–211.

42. Knott, "Narrating the Age of Revolution," 3–36; McDonnell, "Rethinking the Age of Revolution," 301–314.

43. Faÿ, *L'esprit révolutionnaire en France*; Echeverria, *Mirage in the West*; Appleby, "America as a Model," 267–286; Hulliung, *Citizens and Citoyens*; Whatmore, "*The French and North American Revolutions*," 219–238.

44. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*; Adelman, "An Age of Imperial Revolutions," 319–340; Armitage and Subrahmanyam, *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context*.

45. Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*; Gaspar and Geggus, *A Turbulent Time*; Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions*; Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*.

46. Polasky, "Traditionalists, Democrats, and Jacobins," 227–262; Polasky, *Revolutions without Borders*; Polasky, "Revolutionaries between Nations," 165–201.

47. Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime in Europe*. Less influential but still useful is the edited volume: Newman, *Europe's American Revolution*.

48. Palmer, *Age of Democratic Revolution*, 1:103–110, 263–265; 2:156–173.

49. Palmer, Foreword to Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*, ix.

50. Dippel, *Americana Germanica 1770–1800*; Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*.

51. Israel, *The Expanding Blaze*, 606.

52. Wangermann, *Von Joseph II. zu den Jakobinerprozessen*; Körner, "Franz Hebenstreit," 39–62; Reinalter, *Jakobiner in Mitteleuropa*. An outlier is of course: Loft, "The Transylvanian Peasant Uprising," 209–218.

53. John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 13 July 1783, *The Papers of John Adams* [PJA], 15:106–109; Barlow, *Conspiracy of Kings*, 9.

54. Goger, "*Die Beziehungen der Habsburgermonarchie zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika von 1838 bis 1867*"; Curti, "Austria and the United States," 141–220; Loidolt, "*Die Beziehungen Österreichs*"; Szilassy, "America and the Hungarian Revolution," 180–196.

55. Metternich quoted in Sofka, "Metternich's Theory of European Order," 148n64.

56. Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, 224; Schwartz, "Roundtable Review," 6. A similar line is taken by the politician-cum-historian Heinrich Drimmel in his *Die Antipoden*.

57. Singerton, *175 or 235 Years of Austro-American Relations?*, 13–30.
58. Quote from Agstner, *Austria-Hungary and its Consulates*, 36. “Between 1776 and 1829, the United States and the Habsburg Empire had very little to do with one another [. . .]” in Phelps, *U.S.-Habsburg Relations*, 40. Cf. Singerton, “A Story of Benign Neglect?” 56–68.
59. Zahra, *The Great Departure*; Steidl, Fischer-Nebmaier and Oberly, *From a Multiethnic Empire*.
60. Mettauer, “American Studies in Austria”; Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization*; Gassert, “*The Spectre of Americanization*,” 189.
61. Abádi-Nagy, “Not an Untroubled Bliss,” 3–13; Frank and Kövecses, “American Studies in Hungary”; Federmayer, “American Studies in Hungary”; Jařab, “American Studies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.”
62. Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*; Benna, “Österreichs erste diplomatische Vertretung,” 215–240; Fichtner, *Viennese Perspectives*, 19–32; Gorman, *America and Belgium*; Dvoichenko-Markov, “A Rumanian Priest,” 383–389. See also Halácsy, Kátóna, and Závodszy, *American Effects*.
63. Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*; Király and Barany, *East Central European Perceptions*; Tazbir, “The Discovery of America in East-Central Europe,” 263–283.
64. Kunec, “Hungarian Participants,” 41–57.
65. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 48–71. For this reason, I do not prefer the term Habsburg Empire in this book, see Strohmeier, “*Ein Problemaufriss*,” 1027–1056.
66. HHStA, Sonderbestände, Nachlass Schlitter, K. 16, ‘Selbstaubographie’, fols. 40–41; Schlitter, *Beziehung*.
67. Schlitter, *ibid.*, 102–105.

Chapter 1

1. Molnár Basa, “English and Hungarian Cultural Contacts,” 209; Hoff, *Kurze Lebensabrisse*, 2–22.
2. O’Reilly, *Habsburg Eighteenth-Century Global Contexts*. I am grateful to the author for sharing his preliminary draft with me.
3. Bray, “Crop Plants and Cannibals,” 298.
4. Feest, *Von Kalikut nach Amerika*, 367–375. For Maximilian’s claim to universal monarchy, see Madar, *Maximilian and the Exotic*, 237–238.
5. Appelbaum, *Triumph*, 19.
6. Madar, *Maximilian and the Exotic*, 238; MacDonald, “Collecting a New World,” 649.
7. Kleinschmidt, *Ruling the Waves*, 24–25, 117–118, 188–192.
8. Feest, “The People of Calicut,” 295. The artist was Jörg Kölderer.

9. Madar, *Maximilian and the Exotic*, 239–240; Kleinschmidt, *Ruling the Waves*, 196–208.
10. Laubenberger and Rowan, “The Naming of America,” 92–93.
11. For Charles V, see Vandenbroeck, *Amerindian Art*,” 99–104, 110–117. For Maximilian II and Rudolf II, see Gschwend, *The Emperor’s Exotic*, 76–103.
12. MacDonald, “Collecting a New World,” 653, 659, and 663.
13. Turpin, *The New World Collections*, 65–66; Laferl, *Die Kultur der Spanier in Österreich*, 169–171.
14. Pieper, *Die Vermittlung einer Neuen Welt*, 21112 and 201.
15. Pieper, *ibid.*, 29; Rudolph, “Kunstbestrebungen,” 170.
16. Heger, “Altmexikanische Reliquien,” 379–400; Brezina, “Der mexikanische Federschild,” 138–140; Feest, “Vienna’s Mexican Treasures,” 1–64; Meadow, *The Aztecs at Ambras*, 349–368.
17. O’Reilly, “Lost Chances,” 59; O’Reilly, *A Life in Exile*, 66–90.
18. O’Reilly, “Lost Chances,” 66–70; Döberl, *The Royal and Imperial Stables*, 197–232.
19. Page, “Music and the Royal Procession,” 104; Yonan, *Politics of Imperial Art*, 31–41.
20. Ács, *Reformations in Hungary*, 228–229.
21. Gschwend, *The Emperor’s Exotic*, 98; Belozerskaya, *Menageries*, 71; Zedinger, Franz Stephan, 249–253.
22. Simáková and Macháková, *Teatralia*, 1:215, figures XXII–XXIII; Polleroß, *Amerika in der Wissenschaft*, 243; Sommer-Mathis, *Amerika auf der Bühne*, 290.
23. Cesky Krumlov, Státni Hrad a Zámek, Inv. No. 2173.
24. Ivanič, *Cosmos and Materiality*, 30; Hanß, *Making Featherwork*, 148.
25. Oliván, “Two Imperial Ambassadors,” 95–118.
26. Hyden-Hanscho, *France as an Intermediary for Atlantic Products*, 153–167; Hyden-Hanscho, “Invisible Globalization,” 11–54.
27. This occurred with the relative decline in popularity of exotic feathers by seventeenth century, see Johnson, *Cultural Hierarchy*, 256–258 and 264. Cf. Rublack, “Be-feathering the European,” 43–51.
28. Schmale, Romberg, Köstlbauer, *The Language of Continent Allegories*; Romberg, *Die Welt im Dienst des Glaubens*.
29. I extrapolate this number from the *Continental Allegories in the Baroque Age* database <https://erdteiallegorien.univie.ac.at/> (October 2018).
30. Romberg, *Did Europe Exist in the Parish before 1800?*, 101–102.
31. Otruba, “Österreichische Jesuitenpatres,” 31.
32. Otruba, *ibid.*, 31; Otruba, “Der Anteil österreichischer Jesuitenmissionäre,” 430–445; Rynes, “Los Jesuitas Bohémicos,” 193–202.
33. Boglár, “XVIII. Századi magyar utazók Dél-Amerikában,” 449–461; Babarczi, “*Magyar jezsuiták Braziliában.*”
34. Gagliano and Ronan, *Jesuit Encounters*.
35. Po-Chia Hsia, “Jesuit Foreign Missions,” 58–59.
36. Křížová, “Meeting the Other,” 37–38.

37. Kristóf, *Diabolized Representations*, 38–73; Kristóf, *The Uses of Demonology*, 161–182.
38. “Dissertatio philologica de homine” in *Calendarium 1709* cited in Kristóf, *Local Access to Global Knowledge*, 209.
39. Neumann, *Historia seditionum*. Neumann was born in Brussels but came to the Bohemian province for training in the 1660s; see Christelow, “Father Joseph Neumann,” 423–442; Rodríguez, “Joseph Neumann,” 237–259.
40. Quoted in and translated by Křížová, “Meeting the Other,” 42.
41. Kristóf, *Local Access to Global Knowledge*, 208.
42. “Dissertatio geographica altera” in *Calendarium 1681*; “Admiranda plantarum, Viridarium philosophicum” in *Calendarium 1691*; “Descriptio avium peregrinarum” in *Calendarium 1695* cited in Kristóf, *ibid.*, 209.
43. Szentiványi, *Curiosiora et Selectiora*; Angyal, *Martin Szentiványi*, 152–163.
44. Martini Szentivany [*sic*], “Dissertatio physica curiosa de plantis” and “Viridarium Philosophicum” in *Calendarium Cassoviense ad annum Jesu Christi* (Košice, 1754), 63–84.
45. The title of Bertalanffi’s work was *Világnak két ren-beli rövid ismerete [A brief introduction to two colonies of the world]* (Trnava/Nagyszombat, 1757). See Závodszyk, *American Effects*, 10.
46. The first editions between the years 1726 and 1736 were printed in Augsburg as well as Graz; the later editions from 1748 to 1761 were printed in Vienna. See Anhang 2: Die jesuitische Missionszeitschrift der “Neue Welt-Bott” in Borja González, *Jesuitische Berichterstattung*, 277–278.
47. Borja González, *ibid.*, 124–166; Dürr, “The World in the German Hinterlands,” 148–153.
48. Strasser, *Jesuit Migrations*, 104–106.
49. Dürr, “Der ‘Neue Welt-Bott’,” 441.
50. “Anhang 3: Berichterstattung im ‘Neuen Welt-Bott’ nach Regionen,” in Borja González, *Jesuitische Berichterstattung*, 279–281.
51. Borja González and Strasser, *German Circumnavigation*, 73–92.
52. Strasser, *Jesuit Migrations*, 107.
53. Oppermann, *Conceptions of Space*, 111–121.
54. Strasser, *Jesuit Migrations*, 105.
55. Duhr, *Deutsche Auslandssehnsucht*, 47.
56. Borja González, *Jesuitische Berichterstattung*, 167.
57. Many turned to academic positions, see Shore, *Enduring the Deluge*, 148–161. For the Habsburg Italian provinces, see Guasti, *Spanish Jesuits in Italy*, 248–261.
58. Borja González, *Jesuitische Berichterstattung*, 180–186; Stolley, *East from Eden*, 243–262.
59. Tirsch assembled these into the so-called *Codex Pictoricus Mexicanus* located in the Czech National Library; Národní knihovna České republiky, Oddělení rukopisů a vzácných tisků, Sign. XVI B 18.

60. Beales, *Joseph II*, 1:460–464.
61. Lüsebrink, *Between Ethnology and Romantic Discourse*, 129.
62. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, 1:iii–iv.
63. Dobrizhoffer, *Historia de Abiponibus equestri*; Dobrizhoffer, *Geschichte der Abiponer*.
64. Dobrizhofer, *An Account of the Abipones*, 1:v.
65. De Asúa, Science in the Vanished Arcadia, 32; Altic, “Post-Expulsion Jesuit Cartography,” 108; Borja González, Jesuitische Berichterstattung, 232–236.
66. Shore, Jesuits and the Politics of Religious Pluralism, 163–174.
67. Fertig, *Transatlantic Migration*, 195.
68. Fertig enumerated 130,000 between 1683 and 1800, see his *Lokales Leben, atlantische Welt*, 79.
69. Melton, Religion, Community, and Slavery; Gillespie and Beachy, Pious Pursuits; Engel, Religion and Profit.
70. O’Reilly, *Salzburg to the New World*, 120; Thirring, “Die Auswanderung aus Ungarn,” 1–29.
71. Bartlett and Mitchell, *State-Sponsored Immigration*, 91–114; O’Reilly, *Agenten, Werbung und Reisemodalitäten*, 109–120.
72. O’Reilly, Competition for Colonists: Europe and Her Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (University of Galway, n.d.), 6; https://www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/docs/o'reilly_competition_octo4.pdf [December 2019].
73. Diekmann, Lockruf der Neuen Welt; Görisch, Information zwischen Werbung und Warnung.
74. O’Reilly, “Competition for Colonists,” 14.
75. O’Reilly, *Salzburg to the New World*, 119.
76. Schelbert and Rappolt, Alles ist ganz anders hier; O’Reilly, *Bridging the Atlantic*, 25–44.
77. Anon., Der Steyerische Robinson, ii–iii.
78. Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World, 3–34 and 52–156.
79. Frisi, *La colombiade*, vii–xx.
80. Quoted and translated by Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World, 110.
81. Carli, *Le lettere americane*., 2nd ed., 1:197–198, 207; 2:16.
82. Miller, “Some Early Italian Histories,” 103–106. German translation appeared in 1785, French in 1788.
83. Benjamin Franklin to Lorenzo Manini, 19 November 1784. The original was published by Manini in the *Gazzetta di Cremona* (1785: no. 72). A transcription appears in Pace, Benjamin Franklin and Italy, 395–396. For the dedication, see APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXX, 9, Lorenzo Manini to Benjamin Franklin, 9 October 1783.
84. Quoted in Del Negro, Il mito americano, 178–179.
85. Taube, *Friedrich Wilhelm von*, Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 37:420–422. The earliest origin for this seems to be a eulogy by Anton Friedrich Büsching, see his Beiträge, 4:221.

86. Taube, Thoughts. Mentioned in, for example, Baur, *Kleines historisch-literarisches Wörterbuch*, 2:731.
87. Entry under “Taube” in Aikin and Johnston, *General Biography*, 330.
88. *Taube*, *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, 37:420–422.
89. Taube, *Historische und politische Abschilderung*.
90. *Ibid.*, 261.
91. *Ibid.*, 261.
92. *Ibid.*, 263.
93. *Ibid.*, 266–267.
94. *Ibid.*, 268.
95. Taube, *Geschichte der Engländischen Handelschaft*. The appended essay was titled: *Mit einer zuverlässigen Nachricht von den wahren Ursachen des jetzigen Krieges in Nordamerika*.
96. *Ibid.*, iii.
97. Taube, *Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen*; Taube, *Historische und politische Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen*.
98. “Gewältig Veränderungen” in Taube, *Abschilderung der Engländischen Manufacturen*, 2:i.
99. *Ibid.*, s.n. (final page of the preface).
100. Bowd, “Useful Knowledge or Polite Learning?,” 190.
101. Zinzendorf, entry dated 13 December 1778 in Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:318.
102. Entry dated 12 December 1778, in *ibid.*, 2:317.
103. Entry dated 8 January 1779, in *ibid.*, 2:346; entry dated 20th December 1780, in *ibid.*, 2:776.
104. “Serionne, Joseph Accarias” in *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Österreich*, 34:148; Accarias, “Un publiciste dauphinois.”
105. Astigarraga, *Spain and the Economic Work*, 607–634; Astigarraga, “L’Économie Espagnole en Débat,” 357–389.
106. Hasquin, *Population, commerce et religion*, 155–167.
107. Astigarraga, *Spain and the Economic Work*, 615.
108. Sérionne, *Les intérêts des nations*; Sérionne, *La richesse*.
109. Sérionne, *La richesse*, 51–52.
110. *Ibid.*, 93.
111. *Ibid.*, 94.
112. *Ibid.*, 94.
113. *Ibid.*, 94.
114. Lindemayr, *Der engländische Patriotismus*. I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Stockinger for pointing me to this play.
115. Neuhuber, *Maurus Lindemayr*, 1:353 and 355. All quotations come from this edition.
116. *Ibid.*, 354.
117. *Ibid.*, 359.
118. *Ibid.*, 360.

119. Ibid., 375.
120. Ibid., 375.
121. Lindner, "Sozial-, Gesellschafts- und Herrschaftskritische Reflexionen," 195–268; Senigl, *Haydn und seine Beziehungen zum Kloster Lambach*, 145–148.
122. [Joseph Marius Babo], *Das Winterquartier in Amerika*. The play was written by Babo in Mannheim and published by him in Vienna in 1778 but premiered there in 1786, see Adam, *Germany and the Americas*, 1044–45.
123. "Die Pantomime; betitelt: Arlequin - Der Neue Abgott in Amerika," attached to Kurz's *Der Krumme Teufel* ([Vienna], 1759), 1–13.
124. Ibid., 12–13.
125. Tar, *Deutschsprachiges Kindertheater*, 35–36; Scherl and Rudin, *Joseph Anton Stranitzky*, 666–670.
126. Buch, *Magical Flutes and Enchanted Forests*, 254 and 382.
127. Betzwieser, *Kurz-Bernardon, Haydn und die theatrale Anderwelt*, 193–208.
128. Known as Friedrich Augustus Brischdower (Bridgetower), who claimed to be from a line of African princes and whose son George Bridgetower became a famous violinist. See Wright, "George Polgreen Bridgetower," 65–82; Thurman, "Black Musicians in Germany and Austria," 37; Corfield, *Bridgetower, George (1780-1860)*, 1:85–86. For Haydn's tutoring of George, see Walter, *Haydn in seiner Zeit*, 313.
129. Detering, *Kolumbus, Cortés, Montezuma*; Winkler, "Alzire, ou les Américains" de Voltaire," 47–62; Rice, *Montezuma at Eszterház*, 231–242.
130. Sisman, "Haydn's Theater Symphonies," 332–340.
131. Hörwarthner, "Haydn's Library: 415 and 442n178; Van Boer, *Undermining Independence*, 39–60.
132. Melton, *From Courts to Consumers*, 438–460.
133. Polzonetti, "Quakers and Cowboys," 28.
134. Chinatti, "Calzabigi's Vision of an Enlightened America," 135–142.
135. Chinatti provides this synopsis in *ibid.*, 136–137.
136. Polzonetti, *Italian Opera*, 236.
137. Ibid., 242–243.
138. Quoted in Stefania Buccini, *Americas in Italian Literature*, 115.
139. Sauer, "Habsburg Colonial," 5–23.
140. Hunter, *Bourgeois Values*, 171–172; Polzonetti, *Italian Opera*, 234n11.
141. Polzonetti, *Italian Opera*, 247–250.
142. Ibid., 255–256.
143. Ibid., 326.

Chapter 2

1. Sir Robert Murray Keith to Thomas Bradshaw, 15 September 1774, in Smyth, *Memoirs and Correspondence*, 1:474–482.

2. William Lee to Edmund Jennings, 24 June 1778, in Ford, *Letters of William Lee* [LWL], 2:454–455.
3. Press, “The Habsburg Court,” 23–45.
4. Cerman, *Habsburgischer Adel und Aufklärung*, 9.
5. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XIV, 169, Bek to Franklin, 10 June 1779. For Karl von Zinzendorf’s reading of Robertson’s *History of America*, see HHStA, Kabinettsarchiv [KA], Kabinettskanzlei [KK], Nachlass Zinzendorf [NZ], Tagebücher Zinzendorf [TZ], Bd. 30, 15 January 1785, fol. 8 and 5 October 1785, fol. 178. For Zinzendorf’s meeting in Edinburgh, see Rill, “*Die Reise des Grafen Karl von Zinzendorf*,” 14–31.
6. Dickson, “Count Karl von Zinzendorf’s ‘New Accountancy,’” 26. N.B. Karl’s half-brother Ludwig von Zinzendorf was more likely the author of the recommendation.
7. The catalogue was of Louis César de La Baume Le Blanc, the duc de Vallière’s library, see Wolf and Hayes, *The Library of Benjamin Franklin*, entry 1941, 479. For Strattmann, see Hüttel-Herbert and Reiterer, *Strattmann, Paul (1755–1821), Bibliothekar und Geistlicher*, *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexicon*, 13:370.
8. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXI, 104, Strattmann to Franklin, 5 March 1783; Strattmann to Franklin, 15 March 1784, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* [PBF], 42:20.
9. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXIV, 184, Birkenstock to Franklin, 29 December 1786; Franklin to Birkenstock, 15 February 1788, unpublished, “Franklin Papers project at Yale University.”
10. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXIV, 184, Birkenstock to Franklin, 29 December 1786.
11. Both Birkenstock and Strattmann were members of the censorship committee during the American Revolution: Birkenstock from 1774 and Strattmann from 1782.
12. Klingenstein, *Staatsverwaltung und kirchliche Autorität*, 161–178.
13. Sashegyi, *Zensur und Geistesfreiheit*; Bodi, *Tauwetter in Wien*.
14. Bachleitner, *Die literarische Zensur in Österreich*, 73–75.
15. *Ibid.*, 78 and 83.
16. Figures obtained from the “Verdängt, verpönt—vergessen?” database.
17. For a full breakdown and discussion, see Singerton, “Knowledge of and Sympathy for the American Cause,” 138–141.
18. Puttemans, *La censure dans les pays-bas autrichiens*; Delpiano, *Il governo della lettura*; Syrový, *Die italienischsprachigen Gebiete*, 218–220.
19. For censorship ducking by the nobility, see Gates, “Aristocratic Libraries,” 23–41.
20. Sierens, “*De Amerikaanse Revolutie in de Gazette van Gend*”; Lapeera, “*De Amerikaanse Revolutie in enkele Brusselse kranten*”; Köpf, “*Wir Haben Nachricht aus Amerika*”; Vincenzi, “*La rivoluzione Americana*”; Singerton, “Knowledge of and Sympathy for the American Cause,” 130–137.
21. Köpf, “*Daß alle Menschen gleich erschaffen sind*,” 183–196.
22. *Wienerisches Diarium* [WD], 3 April 1779.
23. WD, 24 December 1774, Anhang, 9–11.

24. Köpf, "Wir haben Nachricht aus Amerika," 27.
25. WD, 31 August and 11 September 1776. The *Nuove di diverse corti e paesi* in Lombardy published it in full because the newspaper technically fell under Swiss jurisdiction as it was based in Lugano. The full print appeared also in Florence and Milan in the *Notizie del Mondo* and *Gazzetta Universale*, 3 September 1776 and *Gazzetta di Milano*, 11 September 1776 respectively. Anna Vincenzi suggests the Grand Duke of Tuscany's relaxed governance permitted it in Tuscany, see her "The Many American Revolutions of Italian Public Opinion" (Paper present at the conference on "Propaganda, Persuasion, the Press and the American Revolution, 1763-1783," organized by the University of Hong Kong and the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Hong Kong, China, April 2016). I am grateful to Dr. Vincenzi for sharing this paper with me.
26. *Magyar Hírmondó*, 31 January 1781.
27. WD, 20 December 1777.
28. Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*, 36-37.
29. Nowak, "Christian August Graf Seilern," 51-99.
30. HHStA, StK, Provinzen, Niederösterreich, K. 1, Report dated 22 Christmonats [December] 1777, fols. 162-167.
31. Landriani to Franklin, 9 November 1783, PBF, 41, 187-189.
32. Cerman, *Habsburgischer Adel und Aufklärung*, 385-446.
33. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXIII, 26, Windischgrätz to Franklin, 9 February 1785. A copy can be found in the Czech State Archives at Plzeň, see SOA v Plzni, *Rodinný Archiv Windischgrätzu*, No. 931/16.
34. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXIII, 68, Windischgrätz to Franklin, 1 April 1785. Windischgrätz had made a similar request in 1783: APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XLIII, 245, Windischgrätz to Franklin, 10 August [1783].
35. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XXXIII, 121, Windischgrätz to Franklin, 1 June 1785.
36. Ondo-Grečenková, *Le réseau épistolaire*, 289-305.
37. Franklin to Ingenhousz, 29 April 1785 in Sparks, *The Works of Benjamin Franklin*, 6:533.
38. Beales, *Joseph II*, 2:579.
39. Windisch-Grätz, *De l'âme*, 80-85; Cerman, *Moral Anthropology*, 182.
40. Cerman, *ibid.*, 188-189.
41. Beales, *Joseph II*, 2:579.
42. The "five dames" were: 1. Princess Maria Josepha Clary-Aldringen; 2. Princess Maria Sidonia Kinsky; 3. Princess Marie Leopoldine von Liechtenstein; 4. Countess (Princess after 1794) Marie Leopoldine von Kaunitz-Rietberg; and 5. Princess Eleonore von Liechtenstein. The latter two were sisters of Oettingen-Spielberg originally and the two Liechtensteins (3 and 5) were sisters-in-law. Joseph II and his two close friends, Field Marshall Count Franz Moritz Lacy and Count Franz Xavier Orsini-Rosenberg were frequent attendees from 1769 onwards. See Gates-Coon, *The Charmed Circle*.
43. Beales, *Joseph II*, 1:323.
44. HHStA, KA, KK NZ, TZ, Bd. 30, 18 December 1785, fols. 214-215.

45. Beales, Joseph II, 1:324.
46. *Ibid.*, 326; Wolf, Liechtenstein, 42–43.
47. Gates-Coon, *The Charmed Circle*, 194. For the general view of the *Dames* on Joseph's foreign policy, see *ibid.*, 175–200.
48. *Ibid.*, 282–283.
49. Ingenhousz relayed the whole affair to Franklin in a letter dated 15 August 1783, PBF, 40:475–484. On sequestration of the family's property, see Catanzariti, *The Papers of Robert Morris*, 7:549; Jenkins, *The Family of William Penn*, 425.
50. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, 6, XXVI, 70, Juliana Penn to Franklin, 23 November 1782. She also wrote to John Jay at the same time as Morris and also to John Adams on 24 December 1782, so it seems likely that the Liechtensteins were part of the same campaign.
51. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:169.
52. See, for example, British Library [BL], Add. MS 35525, fols. 301–302, Pergen to Keith, 25 June 1782.
53. Gates-Coon, "Anglophone Households," 133–134.
54. Wraxall, *Memoirs*, 2:241.
55. Diary entries 5 December 1777 and 17 March 1778 in Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:76 and 160.
56. *Ibid.*, 26 January 1778, 2:127.
57. Thun to Hugh Elliot, 24 August 1775 in Minto, *A Memoir* 47–48.
58. This was the unpublished and privately written *Memoires de Romina Grobis* (Memoirs of a Fat Cat), a fictional travel account critical of America written by Princess Alexandrine von Dietrichstein (née Shuvalov) in around 1830. Musilová, "Gâtée par le Monde" *Literární dílo Kněžny Alexandry z Dietrichsteina*, 63n339; for a transcription see *ibid.*, 132–138. The original manuscript is to be found in Moravský Zemský Archiv Brno, Rodinný Archiv Dietrichsteinů, K. 584, Signatur 1264, Inv. C. 2455, 'Literární tvorba Alexandry z Dietrichsteina.' I am grateful to Dr. Ivo Cerman for this example.
59. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 3:822–823, 16 February 1781. The discussion might have had an added effect as two months later, Auersperg bought an American atlas, see entry dated 28 April 1781, in *ibid.*, 3:637.
60. For Seilern's role, see HHStA, StK, Provinzen, Niederösterreich, K. 1, fols. 162–167.
61. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 1: 13–22.
62. "Fact-finding missions" as Elisabeth Fattinger has called them; see her *Conflicting Identities in an Age of Transition*, 113.
63. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, T, Bd. 13, fol. 110r; Gürtler, "Impressionen einer Reise," 333–370.
64. HHStA, StK, England, Varia, K. 11, *Observations*, "Colonies Angloises dans l'Amerique Septentrionale et dans l'Archipel des Antilles," fols. 639–733.
65. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:155, 200, and 206.
66. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 39, 18 October 1794, fols. 260v–261; Bd. 41, 22 October 1796, fol. 287v.
67. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 3:599, 11 February 1780.

68. *Ibid.*, 2:288, 21 October 1778.
69. For example “Les consuls de Venise, de France, d’Angleterre dont le dernier me conta beaucoup de l’Amérique, des anciens troubles à Boston.” *Ibid.*, 2:125, 1 January 1777.
70. For his meetings with the British ambassador about the Revolution, see 3 and 21 April 1778 in *ibid.*, 2:171 and 184.
71. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 20, 3 October 1775, fol. 131; *Ibid.*, Bd. 30, 15 January 1785, fol. 8 and 5 October 1785, fol. 178.
72. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:83, 18 December 1777.
73. This was a circle of twelve gentlemen clustered around Thomas Bradshaw. The twelve were all political-military types who occupied prominent positions in government, banks, and the military. They wrote in a candid, often jocular manner to each other. Keith’s closest friend within the group was Anthony Chamier, the under-secretary to the southern secretary of state and brother of Daniel Chamier, the commissary general to the army in North America, see Bradshaw, *Thomas Bradshaw*, 91–92.
74. Keith to Thomas Bradshaw, 16 September 1774 in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 1:476–477.
75. Keith to Anthony Chamier, 21 January 1775, *ibid.*, 2:35–36.
76. Keith to Chamier, 17 December 1774, *ibid.*, 2:34; Keith to Bradshaw, 16 September 1774, *ibid.*, 1:476–477; Keith to Chamier, *ibid.*, 21 January 1775, 2:35–36.
77. BL, Add. MS. 35511, fols. 248–249, Morton Eden to Keith, 5 April 1777; BL, Add. MS. 35511, fols. 162–163, George Cressener to Keith, 31 January 1777.
78. BL, Add. MS. 35504, fol. 111 and Add. MS. 35506, fol. 141.
79. National Records of Scotland [NRS], Papers of the Scot Family of Gala, Family Letters of Sir Henry Hay-Makdougall and Henry Hay-Makdougall 1770–1777, GD/477/407/Nos. 12, 13, 15, 14, 16, 17 and 18, Sir Henry Hay-Macdougal to Henry Hay-Macdougal, 1 November 1776, 18 November 1776, 2 December 1776, 16 December 1776, 30 December 1776, 6 January 1777, 20 January 1777 respectively; BL, Add. MS. 35512, fols. 77, 152, Sir Henry Hay-Macdougal to Keith, various. The relative was a Sandy Campbell. “You made me truly happy with good accounts of Sandy Campbell.” in NRS, Papers of the Scot Family of Gala, Family Letters of Sir Henry Hay-Makdougall and Henry Hay-Makdougall 1770–1777, GD/477/407/No. 29, Henry Hay-Macdougal to Sir Henry Hay-Macdougal, 5 October 1776.
80. NRS, Papers of the Scot Family of Gala, Family Letters of Sir Henry Hay-Makdougall and Henry Hay-Makdougall 1770–1777, GD/477/407/No. 33, Henry Hay-Macdougal to Sir Henry Hay-Macdougal, 7 December 1776. Further requests in NRS, *ibid.*, GD/477/407/Nos. 30, 31 and 35, Henry Hay-Macdougal to Sir Henry Hay-Macdougal, 6 November 1776, 16 November 1776, and 11 January 1777.
81. Keith to Bradshaw, 29 August 1774 in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 1:474.
82. Keith to Bradshaw, 5 March 1774, *ibid.*, 1:461. Original emphasis.
83. Keith to Andrew Drummond, 14 October 1780, *ibid.*, 2:109–110.
84. Keith to Bradshaw, 16 September 1774, *ibid.*, 1:476–477.
85. Zinzendorf acts as a good example here since he constantly lists news of America from liberal papers such as the *Gazette de Leyde*.

86. NRS, Papers of the Campbell Family (Earls of Breadalbane), GD/112/74/3/13, John Campbell (future fourth Earl of Breadalbane and Holland) to Elizabeth Campbell, 12 December 1781.

87. NRS, Papers of the Campbell Family (Earls of Breadalbane), GD/112/39/335/4, Colin Campbell to Elizabeth Campbell, 18 March 1782. Spanish forces recaptured the island of Menorca in January 1782.

88. Keith to Anne Murray Keith of Murrayhall, 1 December 1780, in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 2:112.

89. *Ibid.*, 112.

90. Jan Ingenhousz to Franklin, 4 and 29 January 1777, PBF, 23:115–117 and 255–257; Lewin, *Französische Botschaft*, 5–6.

91. Jean-François Geogel to Franklin, 9 April 1777, PBF, 23:574–575.

92. APS, Franklin Papers Series, Mss.B.F.85, XLIX, 21, Hennessienne to Franklin, 28 September 1778.

93. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 4 January 1777, PBF, 23:115–117.

94. Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 37.

95. Dickson, Finance and Government, 1:255; Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, i; Beales, Joseph II, 1:92–93. Szabo has since considered this designation more thoroughly in Szabo, *Favorit, Premierminister oder “drittes Staatsoberhaupt”?*, 345–362.

96. Szabo, *ibid.*, 33; Kroupa, *Fürst Wenzel Anton Kaunitz-Rietberg*, 360–382; Lenderova, “Correspondance de Mme Geoffrin,” 309–316.

97. Benna, Contemporary Austrian Views, 6

98. Beer, *Joseph II., Leopold II. und Kaunitz*, passim; Brunner, *Correspondances intimes de l’empereur Joseph II.*, passim.

99. For example “die amerikanischen Insurgenten,” in HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 155, Mercy-d’Argenteau to Kaunitz, 18 December 1776, fol. 123 and HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 157, Kaunitz to Mercy-d’Argenteau, 31 July 1777. For the use of the term, see Roider, “William Lee,” 166; Benna, Contemporary Austrian Views, 49.

100. Whereas Kaunitz maintained his terminology until the end of the war, Mercy-d’Argenteau and Count Georg Adam von Starhemberg, for example, called them “Americans” from around 1781 onwards.

101. TNA, SP80/218, Keith to Lord Suffolk, 30 December 1776.

102. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 157, Kaunitz to Mercy-d’Argenteau, 31 July 1777.

103. Similar to Kaunitz’s reaction to the French Revolution, see Hochedlinger, *Dass Aufklärung das sicherste Mittel ist*, 62–79.

104. HHStA, StK, Provinzen, Niederösterreich, K. 1, Report of 22 Christmonats [December] 1777, fols. 162–167.

105. Maria Theresa to Marie Antoinette, 3 February 1777 in Arneth and Geoffroy, *Correspondence secrète*, 3:16–17.

106. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 14 December 1777, PBF, 25:286–290.

107. Ingenhousz to Baron von Pichler, 29 December 1777, PBF, 25:369–372.
108. *Ibid.*, 25: 370.
109. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 29 November 1782, PBF, 38:364–366.
110. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 20 August 1782, PBF, 38:25–28.
111. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 4 January 1777, PBF, 23:115–117.
112. For the term “revolutionary emperor,” see Szabo, “Changing Perspectives,” 111–138.
113. Archivio di Stato di Firenze [ASF], Affari di Stato [AdS], Affari Esteri, C. 2335, esp. reports dated 16 and 23 December 1776.
114. Niccoli to Franklin with note in Franklin’s hand, 26 May 1777, PBF, 24:84–85.
115. Franklin to Ingenhousz, 26 April 1777, PBF, 23:613–614.
116. Franklin to Ingenhousz, 29 April 1785, unpublished, “Franklin Papers Project at Yale University.”
117. See note in Franklin’s hand affixed to Niccoli to Franklin, 26 May 1777, PBF, 24:84–85.
118. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Hofreisen, K. 9, Konv. 2-1, Journal der Reise Kaiser Josephs II. nach Paris, entry dated 26 May 1777.
119. “Mercredi 28. Sa Majesté étant allé le matin faire quelques visites de congé, je fus déjeuné chez l’Abbé Nicoli où j’avais donné rendez-vous au docteur Francklin.” In Philipp Cobenzl, *Journal de mon voyage en France avec l’Empereur Joseph en 1777* (1777). The manuscript is in the possession of the antiquarian specialist Steffan Völkel to whom I am grateful for sharing with me the extract on Cobenzl and Franklin’s meeting. I provide the exact quotation here since it may not be readily available to other researchers.
120. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 28 June 1777, PBF, 24:239–242.
121. Playfair, *Joseph and Benjamin*, advertisement, s.n.
122. For Playfair’s publishing presence in Paris in the 1790s, see New York Public Library, T. B. Myers Collection, #1435, fol. 1, Stephen Rochefontaine to Ben Walker, 28 January 1792; Furstenberg, *When the United States Spoke French*, 251–252.
123. David R. Bellhouse, *The Flawed Genius of William Playfair: The Story of the Father of Statistical Graphics*, (in press, 2021), Chp. IV “Some Politics and Political Writing,” s.n. I am grateful to Dr. Bellhouse for sharing his forthcoming work with me.
124. Dippel contends this first came from a private letter sent in the mid-1790s—see Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*, 63n75—this most certainly arose from Joseph’s 1777 trip, see Duval-Pyrau, *Journal et Anecdotes and Beales*, Joseph II, 1:384n94.
125. To give but a few examples: Williams, *Europe and America in 1821*, 1:98; Everett, *An Address*, 34; Craik and MacFarlane, *Pictorial History*, 1:473; Bent, *Short Sayings*, 314–315. Most recently by Fairlie, “The Shot Heard Round the World.”
126. Mercy-d’Argenteau to Maria Theresa, 15 July 1777 in Arneth and Geffroy, *Correspondance Secrète*, 3:95.
127. Archivio di Stato di Milano [ASM], Archivio Belgiojoso [AB], C. 571, no. 13, Joseph II to Belgiojoso, 15 April 1782.

128. ASM, AB, C. 571, no. 17, Joseph II to Belgiojoso, 14 August 1782.
129. Joseph II to Pietro Leopoldo [Leopold], 14 September 1780 in Arneth, *Maria Theresia und Joseph II.*, 3:312.
130. Joseph to Catherine, 13 November 1780, in Arneth, *Joseph II. and Katharina von Russland*, 16.
131. Joseph to Catherine, 13 November 1780, *ibid.*, 16; Joseph to Catherine, 10 January 1781, *ibid.*, 34–35.
132. Joseph to Catherine, 13 November 1780, *ibid.*, 16.
133. I adopt the Italian spelling of his name here until his ascension, where I will refer to him as Leopold II.
134. Marraro, “Mazzei’s Correspondence,” no. 3, 275–301; *ibid.*, no. 4, 361–380.
135. Pace, Franklin and Italy, 116.
136. Huber-Frischeis, Knieling, and Valenta, *Die Privatbibliothek*, 48–49.
137. Wandruszka, Leopold II, 1:346; Balázs, *Pierre-Léopold et la Hongrie*, 151. Pietro Leopoldo penned his thoughts in a famous text now edited, see Beales and Pasta, *Relazione*.
138. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 12, Konv. 12, fols. 267–301.
139. Wandruszka, Leopold II, 1:371 and 375; Cochrane, “Le riforme leopoldine,” 199–215; Boutier, “Les imprimés,” 423–468.
140. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 12, Konv. 12, fols. 272–273; Gabrieli, *The Impact of American Political Ideas*, 197.
141. *Gazzetta Universale: O Siena, Notizie Istoriche, Politiche, di Scienze, Arti, Agricoltura* (Florence) and *Notizie del Mondo* (Florence), both 14 September 1776. See Gabrieli, *The Impact of American Political Ideas*, 196; Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence*, 70.
142. Article 1 of Declaration of Rights, 12 June 1776. For the Virginian influence, see Palmer, *Democratic Revolution*, 1:386; Noether, “As Others Saw Us,” 129–134; Zimmerman, *Das Verfassungsprojekt*; and Billas, *American Constitutionalism*, 80, 100–102, and 417.
143. In contrast to the works cited above, only a few historians have correctly identified that it is indeed the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 which influenced Pietro Leopoldo’s constitutional project: Wandruszka, Leopold II, 1:372–373; Schuener, *Constitutional Traditions*; Fichtner, *Viennese Perspectives*, 19–32; Davis, “Observations,” 373–380. The original manuscripts in the HHStA confirm the Pennsylvania constitution was Pietro Leopoldo’s primary object of fascination; see HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 13, no. 10, “Observations sur les Constitution de la République de Pennsylvanie.”
144. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 13, nos. 10 and 11. It is conceivable that he had access to a printed edition of Rochefoucauld’s translation: “Constitution de la République de Pensylvanie, telle qu’elle a été établie par la Commission générale extraordinaire, élue cet effet, & assemblée à Philadelphie, dans ses séances, commencées

le 15 Juillet 1776, & continuees par des ajournemens successifs, jusqu'au 28 Septembre suivant," in Rochefoucauld, *Affaires de l'Angleterre*.

145. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 13, no. 10, fol. 1; translation provided by Davis, "Observations," 377.

146. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 13, no. 10, fol. 1.

147. Their exchanges are in HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 12, nos. 13–21.

148. See Gianni's *Memorie sulla Costituzione di governo immaginata del granduca Pietro Leopoldo de servire all'istoria del suo regno in Toscana* in ASF, Carte Gianni, N. 221. Gianni later published his remarks as *La Costituzione Toscana imaginata dal Granduca Pietro Leopoldo: memoria del Senatore F. M. Gianni scritta nell'anno 1805* (Siena, 1805).

149. *Relazioni sul Governo della Toscana* (1770) as quoted in Becattini, "La lezione," 105.

150. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Sammelbände, K. 13, no. 10.

151. In 1784, Joseph planned to abrogate the Tuscan secundogeniture, ultimately uniting it with the Monarchy, forcing Pietro Leopoldo to see the futility of his plans until his brother's declining health, and heirless condition, made imminent imperial succession revitalise his constitutional ambitions between 1787 and 1789. See Beales, Joseph II, 2:355–359.

152. Pasta, *The Enlightenment at Work*, 41–62.

Chapter 3

1. Universitätsarchiv Wien, S. 94.9, Wiesner's Note to the k.k. Ministerium für Kultur und Unterricht, 11 July 1903.

2. Most notably Palmer, *Democratic Revolution*, 2:135–174; Venturi, *End of the Old Regime*, 2:605–763; Israel, *The Expanding Blaze*, 606–609.

3. Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*, 62 and 223. An earlier version of this section appears in my "A Revolution in Ink," 91–113. Two more letters have since come to light after that publication but these have not materially changed my analysis. (Both letters belonged to Count Joseph O'Donnell).

4. Franklin received a total of 37 letters from 22 Prussian individuals. My estimations come from the overview catalogue of the Franklin Papers based at Yale University.

5. There were undoubtedly lost letters which are mentioned in other letters. For a fuller breakdown of this correspondence, see my "A Revolution in Ink," 91–113.

6. Caroline Winterer, "Where is America in the Republic of Letters?" 608.

7. Polišenský, Benjamin Franklin, američtí Moravané a čeští čtenáři, 315–322; Batha, *Fragment literární*, 1–2; Singerton, "Science, Revolution, and Monarchy," 145–150.

8. See my "A Revolution in Ink," 117–118: APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXIX, 68, Steinský to Franklin, 3 August 1783.

9. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 4, XXXVI, 142, Steinský to Franklin, 17 June 1789; Literární Archiv Památníku národního písemnictví [LA PNP], Fonds F. A. Steinského 1760–1811, 15/5, Franklin to Steinský, 23 November 1782; Korty, “Franklin’s World of Books,” 310.

10. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 137.

11. Landriani to Franklin, 9 November 1783, PBF, 41:187–198; Pace, Franklin and Italy, 39–41.

12. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 8, XL, 128, Nekrep to Franklin, 12 June 1784.

13. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXVII, 190, Anthony Mikoviny to Franklin, 13 March 1783; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, LIX, 83, Baron Carl von Emerich to Franklin, 4 December 1777; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 5, XIX, 51, Baron Philippe-Charles de Pfortzheim to Franklin, 2 August 1780; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, LXII, 106, Rihm to Franklin, 19 December 1777; Guillaume, Régiment de Clerfayt, 40.

14. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, LXX, 88, Kováts to Franklin, 13 January 1777.

15. Gaisberg and Stahel to Franklin, 29 March 1780, unpublished, “Franklin Papers Series at Yale.”

16. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, VII, 189, Comte Leopold Barbo to Franklin, 25 December 1777.

17. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 4, XIV, 151, Hyppolite de Verité to Franklin, 2 June 1779.

18. Oberleithner to Franklin, 9 January 1778, PBF, 25:460–461.

19. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXX, 83, Franz Rudolph von Großing (also Grossinger) to Franklin, 10 November 1783.

20. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, LIX, 50, Gräventiz to Franklin, 26 Jun 1783. He had joined the Aulic Council in November, 1772, see HHStA, Obersthofmeisteramt, Ältere Zeremonialakten, K. 86, Konv. 20, nos. 3 and 4. He retired from there in 1785, see HHStA, RHR, RK, Verfassungsakten, K. 27-28-43.

21. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXVII, 68, *Veuve d’Aubremé & Fils* to Franklin, 31 January 1783; *Ibid.*, 106, *De Vinck et Compagnie* to Franklin, 13 February 1783; *Antonio Salucci & Sons* to Franklin, 5 February 1779, 7 March 1783, PBF, 39:302–303; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 7, XXVII, 65, Wets to Franklin.

22. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, VII, 169, Dujardin to Franklin, 14 March 1778.

23. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 15 November 1776, PBF, 23:7–12.

24. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 23 May 1781, PBF, 35:97–100.

25. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 12 June 1782, PBF, 37:467–69.

26. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 28 June 1777, PBF, 24:239–42.

27. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 18 October 1777, PBF, 25:85–86.

28. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 2 January 1784, PBF, 41:401–404.

29. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 15 November 1776, PBF, 23:7–12.

30. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 1 September 1783, PBF, 40:562–563.

31. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 15 November 1776, PBF, 23:7–12.
32. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 28 June 1777, PBF, 24:239–242.
33. BL, Add. MS. 35511, Hardwicke Papers, Sir Robert Murray Keith Personal Correspondence, fol. 294, Ingenhousz to Keith, [28 June 1777]. The letter is undated in the original, but Ingenhousz listed it as 28 June 1777 in his personal letterbook held at the Koninklijke Bibliotheek in The Hague. I have relied here upon the microfilm duplicate at the APS, Philadelphia, Mss.H.S. Film.23.
34. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 7 April 1781, PBF, 34:521–523.
35. Skemp, Making of a Patriot.
36. HHStA, Handschriftensammlung, HS-Weiß, No. 443, Remarques sur les affaires présente de l'Amérique Septentrionale, [s.d.] September 1777.
37. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 20, 3 October 1775, fol. 131.
38. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 14 December 1777, PBF, 25:287.
39. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek [ÖNB], Handschriften, 6/97-3, "Bericht an Maria Theresa über zwei Briefe Franklins, 18 Mai 1777"; a French translation of Franklin's *Comparison of Great Britain and the United States in Regard to the Basis of Credit in the Countries*, (ca. 1777). See also Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution, 62.
40. Cauffman referenced in Hennesey, American Catholics, 60.
41. Rodenbough, Autumn Leaves, 17.
42. Willcox, "Some Notes," 83–84 and Willcox, "Historical Sketches," 422–427.
43. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 28 March 1775 in Rodenbough, Autumn Leaves, 26.
44. There was contact between the Cauffman family and Bishop Carroll later, see University Archives of Notre Dame, Catholic Church Archdiocese of Baltimore [CABA] Manuscripts, 1/17, Mary Cauffman to Bishop Carroll, 9 May 1810.
45. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 28 March 1775 in Rodenbough, Autumn Leaves, 26.
46. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 28 March 1775, *ibid.*, 28.
47. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 15 July 1776, *ibid.*, 29.
48. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 28 March 1775 and 15 July 1776, *ibid.*, 26–29.
49. "De Cauffmann Josephus ex Philadelphia in Pennsylvania Americanus Med. Auditor" Altes Universitätsarchiv Wien [AUW], Akten der Medizinische Fakultät der Universität Wien, rotokoll der Medizinische Fakultät VIII. His graduation certification is held under AUW, Rigorosenprotokolle, Med. 9.5 Rigorosenprotokoll der Mediziner dated 2 September 1777.
50. Joseph Cauffman to Joseph T. Cauffman, 15 July 1776, in Rodenbough, Autumn Leaves, 28–29.
51. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 2, V, 163, Cauffman to Franklin, 23 April 1777. The letter is also published in "Cauffman Applying for Service," 77–82; and PBF, 23:603–606.
52. Cauffman to Franklin, 23 April 1777, PBF, 23:603–606.

53. Cauffman to Franklin, 23 April 1777, PBF, 23:603–606.
54. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 15 November 1776, PBF, 23:7–12.
55. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 28 June 1777, PBF, 24:239–242.
56. Only the ship's surgeon is listed, not Cauffman, see "Cauffman Applying for Service," 80–82.
57. Cauffman to Franklin, 23 April 1777, PBF, 23:603–606.
58. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 4, XV, 52, Joseph Pelligrini to Franklin, 19 July 1779.
59. For this phenomenon and term, see Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, 50th Anniversary Edition, 230–320.
60. For the recent figures see Conway, *Britannia's Auxiliaries*, 50. The most detailed account still remains Atwood, *The Hessians*.
61. Taylor, "'Patrimonial' Bureaucracy and 'Rational' Policy," 33–56.
62. O'Reilly, *Migration, Recruitment and the Law*, 119–137. For the "evil" attribution, see next citation.
63. Kriegsarchiv, Zentralstellen, Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Protokolle, Hofkriegsrat Memorandum, 9 September 1780, G.2677, No. 5113; see other debates in G.756, No.1433 and G.958, No.1852. I am grateful to Dr. Ilya Berkovich for his help finding these documents.
64. I have relied upon the ongoing *Hessian Information System on Regional History* (LAGIS) project run by the Hessisches Landesamt für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Marburg which digitises muster lists of recruited Hessian soldiers under the HETRINA (Hessian Troops in North America) project and which provides the basis for this estimate.
65. Information from *ibid.*, HETRINA database.
66. Oberösterreichisches Landesarchiv, Herrschaftsarchiv Weinburg, A-IV, Bd. 182.
67. Grüll, "Aus dem Tagebuch," 297. See also *Bericht des Leutnants Johann Justus Eggertt* in Siegfried Haider, *Berichte aus der Neuen Welt*, 14–30.
68. See above as well as the *Militär Schematismus des österreichischen Kaiserthumes* (Vienna: K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1824), 503.
69. In the few scholarly works on Johann Zinner, historians have been content to refer to him by a variety of names: Johann Zinner, Johann Carl Zinner and János Zinner being the most frequent. The "Carl" in his name stems from the letter written by him to Franklin (cited in the following footnote). Hungarian scholars have tended, incorrectly, to prefer the Hungarian variant of his name (János) despite the fact he never personally used this variant. In the archival material cited below, I have seen him referred to multiple times as Ioanne Baptiste Zinner as well as Johann Zinner. Given that Johann Zinner was the name which he most frequently and consistently used, this seems to be the most appropriate. For "Carl" see Winter, "Johann Carl Zinner," 55–61.
70. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 3, XII, 84, Jean-Claude de Zinnern [*sic*] to Franklin, 26 October 1778.
71. There is no surviving letter from Franklin to Zinner, but Zinner gave confirmation of their meeting in his book, *Merkwürdige Briefe*, last page of the "Vorbericht."

72. Announced in the *Magyar Hirmondó*, 4 October 1789, no. 80, 649 as “Janos Czinner” but Zinner was not on the rollcall of the staff that year. He first appears on the staff of the Royal Academy in 1781, see Archiv Mesta Košice, Košická Univerzita Katalóg, vol. 1, 1781, fols. 431–432.

73. The others were Győr, Nagyszombat-Pozsony, Nagyvarad, Zagreb: see, Brnardić, *The Enlightenment’s Choice of Latin*, 119–151.

74. Archiv Mesta Košice, Košická Univerzita Katalóg, vol. 1, 1781, fols. 431–439.

75. See discussion of the *Notitia* below.

76. Zinner, Merkwürdige Briefe.

77. *Ibid.*, 40 and 45–48.

78. *Ibid.*, Vorbericht, s.n.

79. *Ibid.*, 40 and 45–46.

80. *Ibid.*, 142.

81. *Ibid.*, 142.

82. *Ibid.*, 1–3; see also Závodszy, *American Effects*, 21 and Lévai, *The Relevance of the American Revolution*, 100.

83. Zinner, Merkwürdige Briefe, 229–234.

84. *Ibid.*, 177–181.

85. *Ibid.*, 173–174.

86. “Brief VII: Generals Lee Meynung von den gegenwärtigen Unruhen an General Bourgoyne,” *ibid.*, 25–39; “Brief IX: Antwort des Generals Lee an Bourgoyne,” *ibid.*, 49–50.; Mazzagetti, Charles Lee, 101–102.

87. Zinner, Merkwürdige Briefe, 34.

88. *Ibid.*, 38.

89. “Rede des Samuel Adams an die Versammlung zu Philadelphia, gehalten den 1. August 1776,” *Ibid.*, 64–67. For an overview of the Americana banned by Habsburg censors, see my “Knowledge of and Sympathy for the American Cause,” 128–158.

90. Zinner, Merkwürdige Briefe, 312–325. He misattributed it to Samuel Adams, as was common at the time.

91. Most notably the “last asylum of mankind” refrain is missing.

92. See the section beginning with “I have heard it asserted by some, that as America hath flourished . . .” which includes “I answer roundly, that American would have flourished as much, and probably much more, had no European power had anything to do with her” which Zinner translated as “Gesetzt auch, das wäre wahr, so behaupte ich, dass Amerika eben so würde geblühet haben, wenn es auch in gar keiner Verbindung stünde.” Zinner, Merkwürdige Briefe, 316–317.

93. The different handwriting between the *Notitia* and *Versuch* suggests that Zinner had student helpers aid his completion. Given Zinner’s German-speaking background, it is likely he wrote the *Versuch* in his own hand.

94. Both works are held at the Jána Bocatia Library. The several manuscripts written by Zinner here are as follows: *Abhandlung von Europäischen Käyserthümen* (1782), *Acta academica regina cassoviensis* (s.d.), *Ius publicum hungaria* (1781), *Notitia historica de*

coloniis americanae septemtrionalis (1783), *Præcipua prælia secundi belli punici: observationibus militaribus illustrata* (s.d. [ca. 1782]) and *Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte der verbündenen Staaten von Nordamerika* (1784) in Verejná knižnica Jána Bocatia v Košiciach, Rukopisné diela Jána Zinnera.

95. Verejná knižnica Jána Bocatia v Košiciach, Rukopisné diela Jána Zinnera, *Notitia Historica*, Pars I. Completens coloniasum america septemtrionalis ord. et progressum usq. ad initium bello hodierni; Pars II. De bello americano usque ad foedus cum gallis per americanus initium; Pars III. De bello americano ad inito cum gallis foedere usq. ad pacem parisium.

96. Štátny oblastny archív v Košiciach, Hlavné Riaditeľstvo Školského Obvodu v Košiciach, Akadémia v Košiciach 1788–1793, B, K. 21 (97–101), dated 12 January 1789, fol. 480.

97. Archív Mesta Košice, Košická Univerzita Katalóg, vol. 1, 1784. fols. 454–456.

98. Verejná knižnica Jána Bocatia v Košiciach, Rukopisné diela Jána Zinnera, *Versuch einer Kriegsgeschichte der verbündenen Staaten von Nordamerika* (1784).

99. APS, Ms.BF.85, 3, XII, 84, Jean-Claude de Zinner to Benjamin Franklin, 26 October 1778.

100. Jean Zinner to Franklin, 23 September 1783, PBF, 41:30–31.

101. Jean Zinner to Franklin, 23 September 1783, PBF, 41:30–31. I am grateful to Lukas Stelzhammer for producing a German translation from the original Latin for me.

Chapter 4

1. Testimony of Giovanni Jacapo Giusti in TNA, SP98/81, fols. 23–29 enclosed in Sir John Dick to Lord Weymouth, 29 February 1776.

2. HHStA, StK, Portugal, Berichte, K. 10, Count Adam von Lebzelter to Kaunitz, 31 March 1778; TNA, SP89/85, fol. 107, Robert Walpole to Lord Weymouth, 1 February 1778.

3. Action of HMS *Apollo* and the *Stanislaus*, 15 June 1780, described in Osler, Viscount Exmouth, 30–31.

4. Hildebrand, Den svenska kolonin St Barthélemy, 315; cf. Johnson, Swedish Contributions, 1:546, 551–552, and 564–565.

5. Barton, “Sweden and the War of American Independence,” 424; Syrett, *Royal Navy*, 103–106.

6. TNA, SP98/81, fols. 37–38, Weymouth to Lords of the Admiralty, 18 March 1776.

7. TNA, SP98/81, fol. 39, Weymouth to Dick, 22 March 1776.

8. *Ibid.*, fol. 60, Dick to Weymouth, 8 April 1776.

9. *Ibid.*, fols. 77–78, Dick to Weymouth, 3 May 1776.

10. TNA, SP98/82, fol. 6, Sir Horace Mann to Weymouth, 13 January 1777.

11. *Ibid.*, fols. 15–16, Lords of the Admiralty to Sir John Undy, 5 February 1777. These instructions were much delayed and Undy received instructions only at the end of May,

see *ibid.*, fols. 65–65r, Undy to Weymouth, 29 May 1777; and *ibid.*, fols. 57–57r, Undy to Pietro Leopoldo, 4 April 1777.

12. TNA, SP 98/81, fols. 57–57r, Dick to Weymouth, 5 April 1776.

13. *Ibid.*, fols. 57r–58, Dick to Weymouth, 5 April 1776.

14. *Ibid.*, fol. 58.

15. TNA, SP98/81, fol. 59, Dick to Weymouth, 8 April 1776. See also, “Cargoe of a Danish Ship from Trieste consigned to *Messr. Frank & Comp.* arrived at Leghorne April 6, 1776,” “Cargoe of the Dutch Ship consigned to *Messr. Frank & Comp.*,” and “Cargoe of the French Ship from Trieste consigned to *Messr. Frank & Comp.*,” attached to Mann to Weymouth, 20 April 1776, *ibid.*, fols. 70–70r.

16. Dick to Weymouth, 8 April 1776, *ibid.*, fol. 59r.

17. *Ibid.*, fol. 58.

18. *Ibid.*, fol. 60. Original emphasis.

19. *Ibid.*, fol. 71, Dick to Weymouth, 15 April 1776.

20. Bolts, Considerations on India Affairs; Hallward, William Bolts, 103–106; Everaert, *Willem Bolts*, 363–369; Gough and King, “William Bolts,” 8–28.

21. HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Ostindische Kompanien, Triest-Antwerpen, K. 4, Konv. 1, Diplomatischen Korrespondenzen der Staatskanzlei 1774–1776, fol. 2, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 1 November 1774; Bronza, “Preparations of the Austrian Expedition,” 63–76.

22. *Otto Frank & Co.* was based in Hamburg.

23. HHStA, Ostindische Kompanien, Triest-Antwerpen, K. 4, Konv. 1, Diplomatischen Korrespondenzen der Staatskanzlei 1774–1776, fol. 8.

24. TNA, SP98/81, fols. 68–69, Mann to Weymouth [in cipher], 20 April 1776.

25. Hallward, William Bolts, 137.

26. TNA, SP98/81, fols. 68r–69, Mann to Weymouth, 20 April 1776.

27. See “Extrait de l’article cinquième de l’octroi accord par S. M. I. & R. Apostolique à Monsieur Guillaume Bolts, sous la date de Vienne due 5^{me} Jour Juin 1775,” in *ibid.*, fol. 116, Dick to Weymouth, 3 July 1776. It is a remarkable clause given this was written in June of 1775, see FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, K. 902, Oktroi, fols 195r–198r.

28. TNA, SP98/81, fols. 61–62, Weymouth to Dick, 23 April 1776; *ibid.*, fol. 65, Weymouth to Mann [in cipher], 30 April 1776.

29. For talk of resignation, see *ibid.*, fols. 96–97r, Dick to Weymouth, 7 June 1776; for acceptance, see *ibid.*, fol. 102, Weymouth to Dick, 12 July 1776; and for Dick’s confirmation to Weymouth, *ibid.*, fols. 125–126, 3 August 1776.

30. Copied in *ibid.*, fols. 110–110r, Dick to Weymouth, 21 June 1776.

31. “To the printer of the London Chronicle,” enclosed within *ibid.*, fols. 112–112r, Dick to Weymouth, 21 June 1776.

32. *Ibid.*, fols. 156–156r, Undy to Weymouth, 6 November 1776. He presented his credentials to Pietro Leopoldo in mid-November, see *ibid.*, fol. 162, Mann to Weymouth, 16 November 1776.

33. *Ibid.*, fol. 65, Weymouth to Mann [in cipher], 30 April 1776.

34. *Ibid.*, fol. 91, Mann to Weymouth [in cipher], 25 May 1776.
35. ASF, AdS, Affari Esteri, C. 901, Belgiojoso to Piccolomini, 11 September 1772.
36. Becattini, Filippo Mazzei, 32–33.
37. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 30n44.
38. Addobbati, “Filippo Mazzei e Guiseppe Bettoia,” 133–194.
39. Thomas Woodford to Giovanni Fabbroni, 18 December 1775 in Idzerda, Marchione, and Scalia, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:86–87.
40. For Bettoia’s strategy, see Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 31.
41. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 30n46.
42. Idzerda et al, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:262.
43. TNA, HCA 32/430/9, Documents relating to the capture of the ship *La Prosperita* (formerly the *Norfolk* and the *Friendship* [*L’Amicizia*]), 1778, fols. 1–110.
44. Addobbati, *Oltre gli intermediary*, 145–183; cf. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 32n60.
45. TNA, HCA 32/360/5, Documents relating to the capture of the ship *l’Immacolata Concezione*, 1780, fols. 1–141.
46. TNA, SP98/82, fol. 196, Mann to Weymouth, 18 August 1778.
47. *Ibid.*, fol. 145, Mann to Weymouth, 31 March 1778.
48. *Ibid.*, fols. 139–139r, Mann to Weymouth, 14 March 1777. Mann suspected that the French had been withholding American news, see *ibid.*, fol. 122, Mann to Weymouth, 3 January 1778.
49. *Ibid.*, fols. 192–192r, Undy to Weymouth, 10 August 1778.
50. TNA, SP98/81, fols. 169–169r, Mann to Weymouth, 14 December 1776; TNA SP98/82, fols. 106r–107, Mann to Weymouth, 21 October 1777.
51. TNA, SP98/82, fol. 384r, Mann to Weymouth, 3 August 1778.
52. *Ibid.*, fol. 385, Mann to Weymouth, 3 August 1778.
53. This and “Gianni regarded Livorno as a foreign colony in Tuscan territory,” in Tazzara, Free Port of Livorno, 225n73 and 226; Wandruszka, Pietro Leopoldo, 302–303.
54. HHStA, HA, SB, K. 10, Konv. 5-1, fol. 5r, Maria Carolina to Pietro Leopoldo, 28 April 1778; Beales, Joseph II, 1:395–419; Wandruszka, Leopold II, 1:324–331.
55. Angiolini, *Neutrality*, 82–100; Addobbati, “L’espace de la guerre et du commerce,” 233–249.
56. Angiolini, *Neutrality*, 83 and 97–98.
57. A copy can be found in in TNA, SP120/76, “Volendo noi provvedere che nel nostro porto di Livorno, e negli altri porti e scali della Toscana,” dated 1 August 1778.
58. Holldack, “Neutralitätspolitik Leopolds von Toskana,” 733–739; Wandruszka, Leopold II, 1:323.
59. Angiolini, *Neutrality*, 97.
60. Translation and comments in TNA, SP98/82, fols. 198–200, Mann to Weymouth, 18 August 1778.
61. Marginalia in Mann’s copy of the Edict in TNA, SP98/82, fols. 199–199r enclosed in, Mann to Weymouth, 18 August 1778.

62. Marraro, "Mazzei's Correspondence," no. 3, 275–301; *ibid.*, no. 4, 361–380. Mazzei penned several essays for Pietro Leopoldo, including *Reasons why the American States cannot be accused of having rebelled* (1781) and *Reflections tending to predict the outcome of the present war* (1781), see Idzerda et al, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:293–299 and 300–308.

63. *Ibid.*, 1:171.

64. Venturi, *End of the Old Regime*, 1:92.

65. Ralph Izard to Henry Laurens, 18 October 1774, in Izard-Deas, *Correspondence of Mr. Ralph Izard*, 1:15–18.

66. Niccoli to Izard, 28 January 1778 in Sparks, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:689–691; Antonucci, *Consuls and Consiglieri*, 80.

67. Izard to Laurens, 21 December 1777, in "Izard-Laurens Correspondence," 50.

68. Codignola, *Relations*, 30–31.

69. Lampredi, *Dal commercio*, 1:26–27 and 38–39; Meeks, *Revolutionary Western Mediterranean*, 30–31.

70. Zedinger, *Kaunitz und Cobenzl*, 197–217.

71. Wilden-Neeser, *Letters and Papers*, xxi.

72. TNA, SP78/297, fols. 272–272r, Frazer to Weymouth, 29 December 1775; TNA, SP78/298, fol. 11, Frazer to Stormont, 2 January 1776; Archives des Affaires Etrangère [AAE], Correspondence Politique [CP], Angleterre, 514, Stormont to Vergennes, 2 January 1776.

73. TNA, SP78/298, fol. 39, Frazer to Stormont, 19 January 1776.

74. Wilden-Neeser, *Letters and Papers*, 10.

75. Entry for *Eendragt* in the list of ships departing from Texel dated 16 March 1776 in TNA, SP84/552, Yorke to Suffolk, 23 April 1776.

76. TNA, SP78/298, fols. 338–339r, Frazer to Stormont, 30 March 1776.

77. *Ibid.*, fols. 340–341, Frazer to Stormont, 2 April 1776.

78. Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique/Algemeen Rijksarchief van België [ARB], Conseil Privé [CP], 1154B, De Brauwere to Starhemberg, 13 April 1776.

79. Conyngham recalled (in Wilden-Neeser, *Letters and Papers*, 9) that the *Eendragt* arrived late but reports such as De Brauwere's contradict him; see Huibrechts, "Swampin' Guns and Stabbing Irons." I am grateful to Dr. Huibrechts for sharing her dissertation with me. We have conducted similar research in the ARB but our emphases on events are different.

80. ARB, CP, 1154B, reports of De Brauwere and Patrice de Nény to Starhemberg, 13 April 1776.

81. Absent between April and August 1774; January to June 1775; and September onwards, see TNA, SP 77/107, fols. 1–300 *passim*.

82. HHSa, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 212, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 12, 16, 19, 26, and 30 September 1775.

83. TNA, SP77/107, Joseph Fry to William Eden, 3 November 1775.

84. TNA, SP77/108, Peter to Suffolk, 7 April 1776.

85. HHSa, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 216, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 13 April 1776.

86. Copy enclosed in TNA, SP77/108, Gordon to Suffolk, 10 April 1776; original in ARB, CP, 1154B.
87. “dans une forme fort déplacée” in report of Nény, ARB, CP, 1154B.
88. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, K. 216, Starhemberg to Belgiojoso, 12 April 1776.
89. *Ibid.*, Gordon to Starhemberg, 11 April 1776.
90. ARB, CP, 1154B, Starhemberg to Gordon, 11 April 1776.
91. TNA, SP77/108, Gordon to Suffolk [in cipher], 12 April 1776.
92. Depositions of Michel Meynne, Gustavus Conyngnam, Jonathan Nesbitt and Louis Loot in ARB, CP, 1154B, report by Nény.
93. ARB, CP, 1154B, report of De Brauwere to Starhemberg, 13 April 1776.
94. *Ibid.*, De Brauwere to Starhemberg, 16 April 1776; TNA, SP77/108, Peter to Suffolk, 13 April 1776.
95. De Brauwere’s report. The *Industry* arrived from New England and again Frazer had suspected false papers stating Spain as the origin, see TNA, SP78/297, fol. 272, Frazer to Weymouth, 29 December 1775.
96. TNA, SP77/108, Peter to Suffolk, 13 April 1776.
97. ARB, CP, 1154B, De Brauwere to Starhemberg, 18 April 1776.
98. TNA, SP77/108, Gordon to Suffolk, 27 April 1776.
99. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 35, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 30 April 1776.
100. ARB, Secrétaire d’Etat et Guerre [SEG], 1640, Henri de Crumpipen to Nény, 5 July 1776; TNA, SP77/108, Peter to Suffolk, 6 July 1776.
101. Wilden-Neeser, *Letters and Papers*, 10.
102. ARB, CP, 1154B, Crumpipen to Nény, 26 April 1776 (containing the 24 April petition by customers officers).
103. Memoir by Gordon copied in HHStA, Belgien, DDA, K. 216, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 27 April 1776, annex.
104. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, K. 216, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 27th April 1776.
105. Huijbrechts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*,” 444–475.
106. Pole, “Law and the American Revolution,” 126.
107. Perl-Rosenthal, “On Mobile Legal Spaces and Maritime Empires,” 184–185 and 194.
108. Crawford, “The *Hawke* and the *Dove*, a Cautionary Tale,” 49–66.
109. Memoire attached to HHStA, Belgien, DDA, K. 233, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 15 September 1778; HHStA, Belgien, DDA, K. 232, report of the Grand Pensionary of Ostend, 13 August 1778.
110. Results from the “Brill Prize Papers Dataset.”
111. TNA, High Court Admiralty [HCA] 32/343/6, fols 1–33.
112. Schnaubelt, “*Österreich und England*,” 355–356.
113. TNA, HCA42/149/1, Claim of Anthony Songa, 20 November 1781; TNA, HCA42/150/1, Claim 17 of 6 June 1782; TNA, HCA42/150/2, Claim of Anthony and Bartholomew Songa, 24 June 1783; TNA, HCA42/150/3, Claim of 26 June 1784; TNA, HCA42/152/1, Claim of 26 June 1784.

114. HHStA, StK, England, Weisungen, K. 128, fols. 16–17, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 13 September 1779; HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 119, fols. 31–34, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 1 October 1779; Kaps, *Entre el Servicio y los Negocios Transnacionales*, 231.

115. HHStA, StK, England, Weisungen, K. 128, fols. 16–17, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 25 September 1780; *ibid.*, fols. 24–30, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 17 December 1780; *ibid.*, fols. 33–34, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 18 December 1780; HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 120, fols. 53–56, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 29 December 1780.

116. ASM, AB, C. 571, Joseph II to Belgiojoso, 3 July 1781.

117. HHStA, StK, England, Weisungen, K. 128, fols. 1–2, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 5 May 1779.

118. TNA, SP 100/13, ‘Account delivered by Mr Sarkolzy to the King’s Proctor,’ 1 July 1779.

119. TNA, SP 100/13, Belgiojoso for Bienenfeld and Paul Sorkolzy to Weymouth, 8 July 1779.

120. TNA, SP 100/13, ‘Account of saltpetre shipped at Lorient aboard of the Zeepart,’ 12 July 1779; HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 118, fol. 18r, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 13 July 1779. The final sum paid (including interest) was £31,352, see TNA SP 100/13, Belgiojoso to Weymouth, 4 August 1779.

121. HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 120, fol. 33v, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 28 March 1780.

122. De Dordlot, “Les ports d’Ostende et de Nieuport,” 141–157; Ronkard, “Les répercussions de la Guerre Américaine,” 51–90.

123. The court files relating to the entire case from the American side, numbering some four hundred pages, can be found under National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], Record Group [RG] 267, Records of the United States Supreme Court [SC]: Records of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture [CA], Entry 1 – Revolutionary War Prize Case Files, 1776–1786 and Entry 2 Misc. Case Papers, 1772–1784; Microfilm Publication M162. I am grateful to Robert Ellis, archivist at the Federal Judicial Record Office, Washington DC.

124. NARA, RG267, SC, CA, 1-2, Court Proceedings, 22 November 1781.

125. *Ibid.*, Exhibits, Richard Neave to Jacob Kladen, 1 May 1781; Richard Neave to Duncan Campbell of St. Vincent’s, 1 May 1781; Kender Mason to James Morson, 12 May 1781; James Blundell to James Waddington, 12 June 1781; and Jonathan Blundell to William Author, 12 June 1781.

126. *Ibid.*, Exhibits, *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* to Vivian Home, 21 June 1781; *ibid.*, *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* to *Messrs Henry Pinchin & Co.*, 25 June 1781; *ibid.*, copies of ship manifest and goods of *Den Eersten*, notarised 20 September 1781.

127. *Ibid.*, Interrogation of Pol, s.d. [November 1781].

128. *Ibid.*, Judgements of Judge Cushing, 6 and 19 December 1781.

129. Bourguignon, *The First Federal Court*, 116–119; Mask and MacMahon, “Revolutionary War Prize Cases,” 480–483 and 486–495.

130. Resolution, 2 U.S. 1 (1781): Miller et al Libellants and Appellants v. The Ship Resolution, and Ingersoll, Claimant and Appellee & Miller et al Libellants and Appellants v. The Cargo of the Ship *Resolution* and O'Brien and Appellant. The court reheard the case in December 1781 as Resolution, 2 U.S. 19 (1781).

131. NARA, RG267, SC, CA, 1-2, Court Proceedings, 28 January 1782.

132. Ibid., Decree of Condemnation in the Court of Appeals, 5 February 1782.

133. Ibid., Decree of Condemnation in the Court of Appeals, 5 February 1782.

134. Ibid., Order by Cyrus Griffin on 22 March 1782 endorsed by Nathaniel Cushing.

135. Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780; Bourguignon, "Incorporation of the Law of Nations," 270–295.

136. TNA, FO26/2, Alleyne Fitzherbert to Stormont, 3 August 1781.

137. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 160, Mercy to Starhemberg, 10 March 1782; HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 2 April 1782.

138. Memoire de Messieurs *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* enclosed in Vergennes to Franklin, 18 July 1782, PBF, 36:446–447; transcribed and translated in *The Works of Dr. Benjamin Franklin*, 5:122–126.

139. Ibid., 5:124.

140. Franklin to Vergennes, 18 January 1782, PBF, 36:447–448; HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Korrespondenz Frankreich, K. 9, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Starhemberg, 20 January 1782.

141. The second petition (undated) by *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* addressed to Franklin is labelled B in the apostilled collection of documents by Peter Stephen du Ponceau in NARA, RG267, SC, CA, 1-2, Court Proceedings; Vergennes to Franklin, 22 March 1783, PBF, 39:367–368. The enclosures believed to be missing by the Franklin Papers are contained in the court records.

142. NARA, RG267, SC, CA, 1-2, Court Proceedings, Documents relating to the Petition for Review of Darby v. *Eersten* filed on 10 May 1784; *ibid.*, Refusal of a Rehearing heard before the Court of Appeals on 24 May 1784.

143. Ibid., Memorial by *Liebaert, Baes, Derdeyn & Co.* presented to Congress by Prager, 9 February 1785; *ibid.*, John Jay to President of Congress, 13 February 1785.

144. NARA, RG267, SC, CA, 1-2, Court Proceedings, Deposition of John Baes, 1 March 1787.

145. Ibid., Verdict of Judges Griffin and Read, 11 May 1787.

146. Bergmans, "*Handelsbetrekkingen*," 29–88.

147. Frank, "The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea," 410–444; Sauer, "Habsburg Colonial," 5–23.

Chapter 5

1 Based upon an account provided by Sir Robert Murray Keith in TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 27 May 1778.

2. Morris, Peacemakers, 151.
3. Hutson, Adams and Diplomacy, 54.
4. Edward Gibbon even believed Silas Deane travelled to Vienna, see Gibbon to J. B. Holroyd, 21 March 1778, in Prothero, *The Private Letters of Edward Gibbon*, no. 342.
5. "William never got to carry out his commission to Berlin and Vienna" in Van Vlack, Silas Deane, 138. The inaccuracy of Arthur Lee travelling to Vienna in 1778 is present in Mustafa, Merchants and Migrations, 149–150. Paul B. Bernard mistakes Arthur Lee and William Carmichael going on their German mission in 1776 when Carmichael travelled there in 1776 and Arthur Lee went in 1777 to say nothing of William Lee, see Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria, 22. In his repertorium of American diplomats, Walter Burges Smith lists Lee as an envoy to Berlin but not under Vienna, see Smith, *America's Diplomats and Consuls*, 76–78.
6. Roider, "William Lee," 167.
7. Dippel, Germany and the American Revolution, 39.
8. Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, 3.
9. My analysis here benefits from Gould, *Among the Powers of the Earth*, 2.
10. The Habsburgs maintained 57 infantry and 32 calvary regiments during this period (1775–1783), see Table 13 in Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 301; Szabo, *Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism*, 3.
11. "The Elector of Hanover and the Emperor are on exceedingly ill terms" in Chandler, *A friendly address*, s.n.; Black, *The Continental Commitment*, 156.
12. Codignola, *Relations*, 29.
13. Deane to John Jay, 3 December 1776, in Isham, *The Deane Papers*, 1:396; Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 26 November 1777, in Sparks, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:64–65.
14. Mazzei to Franklin, 5 September 1777, PBF, 24:502–503.
15. Jefferson to Adams, 21 August 1777, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* [PTJ], 2:27–29.
16. Stevens, *Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives*, 2: nos. 149–150. Likely authored by Edward Bancroft, see Dull, *Diplomatic History*, 90.
17. As historian Jonathan R. Dull states, Carmichael "remains a remarkably mysterious figure" and his Berlin mission even more so, see Dull, *Franklin the Diplomat*, 37. The best account of Carmichael's mission is to be found in Kapp, *Friedrich der Grosse*, 18–21 with additional material in Kite, "Revolutionary Correspondence," 1–11; and Connecticut Historical Society, Silas Deane Papers, Box 1, Folder 33, Carmichael's letters dated 11, 12, 25 and 26 November 1776 from Hamburg and Berlin.
18. Haworth, "Frederick and the American Revolution," 460–478.
19. Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 2:316 and 319–20; Alden, *Stephan Sayre*, 97–121.
20. Browning, "Hugh Elliot in Berlin," 88.
21. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Arthur Lee Papers, Ms. Am. 811-811.7, MJ811.2.III, fol. 61, Pincus to Lee, 20 July 1777. I am grateful to librarian Micah Hoggart. There is no other trace of Pincus despite searches in local and regional archives.
22. Lee to Franklin, 27 May 1777, in Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:327.

23. Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 46. Historian Pauline Maier saw great value in Lee, casting him as someone who sorely needs “closer examination.” Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution*, 248.

24. Tsapina, “*The Strange Case of Philipp Ludwell*,” 3.

25. Franklin to William T. Franklin, 14 July 1773, PBF, 18:385.

26. *Public Addresses*, LWL, 1:11.

27. Morgan, Dr Johnson’s “Dear Master”, 94.

28. Jennings-Lee, *The Lees of Virginia*, reprint, 236–237.

29. Lee to Charles Dumas, 10 September 1776, LWL, 1:183.

30. Lee to Barbeau Dubourg, 27 August 1776, LWL, 1:180–182.

31. Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 33.

32. Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 15 October 1776, LWL, 1:184–90.

33. Clark, Silas Deane, 133–159; Abernethy, “The Origin of the Franklin-Lee Imbrolio,” 41–52; Goldstein, “Silas Deane: Preparation for Rascality,” 75–97.

34. *Public Ledger*, 22 July 1777, LWL, 1:197; BL, Add. Mss. 34414, George Lupton to William Eden, June to July 1777.

35. Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 37–38.

36. Franklin to James Lovell, 22 July 1778, PBF, 27:54.

37. Arthur Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 4 October 1777; “My idea of adapting characters and places is this - Dr. F[ranklin] to Vienna, as the first, most respectable, and quiet; Mr Deane to Holland . . . France remains the [*sic*] center of political activity, and here, therefore, I should choose to be employed.” Sparks, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:625.

38. President of Congress to Lee, 1 July 1777, *ibid.*, 1:591–592.

39. Lee to the President of Congress, 7 October 1777, *ibid.*, 1:592–593; Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 41.

40. Lee to Charles Thompson, Secretary of Congress, 2 January 1778, in Sparks, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1:596–598; Lee to President of Congress, 22 January 1778, LWL, 1:345.

41. Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee, 4 January 1778, LWL, 1:325–329.

42. Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 2 January 1778, LWL, 1:314–319.

43. Lee to Edward Brown, 12 January 1778, LWL, 1:341–342.

44. Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 43.

45. Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 2 January 1778 and Lee to President of Congress, 22 January 1778, LWL, 1:314–19; 345; Lee to Brown, 26 February 1778, LWL, 2:368.

46. Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 13 and 28 February; Lee to Franklin, 25 February, 12 and 13 March; Lee to Deane, 16 March; and Lee to President of Congress, 28 February 1778, LWL, 2:355–362, 370–373, 367, 395–396, 397–398, 399, 384–386.

47. Lee to American Commissioners 8 and 14 May 1778, LWL, 1:429, 431.

48. Dill, *Militia Diplomat*, 44. Lee held three offices concurrently as he was also a commercial agent for Virginia.

49. Mercer to Washington, 28 November 1778, *The Papers of George Washington* [PGW], 18:321–325. Original emphasis.

50. Simms and Riotte, *Hanoverian Dimension*, 31.

51. Simms, *Three Victories*, 524–525.
52. Scott, *The True Principles of the Revolution*, 51–91.
53. Keith to Chamier, 11 April 1777, in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 2:76–77.
54. Simms, *Three Victories*, 621.
55. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 258.
56. Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*, 40.
57. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 259.
58. Bemis, *Diplomacy*, 70–71n1. The French minister in Munich sent word at 7 p.m. on December 30, 1777; it arrived in Paris on January 4, 1778.
59. Beales, *Joseph II*, 1:77 and 349.
60. Frederick protested on January 3, 1778, at the convention at Ratisbon (Regensburg). Murphy, *Vergennes*, 295–296.
61. *Ibid.*, 292n9; Dull, *French Navy and American Independence*.
62. Bernard, *Joseph II and Bavaria*, 31.
63. Keith to Drummond, 3 June 1778, in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 2:82–84.
64. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 291.
65. Elliot, Hufton and Scott, *Emergence of the Eastern Powers*.
66. Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 7 October 1777, *LWL*, 2:254.
67. Lee to President of Congress, 23 March 1778, *LWL*, 2:411–412. For Frederick II's overtures, see Haworth, "Frederick the Great and the American Revolution," 460–478.
68. Lee to Jennings, 11 April 1778, *LWL*, 2:416.
69. Referring to the flaw pointed out by Mercy-d'Argenteau.
70. Lee to Arthur Lee, 30 April 1778, *LWL*, 2:426.
71. Lee to Izard, 10 May 1778, *LWL*, 2:430–431.
72. *WD*, 2 May 1778.
73. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 22 April 1778. Keith suspected Lee was in Prussia, see TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 16 May 1778.
74. TNA, SP80/220, Suffolk to Keith, 12 May 1778.
75. *Ibid.*, Suffolk to Keith, 3 April 1778.
76. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 27 May 1778.
77. *Ibid.*
78. Keith to Chamier, 11 April 1777, in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 2:65.
79. TNA, SP80/220, Weymouth to Keith, 3 July 1778. The Secretaries for the Northern and Southern Departments directed British foreign policy over separate geographical areas in Europe. Both political appointments, these ministers defended governmental policy in Parliament and reported to the king, see Black, *British Politics and Foreign Policy*, 11–52.
80. AAE, CP, *Autriche*, 336.
81. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 298 and 537.
82. *Ibid.*, 298; Vergennes issued a memorandum to all French ambassadors outlining the case against the Habsburg position which offended Kaunitz.

83. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 25 April 1778.
84. Bernard, Joseph II, 3.
85. *Ibid.*, 4; Fulton, Dr John Moore, 296.
86. Wraxall, *Memoirs*, 2:235.
87. *Ibid.*, 2:236–237.
88. *Ibid.*, 2:238.
89. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 27 May 1778.
90. Fulton, Dr John Moore, 295.
91. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K.126, fol. 132, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 28 May 1778. The British chargé d'affaires commended Kaunitz for his reception of Lee and repeated Keith's request to ensure that the "Door of the Empress's Apartment might be positively locked against him." TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 27 May 1778.
92. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 27 May 1778.
93. *Ibid.*
94. Wraxall, *Memoirs*, 2:237.
95. HHStA, Sonderbestände, Khevenhüller-Metsch Familienarchiv, Reigersburg, K. 183, Bd. 2, Count Franz-Xaver Koller to Princess Anna Khevenhüller-Metsch, 28 May 1778. I am grateful to Count Bartolomäus Khevenhüller for his permission to access these family papers.
96. For the mishaps, see Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*, 26; Schlitter, *Beziehung*, 6–7.
97. HHStA, SB, Khevenhüller-Metsch Familienarchiv, Reigersburg, K. 183, Bd. 2, Koller to Khevenhüller-Metsch, 1 June 1778.
98. *Ibid.*, Koller to Khevenhüller-Metsch, 8 June 1778.
99. Schmidt-Brentano, *Kaiserliche und k. k. Generale*, 86.
100. Roeder, "William Lee," 164; Kneschke, *Adels-Lexicon*, 7:25.
101. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 6 March, 14 May, and 15 June 1778, PBF, 26:67–70, 457–458, and 625.
102. Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 1:177–183.
103. Beales, Joseph II, 1:298.
104. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 31 May 1778 in Arenth, *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, 10:434–444.
105. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 30 May 1778.
106. *Ibid.*
107. Virginia Historical Society Library [VHS], Mss.1.L51.F.417, Section 118, William Lee to Arthur Lee, 29 May 1778.
108. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 3 June 1778.
109. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 10 June 1778; Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*, 41.
110. HHStA, SB, Khevenhüller-Metsch Familienarchiv, Reigersburg, K. 183, Bd. 2, Count Koller to Princess Maria Amalia Khevenhüller (née Liechtenstein), 15 June 1778.
111. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 126, fol. 139, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, 18 June 1778.

112. VHS, Mss.1.L51.F.417, Section 118, Lee to Arthur Lee, 10 June 1778.
113. Lee to Arthur Lee, 29 May 1778 in Roider, "William Lee," 166.
114. Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica, Germania, Kartong 453, Report of Nils Bark dated 30th May 1778. I am grateful to archivist Örjan Romefors for sending this report and to Prof. Ellinor Forster for her translation from Swedish into German for me.
115. To avoid confusion, this was Count Franz Paula Karl von Colloredo (1736–1806).
116. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 13 June 1778.
117. Cerman, *Každodenní život Chotků v parku Veltrusy*, 12–17. I am grateful to Dr. Ivo Cerman for this information.
118. Johann Reinhold Forster to Franklin, 30 July 1778, PBF, 27:181–182; Uhlig, Georg Forster, 168.
119. See the letters of Count Koller to Princess Maria Amalia Khevenhüller (née Liechtenstein) throughout May and June in HHStA, SB, Khevenhüller-Metsch Familienarchiv, Reigersburg, K. 183, Bd. 2. Her husband was Prince Johann Sigismund Friedrich von Khevenhüller (1732–1801), *kaiserlicher und Reichsbevollmächtigter General-commissär* in Milan.
120. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, 3, XII, 84, Jean-Claude de Zinner [sic] to Franklin, 26th October 1778.
121. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 13 June 1778.
122. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 17 June 1778. Keith's earlier exhaustion had begun to show; on June 3, he wrote, "I can hardly guide the pen, my fingers are so tired with scribbling!"
123. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 24 June 1778.
124. Lee to Edmund Jenings, 24 June 1778, LWL, 2:454–455. Lee wrote at least six lengthy letters that day.
125. Lee to Arthur Lee, 24 June 1778, LWL, 2:454–455.
126. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 20 June 1778.
127. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 24 June 1778.
128. Matthäus Graf von Vieregg to Joseph Franz Xaver Freiherr von Haslang, 15 July 1778, quoted in Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution*, 38.
129. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 27 June 1778.
130. Stockton to Franklin, 3 June 1778, PBF, 26:582–583; TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 4 July 1778.
131. Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 63.
132. *Ibid.*, 64.
133. Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica, Germania, Kartong 453, report of Nils Bark, 12 June 1778. Forster translation.
134. TNA, SP80/220, Keith to Suffolk, 18 July 1778.
135. *Ibid.*, Keith to Suffolk, 4 July 1778.
136. Croatian State Archives Dubrovnik, Acta Sanctae Mariae Majoris, XVIII, Series 31.3062/53, 3, Sebastian d'Ayala to Ragusan Senate, s.d [June 1778]. I am grateful to Dr. Anna Vincenzi for helping decode d'Ayala's difficult script.

Chapter 6

1. Houtte, Contribution, 350–353; Davis, Joseph II, 6.
2. Van Bruyssel, Histoire, 3:294n1; NRS, Customs Records, RH20/23.
3. Gaier, Four Centuries, 45.
4. Salay, “The Production of Gunpowder,” 423.
5. Deuborne to Franklin, 10 November 1778, PBF, 28:12–15.
6. Miller, Sir Joseph Yorke, 38; Serruys, “The Port and City of Ostend,” 325.
7. HHStA, StK, Portugal, K. 9–10, fols. 45–46, Lebzelttern to Kaunitz, 14th June 1777.
8. Gaier, Four Centuries, 73.
9. Huibrechts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*,” 510. Huibrechts calculated estimates for the level of exports based upon the transit ledgers of internal customs houses, which recorded the weights and types of military goods, to arrive at this number.
10. Parmentier, *Profit and Neutrality*, 207–208.
11. Kent History & Library Centre [KHLC], Cobb of Margate, Family and Business Papers, *De Vinck & Co.* Correspondence, KCA, EK-U1453/B5/1706, fols. 6–11.
12. Bergbohm, Die bewaffnete Neutralität, 212.
13. Farasyn, De 18de eeuwse bloeiperiode, 68–86; Houtte *Histoire économique*, 2:65, 100, 121, and 169; cf. Van Gucht, “*De trans-Atlantische handel vanuit Oostende*,” 74.
14. ARB, SEG, 2151 (1–2), ‘Rapport du Comité du 28 Avril 1781 sur le projet de l’Agrandissement du bassin d’Ostende.’
15. Everaert, “Le pavillon impérial,” 64–65.
16. ARB, SEG, 2151/2, ‘Rapport du Comité du 8 8bre 1781 au Sujet des artisans et ouvriers Angloix, qui Vivement et établir dans ce Pais-ci.’
17. Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België/Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, Manuscripts Division, no. G2077, *Mémoire des faits de Frédéric de Romberg* (Brussels, 1810).
18. ARB, SEG, 2152, 4 November 1782, Rapport au Comité de Commerce; TNA, FO 95/8/2, Petition of Messers Romberg et Compagnie to Belgiojoso, 15 January 1781.
19. Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 195–8; Parmentier, *Profit and Neutrality*, 214.
20. Meissner, Mücke, and Weber, Schwarzes Amerika, 94; Schulte-Beerbühl and Weber, *From Westphalia to the Caribbean*, 89.
21. Parmentier, *Profit and Neutrality*, 214.
22. Weber, “Linen, Silver, Slaves, and Coffee,” 7; Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 196.
23. Fottrell to Franklin, 21 February 1783, PBF, 39:195; Parmentier, “The Irish Connection,” 31–54.
24. Fottrell to Franklin, 29 October 1781, PBF, 35:664–665.
25. Fottrell to Franklin, 21 February 1783, PBF, 39:32.
26. KHLC, Cobb, EKV1453/B3/5/687 fols. 1–31.
27. Wets to Franklin, PBF, 38:693.
28. *Veuve d’Aubremé & Fils* to Franklin, 31 January 1783, PBF, 38:701.
29. *Connelly & Sons* to Franklin, 4 February 1783, PBF, 38:693.

30. ARB, CP, 1154B, Circular, 25 July 1778.
31. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 232, fols. 175–181, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 25 July 1778, which contains Cazier's memorandum.
32. HHStA, Belgien, DDA Weisungen, K. 40-1, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 5 August 1778.
33. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 232, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 15 August 1778.
34. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 40-1, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 31 October 1778 and 1 December 1778.
35. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 234, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 26 November 1778; HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 41, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 6 January 1779.
36. ARB CAPB 499, D106, Starhemberg and the Committee of Maritime Commerce deliberated for two days between 14–15 February 1781.
37. Franklin to Vergennes, 18 January 1782, PBF, 36:447–448.
38. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Avisé au Comité à Bruxelles, 24 March 1782.
39. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Avisé au Comité à Bruxelles, 24 March 1782.
40. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Starhemberg to Mercy [to Kaunitz], 31 March 1782.
41. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 47, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 13 April 1782.
42. Beales, Joseph II, 1:421–422.
43. The offer was made on 19 May 1779. I have been unable to find the original but it is referenced in Flassan, *Histoire générale*, 7:300.
44. AAE, CP Autriche, 339, Breteuil to Vergennes, 26 May 1779.
45. Maria Theresa to Marie Antoinette, 1 July 1779, in Arneth and Geoffrey, eds., *Correspondance secrète*, 3:327.
46. *Ibid.*, 3:327–328.
47. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 31 July 1779, *ibid.*, 3:336.
48. Maria Theresa to Marie Antoinette, 1 December 1779, in Arneth, *Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette*, 292–293.
49. AAE, CP, Autriche, 340, fols. 222–223, Louis XVI to Maria Theresa, 27 May 1779. The King of Spain reiterated the same: AEE, CP, Espagne, 594, fols. 225–226, Charles III to Maria Theresa, s.d. June 1779.
50. AAE, CP, Autriche, 340, fols. 237–238 and 302–306, Vergennes to Breteuil, 9 June and 17 June 1779; AAE, CP, Autriche, 340, fol. 345, Breteuil to Vergennes, 12 July 1779; Murphy, Vergennes, 311–312 and 331.
51. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 31 July 1779, in Arneth and Geoffrey, eds., *Correspondance secrète*, 3:335.
52. TNA, SP80/221, fol. 152, Keith to Weymouth, 19 June 1779.
53. Joseph II to Marie Antoinette, 9 September 1783, in Arneth, *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II*, 32.

54. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 31 July 1779, in Arneth and Geoffrey, *Correspondance secrète*, 3:335–336. Keith wrote: “Baron Breteuil has received less Thanks in this Capital, than ever any Mediator did after having finished his Work.” TNA, SP80/221, fols. 142r–143, Keith to Weymouth, 2 June 1779.

55. Mentioned in Maria Theresa to Marie Antoinette, 30 June 1780 and Marie Antoinette to Maria Theresa, 13 July 1780, in Arneth and Geoffrey, eds., *Correspondance secrète*, 3:444–445. For Joseph II's earlier contemplation, see Beales, Joseph II, 1:252.

56. TNA, SP80/221, fol. 125–128r, Keith to Weymouth, 19 May 1779.

57. TNA, SP80/221, fols. 176–181r, Weymouth to Keith, 16 July 1779, nos. 9 and 10.

58. *Ibid.*, fol. 197, Keith to Weymouth, 31 July 1779.

59. *Ibid.*, fols. 196–203r.

60. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 31 July 1779, in Arneth and Geoffrey, *Correspondance secrète*, 3:336.

61. Maria Theresa to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 4 August 1779, *ibid.*, 3:338.

62. HHStA, Familienakten, Sammelbände, K. 7, fols. 293–300; HHStA, Familienakten, Sammelbände, K. 26 and K. 27a *passim*. The few which have survived, have been incorporated into Alfred Ritter von Arneth's edition. Here, there is only one letter from 1778, and the next comes in 1780, see Arneth, *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II*, 20–22; Nougaret, “Marie-Antoinette dans les fonds des Archives nationales,” 129–136.

63. Maria Theresa only retained some of the letters from the regular monthly interchange between her and her daughter. Those that do survive are best served in three editions where each editor omitted certain parts (such as the sexual relations between Marie Antoinette and King Louis). The Arneth edition (quoted above) including Mercy-d'Argenteau's correspondence offers the most political discussion. The other editions are: Arneth, ed., *Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette: Ihre Correspondenz* and Girard, ed., *Correspondance entre Marie Thérèse et Marie Antoinette*.

64. Marie Antoinette to Maria Theresa, 16 August 1779, in Arneth and Geoffrey, *Correspondance secrète*, 3:338.

65. HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 111, Konv. 5, fols. 25–26, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 17th June 1779.

66. HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 112, Konv. 1, fols. 1–2, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 1 September 1779. This was obviously dilatory as well as honest since Floridablanca did the same to the Russians when a mediation offer from St. Petersburg was forthcoming, see AAE, CP, Russie, 105, Charles Olivier de Saint-Georges, marquis de Vérac to Vergennes, 8 September 1780.

67. Floridablanca to Kaunitz-Questenberg, 28th November 1779, contained within Kaunitz-Questenberg's report to Kaunitz, 6 December 1779, HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 112, Konv. 1, fols. 138–139r. Kaunitz-Questenberg's follow-up came on 13 November 1779, *ibid.*, fols. 136–137r.

68. Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 16 November 1779 in Arneth and Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy Argenteau*, 543.

69. See, for example, TNA SP80/221, fols. 171–172, Keith to Weymouth, 14 July 1779.

70. Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 3 August 1779 and 1 September 1779 in Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète*, 540–542.
71. De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 223.
72. Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Fondo Ministero Affari Esteri, Inghilterra, Busta 33, Count Michele Pignatelli to Francesco d'Aquino Prince di Caramanico, 28 March 1780.
73. Bemis, *The Hussey-Cumberland Mission*; Morris, *Peacemakers*, 43–66; Dull, *The Miracle of American Independence*, 113–118.
74. HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 112, Konv. 4, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 28 April 1780; HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 113, Konv. 6, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 17 July 1780; *ibid.*, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 7 September 1780; HHStA, StK, Spanien, Berichte, K. 113, Konv. 7, Kaunitz-Questenberg to Kaunitz, 16 October 1780. There was also a close monitoring of the British and French responses to these talks, see HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 120, fols. 15–16, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 27 July 1780; HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 162, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 16 August 1780.
75. Maria Theresa to Marie Antoinette, 30 June 1780, and Marie Antoinette to Maria Theresa, 13 July 1780 in Arneth and Geoffrey, eds., *Correspondance secrète*, 3:444–445.
76. The insinuation must have been verbal as only Prussian reports confirm it, see Morris, *Peacemakers*, 159.
77. AAE, CP, Autriche, 341, fols. 310–314, Breteuil to Vergennes, 5 October 1780.
78. De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 172–215.
79. Af Malmberg, *Neutrality and State-Building*, 36–39; Müller, *Sweden's Neutrality*, 203–224.
80. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 284–287; De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 234–238.
81. Simms, *Three Victories*, 636–661.
82. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 325.
83. Keith to Sir Joseph Yorke, 20 January 1781 in Smyth, *Memoirs*, 1:116; Keith to Richard Rigby, 21 January 1781, *ibid.*, 1:119.
84. Murphy, *Vergennes*, 331; Bemis, *Diplomacy*, 181.
85. De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 264–265.
86. TNA, SP80/223, fols. 31–32r, Stormont to Keith, 25 August 1780.
87. TNA, SP80/223, fol. 3, Stormont to Keith, 8 August 1780; *ibid.*, fols. 37–38, Keith to Stormont, 2 September 1780; and *ibid.*, Keith to Stormont, 6 September 1780, fols. 40–44.
88. *Ibid.*, fols. 167–179, Stormont to Keith, 1 December 1780.
89. Mayer, “The Price for Austria's Security: Part I,” 257–299; Beales, Joseph II, 2:104–132.
90. TNA, FO 7/1, Keith to Stormont, 10 January 1781.
91. Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau [and Belgiojoso], 21 May 1781 in Arneth and Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy Argenteau*, 1:35. Cf. De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 325n66.
92. De Madariaga, *Armed Neutrality*, 239–263.

93. A persistent idea; see ARB, SEG, 2151/2, 'Rapports du 18 Juillet et du 26 Septembre 1782 sur un projet d'acquisition de l'Isle de Tobago.'
94. TNA, FO 7/1, Keith to Stormont, 7 February 1781.
95. AAE, CP, Autriche, 342, fol. 56, Breteuil to Vergennes, 11 February 1781.
96. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 164, Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 8 February 1781.
97. Bemis, Diplomacy, 181–182.
98. AAE, CP, Autriche, 342, fol. 127, Breteuil to Vergennes, 5 March 1781.
99. TNA, FO 7/1, Stormont to Keith, 9 January, 4 February, and 27 February 1781.
100. Adams to President of Congress, 26 June 1781, PJA, 11:396–398.
101. AAE, CP, Autriche, 342, fol. 237, Breteuil to Vergennes, 19 April 1781.
102. Adams to Joseph Ward, 15 April 1809, early access document via "Founders Online."
103. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 164, Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 23 May 1781. Summarised in de Madariaga, Armed Neutrality, 325.
104. HHStA, StK, England, Berichte, K. 120, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, 8 June and 16 July 1781; TNA, FO 7/1, Stormont to Keith, 12 June 1781.
105. Morris, Peacemakers, 188.
106. Black, British Foreign Policy, 11–12; Stockley, Britain and France, 35–36.
107. Joseph II to Marie Antoinette, 9 September 1783 in Arneht, *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II*, 32.
108. TNA, FO 7/4, Stormont to Keith, 15 January 1782.
109. De Incontrera, Trieste e l'America, 99–101; Reill, Nationalists who feared the Nation, 81–82.
110. O'Reilly, "Lost Chances," 53–70; Faber, Litorale Austriaco; Gasser, "Österreichs Levantenhandel," 120–130; Kaltenstadler, "Seehandel über Triest," 55:482–497 and 56:1–104.
111. Bosetti, De Trieste à Dubrovnik, 63.
112. Finanz und Hofkammerarchiv [FHKA], Neue Hofkammer [NHK], Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 992 (1749–1796); British consul Nathaniel Green's reports to London held at BL, Manuscripts, Keith Papers, Add. Mss. nos. 35508–35542 and Drake Papers, Add. Mss. 46826; TNA, SP97/61, Green to Keith, 3 April 1775; see also Kaps, "Small But Powerful," 427–455.
113. Archivio di Stato di Trieste [AST], Deputazione di Borsa poi Camera di Commercio e d'Industria di Trieste (1751–1921) [DB], Serie VII, 'Tramissione da parte del Governo della relazione di Felice Carli sul commercio con le Province americane' in Carteggio [C] no.105, fol.88; 'Trammissione del Governo del rapporto inviato dal console in Nantes sulle cause dell'insuccesso del commercio tra Francia e America' in C.156, fol. 45.
114. AST, DB, Serie VII, C.67, fol. 49, 'Comunicazione del Governo per il rapporto inviato da Hofer relativo al commercio con l'america'; C.160, fol. 59, 'Trammissione del Governo del rapporto del console in Amburgo sul commercio con gli Stati Uniti d'America'; C.60, fol. 40, 'Comunicazione del Governo per la relazione inviata da Hofer sul commercio con l'america'; C.128, fol. 14, 'Trammissione del rapporto

inviato dal console in Amburgo sui rapporti commerciali con l'America'; and C.74, fol. 57, 'Transmisione da parte del Governo del rapporto del console in Amburgo sul commercio con le 13 Province Americane Indipenti'.

115. Christoph Beller to the Hofkammer, 7 August 1776, FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Abteilung, Noten, K. 616, fols. 365–367. The *Hofkammer* was the main administrative organ of the financial matters; see Sapper, "Das Hofkammerarchiv als Forschungsstätte," 309–314.

116. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fols. 897–901, Kaunitz, Memorandum, 11 July 1782.

117. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 137, Kaunitz, Memorandum with Joseph's marginalia, 30 June 1782.

118. Bell, "Philadelphia Medical Students," 10.

119. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 24, 5 November 1779, fol. 275. The Logan family papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania archives yielded no trace of a congressional commission.

120. Franklin's Journal, 2 January 1782, PBF, 36:354–356.

121. Baraux to Adams, 21 March 1782, PJA, 12:342.

122. Adams to Baraux, 7 April 1782, PJA, 394.

123. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, Triestiner und Fiumer Handlung – Zucker, Fasz. 103, K. 893, e.g. fol. 388.

124. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 26, 12 June 1781, fol. 199.

125. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, Flaggenpatente, Fasz. 113v, K. 957 'Verpoorten Band' (1750–1800).

126. Stock, Trieste e l'America nascente, 7.

127. *Historisches Portefeuille*, Year One, 9th edition, September 1782, X, 'Abriss der Begebenheiten,' 1168; Babudieri, Trieste e gli interessi austriaci, 91–92.

128. WD, 29 June 1782; *Politisches Journal*, "VIII: Nachrichten aus verschiedenen Ländern," VIII (1782), 175–176; *Der Teutsche Merkur*, "VI: Octroy der neuen Triester Assecuranz-Handels-und Disconto-Compagnie," I (1783), 88–93.

129. WD, 4 November 1782; Babudieri, Trieste e gli interessi austriaci 92.

130. Popularly reported as *Das Schöne Wien* but the application states *La Città di Vienna*.

131. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fols. 669–685.

132. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, Flaggenpatente, K. 957 'Verpoorten Band' (1750–1800).

133. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fols. 696–701.

134. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 26, 19 August 1781, fol. 260.

135. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Kommerz nach Ost- und Westindien, K. 903, fols. 721–740.

136. For the most recent overview, see Kaps, *A Gateway to the Spanish Atlantic?*, 177–132; FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780–1786) fols. 1003–1020. I was pleased to make this discovery during the course of my doctoral research and to see the table's valuable information of use elsewhere.

137. Babudieri, Trieste e gli interessi austriaci, 92.

138. Ridgewell, *Economic Aspects – The Artaria Case*, 110; Dickson, Finance and Government, 1:426–427.

139. Dr. Alessandra Sambo found a similar Germania classification in Venetian statistical tables defining it as “a vast area that could be defined as Austro-Prussian, perhaps with some extension into the Caucasus region.” (“la Germania, une vaste aire qu’on pourrait définir austro-prussienne, avec peut-être quelques extensions dans le Caucase.”) Sambo, “La balance de commerce,” 387. I am grateful to Prof. Silvia Marzagalli for this information.

140. Based on calculations derived from the FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale Akten, Generalia, K. 850 (1780–1786), fols. 1003–1020 Two caveats are needed: first, India and China are not broken down separately, and so obscure an individual valuation, but collectively represented more than just the United States alone; second, the French ports are not listed but likely included ports in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coastline (Marseille and Bordeaux) and so this cannot be definitely counted either.

Chapter 7

1. WD, 15 February 1783.

2. Arneth and Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy Argenteau*, 1:165.

3. Franklin to Ingenhousz, 16 May 1783, PBF, 40:8–13.

4. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 31.

5. Codignola, *Relations*, 29.

6. *Ibid.*, 30.

7. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.85, XXXII, 84, *Salucci & Fils* to Franklin, 20 August 1784.

8. *Salucci & Fils* to Franklin, 7 March 1783 and 6 June 1783, PBF, 39:302–303 and 40:119–120; Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 32.

9. HHStA, StK, Toscana, K. 20, Veigl to Kaunitz, 26 October 1784, “Notizie dell’America Settentrionale: Le Navi Toscane che cola sono andate da Livorno.”

10. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 33–34.

11. Codignola, *La lettera*, 205–214.

12. *Ibid.*, 34n78; Codignola *Relations*, 31n9.

13. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 142–149.

14. Codignola, Blurred Nationalities, 124 and 150; Antonucci, *Consuls and Consiglieri*, 80–82.

15. Favi to American Commissioners, 10 October 1784, PTJ, 7:437–438.

16. Burnett, “Note on American Negotiations,” 584. They also sent this version to Denmark and Portugal.

17. Favi to American Commissioners, 26 April 1785, PTJ, 8:104.

18. Jefferson, "Notes on Alterations Proposed by Favi," PTJ, 8:105–110.
19. Jefferson, "Observations on the alterations proposed on the part of His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Tuscany in the articles of treaty offered by the Commissioners of the United States of America," enclosed in American Commissioners to Favi, 8 June 1785, PTJ, 8:187–195.
20. Favi to Jefferson, 10 November 1785, PTJ, 9:280; *Nuova minuta del trattato* in PTJ, 8:105–110.
21. Jefferson to Adams, 19 November 1785, PTJ, 9:41–47.
22. Original missing. Jefferson made a note of it in his *Summary Journal of Letters*, 12 May 1785, PTJ, 8:152.
23. Favi to Commissioners, 16 November 1784, PJA, 16:430–431.
24. ASF, AdS, Affari Esteri, C. 930, Fierallmi to Pietro Leopoldo, 26 November 1784.
25. ASF, AdS, Affari Esteri, C. 930, Piccolomini to Count Federico Barbolani di Montanto, 11 January 1785. Transcribed in Cortese, "Le prime relazioni," 14. I have seen the original but refer to Cortese's transcription.
26. Cortese, "Le prime relazioni," 16.
27. *Ibid.*, 17.
28. John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams [sister], 18 August 1785, Adams Family Correspondence [AFC], 6:255.
29. Brush served as a colonel in the Connecticut militia between May 1776 and January 1781, see *Fourth Report of the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution*, 191.
30. For Amsterdam: Diary of John Quincy Adams, AFC, 1, entry dated 10 June 1781. For friendship with Adams family: Abigail Adams to John Adams, 29 September 1781, AFC, 4:220. For Europe in 1782: Brush to Adams, 19 November 1782, PJA, 14:72–73. For firm: Broome-Semans and Broome-Schwarz, Broome, Latourette and Mercereau Families, 105. For background: Mann, "Thomas and Richard Brush," 132.
31. Brush to Adams, 4 February 1785, PJA, 16:515.
32. Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 33.
33. Brush to Adams, 4 February 1785, PJA, 16:515–516.
34. Brush to Adams, 4 February 1785, PJA, 515; Cortese, "Le prime relazioni," 9. This seems to be the same list he presented to the ministers in Naples-Sicily, see Brush to Giovanni [John] Acton, 25 March 1785, Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Affari Esteri, Busta 4210 and Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 55n14.
35. Cortese, "Le prime relazioni," 9; Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 267n14. Brush returned to America after Naples, see John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams [sister], 20 August 1785, AFC, 6:287.
36. *Augspurgische Ordinari Postzeitung*, no. 82, 7 April 1783, last page.
37. *Augspurgische Extra-Zeitung*, no. 288, 2 December 1783, first page.
38. *Augspurgische Ordinari Postzeitung*, no. 289, 3 December 1783, second page.
39. *Wiener Zeitung*, 25 June 1783, 6.
40. Ronkard, "Les répercussions de la Guerre Américaine," 57.

41. Starhemberg to Deplancq, 23 January 1783, transcribed in Schlitter, *Berichte*, 230–231.

42. The six members of the Committee were Gaspar Baudier, Nicolas Botte (secretary), Denis Benoît de Cazier, Henri Deplancq, Ferdinand Grégoire Paradis and Thomas François Grysperre. The three who responded were Deplancq, Grysperre, and Paradis.

43. ARB, CAPB, 512 and SEG, 2162, memoranda of Grysperre, 23 February 1783 and Paradis, 20 March 1783 respectively.

44. Levfevre, Documents, 385; Pricken, Deplancq. Huibrechts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*,” 530n128. Huibrechts states he died in 1785 but Levfevre (p. 350) gives 1791.

45. ARB, CAPB, 512, *Mémoire sur les effets de la Paix relativement au Commerce des Etats de Sa Majesté l’Empereur et sur les combinaisons auxquelles cet événement pourrait donner lieu*, 17 February 1783, transcribed by Houtte, “Contribution,” 363–379. Huibrechts has located another (annotated) version in ARB, CP, 1154B, presumably by the council members or Starhemberg himself. I have only seen the earlier version and quote from Houtte’s version.

46. Houtte, “Contribution,” 363–366.

47. *Ibid.*, 373–374; Everaert, “Le pavillon impérial,” 60–61.

48. Houtte, “Contribution,” 370–371.

49. *Ibid.*, 376.

50. ARB, SEG, 2150/2, Songa, 16 March 1783; ARB, CAPB, 152, De Lattre, 31 January 1783. Some discrepancy on the response numbers: Houtte found nine including Baudier, Deplancq, de Lattre, and Songa whereas Huibrechts found responses from Bedene de Jeune, Friedrich Romberg, Veuve van Schoor, Charles de Proli, Hollier, De Looze, and William Herries. I can confirm her findings.

51. ARB, CAPB, 512, Report, 18 February 1783.

52. ARB, CAPB, 512, Report, 23 February 1783.

53. ARB, CAPB, 512, Report, 6 and 10 February 1783; ARB, SEG, 2162, Report, 4 February 1783.

54. Verhaegen, “Le commerce des esclaves en Belgique,” 254–262; Anspach, “Frédéric baron de Romberg,” 161–181; Huibrechts, “*Swampin’ Guns and Stabbing Irons*,” 476.

55. ARB, SEG, 2151/2, ‘Rapports du 18 Juillet et du 26 Septembre 1782 sur un projet d’acquisition de l’Isle de Tobago.’

56. ARB, SEG, 2150, Charles Kersemans to Kaunitz, 6 March 1783 in ‘Rapport du Comité le 20 Mars 1783 concernant l’Annonce d’une augmentation de Droits en Espagne; ARB, SEG, 2154, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 6 March 1783; ARB, SEG, 2154, ‘Rapport du Comité sur diverses lettres du Secrétaire de légation à Madrid, Hambourg, et du Consul Impérial à Cadix, Comte de Greppi, relatives au nouveau Tarif des Douanes en Espagne, 31 May 1783.’

57. APS, William Temple Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.86, CV, 72, James Drummond to William Temple Franklin, 13 June 1783 and APS, William Temple Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.86, CV, 71, James Elphinston to William Temple Franklin, 13 June 1783.

Drummond was a school friend of William Temple Franklin and associated with *Herries, Keith & Co.* until its restructuring in 1784 when Charles Herries took over, see APS, William Temple Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F.86, CV, 60, *Robert Herries & Co.* Circular to William Temple Franklin, 31 July 1784.

58. The family settled in Amsterdam in the 1740s with a branch in London, *Israel Levin Salomon's*, which relocated to Ostend during the Revolution. Mark was one of three Prager sons to travel to the United States, see Marcus, *United States Jewry*, 1:146–147.

59. Library of Congress [LoC], George Washington Papers, Series 2, Letterbooks 1754–1799: Letterbook 11, 243, Washington to William Fitzhugh, 23 July 1784.

60. Library of Congress [LoC], George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence, Series 4, MSS 44693: Reel 098, 141–142, Prager to Washington, 27 October 1788, which was written from Amsterdam following his father's death in early 1788, see TNA, PROB 11/1162/253, Will of Israel Levin Salomon [Yehiel Prager], 21 February 1788.

61. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 17 June 1785, Add. JJ, fol. 117. The Pragers were part of the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam and used their connections in Lisbon, tapping into a longstanding wheat and wine trade, see Fisher, *The Portugal Trade*, 42–43. They were lucky to operate when the trade was depressed pending a US-Portuguese trade agreement, see Reeder, *Smugglers, Pirates and Patriots*, 90–91.

62. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 25 February 1786, Add. K, fols. 55–68.

63. University of Chicago Library, Special Collections, Butler-Gensaulus Collection, Box 1, fol. 74, Note of John Dickinson, 3 October 1785.

64. Marcus, *United States Jewry*, 1:147.

65. Hagley Library and Museum, Wurts Family Papers, Section I, James Vanuxem Papers, Promissory Notes, Box 1, Folder 15. N.B. sometimes spelled as the Dutch variant *De Heijder, Veijdt & Co.*

66. James Vanuxem Jr. (1790–1877) was born in Philadelphia. He married Susannah Lombaert, daughter of Herman Joseph Lombaert and Margaretta Wynkoop Lombaert, see *ibid.* under miscellany and the historical note to the collection.

67. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 14 November 1784, Add. B, fols. 55–68 and K. 182b, 17 June 1785, Add. C, fol. 12; Du Plessis, *Transitions to Capitalism*, 298.

68. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, i.

69. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182d, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 20 March 1787, Add. M, fols. 51–54.

70. Winterthur Museum, Joseph Downs Collection of Manuscripts, Coll. Mic. 187, Ledgerbook of Samuel Wetherill and Sons, fol. 180. They also sold goods under their own name, see advertisement of *De Heyder, Veydt & Co.* in *The Pennsylvania Packet*, 16 November 1787.

71. TNA, FO 26/3, Torrington to Lord Carmarthen, 22 January 1786.

72. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Beelen-Bertholff to Belgiojoso, 24 November 1786, fols. 447–457.

73. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 14 November 1784, Add. C, fols. 121–143. *Biddle & Tellier* was Clement Biddle and Rudolph Tellier.

74. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 14 November 1784, Add. M, fols. 177–180; Van Winter, American Finance and Dutch Investment, 1:177.

75. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff, 14 November 1784, Add. M, fols. 177–180; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, 13 December 1784, Add. J, fol. 220.

76. Hasquin, Joseph II, 62.

77. Farasyn, De 18de eeuwse bloeiperiode and Ronkard, “Les répercussions de la Guerre Américaine,” Tableau I. Mouvement portuaire: Ostende & Bruges/Antilles, 64–65;

78. Two applications dated 3 July 1782 and 11 January 1782 in ARB, SEG, 2173, ‘Demandes pour des Places de Consuls avec un Inventaire des Rapports et Pieces 1781–1786.’

79. Deplancq’s memorandum, 18 July 1782 in ARB, SEG, 2173, ‘Rapport sur la requête de F. J. Bouvier natif de Namur tendante a nomme Consul General Imperial en Amérique.’

80. Connecticut Historical Society, Silas Deane Papers, Box 7, Folder 21, Sir Robert Herries, ‘Observations on Commerce.’ Herries, a major trader in tobacco, saw success in reshipping Flemish linens, laces, and hats to the United States.

81. Browne to Adams (27 January 1784) is missing but was forwarded by Dennis de Berdt to Adams, 6 February 1784, PJA, 16:17–18. Adams forwarded the letters to Franklin and Jay on 27 March 1784 (PBF, 42:78) and Franklin acknowledged that he had sent the letter on to Congress on 16 April 1784, PJA, 16:165–166. Nothing more came of it.

82. Dill, Militia Diplomat, s.n.

83. Browne and Lee had cooperated throughout the war and had traded with one another since at least 1775, see the Jessie Ball duPont Memorial Library at Stratford Hall [SH], The Archives of the Robert E. Lee Memorial Foundation, Papers of the Lee Family, William Lee Letterbooks [WLLB], Box 9, Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee, 23 September 1775.

84. Lee had known De Berdt since 1771, see SH, WLLB, Box 9, Lee to Anthony Stewart, 1 April 1771. For Lee’s desire to see commerce restored, see Lee to Arthur Lee, 2 April 1783; Lee to Samuel Thorpe, 11 April 1783; Lee to Adams, 24 April 1783, LWL, 3:939–945. For Lee’s scheme with Browne, see VHS, William Lee Letterbooks, Mss.51.f.421, fols. 148–150, Lee to Browne, 26 April 1785.

85. VHS, William Lee Letterbooks, Mss.51.f.421, fol. 153, Lee to Browne, 11 May 1785.

86. *Ibid.*, fols. 265–268, Lee to Browne, 6 May 1786 and Lee to Frederick Grand, 6 May 1786.

87. *Ibid.*, fols. 270–271, Lee to Brothers Overman, 6 May 1786.

88. LoC, Nicholas Low Papers, "Ostend, Belgium," Box 3, William Williams to Nicholas Low, 10 September 1783.
89. LoC, Nicholas Low Papers, "Anvers, Belgium," Box 7, *Werbrouck & Mellerio* to Nicholas Low, 22 March 1785 and 1 August 1785.
90. LoC, Nicholas Low Papers, "Anvers, Belgium," Box 9, *Werbrouck & Mellerio* to Joseph Lacoste, 20 January 1786.
91. Roberts and Roberts, Thomas Barclay (1728–1793), 158–171.
92. *The Papers of Robert Morris* [PRM], 9:xxxvii; Maryland Historical Society, Robert Gilmore Collection, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 29, George Gibson to Gilmore, 15 June 1785.
93. Robert Morris to Gilmore, 14 February 1784, PRM, 9:120–121.
94. Rabuzzi, *Cutting Out the Middleman?*, 184.
95. William Wenam Seward to Jefferson, 25 October 1785, PTJ, 8:672–674.
96. The first representatives were Francis L. Taney in Ostend (1801–1803) and James Blake in Antwerp (1801–1804), see Smith, *America's Diplomats*, 67.
97. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, Fasz. 105, K. 905 'Borse', fols. 260–261 (1775); fols. 271–272 (1776); fols. 278–279 (1777); fols. 286–287 (1779); fols. 415–416 (1783) and fol. 392; Anon., *Handbuch für Kaufleute*, 1:254.
98. Singerton, "New World, New Market," 65–72.
99. Dominique François Belletti to Franklin, 21 February 1783, unpublished, "Franklin Papers Project at Yale University."
100. Belletti to Franklin, 21 February 1783, unpublished, "Franklin Papers Project at Yale University."
101. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 11, Belletti to Franklin, 7 April 1783; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 26, Belletti to Franklin 11 April 1783; APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 39, Belletti to Franklin, 14 April 1783; and APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 62, Belletti to Franklin, 25 April 1783.
102. Antoine-Madeleine Bertrand to Franklin, 15 September 1783, PBF, 40:362.
103. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 39, Zinzendorf for Belletti, 19 January 1780.
104. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXVIII, 90, Proli to Franklin, 14 May 1783. Franklin's letter of introduction (14 May 1783) is in FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fol. 1107.
105. Spellings varied.
106. HHStA, KA, KK, NZ, TZ, Bd. 26, 30 August 1781, fol. 274.
107. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fol. 1046r–1047.
108. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 903, fol. 1046r.
109. APS, Franklin Papers, Ms.B.F85., 7, XXIX, 147, Belletti to Franklin, 15 September 1783. Original emphasis.
110. *Ibid.*
111. APS, Franklin Papers, Ms.B.F85, 8, X, 11, Richard Bache to Franklin, 7 March 1784.
112. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 10 December 1783.

113. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K.182a Report, 25 April November 1784, Add. O, fols. 59–64; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K.182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. A., fols. 114–120.
114. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K.182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add. J, fols. 276–298.
115. *Ibid.*, fols. 280–281.
116. *Ibid.*, fols. 276–298.
117. WD, 18 September 1784. Original letter dated 12 February 1784.
118. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. A., fols. 114–120; Houtte, *Histoire économique*, 1:32–33.
119. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. A., fols. 118–120, ‘Lettre à Mons. Jaumenet maître des forges à Namur,’ September 1784; Hildebrand, “Foreign markets for Swedish iron,” 3–52.
120. Leos Müller and Michal Wanner, “Bohemian Textiles and Glass in Eighteenth-Century Global Trade” presented at *The Third European Congress on World and Global History*, 14–17 April 2011, London School of Economics; Kellenbenz, *Der deutsche Außenhandel*, 4–60; Ramcke, *Die Beziehung zwischen Hamburg und Österreich*.
121. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, No. 3, fol. 32.
122. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report 25 April 1784, Add P., fols. 65–66.
123. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report 25 April 1784, Add P., fol. 66.
124. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Letter, fols. 287–295.
125. The two species were *Nicotiana Tabacum* commonly called “Virginia tobacco,” grown in America, and *Nicotiana Rustica* also called “Aztec tobacco,” grown in Hungary. For attitudes towards tobacco, see Maxwell, “Tobacco as Cultural Signifier,” 1–19.
126. Maxwell, *Everyday Nationalism*, 60–61.
127. In 1777, for example, word of a new consignment of American tobacco arriving in France compelled one Dutch merchant to cancel his order of Hungarian tobacco, see Zinzendorf, diary entry 6 August 1777 in Klingenstein et al, *Zwischen Wien und Triest*, 2:24.
128. Maxwell, *Everyday Nationalism*, 62.
129. *Ibid.*, 61.
130. Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, 28–29.
131. *Ibid.*, 77; Márki, *Amerika és a magyarság*, 4.
132. On Joseph’s journey to the Banat see Beales, *Joseph II*, 1:366–367 and Kulcsár, *The Travels of Joseph II*, 34–57.
133. Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, 78.
134. Almásy to Beelen-Bertholff, 4 December 1783 in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report 25 April 1784, Add. L, fols. 52–56.
135. Mérei, “Marktverhältnisse im Außenhandel,” 378.
136. Maxwell, *Everyday Nationalism*, 63–64.
137. Phelps, *U.S.-Habsburg Relations*, 43–44.
138. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add J, fols. 276–298; cf. Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 70.
139. Lanmon, “The Baltimore Glass Trade,” 21 and 26.

140. HHStA, StK, Provinzen, Küstenland, K. 1, 'Prospetto di una Compagnia di commercio per l'America Settentrionale.' In German the company was called the *Österreichisch-Amerikanische Gesellschaft*. For the Italian name see Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 69.

141. 'V. Handlungsanzeigen' in *Salzburger Intelligenzblatt*, 28 September 1785; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, fol. 313–316, Beelen-Bertholff to Kaunitz, 18 October 1785.

142. For example: 29 October 1785, *Journal Général de France* (Paris, 1785), 524.

143. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 141, Brigido to Joseph II, 12 August 1785.

144. *Ibid.*

145. *Ibid.*

146. HHStA, StK, Noten der Vereinigten Hofkanzlei, K. 14, Nota der vereinigten Hofkanzlei to the Staatskanzlei, 5 September 1785.

147. Lafayette to Jefferson, 4 September 1785, PTJ, 8:478–480.

148. "III. Siebenbürgen. Anfang eines Handels mit Amerika" in *Provinzial Nachrichten aus den Kaiserl. Königl. Staaten*, 17 April 1784, 483–484.

Chapter 8

1. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, 25 February 1786, Add. J, fols. 24–35.

2. Agstner, *Consulates South of the Rio Grande*, 85–117. The two Asian posts were in Canton (1781) and Mauritius (1783) followed later by one in Bengal (1787).

3. ARB, SEG, 2150, No. 76, Requête du sieur Bedene de Jaure, 18 March 1782.

4. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 2 April 1782.

5. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 260, Avisé au Comité à Bruxelles.

6. Franklin to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 18 January 1782, PBF, 36:447–448.

7. Dull, "Franklin and the Nature of American Diplomacy," 346–363; Perkins, *American Foreign Relations*, 1:26–41.

8. Elkins and McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism*, 65–89; Kaplan, *Colonies into Nation*, 158–161; Edling, *A Revolution in Favor of Government*, 131–134.

9. See Guinta and Hargrove, *The Emerging Nation*, 2: "Trials and Tribulations."

10. Gilje, "Commerce and Conquest," 735–770.

11. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 47, Kaunitz to Starhemberg, 13 April 1782.

12. ARB, SEG, 2173, No. 145, Requête de Bouvier, 11 January 1783.

13. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Korrespondenz Frankreich, K. 33.

14. *Ibid.*

15. For American awareness of this issue, see Lee to Adams, 18 February 1783, PJA, 14:276–277.

16. Habsburg ambassadors simultaneously represented both the imperial dignity and the various other dignities held by the Habsburg monarch, see Hochedlinger, *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 46–47.

17. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K.137, fol. 167-173, Kaunitz to Joseph, 19 March 1783.
18. ARB, CAPB, 512, Report, 25 February 1783.
19. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K.137, fol. 170, Kaunitz to Joseph, 19 March 1783.
20. Ibid. fol. 171.
21. Mallon, "Beelen-Bertholff," 149.
22. For Beelen's experience: ARB, CP, 1067, 20 December 1777.
23. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 137, Kaunitz, Memorandum, s.d.
24. ARB, CAPB, 512, Beelen to Starhemberg, 25 February 1783.
25. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 275, Belgiojoso to Kaunitz, Nos. 63 and 69.
26. ARB, SEG, 2162, fol. 156, 'Project de Points pour servir de matériaux au Instructions concernant le commerce de donner au Ministre et au Consul qui seroient envoyées de la part de S.M. l'Empereur auprès des États Unis de l'Amérique Septentrionale,' 6 April 1783.
27. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 49, 'Projet d'instructions pour N.N. declare consul imperial et royal dans l'Amérique Septentrionale,' s.d.
28. ARB, SEG, 2161, fol. 165. 'Sur divers points de directions ultérieures à fixer avant le départ du Baron de Beelen vers les États-Unis,' 25 May 1783.
29. ARB, CAPB, 512, Memoire de Beelen, 14 May 1783.
30. For their marriage: Hellin, *Histoire chronologique*, 482-483.
31. Family information drawn from Historical Society of Pennsylvania [HSP], Beelen Family Papers [BFP]. Two daughters had married by the time of the mission: Philippine married Edouard de Dorlodot in 1781, and Thérèse married Charles François Maurice Villeneuve de Janti. Descendants in the Dorlodot line, especially Baron Albert de Dorlodot—Beelen's great-great-great grandson—attempted to compile a family history and a sketch of the Beelen Mission, see his "Analysis of documents on Baron de Beelen-Bertholff and his mission in America, his life there and his children." in HSP, BFP. From Constantin Antoine stems the Gazzam line, whose descendants also compiled a historical account of the family, see Anton de Beelen Mackenzie, *History of the Gazzam Family—together with a sketch of the American branch of the family of de Beelen* (Reading, PA: 1894). I am grateful to further descendants of both American and European lines for sharing their family story with me.
32. ARB, SEG, 2163, fol.198, Memorandum, 22 July 1783.
33. Alison, "Baron de B," 30-35.
34. Thieriot was shipwrecked and made it to Philadelphia in March 1784. He returned the following year, see Lingelbach, "Saxon-American Relations," 525-30.
35. WD, 29 September 1784.
36. Five Habsburg agents forming an imperial botanic mission to the United States were onboard and recorded the terrible journey. ÖNB, Codex Series, no. 3517 'Expedition Märter', no. 1596, and HHStA, Wissenschaft und Kunst, K. 6 'Märter Schriften.' I have refrained from discussing this interesting episode in the early US-Habsburg relationship since Dr. Heather Morrison is currently working on a monograph on the subject. See her "Open Competition in Botany," 107-119.

37. APS, Franklin Papers, Mss.B.F85, 7, XXIX, 133, Bache to Franklin, 8 September 1783.
38. Mallon, "Beelen-Bertholff," 150.
39. Young, "The Baron de Beelen-Bertholff," 1-7.
40. Untitled Sketchbook in the HSP, BFP.
41. He also composed a short *Treatise on the Use of Colour* in the HSP, BFP.
42. De Dorlodot, "Analysis," 6.
43. PRM, 8:568.
44. 'Erländische Nachrichten,' *Wienerblättchen*, 25 September 1783.
45. WD, 17 September 1783.
46. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add. E, fols. 252-255.
47. 'Projet d'un Édit soumis par la législation de la Pensylvanie à la considération du public tendant à imposer un droit d'entrée additionnel sur les objets et sur le pied y repris.' in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, Report, 17 June 1785, Add. R, fols. 49-52; 'Etat de Rhode Island Douannes.' in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 10 September 1785, Add. D, fols. 177-180; 'Douannes Innovations de Massachusetts.' in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 10 September 1785, Add. C, fols. 173-176; 'New York.' in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 10 September 1785, Add G., fols. 191-194.
48. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add M, fols. 17-180; 'Exportations of Charleston' in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 17 June 1785, Add. P, fols. 46-47; and Piat Lefebvre to Beelen, in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 19 June 1786, Add. T, fols. 295-306.
49. Hill, French Perceptions, 90-94; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 22 December 1786, Add. A, fol. 460.
50. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add. F, fols. 266-269; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 17 June 1785, Add. N, fol. 38; Beelen to Jay, [before 14] September 1785 in Nuxoll, *Selected Papers of John Jay*, 4:177-179.
51. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, fols. 313-320, Beelen to Kaunitz, 18 October 1785. Beelen warned the situation in North Carolina could be severe in his report of 25 February 1786 in HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Add. M, fols. 71-94.
52. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, Report, 17 June 1785, Add. Q, fol. 48.
53. Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle, 24-25; Edling, "So Immense a Power in the Affairs of War," 287-326; Van Cleve, "The Anti-Federalists' Toughest Challenge," 529-560.
54. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. E, fol. 157.
55. Boudinot to Franklin, 1 November 1783, PBF, 41:169.
56. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, fols. 183-188, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 13 December 1784.
57. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, fols. 1-5, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 25 April 1784.
58. Hauptmann and McLester, Onedia Indian Journey, 10.
59. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 25 February 1786, Add. J, fols. 24-35.
60. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add. J, fols. 276-298.

61. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 25 February 1786, Add. J, fols. 24–35.
62. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. E, fols. 22–39.
63. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, fols. 183–188, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 13 December 1784.
64. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 21 March 1785, Add. J, fol. 277.
65. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 13 December 1784, Add. H, fol. 219.
66. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. A, fol. 15.
67. For Temple: HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 25 February 1786, Add. Z, fols. 148–149.
68. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 10 September 1785, Add. K, fols. 225–228.
69. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 19 June 1786, Add. C, fols. 237–240.
70. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, Add. BB, fols. 341–345.
71. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 12 September 1786, Add. O, fols. 401–404.
72. See Temple's reports in *Bowdoin and Temple Papers*, vols. 1–3; Müller, "Swedish-American Trade," 173–188. Hans Schlitter published Beelen's reports, as *Die Berichte des ersten Agenten Österreichs in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1891). Schlitter heavily edited the correspondence and chose selected reports from the collection, however. By my calculations he published the following fractions: K.182a (31%), K. 182b (41%), K. 182c (32%), K. 182d (29%), K. 182e (15%).
73. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, fols. 292–295, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 20 October 1785.
74. Thus rendering Schlitter's edition more incomplete, see Houtte, "American Commercial Conditions," 567–578.
75. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, fols. 313–320, Beelen to Kaunitz, 18 October 1785.
76. Proposals of Cazier, Deplancq and Müllendorf in Starhemberg to Kaunitz, 12 April and 6 May 1783 in HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 270, fols. 34 and 126 respectively.
77. The committee reports are HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, fols. 1–135.
78. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, fols. 49–96, 'Rapport du Committee sur les Deux Reports de Beelen en Philadelphie,' 16 September 1784.
79. AST, DB, Serie VII, C.75, fol. 58 'Comunicazione del Governo per la nomina del Barone di Bellen a Consigliere di Commercio presso di Congresso Americano.'; AST, DB, Serie VII, C.127, fol.13 'Trasmissione del Governo delle tabelle inviate dal consiglieri Barone de Beelen, dei prezzi delle merci in Filadelfia.'; FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, K. 904, fols. 1245, 1272–1278, 1299; FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Litorale, Akten, Generalia, K. 850, fols. 886–890; FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Böhmen, Akten, K. 1205, Teil III – Vorträge, fols. 708–709.
80. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. L, fols. 171–176.

81. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 13 December 1784, Add. G, fols. 207–218; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182c, Report, 19 June 1786, Add. B, fols. 235–236.
82. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 14 November 1784, Add. A, fols. 114–120.
83. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. O, fols. 59–64; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 12 February and 13 September 1784.
84. Incontrera, Trieste e l'America, 124; Codignola, *Le prime relazioni*, 25–38.
85. Pühringer-Gräf, 'Reyer, Franz Thaddäus von,' *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, 21 (2003), 482.
86. Coons, Steamships, Statesmen, and Bureaucrats, 6–9.
87. Righettini and Serera to Beelen, 23 February 1787 in HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182d, Report, 24 May 1787, Add. M, fols. 110–118.
88. HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182d, Report, 24 May 1787, Add. M, fols. 110–118.
89. Wurzbach, *Biographisches Lexikon*, 54:23–26; Adler, *Political Economy in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 213.
90. Quoted in Ingenhouz to Franklin, 26 February 1783, PBF, 39:188–189.
91. Ingenhouz to Franklin, 8 April 1783, PBF, 39:444–446.
92. Franklin to Ingenhouz, 16 May 1783, PBF, 40:8–13.
93. Donath was born to Anton Donath and Anna Catharina Hübner in St. Georgenthal (today Jiřetín pod Jedlovou) in northern Bohemia. He studied at Prague from 1772 to 1775 and entered the civil service in Vienna. His personal papers are at the University of Pennsylvania, Kislak Special Collections, Misc. Manuscripts, Box 6 'Donath Manuscripts.' For his freemasonry: HHStA, KA, VA, K. 70, Nos. 4 & 5, 8 and 13 July 1783, fols. 52–57.
94. Donath seems to have worked for the firm *Kohler & Kern* according to his letter to Steinský, dated 19 April 1790 in Archiv Národního muzea Praha [ANM], Fond Steinský.
95. Ingenhouz to Franklin, 23 June 1783, PBF, 40:216–217. Weinbrenner's letter is missing.
96. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. P, fols. 65–66.
97. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. P, fol. 65.
98. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 25 April 1784, Add. P, fol. 66. The report Donath carried was entitled "Nota über die Musterkarte," but it is missing.
99. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182a, Report, 14 November 1784, Add. L, fols. 171–176.
100. APS, Franklin Paper Series, 8, Mss.B.F85, XXXIV, 161, Donath to Franklin, 27 October 1786.
101. See the family burial plot in the graveyard of St. Mary's Catholic Church, Philadelphia.
102. APS, Mss.Ms.Coll.200, Journal of Bee-Keeping at Spring Mill (1787–1788); Singerton, "A Bumbling Beekeeper from Bohemia."
103. Hagley Library and Museum, Accession no. 38, *Donath & Co.* Letterbooks, 1801–1802; A. McElroy, *Philadelphia Directory for 1839* (Philadelphia, 1839), 65; Winterthur Museum, Delaware, Bernard M. Bloomfield Papers.

104. LA PNP, Fonds F. A. Steinského 1760–1811, Donath to Steinský, 20 July 1792.
105. ‘Observations concernant la Correspondance du Gouvernement des Pais Bas Autrichiens avec le Conseiller de Commerce Baron de Beelen depuis l’arrivée de celui-ci en Amérique en 1783 jusqu’à la fin de 1787,’ 24 April 1788 in HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Rapport au Beelen, fols. 39–90r.
106. Proli to Henri de Crumpipen, 10 February 1788 in HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Rapport au Beelen, fol. 19.
107. Ibid., fol. 20.
108. HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Rapport au Beelen, Appendix B, fol. 32.
109. Proli to Henri de Crumpipen, 10 February 1788 in HHStA, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Rapport au Beelen, fol. 20.
110. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, fols. 256-259, Beelen to Ferdinand von Trauttmansdorff, 28th September 1788.
111. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, fols. 11–18.
112. De Dorlodot, “*Analysis*,” 5.
113. In February 1785, Colonel Jean-Pierre Ransonnet wrote to Pierre de Reuss, assistant to then Secretary of War De Crumpipen, upon his return home to Liège from Pennsylvania. Ransonnet had travelled to the United States in order to surveil Beelen’s mission. In his report, he noted how Beelen had invested in Pennsylvanian land and included a general prospectus aimed at enticing European investment and migrants. ARB, CAPB, 303, Ransonnet to Reuss, 8 February 1785.
114. The main habitation became known as “the castle” and the area today is known as Barons Mills. De Dorlodot, “*Analysis*,” 5; Young, “The Baron de Beelen-Bertholff,” 4.
115. The Hellam deeds are contained within Gazzam, History of Gazzam Family, 61–65. Young, “Beelen-Bertholff,” 4; Andes, “Honey Brook’s only nobleman,” 347–348. Address 2301 South Forrest, York PA is the likely location of Beelen’s last home.
116. York County Historical Society Collections, Lewis Miller, *Chronicles of York, 1790–1870*, 2 vols.
117. Gazzam, History of Gazzam Family, 65.
118. York County Archives, Administration Accounts and Inventory of Baron de Beelen-Bertholff.
119. Young, “Beelen-Bertholff,” 5. Originally the chapel honoured the Beelens with a burial inside near the altar, but at some point, the slab was relocated outside; their bones still rest somewhere beneath the chapel floor.
120. Benna, “Österreichs erste diplomatische Vertretung,” 215–240.

Chapter 9

1. Adams to Jefferson, 20 March 1826, Thomas Jefferson Retirement Series – Early Access, *Founders Online*, National Archives: <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-5970> (December 2016).

2. Jefferson to Adams, 30 March 1826, *ibid.*, <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-5995> (December, 2016).

3. Jefferson's role has been acknowledged by Burnett, "Note on American Negotiations," 579–587; Houtte, "American Negotiations with Austria," 567–578; Benna, *Contemporary Austrian Views*, 12; Schlitter, *Beziehungen*; Friebe, "*Österreich und die Vereinigten Staaten*," 81–88.

4. The most famous popular depiction is of course the James Ivory film *Jefferson in Paris* (1995) and his infatuation with Maria Cosway is most recently examined by Kukla, *Mr. Jefferson's Women*. Jefferson's period in Paris is well covered but not exclusively from a foreign policy perspective, see Kimball, *Jefferson: The Scene in Europe*; Rice, *Thomas Jefferson's Paris*; Adams, *The Paris Years*; Wilson and Stanton, *Jefferson Abroad* among others. The best account of Jefferson's foreign policy in Paris remains Woolery, *The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy* which highlighted that Jefferson's period as minister plenipotentiary in France witnessed "the highest point of technical service that he performed for the United States." (p. 65). The best overview of Jefferson's diplomacy is now Francis D. Cogliano, *Emperor of Liberty*.

5. Beales, *Joseph II*, 2:397. Beales's Chapter 11 (pp. 373–402) in this biography is one of the best summaries in English of Habsburg foreign policy under Joseph II but as Michael Hochedlinger notes "there is no satisfying treatment of Habsburg foreign policy concepts in the second half of the eighteenth century," in his *Austria's Wars of Emergence*, 374–375.

6. Arneth and Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy Argen-teau*, 1:165.

7. Nakhimovsky, "Vattel's Theory of the International Order," 157–173; Holland, "The Moral Person of the State," 438–445.

8. The idea of a *jus gentium* or "law of nations" harkened back to Roman legal conventions in the western juridical tradition. It was a customary expression of natural rights (*jus naturale*) which governed the interaction of members within a system between different *gentes* or peoples and nations. In sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the devastation and instability of confessional wars drove Europeans to reigniting ideals of international conduct. One of the leading theorists was Christian Wolff who applied the novelties of empiricism and logic to the function of international relations and derived the *jus gentium* as a moral imperative of states as part of their natural and sacred power. An influential disciple of Wolff was the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel, whose ideas expanded upon Wolff's ideas and sought to define the reasonable limits of territoriality of states. Though influential, Vattel's propagation of Wolff was by no means universally accepted by the late eighteenth century, see Stapelbroek, "Universal Society, Commerce and the Rights of Neutral Trade," 63–89.

9. Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire*, 2:13–14; Wilson, *The Meaning of Empire in Central Europe around 1800*, 22–42; see also Tanner, *The Last Descendant of Aeneas*.

10. The Holy Roman Emperor acknowledged the imperial dignity of the Russian Tsar in 1742 but the issue had been a thorny one for some time, see Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe*, 44–46 and Wilson, *Heart of Europe*, 153–155. For the dispute with Persia, see the sixteenth-century complaints of imperial ambassadors at the Ottoman court at Constantinople in Stoyanova, *The Benefits and Limits of Permanent Diplomacy*, 152–171. The imperative to still outrank France after Napoleon's self-proclamation as an emperor and his coronation sanctified by the presence of the Pope forced Francis II to elevate the dignity of the Austrian realms in 1804 to an imperial level, see Wilson, "Bolstering the Prestige of the Habsburgs," 722–724.

11. Adams to President of Congress, 4 August 1779, PJA, 8:108–120.

12. Adams to James Warren, 12 April 1783, PJA, 14:401–402; Lee to Adams, 18 February 1783, PJA, 276–277.

13. Vucinich, *Dubrovnik and the American Revolution*, 1–23.

14. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 26 February 1783, PBF, 39:217–222.

15. ASF, AdS, *Affari Esteri*, no. 2335, fols. 372–373; fol. 377; fols. 383–384, Favi to Piccolomini, 20, 27 January and 3 February 1783, respectively.

16. Adams was mistaken: "[Dana] has a Commission which Authorises him to treat with the Emperor, as well as with all the other Powers, who compose the Armed Neutrality," in Adams to Lee, 23 February 1783, PJA, 14:290–291.

17. Adams to Dana, 22 February 1783, PJA, 14:285–287. It seems Dana did not correspond with Cobenzl, see the Dana Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society and Cresson, Francis Dana.

18. Dana to Adams, 16/27 March 1783, PJA, 14:368–369. Dates reflect the Gregorian and Julian calendars.

19. ARB, SEG, 2162, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Starhemberg, 19 April 1783. A few days prior, Mercy-d'Argenteau had asked Franklin for passports for the botanical mission led by Franz Joseph Märter, see Mercy-d'Argenteau to Franklin, 12 April 1783, PBF, 39:474–475.

20. HHStA, Belgien, *Korrespondenz Frankreich*, K. 33, Starhemberg to Mercy, 9 April 1783.

21. Lee to Adams, 18 February 1783, PJA, 14:276–277.

22. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 8 April 1783, PBF, 39:444–446.

23. Adams to Dana, 1 May 1783, PJA, 14:464–465. The only mention Adams made between May and July was to James Warren: "The Emperor has an Inclination to treat with Us but the House of Austria never makes the first Advances," Adams to Warren, 12 April 1783, PJA, 14:401–402.

24. Adams to Livingston, 3 July 1783, PJA, 15:76–81.

25. Mercy-d'Argenteau inherited estates from his natural father and foster father. For details of the familial estates, see LoC, *Mercy-d'Argenteau Estate Papers*.

26. The dinner took place on 9 August 1783, but Adams did not go. Adams to Livingston, 13 August 1783, PJA, 15:220–223.

27. Adams to Livingston, 13 July 1783, PJA, 15:106–109.
28. Bauer, “With Friends Like These,” 664–692.
29. Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, 8:95.
30. Adams to Livingston, 14 July 1783, PJA, 15:109–111; Beales, Joseph II, 2:376–384.
31. Adams to Livingston, 14 July 1783, PJA, 15:110–111.
32. Franklin to Livingston, 22–26 July 1783, PBF, 40:355–370.
33. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 8 April 1783, PBF, 39:444–446.
34. Franklin to Livingston, 22–26 July 1783, PBF, 40:355–370.
35. Hunt, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, 25:754.
36. A continual problem that year, see Franklin’s complaint in Franklin to Livingston, 15 April 1783, PBF, 39:467–472.
37. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Notenwechsel, K. 13, Mercy-d’Argenteau to Kaunitz, 1 October 1783.
37. William Temple Franklin to Adams, 1 August 1784, PJA, 16:287–288n1. The existent copy of Franklin’s letter held in the HHStA was presented by Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl to the Library of Congress, see “Manuscripts,” *Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*, 10, no. 3 (1953), 162.
38. Mercy-d’Argenteau to Franklin, 20 July 1783, PBF, 42:73.
39. HHStA, StK, Frankreich Berichte, K. 169, Mercy-d’Argenteau to Kaunitz, 1 August 1784.
40. The treaty came into full effect in May 1784.
41. HHStA, StK, Vorträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Kaunitz, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 15 August 1784.
42. HHStA, StK, Vorträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Kaunitz, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 15 August 1784.
43. Kaunitz had studied Wolff under his tutor Johann Friedrich von Schwanau, see Klingenstein, *Der Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz*, 169–171.
44. HHStA, StK, Vorträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Kaunitz, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 15 August 1784.
45. HHStA, StK, Vorträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Kaunitz, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 15 August 1784.
46. See marginalia on HHStA, StK, Vorträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Kaunitz, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 15 August 1784.
47. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria, 151–165.
48. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 167, Kaunitz to Mercy-d’Argenteau, 4 September 1784.
49. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 167, Kaunitz to Mercy-d’Argenteau, 4 September 1784.
50. HHStA, StK, Notenwechsel, Hofkanzlei, K. 13, [Kaunitz] Nota an die Vereinigte Hofkanzlei, 4 September 1784.

51. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 52, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 5 September 1784. Starhemberg received the largely ceremonial position as *Obersthofmeister* (Grand Master of the Household) when he returned to Vienna.

52. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 169, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 25 September 1784.

53. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 169, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 25 September 1784.

54. HHStA, StK, Verträge betreffende Akten, K. 2 (1747/1751–1784) – 3, Konvolut 2 'B' 1784, Letter of Mercy-d'Argenteau, s.d.

55. Commissioners to President of Congress, 11 November 1784, PTJ, 7:493–500.

56. Drafts of the treaty have been identified first by Van Houtte in the ARB and Hans Schlitter in the HHStA: see Van Houtte, "American Negotiations with Austria," and Schlitter, *Beziehungen*, 175–183. A copy of the preliminary treaty drawn up by Cazier here is contained within HHStA, StK, Verträge betreffende Akten, K. 2–3, Fol. C, along with the comments by Antonio Songa, possibly by Kaunitz (unidentified hand), and possibly by Karl von Zinzendorf. There are a total of three drafts found to date, ranging from 27 stipulations to 25 stipulations (with 5 extraordinary) to 24 stipulations (with 2 extraordinary). I believe the ARB holds the final treaty draft finalised in 1786, contrary to Van Houtte's suggestion of HHStA, Belgien, "DD Vorträge, K. 13." I have been unable to verify this, however.

57. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 52, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 20 November 1784.

58. Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 21 June 1785, PTJ, 8:241.

59. Gordon-Reed and Onuf, *Most Blessed of the Patriarchs*, 97–134.

60. Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy," 592. For Jefferson's agrarian vision, see Harrison, "Thomas Jefferson and Internal Improvement," 335–349; Sofka, "American Neutral Rights Reappraised" 599–622. For the primacy of this strategy, see Kaplan, *Entangling Alliances with None*; Ben-Atar, *The Origins of Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy*; Gilje, "Commerce and Conquest," 735–770.

61. Jefferson to Jay, 27 January 1786, PTJ, 9:233–236.

62. Cogliano, *Emperor of Liberty*, 10 and 79.

63. Horsman, *Diplomacy of the New Republic*, 110–120; Merritt, "Sectional Conflict and Secret Compromise," 117–171; Carroll, *A Good and Wise Measure*, 6–19; Gilje, *The Making of the American Republic*, 286–290.

64. Lafayette to Jefferson, 4 September 1784, PTJ, 8:478–480.

65. He wrote of the same audience to Washington, but much less than to Jefferson, see Lafayette to Washington, 3 September 1784, PGW, 3:224–225.

66. Jefferson to Adams, 24 September 1785, PJA, 17:466–470.

67. Jefferson to Jay, 6 October 1785, PTJ, 8:592–593.

68. Lafayette to Jefferson, 4 September 1784, PTJ, 8:480.

69. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 167, Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 1 October 1784.

70. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 171, fol. 90–91, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 18 October 1784.

71. Jefferson's tour of northern and southern France as well as the northern Italian states took place in 1787, see Kimball, *Jefferson: The Scene of Europe*, 184–235.

72. Jefferson supposed Congress could have no objections to renew them, or perhaps to send some person to Brussels to negotiate the matter there, see Jefferson to Adams, 12 January 1786 [First letter], PTJ, 9:165–167. Mercy-d'Argenteau agreed, see HHStA, StK, Berichte, K. 171, fols. 4–7, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 9 January 1786; HHStA, StK, Berichte, K. 171, fols. 90–91, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 18 October 1785; and HHStA, StK, Berichte, K. 171, fols. 34–36, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 31 January 1786.

73. Jefferson to Adams, 12 January 1786 [Second letter], PTJ, 9:167.

74. Jefferson to Adams, 12 January 1786 [First letter], PTJ, 9:166.

75. Jefferson to Adams, 7 February 1786, PTJ, 9:258–260.

76. Adams to Jefferson, 28 January 1786, PTJ, 9:238. Original emphasis.

77. Shackelford, *Jefferson's Travels in Europe*, 43–64.

78. Jefferson to Jay, 12 May 1786, PTJ, 9:514–516.

79. HHStA StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 171, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 12 February [Hornung] 1786.

80. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 170, Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 19 February [Hornung] 1786. Kaunitz had received the responses from the regional chancelleries that month, see HHStA, StK, Notenwechsel, Hofkanzlei, K. 108, *Noten von der Hofkanzlei*, 31 March 1786 and HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 142, Kaunitz, *Vortrag an der Kaiser*, 22 March 1786.

81. HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Weisungen, K. 55, Kaunitz to Belgiojoso, 22 March 1786; HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Weisungen, K. 170, Kaunitz to Mercy-d'Argenteau, 22 March 1786; HHStA, Belgien, DDA, Berichte, K. 198, Belgiojoso received confirmation on 1 April 1786; Belgiojoso forwarded his confirmation to Mercy-d'Argenteau on 13 May 1786, see HHStA, Belgien, DDA, *Korrespondenz Frankreich*, K. 38.

82. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K. 171, fols. 19–20, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 20 August 1786. The earlier report is missing.

83. Jefferson to Monroe, 10 May 1786, PTJ, 9:499–504.

84. HHStA, Belgien, Berichte, DDB Rot, K. 182c, fols. 1–4, Beelen to Belgiojoso, 25 February 1786.

85. HHStA, StK, Frankreich, Berichte, K.173, Mercy-d'Argenteau to Kaunitz, 20 August 1786.

86. Historian Csaba Lévai concludes Jefferson's ideas on political economy and the commercial utility were his biggest motivators at this time, see Lévai, *Efforts to Establish Political and Commercial Relations*, 111–126; Lévai, “Van esély a nyitásra a császár részéről,” 20–48.

87. Reeves, "The Prussian-American Treaties," 475–510 is the most important account of the commercial treaty between the Kingdom of Prussia and the United States alongside Kapp, Friedrich der Grosse, 86–150.

88. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," 495 and 498.

89. A series of toleration measures issued between 1781 and 1787 removed the obstacles for non-Catholics to worship more freely in society and to participate to a greater extent in industry but under certain conditions. Protestants, for example, could construct prayer houses but nothing exactly like a church and they could not conduct weddings. Jews were allowed into commercial professions but lost autonomy on taxation, judicial matters, and schools, meaning they had to send their children to state secondary schools and educate them in German-language primary schools. All Jews had to adopt surnames and were eligible for military conscription following the 1782 Edict of Toleration. See O'Brien, "Ideas of Religious Toleration," 5–80; Karniel, *Toleranzpolitik*.

90. For Joseph's enlightened reforms, see Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform*, 227–255; Dickson, "Reshaping of the Austrian Church," 89–114. For Jefferson and religion, see Onuf, *The Mind of Thomas Jefferson*, 139–168; Gordon-Reed and Onuf, *Most Blessed of the Patriarchs*, 267–299.

91. Jefferson to Madison, 8 December 1784, PTJ, 7:557–560; Jefferson to Monroe, 10 December 1784, PTJ, 7:562–565.

92. Jay to Henry Knox, 10 December 1781 in Johnson, *Correspondence and Public Papers*, 2:159–161.

93. Gouverneur Morris to Jay, 25 September 1783 in Johnson, *Correspondence and Public Papers*, 3:85–89.

94. Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee, 12 July 1785, PTJ, 8:286–288; Jefferson to Ezra Stiles, 17 July 1785, PTJ, 8:298–301.

95. Jefferson to Horatio Gates, 13 December 1784, PTJ, 8:571.

96. Jefferson to James Currie, 27 September 1785, PTJ, 8:558–560.

97. Jefferson to John Page, 20 August 1785, PTJ, 8:417–419.

98. Jefferson to Madison, 8 December 1784, PTJ, 7:557–560; Jefferson to Monroe, 10 December 1784, PTJ, 7:562–565.

99. Jefferson to Washington, 10 December 1784, PTJ, 7:566–567.

100. Blanning, "'That Horrid Electorate' or 'Ma Patrique Germanique'?" 311–344.

101. Jefferson to Page, 20 August 1785, PTJ, 8:417–419; Jefferson to James Monroe, 28 August 1785, PTJ, 8:444–446.

102. Thomas Jefferson to Page, 20 August 1785, PTJ, 8:444–446.

103. Murphy, Vergennes, 405–416.

104. Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, 13 January 1785, PTJ, 7:602–603.

105. Jefferson to Charles Thomson, 21 June 1785, PTJ, 8:245–246; Jefferson to Madison, 18 March 1785, PTJ, 8:38–41.

106. Jefferson to Franklin, 5 October 1785, PTJ, 8:585–586.

107. Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee, 30 August 1778 in Idzerda et al, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:135.

108. Jefferson to Seward, 12 November 1785, PTJ, 9:27–28.
 109. Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, 13 September 1786, PTJ, 10:362–363.
 110. Jefferson to Ingenhousz, 14 July 1785, PTJ, 8:295; ‘supplemental documents,’ PTJ, 27:749.
 111. Franklin to Jefferson, 11 July 1785, PTJ, 8:282.
 112. Von Hase, “Eine amerikanische Kritik,” 372–393.
 113. Diary entry, 20 October 1785 in Dávila, ed., *Archivo del General Miranda: Viajes, Diarios 1750–1785*, 1:428.
 114. Klingenstein, *Lessons for Republicans*, 181–212. I am grateful to Prof. Klingenstein for providing me with a copy.

Epilogue

1. McDonald, “Constructing Optimism,” 182.
2. Wilson, Jefferson on Display, 224–225.
3. One reason why Jefferson preferred Bohemian glass was for its “stout” quality of thickness which suited the exposed hill-top location of Monticello, see Jefferson to Donath, 4 December 1796, PTJ, 29:212–213.
4. For his orders, see Jefferson to Donath, 16 November 1792, 12 August 1795, 16 September 1795, 2 October 1796, 9 October 1807, in PTJ, 24:622; 28:436; 28:469; 29:187 respectively; and via “Early Access, Founders Online”. There are also multiple mentions of Donath’s payments in Jefferson’s Memorandum books and his Remodelling Notebook.
5. Hagley Library and Museum, Donath Letterbooks, vol. 2, fol. 162, Donath to H. van der Juissen, 11 August 1804.
6. Friebel, “*Österreich und die Vereinigten Staaten*”; Curti, “Austria and the United States,” 137–206; Davis, “*Diplomatic Relations*.”
7. LoC, Henry Latrobe Papers, Box 3 ‘Correspondence relating to the Capitol,’ vol. 1, Latrobe to Donath, 4 October 1803 and 19 September 1805; Latrobe to Donath, 4 October 1803 and 19 September 1805, in Carter et al, *Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe*, fiches 26 and 44.
8. Andreozzi, *From the Black Sea to the Americas*, 79–81.
9. HHStA, Belgien, DDB, Rot. K. 182d, Report, 27 November 1787, Add. K, fol. 267; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Report, 27 December 1788, Add. N, fol. 346; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Report, 27 March 1789, Add. L, fols. 373–375; HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182e, Report, 22 June 1789, Add. L, fols. 435–437.
10. Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Familienarchiv Trauttmansdorff, Fürst Ferdinand, K. 276, fol. 89, Maximilien de Beelen-Bertholff to Count Ferdinand von Trauttmansdorff, 31 March 1789.
11. HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Notenwechsel, Hofkammer, K. 8, fols. 310–312.
12. FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Littoral, K. 984, (Second) Application of Mussi, fols. 827–832; FHKA, NHK, Kommerz Littoral, K. 984, Application of Franz von Silbernagel, fols. 835–852.

13. Codignola, *Blurred Nationalities*, 71. Cf. Phelps, *U.S.-Habsburg Relations*, 113 and Agstner, *Austria (-Hungary) and Its Consulates*, 71, who both mistake John Lamson as the first US consul in Trieste. Lamson had been appointed in 1799 but was absent from his duties and much delayed in getting to Trieste. He arrived at the end of 1801, but Jefferson replaced him with William Rigg in 1802.

14. The *Sukey* arrived in February 1800, see Stock, *Trieste e l'America nascente*, 15.

15. HHStA, StK, Vorträge, K. 168, VI-IX, fol. 108, Vortrag an den Kaiser, 26 June 1804.

16. Agstner, *Austria (-Hungary) and Its Consulates*, 73-77.

17. Agstner, *Austria(-Hungary) and Its Consulates*, 77-87.

18. HHStA, StK, Brasilien, Berichte, K. 1-9, "Instruktionen an Graf Eltz" (1817).

19. The first Swiss consul took office in Philadelphia in 1816, see Schnyder, "Das schweizerische Konsularwesen," 37.

20. HHStA, StK, Brasilien, K. 1-6, "Mémoire von A. E. Perez betreffend Handel mit Brasilien" (1818); Agstner, *Consulates South of the Rio Grande*, 87.

21. Singerton, "Empires on the Edge," 217-220.

22. For example: *Ungarische Staats- und Gelehrte Nachrichten*, no. 12, 10 February 1787; *Gazette van Gend*, 13 August and 5 November 1787.

23. Adams to Mazzei, 29 December 1785 in Idzerda et al, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:509.

24. O'Reilly, *Competition for Colonists*.

25. BL, Add. MS. 35539, fol. 1, Keith to Carmarthen, 3 August 1787.

26. HHStA, Belgium, DDB, Rot, K. 182c, Report, 25 February 1786, Add. E, fol. 49n.

27. Adams to Mazzei, 15 December 1785 in Idzerda et al, *Mazzei: Selected Writings*, 1:504.

28. Ingenhousz to Franklin, 1 September 1783, PBF, 40:562-563; APS, Franklin Papers, VIII, 33, 115, Franklin to Ingenhousz, 29 April 1785; Dimitrije Obradović, 210. I am grateful to Dr. Wladimir Fischer-Nebmaier for the latter information.

29. APS, Ms.B.F85, 7, LIX, 50, Count Friedrich Grävenitz[-Walhm] to Franklin, 26 June 1783. It appears Grävenitz-Walhm never made the journey.

30. HHStA, Belgien, DDA Berichte, K. 176, Songa to Starhemberg/Kaunitz, 8 February 1783.

31. HHStA, Belgien, DDB Rot, K. 182b, 'Emigration de Européens,' 14 November 1784, Add. G, fols. 159-160.

32. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*.

33. For accounts see Auner, *Bauernaufstandes in Siebenbürgen*; Edroiu, *Horea's Uprising*; Shapiro, "The Horea Rebellion," 65-93; Prodan, "Joseph II and Horea's Uprising," 135-144.

34. In 1744 a revolt led by Visarion Sarai and the Orthodox unrest between 1759-1761 led by Sofronie of Cioara (Stan Popovici). See Hitchins, *History of Romania*, 61.

35. Brissot, *Seconde lettre d'un défenseur du peuple*, 50.

36. *Ibid.*, 79.

37. *Ibid.*, 16-19 and 87.

38. Ibid., frontispiece.
39. Quoted from Beales, Joseph II, 2:477.
40. Palmer, Democratic Revolutions, 1:341.
41. Venturi, End of the Old Regime, 2:711.
42. Davis, Joseph II, 246–260.
43. Smeyers, *De Amerikaanse vrijheidsoorlog*, 153–163; Gorman, America and Belgium, 32–35.
44. KU Leuven Main Library Tabularium Politiek – België 23/3/1787-13/12/1787, (Leuven, Belgium), 3, D’Outrepont, Considérations, 11, 21–22, and 32. I am grateful to Dr. Jane Judge for providing me with a copy.
45. D’Outrepont, Considérations, 14.
46. Schlitter, Regierung Josefs II, 1:223.
47. All quoted in Gorman, America and Belgium, 153–154; Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, 55.
48. Kaunitz to Joseph, 20 June 1787 in Schlitter, Regierung Josefs, 1:249.
49. Polasky, “Traditionalists, Democrats, and Jacobins,” 227–262.
50. Vercruysse, “Révolution Brabançonne,” 1098–1108.
51. Georg Forster, the explorer-botanist resident in Vienna, used the phrase in print, see Forster, *Ansichten vom Niederrhein*, 194. For the name otherwise, see Gorman, America and Belgium, 176–190.
52. Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, 94–95.
53. Antoine d’Aubremez, a wine merchant, had fought out in America whereas Jean-André van der Mersch had not successfully found a way to fight for the patriots, although he was nicknamed “*Washington Belgique*” during this time. See Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, 102 and Judge, The United States of Belgium, 125.
54. Judge, The United States of Belgium, 214–219.
55. Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, 120.
56. Judge, The United States of Belgium, 164–195.
57. Quoted in Balázs, Hungary and the Habsburgs, 262.
58. Balázs, Hungary and the Habsburgs, 262.
59. August von Schlözer, *Staatsanzeigen* quoted in Rényi, *A századforduló (18.-19. század) Angliája*, 199–215; Lévai, *In between and within Great Powers*, 129–141.
60. Szakály, *Managing a Composite Monarchy*, 205–220.
61. Balázs, Reformpolitikus, 145.
62. Lévai, *Within Two Systems*, 41.
63. Nagyváthy, *A Nagy-szivüségénél* (1790) quoted in Závodovsky, American Effects, 46.
64. Katona, “American Influences,” 15. Katona cites Benda, *A Magyar jakobinus mozgalom iratai*, 1:46–49. He relied upon an extensive Viennese network, including the editor of the *Wienerisches Diarium*, Conrad Dominik Bartsch, to source his Americana, see, HHStA, KA, VA, Correspondentiae Heinoczianae, K. 48-1, especially, Bartsch to Hajnóczy, 12 May 1789, fol. 193.

65. Kókay, *Hajnóczy József és Széchenyi Ferenc Kapcsolata*, 91.
66. Závodovsky, *American Effects*, 41–42.
67. Závodovsky, *American Effects*, 44.
68. Palmer and Kenez, “Two Documents,” 423–442.
69. Martinovics, “Beobachtungen über geheime demokratische Verbindungen in Wien von 21ten bis 26ten Jänner 1792,” in Benda, *Magyar jakobinusok iratai*, 1:578–586.
70. Benda, *Jakobinusok*, 454–468, 700, and 788.
71. Martinovics, *A Magyarország gyűlésben egyben-gyűlt méltóságos és tekintetes nemes rendekhez 1790-ik esztendőben tartatott beszéd*; Benda, *Magyar jakobinusok iratai*, 1:125; 144.
72. “Ad normam pensylvanorum” and “Adora Philadelphiae coetum” in Benda, *Magyar jakobinusok iratai*, 1:125 and 147.
73. These were called the “Society of the Reformers” and “Society of Liberty-Equality-Fraternity.”
74. “A True Patriot” [Martinovics], *Felhívás Zemplén megye egybegyűlt rendeihez hogy rázzák le az ausztriai ház igáját* (1794).
75. Singerton, “Knowledge of and Sympathy for the American cause,” 139.
76. Such was the case with József Péczeli, *Summarium Retenioris Europaeae a Detectione Americae ad Revolutionem Gallicum* (Debrecen, 1827). According to Katona, the line about an American standing army was censored, see Katona, “Hungarian Image,” 27n36.
77. Martinovics had informed on Verhovacz’s ownerships of Paine’s *Droit de l’Homme* in his Zagreb library which he allegedly used to teach seminary students, see Fraknoi, *Martinovics élete*, 253 for the information and for Verhovacz’s notes, see Benda, *Magyar jakobinusok iratai*, 2:796–797. For the others, see Benda, *Magyar jakobinusok iratai*, 2:279, 359, and 705.
78. Csokonai to Sándor Bessenyei, s.d. [1795], in Balázs, *Csokonai Vitéz Mihály minden munkája*, 2:809–810.
79. Csokonai to Countess Mária Erdődy (née Festetics), 19 May 1803, in Debreczeni, *Levelezés*, 263.
80. Lévai, *Within Two Systems*, 42.
81. Lévai, *The Relevance of the American Revolution*, 112.
82. Halácsy, “Franklin in Hungary,” 14.
83. Vizsota, “Gróf Széchenyi István a gimnaziumban,” 915; Gál, “Széchenyi and the U.S.A.,” 95–119.
84. Szilassy, “America and the Hungarian Revolution,” 180–96; Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd*, 115–116.
85. Komlos, *Louis Kossuth in America*; Johnson, “*Magyar*-mania in New York City,” 237–249.
86. Peruta, *Milano nel Risorgimento*, 132.
87. Körner, *America in Italy*, 130–138.
88. For comparison of the 1849 Krensier constitutional draft and the American constitution see, Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, 418 and Murad, *Franz Joseph*, 130. For

Aurel Popovici and his plan of a United States of Greater Austria, see Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich*, and its inspiration (among others) from the American model, see Gusejnova, *European Elites and Ideas of Empire*, 74.

89. Brauneder, *America's Influence*, 673–681. More generally, Fröschl, *Amerika in den Verfassungsdiskussionen*, 43–44; Angermann, “Frühkonstitutionalismus und das amerikanische Vorbild,” 1–32.

90. Walter, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung*, Part II, 5:12, no. 3a.

91. ANM, Fond Steinský, Donath to Steinský, 19 April 1790. See also Petráňová, “Z korespondence Františka Steinského,” 101–112. For a full transcription and more analysis of the Donath-Steinský correspondence, see Singerton, “Science, Revolution, and Monarchy,” 145–164.

92. LA PNP, Fonds F. A. Steinského 1760–1811, Donath to Steinský, 20 July 1792.

93. Det Kongelige Bibliotek, NKS 1698-2, Münster Arkiv, Letter 328, Maria Bassegli [von Born] to Friedrich Münster.

94. Sturmberger, *Amerika-Auswanderung aus Oberösterreich*, 65.

95. Barany, “The Interest of the United States in Central Europe,” 298.

96. *Ibid.*, 283. Translation mine.

97. Glant, “A Hungarian Aristocrat in Civil War America,” 287–301.

98. Around 47,450 migrants emigrated via Trieste between 1870–1900 and seven per cent of all Austrian immigrants to the US went via Trieste between 1907–1912. See Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 80; Boyd, “Initiating Mass Movement,” 36. For the millions of transatlantic migrants from the Habsburg lands to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Steidl, *On Many Routes*, 20–21 and 101–162.

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The Archives of the Robert E. Lee Memorial Foundation
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